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When in 1929 the world economy went into crisis, a new approach to international trade and 
finance appeared on the scene. Characterised by bilateralism, protectionism and autarchy, this 
approach challenged the idea of liberal free trade. Its main proponents were Nazi Germany 
and Fascist Italy. This thesis is about the role of economic factors in the German-Italian 
rapprochement under the banner of the fascism. 
 The analysis looks with an institutional approach at three levels: the formulation of 
foreign economic policies, the implementation by governments, and the execution at the level 
of businesses. Not only is the bilateral German-Italian commercial relationship analysed, but 
also co-operation and rivalries between German and Italian government officials, economic 
experts and business representatives in third-party markets, as well as international 
organisations (especially the League of Nations) dealing with the crisis. 
 The thesis shows that the “Rome-Berlin Axis”, which plunged Europe and the world 
into the disaster of World War II, was built on economic foundations with serious cracks. 
Admittedly, Germany’s and Italy’s mutual economic importance increased notably, while they 
foreclosed their markets to former trade partners (especially the US). However, the analysis of 
the institutions governing the trade and its detailed structure indicate without question that this 
rapprochement followed no economic logic. Germany needed political support for its 
revisionist plans for Europe and was willing to pay for it. 
 Nevertheless, in third-party markets no concessions were made. Especially in 
Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, Nazi Germany harvested what Fascist 
Italy had sown. To increase market shares, Berlin copied foreign economic policies, 
developed by the likewise financially strapped Italy. Opportunities for better economic 
collaboration were given away. Victims of the approach can be found in many areas (e.g., 
chemicals, cars, artificial fibres) and especially among cross-border business endeavours. The 
contradictions in the economic rapprochement of the interwar ultra-nationalistic regimes 
clearly demonstrate the limits of economic nationalism in a globalising world. 

Contents 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 1 
1. Setting the Research Agenda ..................................................................................................... 1 
2. Time Frame ............................................................................................................................... 5 
3. Historiography of the German-Italian Economic Relationship ................................................ 8 
4. Notes on Basic Concepts and Methodology ............................................................................ 20 
5. Structure and Empirical Basis................................................................................................. 28 
 
Chapter 1: Prologue – Framing the German-Italian Economic Relationship ........................................ 37 
1. From the Late Nineteenth Century to the 1920s ..................................................................... 37 
2. The Impact of the World Economic Crisis ............................................................................... 45 
3. Institutional Change in Foreign Trade .................................................................................... 57 
 
Part I: Becoming Partners? Bilateral Economic Rapprochement 1929-1936 ....................................... 65 
Chapter 2: Failing Attempts in the Reconstruction after the Crash ....................................................... 65 
Introduction: The Situation in 1929 ............................................................................................ 65 
1. New Initiatives after the End of the “Battaglia per la Economia” ......................................... 68 
2. Attempt No 1: The Spiral of Protectionism ............................................................................. 71 
3. Attempt No 2: Political Rhetoric without Action ..................................................................... 76 
4. Attempt No 3: “Foreign Exchange War” ................................................................................ 80 
Chapter 3: Political Will and Economic Realities after the Nazi Seizure of Power .............................. 93 
Introduction: Institutions of the Economic Relationship before and after 1933 ......................... 93 
1. Brothers in Mind Down to Business? ...................................................................................... 94 
2. Conflict over Artificial Fibres ............................................................................................... 103 
3. A New Nazi Foreign Economic Policy .................................................................................. 108 
4. The Clearing Agreement of 1934 ........................................................................................... 116 
Chapter 4: Continuing Conflicts and New Collaboration ................................................................... 121 
Introduction: From Hitler’s Seizure of Power to the Commercial “Axis” ................................ 121 
1. Evolving Institutions in the Commercial Sphere ................................................................... 122 
2. Industrial Co-operation ........................................................................................................ 130 
3. Changing Trade and the Devaluation of the Lira in 1936 .................................................... 136 
Conclusion Part I: The Economic Foundations of the “Rome-Berlin Axis” ....................................... 144 
 
Part II: Ambivalent Co-Ordination at the International Stage 1929-1933 ........................................... 149 
Chapter 5: The International Implications of the German-Italian Economic Relationship ................. 149 
Introduction: The Big Picture ................................................................................................... 149 
1. Towards Regionalism ............................................................................................................ 150 
2. Crisis and Opportunities in Southeastern Europe................................................................. 157 
3. The League of Nations’ Search for Economic Relief ............................................................. 164 
Chapter 6: Political Revisionism and International Economic Rescue ............................................... 171 
Introduction: Towards International Collaboration.................................................................. 171 
1. Intensifying Contact at the International Organisation ........................................................ 172 
2. Customs Unions – A Political Response to Economic Crisis ................................................ 180 
3. Second Effort: Commercial Preferences ............................................................................... 187 
Chapter 7: From International Co-Ordination to Confrontational Bilateralism .................................. 197 
Introduction: Circumventing International Opposition ............................................................ 197 
1. A Common Stance at the International Economic Conferences? .......................................... 198 
2. Hiding from International Responsibility .............................................................................. 206 
3. Hidden Preferences: The Brocchi Contracts ......................................................................... 214 
Conclusion Part II: The Triumph of Bilateralism ................................................................................ 221 
 
Part III: The Quest for New Markets 1933-1936 ................................................................................ 225 
Chapter 8: Hinterland/Retroterra – Entangled Economic Expansion in Southeastern Europe ........... 225 
Introduction: Economic Expansion after 1933 ......................................................................... 225 
1. Transfer of Commercial Policy ............................................................................................. 226 
2. Connecting Southeastern Europe with the World – Hamburg/Bremen vs. Trieste ................ 233 
3. Institutional Competition in Fascist Italy’s Best Market: Yugoslavia ................................... 244 
4. Collaboration among Equals or Subordination? .................................................................. 252 
Chapter 9: Beyond Europe – Co-operation and Rivalries in the Mare Nostrum ................................. 261 
Introduction: Separated Spaces? .............................................................................................. 261 
1. Joint Manoeuvres in Turkey .................................................................................................. 267 
2. Egypt – Commercial Expansion on Ideological Tailwind? ................................................... 275 
3. Italy’s Multiple Replacement through Nazi Germany’s Trade with Palestine ....................... 281 
4. Iraq’s oil ................................................................................................................................ 286 
 
Conclusion and Outlook ...................................................................................................................... 295 
 
Appendix ............................................................................................................................................. 307 
Sources ...................................................................................................................................... 307 
Literature .................................................................................................................................... 311 
Major Actors ............................................................................................................................. 337 
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................. 342 
 
Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Italy’s gold and foreign exchange (Divise) reserves (in million Lire) 1927-35 ........................ 6 
Table 2: German exports and reparations to Italy 1925-1931 (in million RM) ..................................... 91 
Table 3: Development of Germany’s and Italy’s balance of trade 1929-1937 .....................................112 
Table 4: German-Italian trade (percentage quotas on total trade and rank among trade partners)     
1929-1936 ................................................................................................................................. 144 
Table 5: Germany’s balance of trade with Italy 1929-1936 (million RM) .......................................... 145 
Table 6: Decrease of trade in Southeastern Europe 1928-1932 (in percentage quotas) ...................... 159 
Table 7: Germany’s and Italy’s trade with Southeastern Europe 1927-1930                            
(percentage quotas on total trade and balance of trade) ............................................................ 162 
Table 8: Wheat production in Western Europe 1926-1932 (in million quintal) .................................. 166 
Table 9: Germany’s wheat import 1928-1930 ..................................................................................... 188 
Table 10: Share of Italy’s major overseas trading partners (percentage quotas of total trade) ............ 215 
Table 11: Development of Germany’s and Italy’s trade with Southeastern Europe 1929-1936              
(in percentage quotas of total imports and exports) .................................................................. 260 
Table 12: Germany’s and Italy’s trade with the Eastern Mediterranean 1929-1937                               
(in percentage quotas of total imports and exports) .................................................................. 262 
Table 13: Egypt’s terms of trade 1931-1936 (1934 = 100) .................................................................. 276 
 
Figure 1: Contemporary description of the differing valuations of Italy’s foreign trade deficit          
1929-1936 (in million gold francs) ............................................................................................. 67 
Figure 2: Surplus and deficit of grain (wheat, barley, maize) production in 1930 .............................. 169 








To my parents 
Gudrun and Walter Tiedtke 





























1. Setting the Research Agenda 
    
      Italy’s most difficult commercial relationship is 
      with Germany. We are by far the strongest  
      competitor for the Italian industry; however, 
      among the customers of its agriculture we remain 
      fundamental and crucially important.1* 
 
It was thus that in November 1933 – Fascism had been since the Nazi seizure of power on the 
rise in crisis-shaken Europe – Germany’s consulate general in Milan, Italy’s industrial capital, 
summed up the current stage of their economic relationship. This thesis analyses how this 
seemingly paradoxical relationship, characterized simultaneously by fierce rivalries and 
increasing co-operation, evolved after the eruption of the crisis, developed throughout the 
depression, and intersected with the political rapprochement of National Socialist Germany 
and Fascist Italy. 
 In his analysis of the relationship between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, the British 
scholar Brian R. Sullivan characterised the “Rome-Berlin Axis” as a “path marked out by 
history”.2  However, historiography under the broad rubric of the “brutal friendship”3  has 
indicated already that the alliance of these dictators, who praised their common political 
features and shared expansionist destiny, was prone to mistrust. Regrettably, economic aspects 
have been neglected in the structural analysis of this relationship, which had fatal 
consequences for Europe and the world. Thus, as yet historiography has not provided an 
exhaustive interpretation of this alliance. 
This omission is surprising because economic factors played a crucial role in interwar 
international relations. World War I, an unprecedented “battle of materiel”,4 had shown the 
                                                 
1 GK Mailand to AA, 27 November 1933, PA-AA, R240.861. 
*All the Italian and German language quotes have been translated into English by the author. 
2 B.R. Sullivan, ʻThe path marked out by history. The German-Italian alliance 1939-1943ʼ, in J.R. Adelman, ed., 
Hitler and his allies in World War II (London, 2007), pp. 116-151. 
3 This interpretation of the relationship between National Socialism and Fascism was established by the classic 
and still-valuable study of F.W. Deakin, The brutal friendship. Mussolini, Hitler, and the fall of Italian fascism. 
(New York, 1962). 
4  J.R. Fear, ʻGerman Capitalismʼ, in T.K. McCraw, ed., Creating modern capitalism: How entrepreneurs, 
2 
world how the capacity to wage, and the potential to win a modern war, depended first and 
foremost on the economic might of the belligerents.5 Taking into account this legacy of the 
Great War, it is apparent why political elites of the interwar period shared such a vivid interest 
in the economy.6 In 1921, Walther Rathenau, a liberal philosopher of business ethics who was 
about to become Germany’s foreign minister, famously predicted that, “it is not politics that is 
our destiny, it is the economy”.7 Already the transition from war to peacetime economies had 
caused many conflicts over debt and reparations. For Hans Posse, head of the foreign trade 
department at the German ministry of economics, and therefore of eminent importance for 
this thesis,8 very frequently “political questions hide behind economic façades”.9 The 1929 
eruption of the world economic crisis subsequently inspired new forms of economic 
“regionalism”, which rose up against the idea of a globally integrated international economy. 
In this polarisation, even greater weight was attached to the importance of economic factors in 
international relations.10 
 While after 1929 the tendency to intertwine matters of foreign policy and foreign trade 
spread everywhere in the world, its proliferation in Germany and Italy bore an especially 
menacing character.11  As the two major revisionist European powers of the 1930s, their 
foreign economic initiatives often engendered suspicion on the part of the guarantors of 
Europe’s established political order. This thesis poses the question of whether there was a 
basis for this wariness. The answer is important not only to understand the dynamics that led 
to the disasters of World War II. Rather, the analysis of shared features and attempts at co-
operation in Berlin’s and Rome’s foreign economic initiatives also helps to develop a better 
assessment of the nature of the two ultra-nationalistic regimes. Thereby, it deepens the 
                                                                                                                                                        
companies, and countries triumphed in three industrial revolutions (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), pp. 135-184, 153. 
5 Cf. S.N. Broadberry and M. Harrison, The economics of World War I (Cambridge, 2005). 
6 Cf. G. Ambrosius, ʻVon Kriegswirtschaft zu Kriegswirtschaft 1914-1945ʼ, in M. North and G. Ambrosius, eds., 
Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte: Ein Jahrtausend im Überblick (München, 2005), pp. 289-355. 
7 Walther Rathenau, Gesammelte Reden (Berlin, 1924), p. 264. 
8 Hans Posse, lawyer by training, led the foreign trade department at the RWM as of 1924. He was Germany’s 
permanent delegate at the Economic Committee of the League of Nations. Posse continued his career during the 
Third Reich and became secretary of state at the RWM. For his role in the international organisation see part II. 
Posse also published on the German-Italian economic relationship. See, for instance, his piece in G. Dobbert, ed., 
Die faschistische Wirtschaft: Probleme und Tatsachen (Berlin, 1934). 
9 Quoted in R.M. Spaulding, Osthandel and Ostpolitik: German foreign trade policies in Eastern Europe from 
Bismarck to Adenauer (Providence, 1997), p. 108. 
10  J. Osterhammel and N.P. Petersson, Geschichte der Globalisierung: Dimensionen, Prozesse, Epochen 
(München, 2007), pp. 77-83. C.H. Feinstein, P. Temin and G. Toniolo, The world economy between the world 
wars (Oxford, 2008). 
11 Cf. M. Mazower, Dark continent: Europe’s twentieth century (New York, 1999), pp. 104-137. 
3 
existing research on the German-Italian relationship in the interwar period, which has 
neglected the analysis of economic factors. 
The paucity of research into the German-Italian economic relationship is surprising, 
moreover, because contemporary observers were well aware of the close contacts they shared 
in the economic sphere, and how often this led to rivalries. Elisabeth Monroe, a former 
League of Nations staff member who travelled the region with a Rockefeller fellowship in 
1937, concludes that 
 To all appearances, Italy’s aspirations clash at every turn with the German advance 
 […]. Both powers envisage the same objectives. Both wanted Austria as a satellite; 
 both want to mother Hungary; both want Balkan influence and Balkan markets. In 
 view of the rising tide of German trade not only in Greece and Turkey but in Spain, 
 Egypt, and as far east as Iran, there is every possibility that both will one day want 
 Mediterranean supremacy also. Logically, their alliance should be uncomfortable. Yet 
 it seems to prosper.12 
It is the aim of this thesis to treat this paradoxical situation, and offer a systematic analysis of 
patterns of collaboration and rivalries in the German-Italian economic relationship between 
the onset of the world economic crisis and the proclamation of the “Rome-Berlin Axis”. This 
evaluation will help to describe and explain the construction of the alliance’s economic 
foundations, as well as the later deficiencies of the “Axis” at war. Thereby, it addresses a gap 
in research that has been identified by the more extensive literature that exists for the period 
of World War II.13 
 That is not to say that international history has not dealt at all with the German-Italian 
relationship in the early 1930s. It has been studied, however, only within the narrow focus of 
“classical” diplomatic history, and even eminent followers of that approach have admitted that 
there was more that constituted the “Axis” than the official diplomacy of Hitler and 
Mussolini.14 Therefore, the analysis builds methodologically on recent advances in the field of 
Transnational History. It will integrate comparisons, perceptions and transfers of economic 
institutions such as regulatory laws, commercial contracts or protectionist instruments in order 
                                                 
12 E. Monroe, The Mediterranean in politics (London, 1939), p. 238. Monroe had written one of the few English-
language studies on international affairs in the Mediterranean at that time. Most of the contemporary literature on 
the topic is in Italian. This highlights the importance of the Mediterranean for Italy’s foreign policy. 
13 See, for instance, H. Woller, ʻHitler, Mussolini und die Geschichte der “Achse”ʼ, in L. Klinkhammer, A.O. 
Guerrazzi and T. Schlemmer, eds., Die Achse im Krieg 1939-1945: Politik, Ideologie und Kriegführung 1939-
1945 (Paderborn, 2010) pp. 34-47, 34. 
14 J. Petersen, Hitler-Mussolini. Die Entstehung der Achse Berlin-Rom 1933-36 (Tübingen, 1973), p. XVII. 
4 
to piece together the fabric that constituted the economic “Axis”. Moreover, the thesis is 
inspired by Transnational History’s dedication to the explanatory factor of space. The 
German-Italian economic relationship is analysed not only with regard to the German 
territories or the Italian peninsula; it also looks at those spaces outside the respective national 
territories where their foreign economic interest interacted. In concrete terms, this means that 
the analysis also examines third-party markets equally important for Germany’s and Italy’s 
economy and foreign policy (in particular Southeastern Europe and the Eastern 
Mediterranean), and on the international arena where Berlin and Rome interacted at the 
League of Nations’ economic and financial organisations. 
 What is more, the project is in line with the increased public interest in economic 
history since the 2008 economic crisis. At the height of the crisis, the International Monetary 
Fund stated “history can be a useful guide to understanding the present”.15  Nonetheless, 
Werner Abelshauser, one of the doyens of German economic history, warns us not to draw 
direct conclusions for our time from the events of the 1930s. Abelshauser suggests that the 
“art of learning from history” is achieved by “reducing (economic-) historical effects to its 
fundamental preconditions and processes” in order to identify “institutional settings (ways of 
thinking and acting, rules of the game)”, which can reasonably be compared.16 
 For the current understanding of Europe as an economic area – its debates on divisions 
between “the north” and “the south” or the “core” and the “periphery”17 – the thesis offers 
historical insights on how the economic map of Europe has changed, especially in the 
aftermath of economic crises over questions of surplus and debt. In addition, it provides 
numerous examples how ineffective policies inspired by economic nationalism performed in 
regional economic co-ordination. For one of the crucial questions of economic integration in 
the twentieth century (which continues to be relevant in the twenty-first century), whether 
national economies should strive for an alignment with an open and global economy or create 
regional economic blocs,18 the thesis offers ample evidence of the effects of the latter. 
                                                 
15 International Monetary Fund, ed., World Economic Outlook. Crisis and Recovery (Washington, D.C., 2009), p. 
104. 
16 W. Abelshauser, ʻAus Wirtschaftskrisen lernen – aber wie?ʼ, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 57 (2009), pp. 
467-483, 480. 
17 Cf., for instance, J. Becker and J. Jäger, ‘European Integration in Crisis: the Centre-Periphery Divide’. Paper 
to be presented at 17th Euromemo Workshop on Alternative Economic Policy (Vienna, 16-18 Sep 2011). 
18 Cf. R. Neebe, ʻLudwig Erhard und die Globalisierungskontroverse in den Anfangsjahren der EWGʼ, in D. 
Gilgen, C. Kopper, A. Leutzsch and V. Berghahn, eds., Deutschland als Modell?: Rheinischer Kapitalismus und 
Globalisierung seit dem 19. Jahrhundert (Bonn, 2010), pp. 143-170, 145. 
5 
To the responses to economic crisis can be added the patterns that characterised the interwar 
period and that continue to concern us. According to Kuczynski, the interwar years were 
marked by a global power shift (the US replacing the UK as the world’s leading power), and 
the long-lasting and often difficult-to-gauge consequences this entailed for the international 
economy; a new dimension of unemployment; new forms of collaboration between science, 
business and the state; and the development of corporations into monopolies.19 These patterns 
continue to dominate current debates, whether it is the global power shift to Asia (and namely 
China), new dimensions of youth unemployment in the European South and elsewhere, an 
already-strong and still-growing concern of states to adapt educational systems to the needs of 
the economy or the public commitment of hi-tech pioneers from the Silicon Valley for 
monopolies.20 
 
2. Time Frame 
 
The investigation period 1929-1936 stems from several considerations, both political and 
economic. As the precise dating of the world economic crisis is contested, and the reasons for 
the eruption have a long history, the applied caesura of 1929 is not intended as any kind of 
cut-off point. Rather, it is meant to be a type of metaphor for the institutional changes driven 
by the world economic crisis, which dramatically changed economic relations. When 
necessary, the analysis investigates the 1920s and even reaches back to the end of the 
nineteenth century. Furthermore, the conclusion offers an outlook on the development of the 
German-Italian relationship in World War II. 
 In 1929, decisions with such long-range impact were taken that their effects could be 
felt long after the political turning point of the Nazi seizure of power in 1933. For instance, it 
was in 1929 that Rome decided to boost agricultural production not only in wheat and 
livestock, but especially in fruits and vegetables. This decision was not an expression of an 
early autarchy plan, 21  like the wheat production initiative of 1925, heroically labelled 
                                                 
19  J. Kuczynski, ʻDie Zwischenkriegszeit. Ein neuer Kapitalismus nimmt Gestalt an.ʼ, in K. Borchardt, C. 
Buchheim, M. Hutter and H.D. James, eds., Zerrissene Zwischenkriegszeit: Wirtschaftshistorische Beiträge 
(Baden-Baden, 1994), pp. 357-365. 
20  P. Thiel, ‘Competition is for Losers’, The Wall Street Journal, 12 Sep 2014, available: 
<http://online.wsj.com/articles/peter-thiel-competition-is-for-losers-1410535536> (retrieved 16 Jul 2015). 
21  This has been argued by commentators of the fascist economy with a too-narrow, nation-state centred 
perspective. See, for instance, ‘Der deutsch-italienische Handelsvertrag’, Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 May 
1930. 
6 
battaglia del grano (the battle for wheat); on the contrary, the stimulated output of 
Mediterranean fruits and vegetables was not intended to be sold on the Italian market. It was 
commissioned to be exported north of the Alps, to its biggest market, Germany, in order to 
increase export revenues and to protect the lira which was throughout the period of 
investigation under pressure (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Italy’s gold and foreign exchange (Divise) reserves (in million Lire) 1927-35 
 




11,070.8 12,341.2 9,624.3 7,796.5 7,144.0 7,396.7 6,240.3 4,643.9 
Source: State Department, 19 Dec 1935, FDR Archives, Morgenthau, 267 (referring to Banca d’Italia 
statistics). 
  
The decision to give impetus to agricultural sales on the German market had several 
other long-lasting implications for the German-Italian economic relationship. The Italian 
industrialists feared that a general alignment with the German economy would not only boost 
sales in agriculture, but also threaten their shares in domestic and third-party markets for 
industrial products. At the same time, on the other side of the Alps, German agricultural 
pressure groups stirred up nationalistic sentiments against imports of Italian agricultural goods, 
and tried to benefit from protective measure by the German government equally concerned 
with falling foreign exchange reserves. 
 This is not to say, however, that political events had no influence on the choice of the 
investigation period. It is undeniable that “1929” was also a political event. With the 
premature death of Germany’s Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann on 3 October 1929, a 
German foreign policy dedicated to European reconciliation quickly lost ground. Moreover, in 
Weimar Germany after the death of Stresemann the executive was henceforth no longer 
determined by the parliament, but by presidential decree.22 
The political element is crucial for the definition of the end mark of the investigation, 
1936, which primarily follows the official proclamation of the “Rome-Berlin Axis”. 23 
Alltough it represents a minority opinion among historians, McElligott, in his recent 
                                                 
22 S. Dengg, Deutschlands Austritt aus dem Völkerbund und Schachts “Neuer Plan” (Frankfurt a.M., 1986), p. 
14. 
23 A detailed analysis of the German-Italian economic relationship between 1936 and 1957 exists, and raises 
important questions for the time period under investigation in my thesis. See M. Rieder, Deutsch-italienische 
Wirtschaftsbeziehungen. Kontinuitäten und Brüche 1936-1957 (Frankfurt a.M., 2003). 
7 
reinterpretation of the history of the Weimar Republic, goes as far as to set 1936 as an 
endpoint of his description of the first German democracy. Of course, he does not deny the 
fact that Nazi Germany was a dictatorship as of 1933 and the ratification of the Enabling Act. 
Yet, Hitler’s rule was carried out within the bounds of the Weimar constitution, and was very 
similar to the authoritarian presidencies of Franz von Papen (1932) and Kurt von Schleicher 
(1932-1933), who ruled using Article 48 and the emergency powers it conferred.24 
However, economic considerations back this choice, too. As I will show in detail, in 
1936 a contested re-structuring of the German-Italian trade was concluded, which meant a 
substantial decrease of global integration, especially with respect to the US economy, and an 
increase in mutual relevance as trading partners, with Germany far-and-away Italy’s major 
trading partner. 25  Moreover, in 1936 the German economy was completely submitted to 
rearmament, while between 1933 and 1936 national objectives prevailed that had 
characterised the economic governance of Weimar Germany.26 
 Two features of Italy’s twentieth century economic history support the time frame. 
First, according to Ciocca, in 1929 an economic regime that was largely dominated by the 
quota novanta ended in Fascist Italy.27 The following period, which was distinguished by the 
world economic crisis and national autarchy, lasted till 1936 when war preparations again 
changed the face of the economy.28 The second characteristic is Italy’s positioning within the 
different payments regimes, which after the collapse of the international gold standard divided 
the world economy into several blocks.29 While initially remaining a rather exceptional case 
between the blocks, clinging to gold in order to safeguard its established trade relations, Italy 
gradually moved towards the block of countries with foreign exchange controls, consisting of 
Germany and many states of Southeastern Europe.30 Vicenzo Azzolini, governor of the Banca 
                                                 
24 A. McElligott, Rethinking the Weimar Republic. Authority and Authoritarianism, 1916-1936 (London, 2013). 
For a critical note on McElligott’s work see B. Ziemann, review of: ibid., HSoz-u-Kult, 29 May 2014, available: 
<http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/2014-2-146> (retrieved 16 Jul 2015 ). 
25 Cf. Z. Steiner, The triumph of the dark: European international history, 1933-1939 (Oxford; New York, 2011), 
p. 97. 
26  B.-J. Wendt, ʻSüdosteuropa in der nationalsozialistischen Großraumwirtschaftʼ, in G. Hirschfeld and L. 
Kettenacker, eds., Der “Führerstaat”: Mythos und Realität: Studien zur Struktur und Politik des Dritten Reiches 
(Stuttgart, 1981), pp. 414-428, 425. 
27 The quota novanta, as the revaluation of the Lire was labelled by the fascist propaganda, is further discussed 
below in chapter 2. 
28 P. Ciocca, L’ economia italiana nel periodo fascista (Bologna, 1976), pp. 54-55. 
29 Cf. B. Eichengreen and D.A. Irwin ʻThe Slide to Protectionism in the Great Depression. Who Succumbed and 
Why?ʼ Journal of Economic History, 70, 4 (2010). 
30 See W. Boelcke, Deutschland als Welthandelsmacht 1930-1945 (Stuttgart, 1994), pp. 15-16. 
8 
d’Italia between 1931 and 1944, identified the year 1936 as the end of this period because the 
long-expected devaluation of the lira finally took place.31 
 These examples suffice to highlight the specific pattern of the German-Italian 
economic relationship between 1929 and 1936, which was constituted both by moments of 
fierce rivalries and growing interdependence. Thus, it is through an analysis of this crucial 
period that historiography moves closer to a comprehensive understanding of the foundations 
of the “Rome-Berlin Axis”. In 2010, a major edited volume on various dimensions of the 
“Axis” at war came to the conclusion that the “alliance in World War II has a long background, 
which, indeed, has been equally neglected”. 32  Ponzi argues in a similar vein when he 
describes Germany’s foreign economic policy between 1933 and 1939 as still open to 
interpretation.33 Last but not least, Clavin contends that the interesting documentation of the 
League of Nations, which is also used in this thesis, gives no reason to neglect the years till 
1936, as has happened so far.34 
 
3. Historiography of the German-Italian Economic Relationship 
 
To date, a systematic attempt to explain the German-Italian economic relationship in the 
world economic crisis has not been made. This is quite remarkable, given that this particular 
relationship of interwar Europe has received much attention in historiography, in an effort to 
understand the causes of one of the great disasters of the twentieth century: World War II. 
This part of the introduction establishes the state of the art of research. Two broad strands 
have been separated according to their guiding questions. The first strand is composed of 
studies on the bilateral German-Italian relationship, while the second strand deals with the 
wider spatial dimension of this relationship. 
 
 
                                                 
31 Azzolini to Giannini, 22 Jun 1938, Archivio Storico Banca d’Italia, Direttorio Azzolini, cart. 23, fasc. 11. 
32 Woller, ʻHitler, Mussoliniʼ, p. 34. In his positive review, Daniel Hedinger refers to three fruitful tasks for the 
study of the relationship, which my thesis intends to realise: First, the systematic integration of the early 1930s 
when Italy acted more independently; second, the integration of the perception of the Axis’ enemies; and third, a 
wider spatial framework to connect the historiography of the Axis with global history. See D. Hedinger, review 
of: ibid., H-Soz-Kult, 28 Feb 2013, available: <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/2013-1-133> 
(retrieved 16 Jul 2015). 
33 P. Fonzi, ʻLa politica economica estera del nazionalsocialismo tra il 1933 e il 1939. Un percorso obbligatoʼ, 
Studi Storici, 49, 1 (2008), pp. 51-108, 54. 
34 P. Clavin, Securing the world economy: The reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920-1946 (Oxford, 2013), 
p.124. 
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3.1 The Bilateral German-Italian Relationship 
 
“Classic” Diplomatic History of the German-Italian Relationship 
 
Along with mainstream International History,35 historiography primarily focused for many 
decades on the politics of Hitler, Mussolini and their diplomatic elite, while touching on 
economic aspects only en passant. The above-mentioned landmark work of Deakin 
emphasised the perspective of the dictators, and devoted a great deal of empirical research to 
the collapse of the coalition in World War II.36 Ever since then, Anglophone historiography 
has remained highly influential (and slightly biased) in its research on the dictators37 and the 
“Axis” in war. Mack Smith’s classic biography on Mussolini indeed did mention 
inconsistencies in Italy’s foreign policy, which, for instance, sent Italian troops to fight and 
plunder in Southeastern Europe together with the German Wehrmacht, and ordered at the 
same time the expansion of Italy’s northern fortifications.38 While Mack Smith explains this 
and other contraditions largely through reference to the personal deficiencies of the dictators, 
his approach has been criticised for neglecting other social, and indeed economic, factors.39 
More recent contributions such as Knox’s insightful studies highlight, despite his emphasis on 
the poor military performance of the Axis in World War II, the importance of explaining this 
outcome by looking at economic factors in a longer-term perspective as well.40 
A first major contribution by German historiography was Petersen’s study of the 
German-Italian relationship between Hitler’s seizure of power in 1933 and the official 
proclamation of the “Rome-Berlin Axis” in 1936. Petersen has contributed immensely to 
                                                 
35 For a critical survey on the past, present and future of International History, see P. Finney, Palgrave advances 
in international history (New York, 2005), pp.1-35. 
36 Deakin, The brutal friendship. Another classical study without any great interest in structural depth is E. 
Wiskemann, The Rome-Berlin Axis: A study of the relations between Hitler and Mussolini (London, 1966). 
37 Especially Mussolini has received constant attention up until recent times. Cf. R.J.B. Bosworth, Mussolini 
(London, 2002). Bosworth also edited the Oxford handbook of fascism, which was criticised for its gaps in 
covering the German-Italian relationship. Cf. C. Goeschel, review of: R.J.B. Bosworth, ed., The Oxford 
handbook of fascism (Oxford, 2010), H-Soz-Kult, 30 Nov 2011, available: <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-
berlin.de/rezensionen/2011-4-154> (retrieved 16 Jul 2015). 
38  D. Mack Smith and M. Grendacher, Mussolini: Eine Biographie (München, 1983). Mack Smith’s study 
marked at the time of publishing also the state of the art in German historiography on the Italian dictator. 
39 H. Höhne, review of: ibid., Der Spiegel, 25 Jul 1983. 
40 M. Knox, ʻExpansionist zeal, fighting power, and staying power in the Italian and German dictatorshipsʼ, in R. 
Bessel, ed., Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany: comparisons and contrasts (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 113-133, esp. 
113. M. Knox, Hitler’s Italian allies: Royal Armed Forces, Fascist regime, and the war of 1940-1943 
(Cambridge, 2001). A similar approach, but with an even more narrow focus on military and foreign relations is 
offered by J. Gooch, Mussolini and his generals: The armed forces and fascist foreign policy, 1922-1940 
(Cambridge, 2007). 
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further investigation into the conflictive history of the “Axis” by shedding light on the conflict 
over Southeastern Europe and especially Austria. However, despite his doubts about the range 
of diplomatic history in the German-Italian case, he remained focused on the study of 
diplomatic sources in a crucial – but very narrow – period of the German-Italian 
relationship.41 Torunsky traced this relationship further back in the 1920s with a study of the 
coalition policies of Stresemann and Mussolini. Albeit still making a contribution to 
diplomatic history, Torunsky underscored the importance of economic factors like, for 
instance, the massive Italian orders of German coal. All the same, she admitted that her 
attempt to provide an account of German-Italian trade was of a “fragmentary character”.42 
 In spite of major criticisms of diplomatic history, especially from the “Bielefeld 
School” of German historiography around 1980,43 scholars have devoted, and continue to 
devote, much attention to this approach.44 My project considers contributions in this field 
concerning relevant actors in diplomacy who actively influenced economic relations. Schlie, 
for example, has published a selection of diaries and correspondence by Ulrich von Hassell, 
Germany’s ambassador in Rome (1932-38), who was a relentless supporter of German-Italian 
economic co-ordination in Southeastern Europe, and who therefore is of utmost importance 
for this thesis.45 
 However, as has been shown by studies on the “parallel-diplomacy” of Herman 
Göring,46 the embassies and “official diplomacy” were by no means the only institutions 
shaping the German-Italian relationship. In point of fact, Göring’s missions to Italy supported 
the rapprochement between the dictators. These missions were sceptically observed by the 
uninvolved German foreign ministry, as were his missions to Southeastern Europe to establish 
a German political and economic hegemony. Accordingly, Falanga’s attempt to provide an 
(astonishingly still-lacking) overall history of the German-Italian relationship between 1933 
                                                 
41 Petersen, Hitler-Mussolini, p. XVII. 
42 V. Torunsky, Entente der Revisionisten?: Mussolini und Stresemann 1922-1929 (Köln, 1986). For a general 
analysis of the Weimar Republic’s approach to foreign policy, which used economic power to compensate for 
military weakness, see P. Krüger, Die Aussenpolitik der Republik von Weimar (Darmstadt, 1985), especially pp. 
247-269. 
43 For an overview on the history of the discipline, cf. B. Simms, ʻThe Return of the Primacy of Foreign Policyʼ, 
German History, 21, 3 (2003), pp. 275-291, 277-279. 
44 Cf. J. Schröder and C.A. Lückerath, Hitler und Mussolini: Aspekte der deutsch-italienischen Beziehungen, 
1930-1943 (Gleichen, 2007). See for this approach the works of Zara Steiner on European diplomacy in the 
interwar period: Z. Steiner, The lights that failed: European international history, 1919-1933 (Oxford, 2005); Z. 
Steiner, The triumph of the dark: European international history, 1933-1939 (Oxford, 2011). 
45 U. von Hassell and U. Schlie, Römische Tagebücher und Briefe: 1932-1938 (München, 2004). 
46 A. Kube, Pour le mérite und Hakenkreuz: Hermann Göring im Dritten Reich, (München, 2009). S. Martens, 
Hermann Göring: “Erster Paladin des Führers” und “Zweiter Mann im Reich” (Paderborn, 1985). 
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and 1945 on the basis of published diplomatic sources has received a great deal of criticism.47 
With his narrow focus, his critics claim that his study lacks coverage of the close relations at 
other levels of the state, the military, or the economy, all of which were constitutive for the 
Axis.48 
 Italian historiography has paid scant attention to the German-Italian relationship 
between 1933 and 1945 in diplomatic history. This particular relationship is covered by 
overall analyses of fascist foreign policy,49  but explicit contributions to the study of the 
“Axis” are rather scarce compared with the German historiography.50 One reason for this, 
presumably, can be found in the long-standing impact of a research perspective which was 
intended – in the words of one of its most influential representatives, Renzo de Felice – to 
keep Italian fascism “out of the shadows of the Holocaust”.51 This perspective hampered 
attempts to write on the German-Italian relationship during the heyday of diplomatic history. 
This assumption is supported by the fact that a detailed analysis of the relationship between 
Fascist Italy and Weimar Germany exists. Scarano’s52 study contributes to my thesis, as it 
sheds light on the “official” positions taken by diplomacy regarding the impact of the world 
economic crisis. From this overview of the classical diplomatic historiography of the German-
Italian relationship in the interwar period, it can be seen that research has taken account of the 






                                                 
47 G. Falanga, Mussolinis Vorposten in Hitlers Reich: Italiens Politik in Berlin 1933-1945 (Berlin, 2008). 
48 The staff of the Italian embassy in Berlin, for instance, heard about the Italian invasion into Albania from the 
radio. For the critique, see P. Bernhard, review of: G. Falanga, Mussolinis Vorposten in Hitlers Reich: Italiens 
Politik in Berlin 1933-1945 (Berlin, 2008), sehepunkte 9 (2009), available: 
<http://www.sehepunkte.de/2009/07/15336.html> (retrieved 16 Jul 2015). 
49 Of distinguished importance for this thesis is E. Collotti and N. Labanca, eds., Fascismo e politica di potenza: 
Politica estera; 1922-1939 (Firenze, 2000). The study advances the thesis that the Italian penetration of 
Southeastern Europe since the 1920s supported the German expansion in the same region after 1933. This thesis 
needs to be evaluated with respect to economic relations. 
50 For instance, the Italian Wikipedia entry for the “Axis”, only refers to a British historian and Petersen’s study 
from 1973. See ‘Potenze dell’Asse’, Wikipedia, available: <http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potenze_dell%27Asse> 
(retrieved 16 Jul 2015). 
51  Giuliano Ferrara, ‘Interview with Renzo De Felice’ in J. Jacobelli, ed., Il fascismo e gli storici oggi 
(Roma/Bari, 1988), pp. 3-6. 
52 F. Scarano, Mussolini e la Reppublica di Weimar: le relazioni diplomatiche tra Italia e Germania dal 1927 al 
1933 (Napoli, 1996). 
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Studies on Bilateral Economic Relations 
 
In contrast to the previously mentioned bias in the coverage of the German-Italian relationship 
in diplomatic history, German historiography has paid less attention to the bilateral economic 
relationship than its Italian counterpart. In general, the very controversial debate on the 
primacy (Primat) of politics over the economy or vice versa, as it manifested in German 
historiography since the 1970s,53 has produced resentments towards the analysis of economic 
factors in international relations.54 What is more, due to the far-reaching history and persistent 
patterns of economic relations, other countries (and in particular Russia)55  have received 
greater attention from German historiography. 
 However, a major reference point for this project is Rieder’s study of German-Italian 
economic relations between 1936 and 1957.56 Rieder’s multi-archival and multi-institutional 
approach is exemplary, and instructive for this thesis. However, she centers on the transition 
from World War II to postwar reconstruction. In accordance with Zamagni’s central 
interpretation of Italy’s economic history,57 Rieder asks how Italy managed to move out of its 
position in the “economic periphery”,58 which was to a large extent constructed in relation to 
Germany. In asking this, she raises important questions for the study of the period between 
World War I and the sealing of the “Axis” in 1936, the time when the Italian perception of its 
position triggered a major impact on the formulation of foreign economic policies. This thesis 
contrasts the Italian attempt to become an “economic core”59  not only in relation to the 
economic expansion of Nazi Germany after 1933, but also to the foreign policy of the late 
                                                 
53 See G.-Th. Mollin, ʻInternationale Beziehungen als Gegenstand der deutschen Neuzeithistoriographieʼ, in W. 
Loth and J. Osterhammel, eds., Internationale Geschichte: Themen – Ergebnisse – Aussichten (München, 2000), 
pp. 3-30, 19-22. 
54 See H. Zimmermann, ʻDie politische Ökonomie der internationalen Geschichteʼ, in E. Conze, U. Lappenküper 
and G. Müller, eds., Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen: Erneuerung und Erweiterung einer 
historischen Disziplin (Köln, 2004), pp. 113-138, 120. 
55 The studies on economic relations between Germany and Russia are numerous and not very relevant for the 
thesis. However, there is evidence that the economic relations with the ‘economic giant’ in the East in the early 
1930s became a central field of co-ordination because, so the German argument went, only together were 
Germany and Italy strong enough to be “appreciated” by the Soviet Union. Cf. K. Krüger, Deutsche 
Großraumwirtschaft (Hamburg, 1932), p. 65. 
56 Rieder, Deutsch-italienische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen. 
57 V. Zamagni, Dalla periferia al centro. La seconda rinascità economica dell´Italia 1861-1990, (Bologna, 2003); 
V. Zamagni, Introduzione alla storia economica d’Italia (Bologna, 2007). 
58 Aldcroft’s major study of the European “economic periphery” in the interwar period discusses on its first page 
whether Italy was still part of it. Albeit citing other opinions, Aldcroft argues that Italy had just crossed the 
frontier due to, for instance, its armament potential. See D.H. Aldcroft, Europe’s third world: The European 
periphery in the interwar years (Aldershot, 2006), p. 1. 
59  For a discussion of the “core”-“periphery” concept, see below, the introduction to basic concepts and 
methodology. 
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Weimar Republic, which was according to standard reference on the first German democracy 
an “economic version of power policy”.60 
Presumably, it is because the industrialized area north of the Alps had had a huge impact on 
the industrialization of the peninsula that Italian historiography has made a greater effort than 
German historiography to study German-Italian economic relations. Caglioti examines for the 
period of World War I rising economic nationalism with a publicly orchestrated campaign 
against imported German pharmaceuticals.61 Similarly, Alegi describes for the 1920 the secret 
plan between Italy and Germany to produce airplanes for Germany in Italy, which was 
hampered and sometimes even thwarted by acts in the name of national interest.62 Extending 
the research question of these case studies, this thesis analyses in what other fields economic 
nationalism with an anti-German direction of impact emerged, and how it intersected with the 
political rapprochement of the 1930s.   
 With a larger time frame on the interwar period, Bientinesi highlights in his 
unpublished doctoral thesis on Italy’s foreign trade policy the importance of the economic 
relationship with Germany. The study indicates relevant archives and aspects from the Italian 
perspective, but fails to take into account the German perspective.63 Mantelli published an 
instructive paper about the influence of economic factors on the German-Italian relationship 
between 1933 and 1936.64 However, his announced larger study on the subject has not been 
published. Tattara, in his quantitative analysis of German-Italian trade in the 1930s, has called 
for an analysis of the composition of trade rather than the statistical terms of trade to address 
the question of power. His highly elaborated analysis concludes with a rejection of the 
argument that German economic penetration in Italy was unilaterally exploitative, and asks 
for a more detailed analysis of goals and outcomes in economic foreign policy making, which 
is at the heart of this thesis.65 
 
                                                 
60 G. Niedhart, Die Außenpolitik der Weimarer Republik (München, 2006), pp. 64-66. As Niedhard provides the 
standard reference for the foreign policy of the Weimar Republic, his overview on Germany’s economic relations, 
and the missing German-Italian case, makes more evident the “gap” in research. 
61 D.L. Caglioti, ʻNazionalismo economico e antigermanesimo. La campagna contro i farmaci tedeschi durante la 
prima guerra monidiale in Italiaʼ, Contemporanea, 13, 4 (2010), pp. 681-691. 
62 G. Alegi, ʻBalbo e il riarmo clandestino tedeco. Un episodo segreto della collaborazione italo-tedescaʼ, Storia 
contemporanea, 23, 2 (1992), pp. 305-317. 
63 F. Bientinesi, La politica commerciale italiana fra le due guerre mondiali: 1919-1939 (Unpublished Ph.D. 
Diss., Università Pisa, 1999-2000). 
64  B. Mantelli, ʻVom “bilateralen Handelsausgleich” zur “Achse Berlin-Rom”. Der Einfluß wirtschaftlicher 
Faktoren auf die Entstehung des deutsch-italienischen Bündnisses 1933-1936ʼ, in J. Petersen, ed., Faschismus 
und Gesellschaft in Italien. Staat – Wirtschaft – Kultur (Köln, 1998), pp. 253-279. 
65 G. Tattara, ʻPower and Trade: Italy and Germany in the Thirtiesʼ, VSWG, 78 (1999), pp. 457-500, 490, 498. 
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Contributions from Business History 
 
Studies in Business History allow us to analyse the impact of economic foreign policy making 
on the private sector, and, conversely, the impact of private actors on policy making. In a 
reflection of the discipline, Friedman and Jones ask “why has business had a poor record of 
resistance to totalitarian regimes, not only in Hitler’s Germany”?66 Only a small number of 
studies have considered businesses within the German-Italian relationship in the interwar 
period. Buggeln offers the criticism that studies on businesses under the swastika, which saw 
a boom in the late 1990s and 2000s, have a very narrow perspective, and neglect the 
interaction of business with armament and war in other countries such as Italy.67 However, the 
few interpretations which exist are of great use for this thesis in that they help to identify 
different patterns of rivalries and collaboration in sectors more-or-less strategically relevant 
for Berlin and Rome. 
 Von Oswald has studied foreign direct investments of German businesses in chemicals, 
iron and steel, engineering and electro technology in Milan, Italy’s industrial heart, from the 
late nineteenth century to 1945.68 Apart from a general overview of economic relations in the 
longue durée, von Oswald provides interesting evidence on how growing Italian nationalism 
in certain sectors led to accusations over German products and investments. 
 However, the continuing strong demand for German technical knowledge in Italy 
encouraged co-operation between companies in which fierce rivalries still prevailed. Petri 
examines the technological transfer between Germany’s and Italy’s chemical industries. He 
concludes that, in general, foreign policy supported a stronger co-operation, particularly in 
strategic sectors relevant to armament, such as the light metal or oil industry. However, the 
stakeholders acted within a framework of “competing national respectively company 
interests”.69 Hertner deals with the case of the German electro-technical industry in the Italian 
market. He also identifies the tendency of German multinationals to adjust initial reluctance 
                                                 
66 W. A. Friedman and G. Jones, ʻBusiness History: Time for Debateʼ, Business History Review, 2011, 1 (85), pp. 
1-8, 8. 
67 M. Buggeln, review of: N. Frei and T. Schanetzky, Unternehmen im Nationalsozialismus: Zur Historisierung 
einer Forschungskonjunktur (Göttingen, 2010), H-Soz-Kult, 24 Nov 2011, availabe: 
<http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/2011-4-140> (retrieved 16 Jul 2015). 
68 A. von Oswald, Die deutsche Industrie auf dem italienischen Markt von 1882 bis 1945. Außenwirtschaftliche 
Strategien am Beispiel Mailands und Umgebung (Frankfurt a.M., 1996). 
69 R. Petri, ʻZwischen Konkurrenz und Kooperation. Die deutsche Chemieindustrie und das technologische 
Aufholen Italiensʼ, in R. Petri, ed., Technologietransfer aus der deutschen Chemieindustrie (1925-1960) (Berlin, 
2004), pp. 253-290, 289. 
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towards direct investments and joint cartels to the nationalistic conditions of the interwar 
period.70 
 A fairly successful collaboration is detected by Feldman for the case of insurance 
companies under the “Axis”. Very interestingly, he points out that the “insurance Axis 
functioned well despite, rather than because of, the ideological and political circumstances.”71 
The companies favoured a liberal organisation of the sector. As the sector was not at the 
centre of strategic considerations, political governance intervened only marginally, thus 
leaving the insurance business outside the rivalries emerging in other fields with greater 
importance for the strategic aims of the regimes. 
 The performance of businesses under varying patterns of collaboration and rivalry is 
far from sufficiently analysed. The thesis takes up suggestions by the above-mentioned 
authors and considers several sectors: banks, raw materials (especially crude oil), chemicals, 
transportation72 (namely merchant shipping and railways) and one of the booming sectors of 
the interwar period, artificial fibres. In this sector, Italy became the global export champion. It 
is a difficult but nevertheless very promising endeavour to identify business case studies that 
shed light on the performance of the foreign economic policy set out by governments. For the 
case of Germany, Berghan has put forward that there are “many books on what German 
diplomats, intellectuals and generals have been doing or dreaming of in this century […] but 
we lack information about the behaviour of German business in a larger European context in 
this century”.73 This thesis takes up Abdelal’s claim “that we have to understand the actually 
existing logic of trade – and, by extension, the practices of real firms – if we are to make 
sense of these new logics of world politic”.74 
 
                                                 
70 P. Hertner, ʻThe German electrotechnical industry in the Italian market before the Second World Warʼ, in G. 
Jones and H.G. Schröter, eds., The rise of multinationals in continental Europe (Aldershot, 1993), pp. 155-172. 
Idem, ʻVom Wandel einer Unternehmensstrategie. Die deutsche Elektroindustrie in Italien vor dem dem Ersten 
Weltkrieg und in der Zwischenkriegszeitʼ, in H.G. Schröter, ed., Politik, Wirtschaft und internationale 
Beziehungen: Studien zu ihrem Verhältnis in der Zeit zwischen den Weltkriegen (Mainz, 1991), pp. 139-148. 
71 G.D. Feldman, ʻCompetition and Collaboration among the Axis Multinational Insurers. Munich Re, Generali, 
and Riunione Adriatica, 1933-1943ʼ, in C. Kobrak and P.H. Hansen, eds., European business, dictatorship, and 
political risk, 1920-1945 (New York, 2004), pp. 41-61, 59. 
72 The question of who benefits from a region’s trade was – and still is – the question of who controls and 
organised the main trade routes. With regard to Southeastern Europe, rivalries occurred over the question 
whether the trade would be conducted via the Italian Adriatic or the North Western German harbours. Italy and 
Germany pursued this quest by engaging in infrastructure and railway projects (see Part III). 
73 V.R. Berghahn, Quest for economic empire: European strategies of German big business in the twentieth 
century (Providence, 1996), p. 2. 
74 R. Abdelal, ʻThe profits of power: Commerce and realpolitik in Eurasiaʼ, Review of International Political 
Economy, 20, 3 (2013), pp. 1-36, 29. 
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3.2 The Wider Spatial Dimension of the German-Italian Economic Relationship 
 
Economic Relations with Southeastern Europe 
 
In contrast to the few studies on the bilateral economic relationship between Germany and 
Italy, a rich literature exists on both Germany’s and Italy’s economic relations with 
Southeastern Europe 75  as a whole, or with certain countries of the region. Regrettably, 
patterns of rivalry and co-operation between the later “Axis” allies rarely have been addressed 
explicitly.76 That the region has received so much academic interest is a result of the enormous 
changes that took place during the interwar period, both in terms of political as well as 
economic history.77 As a consequence of the peace agreements after World War I, a number of 
new states emerged within the borders of the extinct Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. 
The remaining European powers engaged in the economic reorganisation of the region in 
order to pursue political aims and to seize economic opportunities in the new markets. The 
dynamics of the region had had such a huge impact on research that several authors have 
pointed out that the academic discipline Economic Development was largely founded by 
researchers from the region, using regional data as their empirical basis.78 
 There is a great deal of literature on the economic relations between Italy and Austria, 
the newly founded state on Italy’s northern border of pivotal importance for Fascist Italy’s 
foreign policy.79 Although Germany’s influence on Austria’s political arena and market was 
anathema to Rome, research has often not taken into account the German perspective. Yet, 
                                                 
75  The spatial concept of “Southeastern Europe” (or “Balkans, “Danube region”, etc.) is contested in 
historiography, especially after the seminal study of M.N. Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York, 1997). 
As for my project, the pivotal question of regional identity and its construction (from inside and outside) is of 
minor relevance for the analysis of German-Italian economic collaboration and rivalries in the region. 
76 I can only speculate on the reasons for this gap. One reason certainly seems a professional one. The typical 
author was often a historian, based in a specific national academic framework in one of the “peripheral” 
countries and writing on economic relations with one of the “cores”, or the author was based in either Germany 
or Italy and writing on the economic relations with the “periphery”. Cf. H. Sundhaussen, ʻWirtschaftsgeschichte 
Südosteuropas. Ist und Sollʼ, Südost-Forschungen, 69/70 (2010), pp. 431-440, esp. 434. An explicit triangular 
perspective was only adopted very rarely. 
77 Cf. Aldcroft, Europe’s third world. 
78  M. Todorova, ʻThe Trap of Backwardness: Modernity, Temporality, and the Study of Eastern European 
Nationalismʼ, Slavic Review, 64 (2005), pp. 140-164, 145-146. Berend is one of the doyens of the field, who also 
touches on the relations with Germany and Italy in his major reference works. Cf., for instance, I.T. Berend, 
Decades of crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II (Berkeley, 1998). Not less eminent in 
economic history of Southeastern Europe is Teichova. Cf., for example, A. Teichova, ed., Österreich und die 
Tschechoslowakei 1918-1938: Die wirtschaftliche Neuordnung in Zentraleuropa in der Zwischenkriegszeit 
(Wien, 1996). 
79 Cf. P. Cuomo, Il miraggio danubiano: Austria e Italia, politica ed economia, 1918-1936 (Milano, 2012). 
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many existing studies point out events and settings, which the thesis investigates further. 
Enderle has studied the 1934 “Protocols of Rome” – an agreement at the frontier of foreign 
policy and foreign trade between Italy, Austria and Hungary. He neither uses Italian archival 
sources nor pays great attention to the role of Germany, which was, nevertheless, a central 
reference point of the agreement.80  Similarly, Enderle-Burcel analyses the initial interwar 
years of the economic relationship between Italy and Austria through a focus on Austrian 
government documents.81 Enderle-Burcel has continued to work on the topic, for instance, in 
the field of merchant shipping on the Danube, which the thesis assesses with regard to 
German-Italian rivalries.82 
Going beyond Austria, Iaselli’s doctoral thesis83 takes up a well-established branch of 
research on fascist foreign policy: 84  the analysis of Italy’s economic expansion into 
Southeastern Europe. While devoting a chapter to the “ridimensionamento delle aspirazioni 
italiane nei Balcani alla luce del ‘Drang Nach Osten’ tedesco”, Iaselli is, in line with the 
older literature, not so much interested in reflecting on the German expansion itself nor on 
mutual perceptions and interactions. However, Iaselli makes interesting reference to the big 
Italian banks, which were heavily involved in Italy’s expansion into Southeastern Europe and 
penetrated pre-war positions of German banks. German banks, on the other hand, tried to 
forge alliances with their Italian counterparts, which were the financially weakest among the 
banks of the victorious powers of World War I, in order to re-establish former positions.85 
Thereby, a constellation of co-operation and rivalries evolved, which the thesis examines in 
closer detail. 
 Italy’s economic penetration of Southeastern Europe is also an active field of 
historiography that deals with conceptions of space. In 2010, Petri edited a thematic issue of 
                                                 
80 P. Enderle, Die ökonomischen und politischen Grundlagen der Römischen Protokolle aus dem Jahre 1934 
(Unpublished Ph.D. Diss., Universität Wien, 1979). 
81  G. Burcel, Die österreichisch-italienischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 1919-1923 (Unpublished Ph.D. Diss., 
Universität Wien, 1979). 
82 G. Enderle-Burcel, ʻKonkurrenz auf der Donau. Anfang und Ende der Betriebsgemeinschaft der Ersten Donau-
Dampfschiffahrtsgesellschaft mit der königlichen ungarischen Fluß- und Seeschiffahrts A.-G. in der 
Zwischenkriegszeitʼ, in H. Matis, A. Resch, D. Stiefel and A. Teichova, eds., Unternehmertum im Spannungsfeld 
von Politik und Gesellschaft: Unternehmerische Aktivitäten in historischer Perspektive (Münster, 2010), pp. 171-
184. 
83 L. Iaselli, L’espansione economico-finanziaria italiana nei Balcani durante il fascismo (Napoli, 2006). 
84 Cf., for instance, N. La Marca, Italia e Balcani fra le due guerre: Saggio di una ricerca sui tentativi italiani di 
espansione economica nel Sud Est europeo fra le due guerre (Roma, 1979); Collotti and Labanca, Fascismo e 
politica di potenza, pp. 205-246; S. Lavacchini, ʻL’Europa centro-orientale nella politica dell’Italia fascistaʼ, 
Italia contemporanea, 230 (2003), pp. 49-78. 
85 For the Italian bank expansion see L. Stanciu, ʻItalian multinational banking in interwar east central Europeʼ, 
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qualestoria, in which several scholars discussed the role of Italy’s north-eastern borderlands 
within the larger concepts of Italy’s sphere of influence. The authors deal with several actors 
from the region of Trieste, Italy’s “porta orientale”, like Fulvio Suvich, Igino Brocchi and 
Camillo Castiglioni. They all held important positions in business and government institutions 
and produced documents that are highly germane to this thesis.86 
 Germany’s economic relations with Southeastern Europe in the interwar period is also 
a well-mined topic in German historiography. The recurring search is for continuities and 
discontinuities in policy approaches since the concept of an economic “Mitteleuropa” became 
popular during World War I. 87  In connection with Transnational History’s interest in 
conceptions of space, Sachse has edited a study on Southeastern Europe as an area, planned 
and developed by experts in the field of economic affairs. She points out that the aspect of 
domination has only very rarely been addressed in the recent spatial turn.88 By looking at 
German-Italian rivalries in the construction of economic spaces in Southeastern Europe, the 
thesis brings back into discussion the question of power. Furthermore, Gross has argued that 
there have been many attempts “to make sense of how Germany’s economic relationship with 
Southeastern Europe evolved in the 1930s”, but that little has been done to explain how 
German merchants actually expanded commercial ties.89 This is a fact that this thesis, with its 
evaluation of business performances in Germany’s and Italy’s economic expansion into 
Southeastern Europe, is going to alter. Above all, in most studies on Germany’s economic 
relations with Southeastern Europe, Italy appears (if at all) in a section that briefly states that 
other powers and their different or competing concepts existed, without offering details on the 
triangular relationship. 
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Studies that have dared to deal with triangular relationships are rare, but they do exist and 
have offered new insights.90 However, historiography has not explained the patterns of rivalry 
and collaboration in economic relations between Germany and Italy. Poulain91 and Borejsza92 
have investigated instead rivalries between the dictatorships on the political level. With her 
study of Italian fascism in the world economic crisis, Rafalski provides the most 
comprehensive approach so far.93  She also deals in one chapter with the German-Italian 
contest for the markets of Southeastern Europe. However, Rafalski makes very little use of 
archival documents. To conclude, patterns of German-Italian economic co-operation or 
rivalries in Southeastern Europe have been identified by research, but not yet properly 
scrutinized. Hence, this thesis investigates with a multilateral perspective and a broad archival 
documentation the triangular relationship, aiming to draw conclusions for the central question 
of power in the formation of the “Axis”. 
 
Economic Relations with the Eastern Mediterranean 
 
The introduction has highlighted that the conflictive German-Italian relationship was not 
confined to the European continent, but showed up in the markets of the Eastern 
Mediterranean as well. This region and its economic relations with Germany and Italy have 
received considerably less research attention than Southeastern Europe. This is to some extent 
understandable, as the latter was certainly more economically important at the time, but it is 
nevertheless unjustified, for two reasons. First, the region shared many characteristics with 
Southeastern Europe, and second, German and Italian institutions governing the economic 
expansion linked the two regions (see Part III, Chapter 9). In this context, it is interesting to 
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note that studies that deal with the general phenomenon of economic expansion, such as Di 
Quirico’s already-mentioned study of Italy’s banks, cover both regions.94  
 It appears that since the turn of the century, Italian historiography has been showing a 
growing interest in the region. In 2010, Arielli published a study on fascist foreign policy 
towards the Middle East in the 1930s, which also touches on Italy’s economic interests. While 
there is scant reference to Germany, Arielli’s interestingly observes that for Mussolini, all 
countries in the Eastern Mediterranean went through a phase of economic transition.95 As this 
attitude has also been detected in Italy’s as well as Germany’s perspective on Southeastern 
Europe, the thesis follows the reasoning and investigates the relationship between the 
identification of certain countries as emerging economies and the policies of economic 
expansion in the aftermath of the world economic crisis. 
 Certainly not surprising is the attention in the literature to policies towards the oil of 
the Middle East.96 The thesis takes up this strand to analyse Germany’s and Italy’s quest for 
oil in Iraq, where companies with government links from both countries joined a consortium. 
The above-mentioned studies show how important it is to broaden the analysis in terms of 
space into the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, the thesis is not only able to study connections 
between different spatial concepts, but also to improve the understanding of the repercussions 
of the wider spatial dimension on the bilateral German-Italian economic relationship and vice 
versa. 
 
4. Notes on Basic Concepts and Methodology 
 
The concept of (economic) crisis is paramount in this thesis, and thus deserves to be 
mentioned first in this introduction to basic concepts and applied methods. It has even been 
argued that the concept is essential for historiography. 97  During economic crises new 
opportunities arise for new actors.98 The crisis’ symptoms help the historian to identify the 
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basic principles of the prevailing social order. Moreover, crises trigger processes of learning 
and development, which are a constitutive element of dynamic societies. 99  Therefore, 
although the discussion on the reasons for the seminal crisis in the interwar years is taken into 
consideration, this thesis is more about the opportunities that arose with it.100 
 The changes in economic policy brought forward by the crisis, especially in the case of 
Germany and Italy, are often described with the somewhat vague concept of “economic 
nationalism”. For the interwar period, James has argued that the implications of a global 
economy became painfully aware to large parts of the world population, and provoked 
nationalist responses. The first wave of modern globalisation (roughly 1870-1914)101 was 
tested “so brutal that the system was destroyed, and the world reverted to autarchic or near-
autarchic national economic management”.102 Autarchy, the self-sufficiency of an economy, 
was and still is an important element of economic nationalism. However, Nakano has 
proposed in his instructive theoretical discussion of economic nationalism that the two 
concepts are not necessarily congruent.103 At the very least, the goal of economic nationalism 
is to increase national power, and even a regime entirely driven by economic nationalism will 
embrace international economic co-ordination when it helps to increase national power. 
Nützenadel has pointed out that in spite of the setbacks to globalisation in the 1920s and 
1930s, there have been new initiatives for international integration, for instance with the 
creation of the League of Nations.104 The thesis analyses the attempts of the nationalistic 
German and Italian regimes at international co-ordination not only at the League, but also in 
their shared economic “periphery”. 
The economic crisis of the 1930s changed significantly the economic relationships 
between the “core” and the “periphery”. The concepts are applied in the thesis in accordance 
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with Aldcroft, who categorises a country solely on economic, rather than on political 
criteria.105 Unlike the industrialised core of Europe, to which Germany in the interwar period 
clearly belonged, the peripheral countries in the continent’s southeast were characterised by 
retarded industrialisation, low levels of urbanisation, no strong and acquisitive middle class 
element and an overall large share of agriculture, which led primarily to the export of 
commodities and imports of manufactured goods and capital.106 Italy in the 1920s and 1930s 
is a very interesting case. At the time, it was just crossing the line, and thus a case in itself 
alongside Germany being part of the “core”, and the countries of Southeastern Europe and the 
Eastern Mediterranean in the “periphery”.107 
 The concept of “economic relations” is considered broadly in this thesis. It includes 
the more narrow “commercial relationship”, that is, the exchange of goods and the flow of 
capital. Moreover, it includes all mutual exchanges having an impact on the performance of 
the economies. These exchanges include, to name but a few, the transfer of technical 
knowledge, the negotiation of commercial contracts, or the competition between opposing 
lobby groups. To assess the state of the commercial relationship the thesis often refers to the 
balance of trade, which depicts the difference between exports and imports as expressed in the 
official statistics. The balance of trade became a constant bone of contention in the interwar 
years. Likewise controversially discussed was the balance of payments, which records all 
economic transactions between two areas. In the case of Germany and Italy, this included in 
particular payments for imports, the German reparations, or the expenditure on tourism.108 
 The thesis applies two other means used by international economics to quantitatively 
assess commercial relationships. The first is the regional distribution of trade. Not only for 
Germany and Italy, but also for the countries in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern 
Mediterranean, the thesis analyses how much of the total trade was carried out with a given 
trade partner, and what conclusions can be drawn for the level of economic integration,109 as 
well as the strategic importance of a given trade relationship. For the strategic importance, the 
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analysis draws on Hirschman.110 He distinguishes in his landmark work on the relationship 
between national power and foreign trade two effects. Firstly, the “supply effect”, which 
describes that, “by providing a more plentiful supply of goods or by replacing goods wanted 
less by goods wanted more (from the power standpoint), foreign trade enhances the potential 
military force of a country”. Secondly, the “influence effect”, which stresses that in one 
country there are “conditions which make the interruption of trade of much graver concern to 
its trading partners than itself”.111 
 The second quantitative means is the price effects as expressed in the terms of trade. 
The terms of trade indicate how much imports can be acquired with a certain volume of 
exports in exchange. It is analysed if the terms of trade of a country X turn more favourable or 
worsen while trading with country Y over a certain time.112 However, the terms of trade, and 
furthermore a mere quantitative analysis of international economic relations, have been 
subject to criticism. 113  Arguably, the analytical instruments modelled on the theoretical 
assumptions of free-trade theory become less important for an economic history perspective, 
in particular when the spotlight is trained on the interwar period. The multitude of interests, 
motives and politic aims that drove the historical actors who built up the economic 
relationships can be captured only very partially with a quantitative assessment of traded 
goods and capital flows.114 
 An institutional approach, however, seems to be well suited for a close investigation of 
the multi-layered fabric that constituted the German-Italian economic relationship. For North 
– one of the founding fathers of new institutional economics – institutions are understood as 
“rules, enforcement characteristics of rules and norms of behaviour that structure repeated 
human interaction”.115 An economic system therefore can be regarded as constituted by all the 
institutional conditions restricting the decision making of economic actors. Accordingly, my 
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thesis looks at the formulation and implementation of commercial contracts, transnational 
agreements between businesses in consortia or trade fairs and other institutions having an 
impact on the actors of the German-Italian economic relationship. Institutions “can reduce 
transaction costs and thus may contribute to a more efficient use of productive use of 
productive resources”.116 Nevertheless they are not necessarily created to be socially efficient. 
The formal rules are created to serve the interest of who has the power to create new rules.117 
Taking this quality of institutions into consideration, the thesis draws conclusions from the 
development of the institutionalised economic relationship for the overarching question of 
power in the German-Italian relationship.118 
 A focus on institutions in different national and transnational contexts requires a 
comparative perspective. A long tradition of grand comparisons between Nazi Germany and 
Fascist Italy exists. This approach is driven by the search for common features that might 
have contributed to the rise of fascist movements and regimes. In general, rather few studies 
in historiography have compared explicitly the economies of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. 
In contrast to this, the role of economic aspects has been prominently pointed out by the 
godfather of economic sociology, Polanyi, who saw the rise of fascism as a consequence of 
the condition of the market system.119 
 In Germany and Italy, comparison has had a place in historiography since the end of 
World War II. However, its conclusions and political implications (Geschichtspolitik) have 
changed over time. Under the rubric of totalitarianism, comparisons in German historiography 
and political science centered for several decades on the Soviet Union and stressed its 
similarities with National Socialism in terms of totalitarian violence. Italian fascism was only 
used as a negative foil, which made the similarities between the other regimes more striking, 
while drawing a more detailed picture of Mussolini’s regime did not seem attractive to this 
strand of research. In Italy, a similar tendency to highlight differences rather than similarities 
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emerged from the already-mentioned research perspective in the tradition of scholars like De 
Felice.120 
 Comparison as a method has remained popular despite the major changes brought by 
the end of the Cold War. In this context, it is very interesting to note that Schivelbusch’s 
comparison of National Socialism, Italian fascism and the US New Deal, which touches on 
economic aspects implicitly when discussing the shared attack against liberalism, has not been 
criticised for overstating differences but, on the contrary, for its arbitrary construction of 
similarities.121 As Patel’s comparisons of the American New Deal and Nazi Germany’s social 
policy has discovered, for instance, the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), an institution 
built to tackle the problem of mass unemployment in the Great Depression, was on a 
superficial level very similar the Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD) in Nazi Germany. However, his 
detailed analysis reveals the differences in terms of organisation and political objectives; it 
proves that the RAD was used instead as a negative example for the advancement of the 
CCC.122 
Economic aspects have only recently gained more ground in the field of 
comparison.123 Even in 1996, an edited volume comparing Fascist Italy and National Socialist 
Germany only marginally touched on the role of the economy when discussing the 
relationship between fascism and the working class and the crisis of the bourgeoisie. This is 
surprising because it was the editor’s intention to address the overall question as to what 
extent the two regimes paved the way for modernity.124 This gap in the research is about to be 
addressed. 125  An explicit comparison of the political economy of the regimes has been 
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provided by Baker. He explains historiography’s scant attention to the political economy of 
Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany through recourse to its eclecticism and lack of coherence. 
However, he points out that precisely this ability to integrate different strands of economic 
thinking found among capitalism and socialism, broadly grouped under the label of the ‘third 
way’, is a shared feature of fascist political economy.126 The common disposition to flexible 
integration triggers a research perspective that is not present in Baker’s work, but that in 
recent years has unveiled many new insights on the German-Italian relationship and thatis 
also at the heart of the thesis’ methodological orientation: the study of transfers between the 
dictatorships. 
 Transfers – targeted movements of various objects (ideas, institutions, technologies, 
political or social techniques, goods, cross-border commuters, etc.) over borders127 – are often 
mentioned in connection with debates on ‘transnationalisation’ of historiography.128 The study 
of transfers is a suitable approach to analyse the various relations (from government 
institutions to civil society) that constructed the fabric of the “Rome-Berlin Axis”. The 
concept of transfer analysis applied by this thesis is in line with comparative history.129 In 
order to correctly assess what happens during a transfer, comparisons before and after are an 
integral part of the research process.130 
 Early contributions that pointed in this direction concentrated especially on the 
perception of fascism in the crisis of the Weimar Republic and the flow of fascist ideas into 
Germany.131 This strand is still informative for the thesis, for instance, when the prologue 
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analyses the ideological foundations on which the economic relationship was built after 1929. 
Reichardt’s edited volume from 2005 is probably one of the first major studies to follow 
explicitly the strand of transfer history.132 Schieder, for example, contributes to the volume 
with a description of the fascist propagandist Giuseppe Renzetti, who travelled to Weimar 
Germany in order to build up chambers of commerce and to promote the Italian idea of 
corporatism.133 Renzetti is pre-eminent for the economic rapprochement as described in Part I 
of the thesis, and so is Schieder’s dedication to historical actors. Transfers do not happen 
without human intervention, and thus the thesis closely observes the identities of the actors 
behind a transfer. 
 Liebscher has dealt with transfers in the field of social policy with a case study on 
Kraft Durch Freude. This recreation agency was set up by the Nazi government using as a 
template the Italian example Dopolavoro. 134  Liebscher’s dissertation has broadened the 
analysis of transfers on the field of social policy.135 Fascist Italy’s social reforms were one of 
the regime’s preferred subjects for its foreign propaganda in 1927-1935, when it praised its 
political system as a global model.136 The same channels were used for these campaigns as for 
Italy’s propaganda on foreign commerce, a field that Liebscher considers as insufficiently 
covered by research.137  Her study is very useful for this thesis, as she identifies actors, 
institutions and archives for the study of transfers in social policy, which, however, are even 
more instructive for a study of transfers in economic relations.138 Liebscher also signals the 
paucity of knowledge regarding the situation in Geneva. The thesis takes up this point and 
deals in its second part, inter alia, with Italian industrialists and government officials who 
engaged in international organisations in order to enhance international support for Italy’s 
foreign economic policy. 
                                                 
132 S. Reichardt, ed., Faschismus in Italien und Deutschland: Studien zu Transfer und Vergleich (Göttingen, 
2005). 
133 Promemoria Renzetti, 12 May 1929, BArch, NL 1235/1; Cf. G. Renzetti, Der korporative Staat (Leipzig, 
1934). See W. Schieder, ʻFaschismus im politischen Transfer. Giuseppe Renzetti als faschistischer Propagandist 
und Geheimagent in Berlin 1922-1941ʼ, in Reichardt, Faschismus in Italien und Deutschland, pp. 28-58. 
134  D. Liebscher, ‚Faschismus als Modell. Die faschistische Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro und die NS-
Gemeinschaft Kraft durch Freude in der Zwischenkriegszeit‘, in ibid., pp 94-118. 
135 D. Liebscher, Freude und Arbeit: Zur internationalen Freizeit- und Sozialpolitik des faschistischen Italien und 
des NS-Regimes (Köln, 2009). 
136  B. Scholz, Italienischer Faschismus als‘Export’-Artikel (1927-1935): Ideologische und organisatorische 
Ansätze zur Verbreitung des Faschismus im Ausland (Trier, 2001). 
137 Liebscher, Freude und Arbeit, p. 38. 
138 Liebscher used the document series of the Italian Foreign Ministry’s Department of Trade Relations (1919-
1950) with a focus on social policy. However, more can be found on Italy’s economic relationships. 
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The transfer approach is far from over-worked. It is a very welcome development for 
historiography that young Italian scholars working on the German-Italian relationship are also 
paying increasing attention to transfers.139  Furthermore, recent methodological reflections 
have posed the still-open question of what triggers transfers. Is it, perhaps, a reaction to a 
perceived situation of rivalry, as the edited volume by Aust suggests?140 As against most 
extant empirical work, which considers connections between democracies rather than 
dictatorships or the flow of Opera rather than the arms trade, the authors of the Palgrave 
Dictionary of Transnational History have called on historiography to focus on the flows of 
“evil”.141 This thesis offers both: a reflection on transfers between dictatorships as well as 
between rivals in economic relations. What is more, many approaches to transnational history 
stress the role of space as a heuristic tool of historiography.142 The thesis takes up this branch 
of research and treats the construction of transnational economic areas in Southeastern Europe 
as well as the Eastern Mediterranean. As will be shown, to the construction of these areas 
transfers of institutions such as commercial contracts or transportation subsidies contributed 
in many ways. 
 




Chapter 1 stands between the conceptual remarks of the introduction and the main body of the 
thesis. It guides the reader to the topic, whereby it goes beyond the time-frame of the main 
body (Chapters 2-9). First, it looks back at important milestones in the German-Italian 
economic relationship since the late nineteenth century to better understand the changes the 
world economic crisis sparked after 1929. In addition, to specify the foundations on which the 
economic relations after the world economic crisis were built, it asks, through an explicit 
comparative perspective, how each of the countries faced the crisis. What were common 
features and major differences in terms of response mechanisms? Following this comparison, 
                                                 
139 Cf., for instance, C. Poesio, Il confino fascista: L’arma silenziosa del regime (Roma, 2011). 
140  See M. Aust, ed., Vom Gegner lernen: Feindschaften und Kulturtransfers im Europa des 19. und 20. 
Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt, 2007). 
141 P.-Y. Saunier, ʻLearning by Doing. Notes about the Making of the Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational 
Historyʼ, Journal of Modern European History, 6, 2 (2008), pp. 159-180, 170. 
142  K.K. Patel, ‘Transnationale Geschichte – Ein neues Paradigma?’, H-Soz-Kult, 2 Feb 2005, available: 
<http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/forum/id=573&type=artikel> (retrieved 16 Jul 2015). 
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the analysis goes deeper. In order to avoid constructing the two national cases as “black 
boxes,” attention is drawn to each country’s perception of the other in tackling the crisis and, 
moreover, will identify transfers in the field of economic relations. 
 
Part I: Bilateral Economic Rapprochement (Chapters 2-4) 
 
After the prologue finishes with a description of the differences and similarities in tackling the 
world economic crisis in both countries, Part I will lay bare the consequences of this 
development on bilateral economic relations. The statistics show that up to 1929, the two 
countries had diverse trade relations with Western powers and a steadily rising share in trade 
with the US. However, from then on their levels of integration into the global economy 
declined, with Germany taking the position of Italy’s major trade partner. The thesis analyses 
the structural changes in trade, and shows the repercussions with foreign policy. Did the 
economies become more complementary, or was the rapprochement rather a necessary 
consequence of the international trend towards regionalism in the aftermath of the world 
economic crisis? In other words, was the outcome intended by the policy makers, or was it 
actually undesired but accepted as inevitable? In this regard, Part I investigates the role 
ascribed to the respective other in the concepts of autarchy, which became popular as a 
reaction to the world economic crisis. Part I ends with a consideration of the conclusions that 
may be drawn from this for the crucial question of power in the German-Italian relationship. 
That is to say, did Italy become economically dependent on Germany? 
To answer these questions, Part I relies on a variety of sources. Foreign trade was in 
the period of investigation largely subdued to political control. Therefore, an analysis of the 
institutional framework which constructed the new logics of trade (quite different from the 
liberal concept of free trade) offers insights into expectations and goals of the involved actors. 
As recent studies of transfers within the “Axis” have successfully shown, the institutions of 
“official diplomacy”, the embassies, were not the only places of interaction. Central bankers, 
government officials from ministries of economy, agriculture or infrastructure, but also 
corporations and other private institutions (such as business associations or trade fairs) all 
nurtured relationships that spanned the Alps. 
 The sources used for this paper represent the variety of actors who shaped the 
German-Italian economic area. The analysis is based on previously unexploited material from 
the archives of the foreign ministries’ trade departments and consulates; other central 
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government institutions (e.g. Reichsstelle für Außenhandel; Istituto Nazionale per il 
Commercio Estero) and central banks (Reichsbank; Banca d’Italia); as well as evidence from 
private business representatives. It is particularly interesting to note that the rarely studied 
document series of the foreign ministries’ trade departments (kept at Politisches Archiv – 
Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin and Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri143 in Rome) 
bring the documentation of two crucial authorities back to life. In both countries, the archives 
of the ministries for economic affairs (Reichwirtschaftsministerium; Ministero delle 
Corporazioni) have been mostly lost, but the secondary documentation, evolving from the 
entanglement of competences with the foreign ministries’ trade departments, allows us to 
come to some understanding of these decisive authorities.144  The analysis also draws on 
reports produced by Fascist Italy’s secret police, the polizia politica or OVRA 
(Organizzazione per la Vigilanza e la Repressione dell’Antifascismo).145 Its reports provide 
unadorned accounts of the real state of the Italian economy and its relations with Germany. 
Therefore, they serve to balance the doubtlessly palliated description offered by the official 
propaganda (of course, keeping in mind that the polizia politica often based its reports on 
rumours and did not specify sources).  
More valuable information can be gleaned from the newspaper collections on 
commercial issues compiled by institutions dealing with foreign trade. These collections 
provide insightful information, as they represent attitudes by different stakeholders using 
specific newspapers as their mouthpiece (e.g. Il Popolo di Roma for Italy’s agricultural lobby). 
It can be assumed that the articles retrieved from a collection not only represent the leading 
media in covering the matters discussed, but that the content of the articles was very likely at 
the disposal of the economic operator behind the collection. The press, of course, was 
increasingly subjected to government control in the period under investigation. 
 After archival material is mined to reveal the intentions of the various stakeholders 
vis-à-vis the German-Italian economic relationship, and newspaper coverage to illustrate 
public opinions surrounding the institutional milestones, submissions by businesses and 
foreign trade statistics are consulted to confront expectations with actual performance. In 
                                                 
143 Mantelli refers in a paper on Italian archives and research into fascim to the “very interesting” and largely 
unexplored document series of the department of trade relations (1919-1950). See B. Mantelli, ‘Im Reich der 
Unsicherheit? Italienische Archive und die Erforschung des Faschismus’, in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 
53 (2005), pp. 601-614, 609. This document series provides a great deal of evidence for this thesis. 
144 Quite similarly, the economics ministries in both countries successfully invaded the competence of the foreign 
ministries to conduct trade contracts, and eventually became the leading authorities. The commercial attaches in 
Italy’s embassies, for instance, were delegated officials of the MCorp. 
145 It is not entirely clear what the abbreviation OVRA stands for. 
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addition, several actors who actively shaped German-Italian economic relations have 
published reflections on the relationship, which will also be taken into account. Of major 
importance are the works of Felice Guarneri,146 Alberto De Stefani and Mussolini’s long arm 
in Berlin, Giuseppe Renzetti, who was affiliated with different institutions of Italian foreign 
economic policy. In Germany, publications will be considered from, among others, the pen of 
Hjalmar Schacht, president of the central bank and minster of economic affairs and Ullrich 
von Hassell, German ambassador in Rome. 
 
Part II: Ambivalent Collaboration at the International Level (Chapters 5-7) 
 
Even though the analysis of the bilateral relationship will present in detail the shared 
fascination for economic autarchy, both countries remained entangled with the international 
economy. The Vossische Zeitung, Germany’s liberal newspaper of record, reflected in 1932 
that 
 …today, real economic convergence [between Germany and Italy] is only  
 possible if it creates a new economic area. Two countries alone are too weak to  
 form a new economic area. The world and especially Europe are on the move  
 to create large economic areas. Therefore every economic convergence, if  
 sustainability is intended, must be target-aimed. That means, both partners  
 must consider themselves as part of a larger economic area, and be determined  
 to fight for it. Therefore, every economic convergence reaches far into power  
 politics.147 
Accordingly, in order to assess coherently the German-Italian economic rapprochement, Part 
II looks at those international economic initiatives involving both revisionist regimes with a 
strong discontent for the post-war order of Europe and beyond. 
 Needless to say, the supporter of the political order created after World War I appraised 
with suspicion the shared initiatives. There was certainly reason for mistrust. Part II 
                                                 
146 Felice Guarneri, an economist by training, started his career in public service at the Istituto Mobiliare Italiano 
(IMI), a state holding company and predecessor of the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI), which took 
large shares in banking and industry during the world economic crisis. In 1935, Guarneri became undersecretary 
of state responsible for trade and foreign exchange. His department was promoted in 1937 into a separate 
ministry. See S. Cardarelli, F. Cotula and L. Spaventa, La politica monetaria tra le due guerre: 1919-1935 
(Roma, 1993), p. 907. Guarneri’s monumental, two-volume memoire on “economic battles” in the interwar 
period provide a rich documentation for the analysis of the German-Italian economic relationship. See F. 
Guarneri, Battaglie economiche fra le due guerre (Bologna, 1988). 
147 ‘Der unerklärte Handelskrieg’, Vossische Zeitung, 4 Mar 1932. 
32 
demonstrates, for instance, how the project of a German-Austrian customs union in 1931 was 
disguised at the international stage as an economic rescue action, but could hardly dispel 
misgivings on behalf of the opponents to the union that economic concession ultimately 
intended a greater political leverage. Fascist Italy followed the same path. Given its relative 
economic weakness and Mussolini’s foreign policy, which intended to make Italy the peso 
dominante (the decisive weight in the international arena), Fascist Italy’s foreign economic 
policy had initially tried to keep sound relationships with each of its major trading partners. 
However, with the outbreak of the world economic crisis it increasingly followed an approach 
shared with Germany. It not only adopted instruments already set into practise by the German 
government such as, for instance, import quotas and preferential commercial contracts, but it 
also independently drove forward the institutionalisation of trade in the form of bilateral 
agreements, thereby taking its share in what soon appeared to contemporary commentators as 
a common German-Italian stance. 
 Robert Fabre-Luce, a French aristocrat active in the Abendland movement, described 
in the German newspaper Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung that 
 …with every Italian I meet I constantly experience a certain sense of pride 
 that they [the Italian nation] were able to imitate the former German state 
 and to improve it according to its purpose. And in doing this, they are not 
 separated from Europe but the antithesis of Europe. In propagating 
 Antieuropa, they unconsciously do the best for Europe: because they 
 build a standard, provide an example, a pointer to the future.148 
Part II shows how the idea of Antieuropa, understood as a German and Italian counter-concept 
to liberal free trade, also guiding their plans in constructing their economic relationships with 
Europe and beyond. 
 Similarities do not necessarily imply collaboration. As contributions from transfer 
history have pointed out, even between the borders of the polarised cold war world transfers 
of knowledge influenced the formulation of similar policies on both sides of the iron curtain 
(e.g. Taylorism), without of course providing for a political rapprochement.149 Despite the 
similarities of the German and Italian stance, this relationship was far from rival-free. 
Therefore, this chapter aims at not only adding an important cornerstone to the analysis of the 
                                                 
148 R. Fabre-Luce, ‘Was kann Europa vom Faschismus erwarten?’, Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 Jan 1930. 
149 See M. Aust and D. Schönpflug, ʻVom Gegner lernenʼ, in Aust, Vom Gegner lernen, pp. 9-35. 
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political economy of fascism and Nazism in the Great Depression, but also at drawing 
inferences about the German-Italian economic relationship. 
 In terms of structure, Part II starts with presenting the big picture of the international 
dimension of the German-Italian economic relationship. Subsequently, the analysis refocuses 
on the institution which, albeit new to the diplomatic stage, became a major forum for 
discussions on the international economic order: the League of Nations. One region caught 
the particular attention of the League. In Southeastern Europe, World War I ended with the 
collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman Empire, and the rise of several new nation- 
states. The League took from its foundation a great share in the economic reconstruction and 
development of these countries as it supervised many of the international loans granted to the 
new states.150 However, after the outbreak of the economic crisis, which was particularly 
severe in Southeastern Europe, the League’s impact reached unprecedented levels when it set 
up relief programmes for the debtor countries in economic crisis. This happened concurrently 
with Germany’s and Italy’s reinforced expansionist desires for the same region. Hence, the 
analysis hones in on Germany’s and Italy’s involvement in the League’s economic and 
financial work. The thesis asks how Germany and Italy attempted to align the League’s 
agenda with their own foreign economic expansion, and what role their rivalries played in this 
regard. Moreover, it signals the longer-lasting impact the discussion at the League had on both 
countries’ foreign economic policies. 
This chapter, then, is a crucial connector between the bilateral economic 
rapprochement as described in Part I, and the German-Italian clashes in the actual penetration 
of the markets in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, as described in Part III. 
To keep these three topics together, a decision was taken against a chronological order. While 
Part I deals with the bilateral relationship between 1929 and 1936, Part II starts with the 
analysis of the international dimension again in 1929 and finishes in 1933. Part III covers the 
international dimension between 1933 and 1936. 
  Sources have been collected from national archives in Germany, Italy and the United 
States, but also from the archives of the League of Nations at UNOG in Switzerland. This 
twofold documentation allows for distinguishing the (tactical) international rhetoric present at 
the official level from the underlying targets concerned with the national interest only.151 
                                                 
150  Cf. Clavin, Securing the world economy; Y. Decorzant, La Société des Nations et la naissance d’une 
conception de la régulation économique internationale (Bruxelles, 2011). 
151 This twofold perspective has been claimed in an early account on research on the League of Nations. See P.L. 
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Moreover, it helps to identify different levels of economic co-operation and rivalries between 
the two major ultra-nationalist regimes of the interwar period. 
 
Part III: The Quest for New Markets – Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean 
(Chapters 8 and 9) 
 
The third and last part of the thesis demonstrataes the degree to which the economic 
expansion of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy after 1933 built on the experience officials 
acquired while working at the League of Nations. German and Italian former League experts 
like Hans Posse or Fulvio Suvich became high-profile foreign economic policy makers after 
they moved from Geneva to their respective capitals. They brought with them valuable and 
even confidential information they had acquired in dealing as delegates directly with national 
governments and economies in crisis. Furthermore, the commercial instruments applied after 
1933 still bore evidence of means to attenuate the crisis, which were elaborated before 1933. 
Of particular interest are Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean (which, as the 
thesis shows, are not always clearly divided in the sources) because these regions were the 
common intersection of both foreign economic policies.152 The roles which the respective 
other had in policy concepts with regard to the regions is identified, as is the way in which the 
concepts shaped each other. 
 Finally, Part III addresses the question of how the policies were implemented in the 
markets and what conclusions can be drawn when the development in the “periphery” is 
confronted with the dynamics of the bilateral relationship, as described in Part I. More 
precisely, did Germany’s and Italy’s economic expansion coexist with mutual benefits? That 
                                                                                                                                                        
Orsi, ʻL’archivio della Società delle nazioni e la politica italianaʼ, Rivista di storia contemporanea, 10, 2 (1981), 
p. 282-291, 286. 
152  There are good reasons to include Latin America into this thesis. Not only were its markets a major 
battleground between the US and Germany/Italy, it potentially bears much evidence on the economic rivalries 
between Germany and Italy on third-party markets that will be analysed in Part III. However, the decision was 
made not to include it because, first, the consulted documentation on third-market rivalries refers more 
extensively to the regions covered; second, the political dimension of the economic relationships was 
significantly lower than the ones with Southeastern European states (major targets of revisionist claims); and 
third, no substantial explanatory gains that would justify the inclusion in the limited amount of space therefore 
seem likely. Furthermore, one could possibly argue that also Ethiopia, which became part of imperial Italy in 
1936, should have been treated as well. However, studies that deal with German-Italian economic co-operation 
already exist. See L. Montazel, ʻLa coopération économique germano-italienne en Ethiopie (1936-1941)ʼ, in G. 
Bender, R.M. Kiesow and D. Simon, eds., Die andere Seite des Wirtschaftsrechts: Steuerung in den Diktaturen 
des 20. Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt am Main, 2006), pp. 225-256; Rieder, Deutsch-italienische 
Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, pp. 77-82. Moreover, the history of the war in Ethiopia, and its subsequent integration 
into the empire, would be difficult to bring in line with the time frame of this thesis. 
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is, were attempts made to collaborate, or did the achievements of one mean significant losses 
for the other? The guiding questions of Part III, therefore, allow us to complete the circle 
opened with the questions raised in Part I, and eventually come to the conclusion of the thesis. 
 To address the questions posed in Part III, the same trio of contemporary research 
literature, publications by relevant actors and archival sources from institutions in the field of 
foreign economic policy is used as for the study of the bilateral economic relationship. 
Especially Southeastern Europe and its economic relationship with Mitteleuropa (Central 
Europe) has drawn much attention from research institutions like the Institut für 
Weltwirtschaft (Institute for the World Economy).153 Studies as Francescon-Centa’s (1937) 
publication on Italy’s foreign economic policy address both trade with Germany and, for 
instance, the “steering of exports into the countries of the Levant”.154 As the chapter is about 
actual economic interpenetration of the markets in Southeastern Europe (particularly Austria, 
Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania) and the Eastern Mediterranean (Turkey, Egypt, 
Palestine, Iraq), much weight is given to documents providing evidence of business activities.
                                                 
153 Cf. David, Nationalisme économique, p. 22. 
154 Francescon-Centa, Die Außenhandelspolitik. 
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1. From the Late Nineteenth Century to the 1920s 
 
Since in May 1882, when the first trains passed the Gotthard massif, and the whole European 
continent was marvelling at this technical milestone, Germans and Italians developed entirely 
new perspectives for their trade. The “industrial triangle”, as the interconnected cluster of 
Turin, Genoa and Milan in northern Italy is called, was now directly connected with Central 
Europe by rail. 
 At the same time, German goods became more and more popular in Italy. This was 
because parallel to the political alienation between Italy and France due to an unsolved 
“Roman question” and the colonial struggle for North Africa, the attractiveness of the French 
market eroded. In 1886, the French market was still receiving 44.3 per cent of Italian 
exports.156 With the Franco-Italian trade war starting in 1888, and a series of protectionist 
demands and measures that seriously affected the exchange of goods between the sorelle 
latine,157 German goods received a new opportunity.158 The transalpine integration of the two 
economies was politically backed by Italian Prime Minister Francesco Crispi, who took over 
in 1887, and his orientation towards the triple alliance (Dreibund) with Germany and Austria-
Hungary. 159  The German-Italian commercial contract, concluded on 6 December 1891, 
implied for German exporters tariff concessions to all goods that replaced French products on 
the Italian market.160 
 The “late comer”, Italy was during this time still in the midst of a transformation from 
a largely agrarian economy, which saw individual initiatives of industrialisation. It was 
                                                 
155 Chapter 1: Prologue – Framing the German-Italian Economic Relationship is based on my unpublished MA 
thesis. See P. Tiedtke, Ökonomie der Achse. Wirtschaftliche Aspekte der deutsch-italienischen Beziehungen 
zwischen der Weltwirtschaftskrise und dem Zusammenbruch 1945 (Unpublished MA thesis, Uninversität Bonn, 
2009). 
156 Zamagni, The economic history of Italy, p. 123. 
157 Still in 1936, German Ambassador in Rome Ulrich von Hassell denominates Italy and France as the Latin 
sisters, see U. von Hassell, and U. Schlie, Römische Tagebücher und Briefe: 1932-1938 (München, 2004), p. 254. 
158 Cf. H. Afflerbach, Der Dreibund: Europäische Großmacht- und Allianzpolitik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg 
(Wien, 2002), pp. 242-259. 
159 Cf. von Oswald, Die deutsche Industrie, p. 42. 
160 Cf. P. Schubert, Die deutsch-italienischen Handelsbeziehungen von der Gründung des Königreiches Italien 
bis zur Gegenwart (Bielefeld, 1930), pp. 80-81. 
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decisive for the future character of the Italian economy that these initiatives were carried out 
largely in the regions of northern and central Italy, thus shaping the still-existing economic 
north-south divide for the industrial age. While in northern Italy, 36 per cent of the general 
working population was in industry and 42 per cent in agriculture, on the national level only 
less than a third of the work force was industrial.161 The economic upswing had to face 
setbacks at times, showing all in all an uneven picture of the Italian industrialisation.162 A 
telling description provides a report of the director of the German Archaeological Institute in 
Rome, Ludwig Curtius, who travelled to Italy in 1900 and referred to “flourishing industries” 
in northern Italy and public letter writers for the illiterate population of Naples.163 
 The German economy passed, in the last decade before the turn of the century, the 
decisive stage towards the industrial age. More people were working in industry and the 
tertiary sector than in agriculture. As a consequence of the still-increasing population, 
agricultural goods and raw materials were in short supply. The capital formation, however, 
increased, and finally the surplus enabled a linkage with other countries’ markets to increase 
profits and sales opportunities.164 The comparison of Germany’s and Italy’s level of economic 
development Italy highlights the import and export requirements that would define trade 
between Germany and Italy for the future. 
 In order to ensure the expansion of production, Germany increasingly demanded raw 
materials on the world market. Since Italy barely possessed mineral resources, Germany 
discovered the Mediterranean market primarily as a supplier of agriculture goods.165 Among 
the Italian raw material exports, silk became, with more than half of total exports, Italy’s 
export hit.166 Within the category “food and beverages”, Germany received southern fruits on 
a preferable basis. The export of industrially manufactured goods was in importance far 
behind the first two positions. To sum up, German imports from Italy consisted mainly of 
goods that were not essential for the German economy, and thus only represented a small part 
of total imports. They rather served to attain a certain quality of life. In addition, demand was 
                                                 
161 See Knox, ʻExpansionist Zealʼ, p. 115. 
162 An overview of the divergent research reconstructions of the Italian phases of industrialisation provides 
Zamagni, The economic history of Italy, pp. 75-109. 
163 Jahresberichte der deutsch-italienischen Handelskammer (1928), p. 13. 
164 H.-W. Hahn, Die industrielle Revolution in Deutschland (München, 1998), pp. 46-47. 
165 Cf. H. Klein-Berlin, ʻProbleme der italienischen Wirtschaftsentwicklungʼ, in E. Wunderlich, ed., Italien: 
Moderne Entwicklungen und Probleme (Stuttgart, 1932), pp. 23-38. 
166 See B. Höpfner, Der deutsche Außenhandel 1900-1945 (Frankfurt a.M., 1993), p. 323. Other goods of the 
category raw materials: flax, hemp, jute, fur, sulphur and marble. See Schubert, Die deutsch-italienischen 
Handelsbeziehungen, p. 98. 
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less constant, since a good harvest in Germany automatically reduced demand of agricultural 
products from Italy. 
In Italy, however, imports were characterised by the yet-early stage of industrialisation, 
creating especially a demand for industrial finished goods, semi-finished goods and foreign 
capital. In the 1890s, the class “textiles and fabrics” still dominated the statistics, whereas, 
with the turn of the century, the class “machines, instruments and vehicles” and “iron and 
steel goods” captured the top positions among exported goods. In the first decade of the 
twentieth century, the products of the German chemical and pharmaceutical industry reached 
second place in the trade statistics, which also for the first time contained products of the 
electro-technical industry.167 The only position in the class of raw materials that increasingly 
rose in importance was the commodity group of “hard coal and coke deliveries”.168 Even 
better for the German export, imports in these classes were barely or not at all burdened by 
Italy’s customs policy. 
 The structure of exports to Italy was largely consistent with Germany’s total export, 
which specialised in industrial products and manufactured goods. In contrast, Italian imports 
from Germany were compared with Italy’s total imports of a completely different character. 
This highlights the success of German interest against international competition on the Italian 
market, which reached at the beginning of the twentieth century a dominant position in a 
number of industries.169 
 This success was due to the strategy of the German business community, active on the 
Italian market. A contemporary observer certified that German merchants were scrupulous 
about maintaining direct contact with their customers. With their distinct language skills, the 
Germans were able to ferret out market needs and desires. Once the needs were identified, the 
German companies not only offered goods customised for the Italian market within a very 
short time, they also presented them in catalogues with Italian prices and weights so that their 
import character was rather veiled. The direct rail connection made it easier to deliver the 
goods to the customer’s door and not, as was common when ordering from the UK, to the 
water’s edge of a British port. The personal relationship established between German 
                                                 
167 Hertner, ʻThe German electrotechnical industryʼ, pp. 155-172. 
168 For a detailed description of the balance of trade see Schubert, Die deutsch-italienischen Handelsbeziehungen, 
p. 104. 
169 In the years before World War I, German finished goods were able to increase their market share to 46.9 per 
cent. The electro-technical industry provided 70 per cent of generators, 65 per cent of transformers, and 60 per 
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merchants and Italian customers allowed them to assess more precisely credit quality, as well 
as enabling them to issue long-term loans on terms which cut out the other trade 
competitors.170 
Not only German goods, but also German capital, stimulated the young Italian 
industries. German companies took part in operations of various branches of industry and the 
capital market where they suspected development opportunities and lucrative prospects.171 In 
addition, foreign direct investments of multinational corporations in Italy brought along cost 
advantages because it reduced expanses for customs duties and transportation on a developing 
market.172 The foundation of the big Italian universal banks (Banca Commerciale Italiana and 
Credito Italiano) was largely influenced by the German financial industry.173 
 On the eve of World War I, after two decades of growth during the Giolitti area,174 and 
in an atmosphere of expanding Italian nationalism, fewer and fewer voices perceived the 
exchange of “golden oranges and scented lemons [against] machinery and colours”175 as a 
profitable investment, but as a sort of “economic imperialism”176 and a threat to domestic 
industrial development. In Italian business circles, mistrust increased against the tedeschi,177 
who were suspected of an unfair policy of dumping. For instance, the German steel producer 
association was explicitly accused of keeping the prices so low that they did not even cover 
the cost of production, and therefore stifled the development of the Italian steel industry.178 
 Another accusation insinuated that German entrepreneurs would engage in industrial 
espionage on a grand scale. In the textile industry, according to the historian and 
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contemporary propagandist Ezio Gray, German negotiators obtained secret patterns from 
fashion houses in Paris and delivered them to German manufacturers for mass production. 
With low prices and stolen ideas, “the German Mastino invades with brutal attacks” the 
Italian market, so went the accusation.179 
Although this example with all its sharpness is only anecdotal evidence of the public 
mood, a systematic evaluation of German influence on the young industries of electrical and 
mechanical engineering, chemical and pharmaceutical industries concludes that the German 
dominant trading position inhibited or even prevented the establishment of Italian 
productions.180  This is one aspect that should be taken into consideration throughout the 
investigation of the inter-war period and the attempts of fascism to detach from the influence 
of other economies. 
 World War I notably changed the German-Italian economic relationship for both 
protagonists. With the treaty of Versailles, Germany lost all property abroad, and also had to 
pay reparations to the victorious powers (including Italy). The secessions of territory in the 
East changed the raw material and food supply of the German economy, and the new states 
had still to be integrated into a functioning trading system.181 
 Italy was able to strengthen its position, confidently entering the trade negotiations, 
which paved the way to the post-war reconstruction period. Although the Regno was among 
the first Entente powers that started trade negotiations with Germany, Rome still took 
advantage of the trade discrimination against Germany, established by the treaties of 
Versailles.182 Rome imposed on its German trading partner the unilateral, unconditional most- 
favourable treatment of Italian goods on the German market. The most-favoured-nation clause, 
one of the pillars of a liberal conception of free trade, provides that two states concluding a 
foreign trade agreement take the goods of the contractual partner on the same favourable 
terms that have been granted to other trade competitors.183 Unlike imports from the US and 
France, which were in value as in volume increasing more and more, German goods no longer 
enjoyed equal treatment on the Italian market in the first half of the 1920s.184 A reason for 
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Rome’s early attempt to re-open formal trade talks with Germany lays in the fact that the 
Italian industry was not yet able to compensate for the lack of highly specialised German 
products. However, the negotiators tried to impede a dominance that would allow the German 
economy to “invade” the Italian market again. 
 In this way, a young domestic industry should be supported, which in the years of war 
and cut commercial ties had taken the opportunity to gain market shares in sectors previously 
dominated by foreign goods.185 During war, the state had massively increased its demand in 
weapons, machinery, explosives, ships and motor vehicles. Subsequently, not only the Italian 
heavy industry prospered in the post-war period. In the absence of coal deliveries, the energy 
industry had discovered hydro-power as “white coal”. Furthermore, the machine and precision 
engineering industry and especially the chemical industry breached into various new market 
segments.186 The growth of export-oriented industries benefited from inflation during the first 
post-war years, the reduction of debts, increasing investments and a favourable exchange rate 
situation owed to a relatively weak lira.187 
 Yet, enthusiasm was by no means undivided. Victims of the new trade policy were not 
only German industrialists, who had to overcome even harder obstacles after Rome 
introduced a new customs tariff act in 1921. The Italian farmers, who still represented a 
powerful element of the society, were afraid that its best “customer” Germany would also 
regulate imports of agricultural products from Italy in response to the protectionist measures 
of Rome’s industrial policy.188 
 The Italian advances in industrialisation can be grasped as well from the trade statistics 
of the 1920s. On the one hand, the proportion of semi-finished and finished goods among 
Italy’s exports could be increased.189 On the other hand, the demand for German coal grew 
rapidly because even the enlarged Italian hydroelectric plants could no longer satisfy the still-
growing energy needs of the Italian industry. The German iron and steel industry, as well as 
the textile industry, could not achieve the pre-war volume of their sales and joined the ranks 
of the victims of the post-war order. In a few sectors, where an Italian production only 
recently had taken ground such as in mechanical engineering, the chemical industry and 
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electrical engineering, specialised German goods could achieve or even surpass the pre-war 
sales volume in some years. But on the whole, in the 1920s German-Italian trade in these 
sectors was subject to turbulent and irregular fluctuations.190 
 Certainly responsible for trade fluctuations and increasing protectionist obstacles was 
the increased state influence on commerce. Unlike its competitors Britain and France, which 
had established chambers of commerce in Italy before World War I, German authorities used 
to be satisfied with the economic reports written by the consulates’ diplomats. Immediately 
after the war, the Auswärtiges Amt (AA) established foreign trade agencies, whose function 
was eventually taken over by the private news agency Wirtschaftliche Nachrichtendienst 
GMBH.191 It was not until 1921 that the first chambers of commerce in Genoa and Milan were 
established.192 In the same year, envoys of the two countries agreed on the formation of a 
bilateral and evenly borne chamber of commerce in Frankfurt am Main. Its tasks included the 
settlement of trade and delivery disputes as well as the provision of information on suppliers 
and potential customers. Furthermore, it distributed information on passport matters, 
transportation and all applicable fees, and therefore facilitated transalpine trade.193 
 After the international restrictions on Germany’s foreign trade were lifted in 1925, the 
German government immediately attempted to return to the favourable trade conditions that 
existed prior to World War I. The result was the conclusion of the German-Italian commercial 
treaty on 31 October 1925. Previously, the stabilisation of the Reichsmark had inhibited the 
sales of German products on the Italian market. Simultaneously, signals were sent from Italy 
that German goods were still in demand and that concessions regarding tariff issues were 
possible. Most significantly, the treaty ended the discrimination toward German trade, and 
bound both countries to mutual most-favoured-nation obligations. In exchange for greater 
accommodation of Italian agricultural products, Germany accomplished a reduction of 
customs duties for many of its manufactured goods. However, these concessions did not 
include to the same extent the sectors of electrical and chemical products, due to strong 
domestic interest and reservations.194 
 With the conclusion of the contract in 1925, many stakeholders expressed hopes that 
commercial relations finally would be kept on an even keel. However, barely a year after 
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signing the contract, a major intervention of the fascist regime in the economy caused new 
ripple effects in trade. After the Italian economy had experienced an economic upswing in the 
first half of the 1920s,195 the forecasts darkened progressively since mid-decade. The deficit in 
the balance of payments increased constantly because, among other factors, the remittances of 
many Italian emigrants went into decline.196 Subsequently, the lira lost value, which resulted 
in rising costs for the industries with huge import requirements. At the same time, public debt 
and the tax burden on citizens increased, who now were forced to reduce their savings 
deposits. Parts of the Italian population responded with open protest and strikes to this 
perceived threat to their economic wellbeing.197 As inflation was heading for ever-higher rates 
and the value of the lira was under continual pressure in the summer of 1926,198 Mussolini 
decided to act in order to save the international reputation of the Italian economy. 
  In his famous speech on 18 August 1926 in Pesaro, the Duce announced a policy 
termed, “quota 90”, with which he proposed to fight a “battle of the lira [...] till death”.199 The 
lira was dramatically appreciated, reaching an exchange rate of 92.46 Lire per pound sterling, 
a level last reached in 1922, the year of Mussolini’s “March on Rome”. This reform was 
anything but uncontroversial, and for a long time it had seemed as if a policy of “quota 
120”,200 suggested by Italian Finance Minister Giuseppe Volpi, would prevail. Volpi merely 
intended to moderate inflation and received support from business representatives of 
traditional and emerging, export-orientated industries. The rigid policy of deflation, which 
stood behind Mussolini’s demand for a “quota 90”, however, favoured domestic electrical, 
chemical and heavy industries that had focused its sales strategy on government contracts and 
the Italian market. Its high import requirements could be met by the appreciation at much 
lower costs.201 Given the unequal impact on certain interest groups of the Italian economy, it 
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is no wonder that the “quota 90” has been considered as Mussolini’s “most controversial 
measure […] before 1929”.202 
 Since 1926, world trade had experienced a cyclical upturn, but the picture in Germany 
and Italy was a different one. In the latter, the value of exports decreased steadily since 1925 
(mostly due to the “quota 90”), and did not experience growth until 1928.203 Germany, instead, 
was able to take advantage of the global economic trend and increased in the second half of 
the 1920s the value of its exports.204 In 1929, when the world went into crisis, the German 
market absorbed up to 11.7 per cent of Italian exports and thus acquired the second position 
among Italy’s customers. Among Italy’s main suppliers, the German economy was with a 
share of 14.2 per cent only beaten by the US (see Table 4). 
 
2. The Impact of the World Economic Crisis 
 
The bankruptcy of the Austrian bank Creditanstalt in May 1931 was a crucial moment in the 
world economic crisis. Immediately thereafter, German banks too encountered existential 
financial difficulties. The government was forced to apply extreme measures, and closed 
banks to protect them against bank runs. In addition, the government introduced far-reaching 
measures to curb the flight of gold and protect foreign exchange reserves. 205  Once the 
monetary flow was cut unilaterally with exchange controls, Germany’s creditors, particularly 
in Europe’s largest financial centre, the city of London, came under pressure. On 21 
September 1931, the Bank of England responded by ending the tie of the currency to gold, 
and thus the role as an “invisible conductor of the international orchestra” it had possessed 
throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century.206 
 With this day, the attempt to build an international financial system based on the gold 
standard finally failed. Due to the relatively rigid regulations of the gold standard, individual 
governments had not been able to respond with an expansionary monetary policy to economic 
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problems. Schumpeter called it the “golden brake on the credit machine”.207 During times of 
global economic balance, it used to have the advantage that economic problems were limited 
to their place of origin. However, as the global economy started losing ground, the gold 
standard accelerated the spread of the problems in a way never seen before.208 The Bank of 
England’s decision to abandon the gold standard and devalue the currency caused such an 
alarming effect that within a very short time 24 countries followed this example. In the 
summer of 1932, in Europe only France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland and 
Italy refused to give in to the trend. The countries of the so-called gold bloc hoped to keep 
with the gold standard their commercial relationships sound.209 
 In Italy, a banking crisis could be curtailed before it unfolded completely. When the 
two universal banks Credito Italiano and Banca Commerciale faced bankruptcy, the state 
responded with a massive financial support programme. In return, the state decreed that the 
banks change their holding and investment strategies within the industrial sector, and thus 
provided for a stronger state involvement in the private sector.210 In general, the Italian public 
hardly registered or even commented on the precarious bank situation. In informal meetings 
with the head of the Italian financial industry, the fascist regime succeeded in adopting the 
measures in secret. Thereby, it stripped the crisis of its mass psychological aspect.211 
 With the averted banking crisis in mind, some observers have classified the 
macroeconomic impact of the world economic crisis on Italy as much less severe than its 
impact on most other countries. This assessment is also supported with reference to the Italian 
GDP, which only fell by two per cent between 1929 and 1932. A more detailed evaluation of 
the different production sectors reveals, however, that the Italian industrial production 
declined in the same period by 14 per cent, and was thus harder hit by the worldwide slump in 
demand than, for example, the industry of Britain.212 The situation in Italy was the result of 
the specific level of industrialisation, which on the peninsula was still lagging behind the 
European trend. While sectors such as agriculture, construction and public administration 
neither shrank nor grew, sectors such as the already-mentioned lending and insurance business, 
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the service sector and industries stimulated by public demand (e.g. electricity) were able to 
balance the significant losses in general industrial production. 
 To the production figures, historiography added the development of unemployment to 
support the argument of a weak crisis’ impact in Italy. In Germany, the decline in production 
had devastating consequences. One of three employable citizens was unemployed at the 
height of the crisis. Official figures alone reported six million registered unemployed, and at 
the same time suppressed figures for the many unreported victims of the price decline in 
agriculture.213 For Italy, Maddison has estimated on the basis of official statistics an increase 
in unemployment of 4 per cent for the period from 1929 to 1932, 214  which was only 
outperformed by the employment development in France, which was thanks to its large gold 
reserves less affected after the collapse of the gold standard.215 In contrast, a study by Toniolo 
concludes that unemployment figures shoot up between 1929 and 1932-33, from 300,000 to 
over a million. The discrepancy can be explained because Toniolo assumes that Italy’s still 
quite-significant agricultural sector acted as a “sponge sector”, whereby many of the newly 
unemployed were not covered by the official statistic.216 
 The Great Depression undoubtedly hit Germany harder than Italy. By all accounts, the 
industrial power, internationally connected with other economies by a strong and growing 
export as well as the obligation to pay reparations after the lost war, was in the midst of the 
events that triggered the crisis. And even if the difficulties arising for the economies in crisis 
had the same macroeconomic causes, they developed in most countries – and not only in Italy 
– in very different ways. Making the sweeping statement that Italy had been spared from the 
world economic crisis would reduce the complexity of economic development and lead to an 
inadequate assessment of the situation in Italian industry. 
 Over the course of the crisis, fundamental institutions governing foreign commerce 
wavered. Many citizens lost their confidence in the liberal theory of the self-regulating forces 
of the market, which had had a major impact since the beginning of the industrial age. Among 
the accusers of free trade were not only scientifically arguing economists, but also the highest 
leaders of the fascist and Nazi movements in search of a common denominator to disguise 
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their ideological pragmatism.217 In 1929, Mussolini proudly proclaimed that the Italians had 
been the first in declaring that the individual freedom has to be limited as the more complex 
civilisation become”.218 From the perspective of fascism, he named the guilty party and a way 
out of the crisis. The doctrine of individualism would have misled the economic operator to 
selfish and only-for-profit behaviour. Due to the increasing complexity of the global economy, 
this had undermined and eventually also caused the collapse of international trust. The Duce 
set the value of individual freedom against the value of the “absolutist state”, which would 
have an impact on all areas of life and thus pave the way for a “state capitalism”.219 Felice 
Guarneri, director of the Banco di Roma, and one of the most influential economists of the 
fascist regime,220 held the opinion that World War I was the beginning of the collapse of 
liberal free trade. Guarneri commented in a lecture at the Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel 
Institute for the World Economy) that during the post-war period the “death blow” to free 
trade was dealt by the Versailles decisions on reparations and political borders, a trend 
towards tougher protectionism, barriers in the movement of goods, persons and capital and the 
general uncertainty in financial markets and government policies.221 
 Likewise in Germany, criticism of liberalism arose with the Nazi seizure of power to a 
level of state doctrine. At the same time, the agitators could refer to a long tradition of thought 
that ranged from Hegel, Friedrich List and Karl Marx, to a contemporary of National 
Socialism, Werner Sombart, which embarked on a path beyond individualism. Although 
Germany, a nation-state that experienced its first major economic crisis (“Gründerkrach”) 
only two years after its formation, joined the ranks of the most industrialised nations in the 
late nineteenth century, the influence of that tradition of thought increased.222 Representatives 
of the NSDAP, as the head of the foreign trade department of the party, Werner Daitz, 
regarded liberalism only as a degenerate remnant of ideology that expresses the “lower ethics 
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of international traders”. 223  Hitler himself warned in Mein Kampf of “an extreme 
internationalisation of the German economy”, and called for a fight against the system of 
“enslavement of labour under capital” practised by liberalism.224 
 Particularly in Germany, the criticism was formulated in racial categories. The 
individual according to the völkische ideology could only be “free” to the extent that its 
nation (Volk) would enjoy “freedom”.225 But international trade since the nineteenth century 
would be characterised by an unequal distribution of this freedom. Especially those people 
that should have appeared as guardians of the principle of equal distribution due to their 
favoured economic position had insisted merely on maintaining their share and thus fomented 
the disappointment of the “havenots”.226 In Italy, it was not so much the völkische ideology 
built on race and a related living space (Lebensraum), but rather a political culture of 
“latinity”, understood as a historical bond between the fascist regime and ancient Rome, that 
opposed individualism.227 
 While looking for alternatives, critics of liberalism in Germany as well as Italy called 
for a strong state, which acted on a self-contained, if possible self-sufficient market devoid of 
any international impact. These principles characterised the doctrine of autarchy. As an 
“economic ideal of nationalism”,228 autarchy should guide the restructuring of the economy in 
a fundamental way.229 The objective of economic growth changed, and no longer aimed at 
“external growth”, because the depression impeded extensive and constant increases in trade. 
Instead the major objective became “internal growth”.230 
 In the Great Depression, British economist John Maynard Keynes recommended that 
governments, in particular those seriously hit by the crisis, engage the army of unemployed 
citizens “to dig holes in the ground and then fill them up”, in order to stimulate domestic 
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demand, and ultimately, the entire economy.231 As a result, governments in the industrialised 
world resorted to drastic measures to prepare the ground for new economic upswings by 
improving the desperate labour-market situation.232 Even abroad there was the impression that 
Hitler, too, followed the advice of Keynes, and was engaging the unemployed masses to 
engage in “straightening the Crooked Lake, painting the Black Forest white and putting down 
linoleum in the Polish Corridor”.233 What is, however, still not widely known is that he was 
able to build on the successes of the economic stimulus and job creation programs of the 
Papen and Schleicher governments, and progressed along the very same path. Neither in 
format nor in substance did the Nazis add new initiatives to these programmes. Nevertheless, 
they understood having the measures celebrated by the state propaganda such that the 
impression of a regime dedicated to work arose. The extent of investments also did not 
increase significantly, and only 29 per cent of the RM 5.1 billion spent on job creation in the 
period between 1932 to 1934 was invested after 1933 and the seizure of power.234 
 Next to these continuities in labour market policies of the presidential cabinets of the 
Weimar Republic and the Hitler government, there was also a significant difference. Hitler 
regarded economic policy merely as a subcategory of power politics,235 which served already 
at an early stage for military build-up and expansion.236 The successes that eventually were 
achieved led to a labour shortage in 1937 and gave the illusion that the Nazi job-creation 
scheme was a sample piece of Keynesian interventionist policy. Such a judgment, however, is 
misguided, as it fails to take into consideration the nature of the Nazi economic and labour 
market policy. In contrast to Keynes’ postulation of suspending state intervention once full 
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employment is nearly achieved, the measures had to continue to contribute to the armament 
programs. 
 The Italian state responded in a similar way once the demand situation deteriorated in 
the private sector and unemployment became a threat to broad sections of the population. 
With a number of publicly funded projects, for example, new land was cultivated. As in the 
case of the reclamation of the Pontine Marshes, which had been attempted already in ancient 
Rome, state propaganda accompanied these initiatives with triumphal proclamations. 
Initiatives such as the expansion of the Italian road network and especially the connection of 
commercial centres by road highways also served as a model for investments in Germany.237 
 To combat the effects of the economic crisis, the fascist regime went beyond the fields 
of labour-market and monetary policies, which were reformed somehow in almost every 
crisis-affected country. Under the policy of corporatism, the regime interfered severely in the 
relationship between the state and private sector. Mussolini used corporatism as a tool to 
organise and standardise the productive forces, to increase wealth, power and the well-being 
of the Italian nation.238 Since the early years of the fascist movement, opinion leaders had 
demanded a union of workers, employees and enterprises of the same production sector in one 
corporation.239 The private initiative of entrepreneurs and private capital should be maintained, 
but fully benefit the interest of the nation. According to Minister of Justice Alfredo Rocco, the 
state assumed the role of “watchdog” over the corporate economy, which neither gives in to 
market forces, nor takes control of the entire production. 240  With this definition, Rocco 
separated corporatism from classical liberalism on the one hand and socialism on the other, 
which was a typical element of fascist thinking and propaganda claiming to represent the 
“third way”.241 
 The implementation of the concept lagged far behind ambitions, and for many years 
struggled for consensus. Only the economic crisis generated considerable impetus for change. 
With the economic constitution of 1934, 22 corporations were created, divided along sector 
lines, whose impact on the paper, however, was still far stronger than it was in real economic 
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life.242 Of far greater relevance for the private sector was the founding of the Istituto per la 
ricostruzione industriale (Institute for Industrial Reconstruction IRI). The core business of the 
public holding company included the reorganisation of the debt market, which had gotten into 
difficulties in response to the banking crisis, as well as winding up collapsed companies. The 
institute, originally intended as a temporary solution, was eventually able to play a decisive 
role in the Italian industry. As early as 1933, it controlled about 48.5 per cent of the Italian 
stock capital.243 With IRI, the fascist regime was able to implement its preference for big 
businesses, and to launch consolidations in the sectors deemed strategically important.244 
Typically, the corporate elites were not concerned about the large-scale state 
involvement. Although it happened that besides the financial involvement, structural changes 
up to the appointment of a “trusted board” were enforced,245 the majority of entrepreneurs 
appreciated the state becoming a shareholder. Particularly those sectors could benefit that had 
been less attractive for private capital.246 The position of the entrepreneurs was strengthened 
by the appointment of its lobby organisation Confindustria, which had been in operation since 
1910, to an official body the economic administration.247 Henceforth, the entrepreneurs were 
committed in inter-ministerial and inter-corporate committees and further strengthened the 
ties between the state and private businesses.248 
 According to the Duce, the policy of autarchy was not to be satisfied with influencing 
the private business sector, but should “come close to the people – reducing the distance”.249 
The consequence was a direct influence of the state on its citizens’ production and 
consumption. Productions were no longer assessed solely by virtue of their cost efficiency, but 
also by taking political objectives into consideration. Thus, the current pricing mechanism of 
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a market economy was undermined and replaced by centrally planned economy elements, as 
they were formulated in the autarchy plans of 1935/36.250 
 Italian fascism, and especially its corporatist organisation of the economy, was 
perceived in the late Weimar Republic as exceptionally modern. 251  The most widely 
recognised experts among the many admirers of Italian fascism in Germany were Ludwig 
Bernhard, professor of economics in Berlin; representatives of the Ordoliberalismus252 such as 
Erwin von Beckerath and Alfred Müller-Armack, and publicists like Fritz Schotthöfer and 
Hans Reupke.253 The image of a state, able to organise the economy according to its political 
goals, was heavily supported by the fascist propaganda.254 From Italy, the emigrated German 
sociologist Robert(o) Michels, who became in 1928 a professor of economics and corporatism 
at the University of Perugia, actively influenced the perception of fascism in Germany.255 
Moreover, the multipliers of Italian fascism in Germany often possessed institutional 
affiliations that supported their cause. Hans Reupke’s publishing activities, for instance, were 
assisted by the Club von Berlin, a social club for Berlin’s avant-garde. 
 A similar institution was the Society for the Study of Fascism (Gesellschaft zum 
Studium des Faschismus, GSF). The club was founded in 1931 by the right wing agitator and 
weapons trader Waldemar Pabst to discuss and stimulate transfers from Fascist Italy.256 The 
extraordinary line-up – many of whom are mentioned elsewhere in this thesis – consisted of 
prominent economic experts like Max Hahn (head of the Mitteleuropäischer Wirtschaftstag) 
and Hjalmar Schacht (president of the Reichsbank); future top government officials of the 
Nazi Regime like Herman Göring and Walther Funk (minister for economics; right-wing party 
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politicians such as the head of the Stahlhelm Theodor Düsterberg; and prominent businessmen 
like Günther Quandt257 and Fritz Thyssen.258 To the board of the GSF it was clear that, “in 
consideration of the different national [völkisch], economic and cultural conditions in 
Germany and Italy, a fascist Germany must resemble Fascist Italy in its general structure, but 
differ in the institutionalisation of detailed political and economical practises”. 259  The 
workshops of the GSF compared, for instance, Mussolini’s fascism with the Kemalist state in 
Turkey, and tried to draw conclusions for the reform of a detested Weimar Republic.260 For its 
work, which doubtlessly provided a positive image of Fascist Italy abroad, and which 
therefore was supported by Mussolini’s middleman Renzetti,261 the GSF was able to draw 
funds and information from the Italian foreign ministry.262 Yet, once the Nazis came into 
power, the GSF was dissolved no later than December 1933 because its main political goal, 
the authoritarian transformation of the Weimar state, was now the state’s main task, and the 
Nazi regime did not intend to share this responsibility.263 
 The end of the GSF, however, did not change Fascist Italy’s character as a source of 
inspiration for economic reforms in Germany. Especially the large-scale state intervention in 
the economy carried out by IRI induced fascination in a country with big companies shaken 
by the global crisis and a regime obsessed with obtaining totalitarian control of the society. 
The German ambassador in Rome, Ulrich von Hassell, reckoned that, “the leadership of IRI is 
the decisive voice of the economy and its controlling state”.264 When IRI started its operations 
in the Italian banking sector, Germany’s newspapers of record observed attentively. 265 
Moreover, the Akzeptbank AG, a public-private institution found in the midst of the banking 
crisis by the Reichsbank and many private banks in order to inject liquidity into the financial 
markets, soon acquired new competencies. Apparently modelled on the Italian experience, it 
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started to use the leverage of its growing funds to favour certain initiatives in industry over 
others, thus providing a window of opportunity for the public hand to get a grip on the 
economy.266 The Reichsbank under its president and close observer of Italian fascism, Hjalmar 
Schacht, repeatedly asked the Banca d’Italia about IRI’s reconstruction of the Italian 
economy.267 
 Hitler told Renzetti, Mussolini’s long arm in Berlin, that he himself was studying the 
measures Italian corporatism suggested to overcome the tensions between the social partners 
in industrial relations, and eventually the plight of the unemployed.268 What was more, like 
the fascist regime in Italy, the Nazis did not rest satisfied by boosting the economy by 
reducing unemployment. Guided by the idea of autarchy, the economic experts of the NSDAP 
developed a programme that would improve production by means of a better utilisation of the 
“German soil”. The spatial concept of “German soil” was intertwined with the ideological 
core concept of National Socialism, which foresaw that a growing German nation had to 
conquer “Lebensraum” (living space) in the East. The concept of “Lebensraum” was 
developed already during the movement phase of the NSDAP in the 1920s. But it was the 
experience of the Great Depression that induced the party to transfer ideology to an economic 
model. The party experts doubted that the old pattern of international free trade would have 
the potential to increase the prosperity of the German people, and propagated instead a large, 
self-sufficient economic area under German leadership, including the countries of Eastern 
Europe.269  “Internal growth”, therefore became, as in Fascist Italy, the goal of economic 
intervention.270 
 In order to further stimulate growth, as well as to get a grip on those industries deemed 
of strategic importance, the Nazi regime transformed the economic system. A contemporary 
edition of the encyclopaedia Neue Brockhaus describes the restructuring in that henceforth 
“the state leads and directs”, but still grants “independence and responsibility” to the 
economic operators in their specific sector.271 The theory saw the “Führer” at the top of the 
economic government, directing the affairs of the national economy by appropriations. 
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Eigennutz (self-interest), as the private initiative was labelled, was granted to the business 
leaders, and even encouraged.272 However, it was only allowed if it would not work against 
the “public interest” of the German people, for whom the “Führer” intended the military 
expansion. 
 National Socialism presented the private sector, weakened by the shock of the 
economic crisis, a system that differed significantly from the liberal concept of a free market 
economy. In spite of popular impressions that the NSDAP had come to power especially with 
the support of industrial magnates, the business community before 1933 showed a wide range 
of political attitudes, ranging from open support and opportunistic admiration, to scepticism 
among some established industrial elites, and a very low number of supporters of the 
resistance.273 In the corporatist institutions for economic self-management (wirtschaftliche 
Eigenverantwortung) of the National Socialist state, the entrepreneurial knowledge was 
concentrated and connected with state bureaucracy. 274  From then on, this network of 
government agencies and private stakeholder decided on production and sales. Success or 
demise of a company no longer depended on observation and interaction with market 
development, but on negotiation skills to be used in the committees of the corporatist 
economy. Against the background of the economy, which was since the second half of the 
1930s running at full capacity, and thus experienced a shortage of skilled workers and raw 
materials, co-ordination became even more important. The state interfered in a rigid way into 
the price mechanism of the market economy by freezing wages and prices. Henceforth, the 
forced control of the economic process limited the market system in such a way that the 
political objective of rearmament took absolute pre-eminence.275 
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3. Institutional Change in Foreign Trade 
 
The regimes in Germany and Italy were quite aware of the possibilities and limits of autarchy. 
Hitler proclaimed to the newly elected Reichstag on 23 March 1933 “that the geographical 
location of resource-poor Germany would not allow a perfect form of self-sufficiency for the 
German Reich”, and that Germany therefore still needed “connections with the world”.276 The 
biggest obstacle for Germany’s march to autarchy, the lack of raw materials, inhibited Italian 
plans for self-sufficiency to a much greater extent. Striving to put the Italian dependence on 
foreign energy sources into perspective, Mussolini emphasised in 1936 that, “no nation in the 
world would be able to realise on its own territory the ideal of economic autonomy in an 
absolute sense”.277 
 Sure enough, both dictators understood that they remained dependent on their foreign 
trade relations if they did not want to give up their expansionist aspirations. The Grand 
Council of Fascism, the central government body of Fascist Italy, defined foreign commerce 
as a “matter of public interest” whose “control [...] therefore would be justified”.278  The 
German government developed a similar ambition to maintain and extend German exports, 
and transformed foreign trade into a political instrument.279 A crucial requirement was that, as 
in the domestic economy, the economic operator should not only make transactions across 
national borders for its personal advantage, but always keep in mind the “social needs of the 
nation”.280 
 In order to realise this requirement, the instrument of quotas was applied. Not only in 
totalitarian countries did the trend to increase protectionism, existing since the end of World 
War I, enter during the Great Depression into a new phase.281 In contrast to the previously 
common protectionist barriers that mainly promoted or impeded the import of certain goods 
with customs tariffs, whereby demand was only indirectly influenced by state intervention, 
quotas regulated exactly in weight and quantities how much of one good was permitted to be 
traded. Quotas became institutionalised with trade agreements between the governments, and 
displaced the pricing mechanism based on supply and demand. As a result, quotas sparked 
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cases in which the economic operator refrained from exploiting the quota volume since it was 
no longer profitable.282 
 In Germany, foreign trade experts of the AA (ministry of foreign affairs) responded 
already a few months after Hitler’s seizure of power, and looked into the existing trade 
agreements in order to reorganise imports to Germany with a quota system.283 Dealing with 
the domestic economy also required diplomatic skills, as the agricultural sector detected in 
this instrument a suitable protection against the import of cheaper agricultural products, and 
insisted on its widespread implementation. Thereby, agricultural interests opposed German 
industries with a strong export interest. The latter feared feared that the quota system would 
disturb their established global network of raw material suppliers. Italy, which depended even 
more than Germany on imports, did not follow the quota trend until 1934, when it adopted the 
same protectionist path.284 
  Initially, the governments of Germany and Italy felt inclined to introduce quotas due to 
the development of foreign exchange reserves, which became a fundamental problem of both 
economies.285 During the economic crisis, the two import-dependent economies had to deal 
with drastically declining demand for their export products and the withdrawal of foreign 
capital. By 1934, the German balance of payments turned negative.286 At that point, Germany 
shared a problem with Italy, which, although its balance had been long negative, faced an 
ever-worsening situation since 1933 (see Table 1). In order to stop the rapid decline of foreign 
exchange reserves, and to secure the remaining funds for the import of indispensable goods, 
the government decided to implement even harsher import controls. 
 In July 1934, the president of the Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht,287  was appointed 
provisional minister for economic affairs, and charged with the crucial task of solving the 
armament-related currency problem. 288  His “new plan” was based on the principle that 
German producers made their orders “always there, where [they] can exchange them for their 
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own goods”.289 State authorities now controlled the entire flow of imports, and allocated 
strategically important raw materials to the producers. 
 In Italy, Felice Guarneri, who was not only director of the Banco di Roma but also 
president of Confindustria, was entrusted with the government control over foreign exchange 
reserves. In accordance with the fundamental principles of Germany’s “new plan”, the state 
was meant to ensure that Italy was importing only as many goods as it was able to pay for 
with its own exports. For this purpose, the government established the Istituto nazionale per i 
cambi con l’estero (Istcambi), and Guarneri became the “foreign exchange dictator”,290 who 
watched over Italy’s foreign trade. 
 As a logical consequence of the declared goal, to pay imports no longer in gold or 
foreign currency, foreign trade experts developed an instrument which became one of the 
most constitutive elements of economic relations between the Great Depression and World 
War II: clearing agreements. A general definition is difficult because, as will be described with 
the examples of the thesis, different types of clearing agreements served different purposes.291 
Nevertheless, the rationale of an agreement was that the importers in country X paid for their 
orders from country Y in local currency to a domestic clearing office (e.g. at the central bank 
of X). This office then paid exporters of country X from its collected funds. The same 
offsetting occurred in country Y. Therewith, the agreement allowed for trade between two 
countries without tapping the foreign exchange reserves.292 
 By 1930 the instrument was already infamous. It has been depicted by its 
contemporary witness and scholarly investigator, Albert O. Hirschman, as one of the major 
weapons in the hands of Nazi Germany’s domination over Europe.293 However, it was first 
employed by Switzerland. In November 1931, Switzerland signed clearing agreements with 
Austria and Hungary, and soon became the “pacemaker of clearings”, according to a 
contemporary German author.294  The experts who put the clearings into practise saw the 
deficiencies in comparison with free trade. The economist G.W.J Bruins, a specialist on the 
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Dutch clearings, emphasised that, “even the best bilateral settlement is inferior to an 
international payment system, with its almost automatic multi-directional liquidation of 
debts”.295 Equally critical was Felice Guarneri, who was responsible for the Italian clearing 
agreements. In his treatise on autarchy and foreign trade he described clearings as inevitably 
rigid, and therefore most likely to hamper trade.296 Even Hitler, who proclaimed at a party 
convention in 1936 that he would transform clearing agreements into a “free and modern 
business”, had to admit that they still looked like “prehistoric bartering agreements”.297 More 
negative accounts could be easily identified, and yet, against all odds they became very 
popular. 
 Many countries facing the collapse of the gold standard considered clearing 
agreements to be the only alternative. The raison d’etre lay in the widespread introduction of 
foreign exchange controls, which dramatically changed the logic of trade. In the area of 
international free trade, governments had paid attention mostly to the flow of goods, 
facilitated by commercial treaties on the basis of the most-favoured-nation clause, and only 
secondarily to the flow of payments. In the early 1930s, it was the other way around. To 
guarantee the flow of payments and protect their countries from insolvency, governments 
unilaterally introduced foreign exchange controls, which cut deep into the established fabric 
of trade relations. The clearing agreements, then, offered the possibility of limiting the 
negative consequences at least for selected bilateral trade relationships. In addition, with 
maximised government influence on trade, and the possibility for preferential (or 
discriminatory) treatment of certain trading partners, the clearing agreements became a 
“dreadful commercial weapon”.298 
 This “commercial weapon” was employed in different ways, however. For the 
“pacemaker” Switzerland, the clearings served initially only as a means to protect creditor 
interest by safeguarding the flow of payments. Germany’s experimental clearing agreements 
of 1931/32 regulated the exchange of certain goods considered essential and at risk due to 
Germany’s foreign exchange controls. After the political watershed of 1933, clearing 
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agreements eventually covered the entire flow of goods and payments and can be classified in 
two categories according to their geographical distribution. The first one, labelled the 
“Western type”, was primarily concerned with cushioning the negative consequences of 
foreign exchange controls on imports to Germany, and to prevent retaliation from its trading 
partners, especially from those with financial claims. In contrast, the second, or 
“Eastern/Southeastern type”, intended to safeguard Germany’s exports in times of 
difficulty.299 For the Italian clearing strategy, Bientinesi has argued that it was initially driven 
by the purpose to secure Italy’s export markets (similar to the “Eastern/Southeastern type”). 
Later in the 1930s it became a measure to protect its domestic market (and therefore akin to 
Germany’s “Western type”).300 
 With the introduction of foreign exchange controls, quotas and clearings, Felice 
Guarneri reckoned that the most-favoured-nation clause, a pillar of foreign trade relations in 
the liberal era, had lost its meaning. No longer did the best price determine demand and sales, 
but the political proximity of two states that had given their economic relationship the 
appropriate institutional design. Using these commercial instruments, politics formed the 
economic foundations of the “Rome-Berlin Axis”. 
 On both sides of the Alps, the regimes built up a dense network of public authorities 
and semi-governmental organisations, which also controlled the German-Italian commercial 
relationship. The new commercial instruments changed the distribution of power within the 
administrative structure. Traditionally, Germany’s foreign relations, whether political, cultural 
or economic, fell within the business of the ministry of foreign affairs (Auswärtiges Amt, AA). 
In the 1920s, the AA established a special unit W, which was responsible for fundamental 
economic and commercial issues, and intruded in the competencies of ministry of economics 
(Reichswirtschaftsministerium, RWM).301 With Hitler’s seizure of power, however, the sphere 
of influence changed at the expense of the AA. Hitler appointed the president of the 
Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht, as special envoy to negotiate with the US and entrusted him to 
lead the German delegation at the London Economic Conference in June/July 1933. Hitler – 
not only in the conclusion of bilateral clearing agreements – preferred the direct and discreet 
meeting between representatives of two states over a more open process. For this purpose, the 
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regime established the position of special envoys, who conducted negotiations alongside the 
traditional career diplomats. 
 As one of the major administrative bodies behind the bilateralisation of trade, the 
German compensation fund (Deutsche Verrechnungskasse, DVK) was established on 16 
October 1934. It was an independent bank and subordinated to the RWM. Since the DVK 
managed most of the governmental clearing accounts, it became one of the central reference 
points of bilateral foreign trade.302 In the years 1932-1934, the offsetting of imports and 
exports had been handled by the Reichsbank. But it was neither legally empowered to secure 
the financing of foreign trade, nor was it able to cope any longer with the increased 
administrative burden and the complexity of the clearing arrangements.303 In the first year of 
its existence, the DVK grew tremendously and was, with its 1,200 employees who managed 
17,000 account transactions per day, an impressive example of government interference and 
bureaucratisation of foreign trade.304 To pay for their imports, the German merchants had to 
refer to the subordinated office relevant to their industry in order to obtain a “certificate of 
currency”. 305  These measures were intended to concentrate decision-making powers a 
monopoly of decision in order to prevent an uncontrolled outflow of foreign funds. 
The AA was still in charge of the national office for foreign trade (Reichsstelle für den 
Außenhandel). It was founded on 18 October 1933,306 and designated as the central organ of 
foreign trade promotion. Its scope of duties included the monitoring of foreign markets, the 
development of expertise for the German export economy and consulting services to the AA 
and the RWM. The body served as a contact point for the German economy, and represented 
German interests in foreign markets with a triad of consular posts, representations of the 
foreign organisations of the NSDAP and the chambers of commerce.307 
 The network constituted by the chambers of commerce experienced a change of 
meaning, too. The German-Italian chamber of commerce was a private initiative of German 
merchants in Milan, founded in 1921.308 In 1934, it was converted into a national German 
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chamber of commerce for Italy, which had to support the Nazi regime’s export initiative in 
order to improve the German foreign exchange situation. The Italian autarchy plans and the 
German “new plan” stipulated that its scope of duties now encompassed legal and 
administrative advice to merchants, who were overwhelmed by government bureaucracy. The 
funding changed as well. While initially it was supported by members’ contributions, it 
increasingly relied on public funds.309 Thus, the development of the German-Italian chamber 
of commerce describes the process of state paternalism in foreign trade on a small scale. 
 The Italian situation in the early 1930s gives a confusing picture of the responsibilities 
of the various institutions and authorities dealing with foreign trade. The regime changed the 
divisional structure of the ministry of foreign affairs (Ministero degli Affari Esteri, MAE) in 
1932, and created a separate division for commercial affairs.310 Major reform impetus was 
provided only a few months after the Nazi regime changed its administrative control of 
foreign trade. Fundamental policy decisions were now made by the ministry of corporations 
(Ministero delle Corporazioni, MCorp). The MCorp was celebrated at its formation in 1926 as 
a milestone of fascist economic policy, then sank into oblivion for many years, and only 
gained major responsibilities in 1934. The ministry of finance, in turn, controlled the import 
quotas. Reminiscent of the Reichsbank-DVK relationship, the foreign currency holdings and 
the process of clearing transactions were controlled by the central bank Banca d’Italia in 
collaboration with the Istituto nazionale per i cambi con l’estero (Istcambi), which had 
branches in the commercial centres of Italy’s major trading partners. The counterpart of the 
German Reichsstelle für den Außenhandel, the Istituto nazionale per l’esportazione (INE), 
had been founded in 1926 as part of the “quota 90”, and the subsequent “battle of exports”. It 
co-ordinated private initiatives by collecting and publishing economic and trade information, 
resolving technical and logistical issues of trade and regulating the banking and insurance 
aspects of foreign trade.311 In the administration of foreign trade, INE sometimes competed 
with Istcambi.312 
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It took a little more than a year until the regime realised that the overlapping responsibilities 
and complex co-ordination between the authorities caused frictional losses. To deal with this, 
on 23 May 1935 the regime set up the sovrintendenza allo scambio delle valute 
(superintendence for trade and foreign exchange), which supervised all actions regarding 
economic relations from Mcorp, Istcambi, and INE. The authority quickly gained in 
importance. By December 1935 it was upgraded to an under-secretariat, and finally in 1937 to 
the Ministero per gli Scambi e le Valute. Besides supervising the export institute and the 
foreign exchange authorities, the new ministry provided the commercial attaches of the Italian 
embassies and exercised control over the chambers of commerce.313 The leadership of the 
authority was assumed by “foreign exchange dictator” Felice Guarneri. At both bridgeheads 
of the German-Italian economic relationship, the presidents of the central banks assumed their 
positions as guardians of foreign exchange and external trade. The following Part I analyses 
how these new institutional settings changed the German-Italian economic relationship. 
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Part I: Becoming Partners? Bilateral Economic Rapprochement 
1929-1936 
 
Chapter 2: Failing Attempts in the Reconstruction after the Crash 
 
Introduction: The Situation in 1929 
 
“I found here much cordiality, a diffuse desire for closer political relations with Italy, [and] an 
enormous admiration for the Duce”, reported Alberto de Stefani after his visit to Berlin in 
February 1930. However, he mentioned one major obstacle to closer collaboration: “The 
future commercial relationship between Germany and Italy presents difficulties”. De Stefani’s 
judgment was well informed. Despite having lost his position as minister of finance when he 
was dismissed by Mussolini in 1925,314 and having been set to the side as president of the 
political science faculty of the University of Rome, he was able to enter Germany’s inner 
political and economic circles. Within five days he had met, among many others, Internal 
Affairs Minister Carl Severing, President of the Reichsbank Hjalmar Schacht, who had an 
excellent reputation in Italy,315 and Alfred Hugenberg, a major business figure of coal and 
steel, armament and media. The various discussions left De Stefani with the impression that 
the commercial relations could be aligned with the recent political rapprochement, which had 
grown out of Mussolini’s support over Germany’s rearmament.316 “Vast opportunities in the 
future, if not now” seemed possible. But first, the obstacles still afflicting the German-Italian 
commercial relationship had to be removed. 317 
 Until the outbreak of the world economic crisis, Germany and Italy possessed 
relatively diversified foreign trade relations, with Germany being significantly more important 
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for Italy than vice versa. One of the most recent studies of Italy’s foreign trade estimates that 
in 1928 imports from Germany amounted to 12.1 per cent of Italy’s total imports, representing 
the second-largest share after imports from the US (17.6 per cent). However, the two other 
major European economies, France (9.0 per cent) and Britain (7.8 per cent) still possessed 
market shares that were much closer to the German share than in 1914, the year of the highest 
German share thus far in Italian imports. In that year, Germany had exported more than three 
times as much as France to Italy. With regard to Italian exports in 1928, the German market 
took the first position and accounted for 12.3 per cent of Italy’s total export, followed by the 
US (10.7 per cent), Britain (9.4 per cent) and France (9.2 per cent). 318  Italy played a 
considerably smaller role in Germany’s trade relations. In 1928, Italy accounted for only 3.3 
per cent of Germany’s total imports and for 4.5 per cent of its total exports, while the US 
economy was of similar importance for Germany and Italy. 
 Germany’s export of RM 547 million consisted largely of finished products of various 
kinds (66 per cent) and, to a much lesser extent (31 per cent) raw materials (mostly coal). 
Italy’s exports, worth a total of RM 466.3 million, were more diverse: raw materials (esp. silk 
and flax) accounted for 48 per cent, food and beverages (esp. Mediterranean fruits and 
vegetables) for 33 per cent, and finished products (esp. cars and artificial fibres) for 19 per 
cent.319 
 Germany’s and Italy’s relative importance in trade grew throughout the Great 
Depression (see Table 4), but this growth did not come without conflict. Crucially important, 
in 1928/29 the balance of the German-Italian trade reversed itself. In the second half of the 
1920s Italy first achieved a surplus in trade with Germany. According to statistics from the 
Italian foreign ministries’ department of commercial relations, in 1927 Italy exported goods to 
the tune of Lire 2,149.2 million while Germany’s exports amounted to Lire 1,914.1 million.320 
Numbers are not innocent, however; they are fabricated from political madates. As such, in 
historical inquiry – as in political discourse – they have to be handled carefully.321 In the case 
of 1927, Italian and German calculations of the balance of trade largely conflict, but they 
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agreed on one point: Italy’s surplus. Germany’s economics ministry, for instance, calculated 
that with the exclusion of war reparations paid to Italy, the trade balance for Germany was 
negative in 1924/25 and 1926/27.322 
 
Figure 1: Contemporary description of the differing valuations of Italy’s foreign 
trade deficit 1929-1936 (in million gold francs) 
 
Source: S. Zuckermann, Italiens Außenhandel. In graphischer Darstellung 1928-1936 (Bruxelles, Berlin, 1937) 
  
With only a very few exceptions, it had been the other way around for the entire industrial age, 
and the history of Italian deficits had created sentiments that had led to nationalistic outbursts 
and the neglect of existing or potential advantages of trading with Germany. When, in 1928, 
the episode of an Italian surplus came to an end, Italian opponents of a closer commercial 
interpenetration with Germany could draw on a broad set of reservations about German 
economic dominance. At the same time, the conservative newspaper Kölnische Zeitung, one 
of Weimar Germany’s premium newspapers, wrote about Italy’s “Handelsneid” (“trade-envy”) 
recognising the tendency that “the Italians still hold Germany as the actual rival in the trade 
sphere”. Whereas third-market rivalries, as with the UK in the Eastern Mediterranean, or a 
large deficit in trade with the US, were accepted as “destiny willed by God”, Germany’s trade 
initiatives in the Eastern Mediterranean or the significantly smaller deficit in trade with 
Germany were deemed to be absolutely unbearable. The “fact that Germany is the best 
customer is not in the least reconciling”.323 
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1. New Initiatives after the End of the “Battaglia per la Economia” 
 
The growing Italian deficit and the resulting tensions can be traced not only to policy 
decisions in Germany, but also to the 1929 decision of the fascist regime to mitigate its 
industry protectionism in favour of agriculture. The year that the world economic crisis hit 
hard, the fascist government alleviated the battaglia per la economia.324 This “battle for the 
economy” was a state measure accompanying the introduction of the “quota 90” in 1926. 
Principally, the decision had benefited imports, crucial for a country importing most of its raw 
materials, and even foodstuffs such as wheat. However, the decision placed Italy’s export 
industry at a disadvantage as their international competitiveness declined due to higher prices. 
Therefore, under the banner of the battaglia per la economia, the fascist regime introduced 
several measures to support the threatened export industry. On the institutional level, the 
government founded the Istituto nazionale per le esportazioni (INE), and made several 
changes to customs policy.325 Moreover, buy-at-home rules were introduced and supported by 
the state propaganda. Italian businesses and public institutions had to buy Italian products if 
foreign products were not cheaper by at least 10 per cent,326 or were called upon to obey the 
“10 amendments of the true Italy”. Published as a leaflet, the amendments demanded, for 
instance, “not to desecrate the Italian soil or the Italian factory by the presence and the use of 
machines and instruments produced abroad”. The “10 amendments” became notorious in 
Germany and were exhibited in a collection on protectionism in Europe.327 
 For the German export, the battaglia meant significant challenges.328 A 1929 German 
survey on the important export segment of machinery concluded that the support of “national 
industries” in Italy after 1926 had increasingly damaged the market share of German products. 
Especially machinery supply for sectors in which Italy intended to play an international role 
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as an exporting country, such as the textile industry, was taken out of foreign hands. The 
forced market change is also apparent in the machinery supply for the major land reclamation 
works of the fascist regime, presented by the fascist propaganda as bonifica integrale in Italy 
and abroad. For instance, Mussolini sought to fulfil an ancient desire and dry out the Pontine 
Marshes south-east of Rome. For this enormous task, huge numbers of pumps were needed, 
but instead of creating business opportunities for German companies, which used to hold 
significant market shares in this segment, the fascist government subsidised the use of Italian 
products with up to 40 per cent of the costs.329 
 Private banks participated in building up protectionist walls around the “new land” 
created by the bonifica integrale. In 1930, Vereinigte Stahlwerke, Europe’s biggest steel 
producer, complained to the German consulate in Palermo that it was cut off from the tube-
supply of the land ameliorations carried out by the company Fratelli Anoroso. The company’s 
financier, Banco di Sicilia, deployed by the government to distribute the state subsidies for 
Sicily, had threatened Fratelli Anoroso that it would cut its financing if it continued to use the 
cheaper products produced by Vereinigte Stahlwerke.330 
 In other export segments, all that was left for German companies outdone by Italian 
competitors was to form joint ventures with domestic companies in order to circumvent the 
protectionist barriers. The Berlin-based delegate of the Banca d’Italia Milkowski, while 
speaking of his close relationship with Schacht, insinuated that, “he would be happy to use his 
[Schacht’s] influence to assure for our country German financial and technical assistance”.331 
While Italian companies appreciated joint ventures, the German industry seemed more wary 
of them. A survey by the German-Italian chamber of commerce conducted among German 
companies with business relations in Italy listed various complaints. In particular, group 
headquarters in Germany faced difficulties in employing German citizens in the factories of 
their Italian branch, and even in sending engineers to set up the production.332 
 The impact of the battaglia on Germany’s commercial interest was grave enough for 
Ernst Trendelenburg, state secretary at the RWM, to condemn it in a 1929 assessment. 
Especially the increase of tariffs – 54 increases out of 131 were carried out in tariff lines 
where Germany was the main exporter – had atrophied Italian imports from Germany, and 
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subsequently led to the German deficit. From Trendelenburg’s point of view, the tariff 
increases contradicted the regulations of the German-Italian commercial treaty of 1925.333 
 Despite some early success, as shown by the positive trade balance for Italy, after 1929 
the battaglia started to face limitations, and restrictions on imports from Germany as well as 
the buy-at-home rules lost favour within the Italian population. Italian security authorities, for 
instance, tried to gain information about Italian buyers of German goods by interrogating 
Italian drivers of German freight vehicles at the border about their destination and the Italian 
recipients of the outlawed goods. Given this practice, Germany’s ambassador to Rome, 
Konstantin von Neurath (1921-1930), advised German exporters to employ only German 
freight forwarding companies and German drivers. It was supposed that they could hold their 
tongues regarding who was buying German goods.334   
 Moreover, Trendelenburg recognised early in 1930 “statements of important 
[unspecified] personalities” in Italy speaking in favour of cutbacks in the protectionist 
framework of the battaglia. A complete removal of the battaglia was not to come, as major 
interest groups would fight for its maintenance, but Trendelenburg reckoned that significant 
customs facilitations could be achieved. His confidence was based on his observation that the 
Italian government had recently shifted its attention from industry protectionism to 
agricultural investment.335 Institutionally, this shift was represented in the transformation of 
the ministry of national economics into the ministry of agriculture.336 Moreover, the German 
consulates in Italy (Milan, Genoa, Turin, Venice, Trieste, Naples and Palermo) had reported 
recently that they were handling considerably fewer complaints by companies over 
discriminative issues allegedly caused by the battaglia. According to the reports, “foreign 
products” were again gaining acceptance not only in private businesses like FIAT or the Terni 
steal plants, but also in state-owned enterprises like the shipyard Cantieri di Castellammare. 
However, the German embassy in Rome warned against mentioning the signs of dissolution in 
the framework of the battaglia on the level of official diplomacy in order not to give away 
bargaining power for the looming major dispute of 1930: the end – or the extension – of the 
expiring German-Italian commercial treaty.337 
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2. Attempt No 1: The Spiral of Protectionism 
 
The Frankfurter Zeitung, a flagship newspaper of German liberalism, predicted the 
importance of the negotiations by stating that, “big events cast shadows long before” they 
occur.338 The tone of the German-Italian public debate over the ideal basis of the German-
Italian trade was set in April 1930 by Alberto De Stefani in an article for Corriere della Sera, 
Italy’s best-selling newspaper. He made his arguments public only a short time after he had 
returned from a visit to Berlin in February 1930. De Stefani argued that the terms of trade had 
recently changed dramatically in favour of Germany. To support his claim, he invoked the 
balance of trade over the past three years, demonstrating that Italian exports had decreased 
since 1928, whereas German exports had increased. De Stefani averred that in the long run, 
this kind of imbalance would be unsustainable. Interestingly, his suggestions on how to bring 
the economic crisis to an end did not, despite the growing global popularity of protectionism, 
include import restrictions, such as those put in place by the battaglia. “May the German 
goods come”, argued De Stefani, but he also demanded changes in the German economic and 
tariff policy to allow the German market to open up for Italian products. He expected that the 
comparative advantage in German-Italian trade could be exploited only with the 
implementation of these measures.339 
 The article was widely read in German government and business circles, because it 
was thought to represent the opinion of the fascist government, and therefore to provide a first 
impression of the arguments that would be heard at the upcoming treaty negotiations. Almost 
invariably, the arguments were rejected. The German point of view is exemplified, for 
instance, in a response by the Frankfurter Zeitung. First of all, the entire reasoning, claiming 
that the balance of trade was developing in favour of Germany, was judged to be flawed. By 
taking 1927 – indeed a very favourable year for Italy – as reference, De Stefani was accused 
of having described an overly negative trend for the period till 1929. Drawing on the history 
of the Italian deficit, the Frankfurter contended that by looking at a longer time period the 
development was not as negative as De Stefani had depicted, but rather a normalisation. 
Moreover, De Stefani was accused of building up his assessment solely on the balance of 
trade, thereby concealing other important factors contributing to the balance of payments. 
Two factors in particular were noted: reparations and the thousands of German tourists in Italy. 
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With regard to the deliveries of coal and other goods as reparations, payments of annually 
Goldmark 26.5 million and the money spent by German tourists visiting Italy, the article 
asserted that a payment flow from Germany into Italy had been created that was not paralleled 
by a similar flow into Germany, and which more than compensated for the Italian deficit in 
trade.340 
 Disagreement existed not only about the correct calculation of surplus and deficit, but 
also over the means to compensate for these imbalances. The Berliner Börsenzeitung, 
dedicated to the national conservative readership and focused on the stock exchange, 
implicitly responded to De Stefani’s demand for a German market better suited for Italian 
products. In the ongoing economic crisis, a decreasing demand for Italian products would 
only be natural. Germany imported mainly luxury goods like Mediterranean fruits and 
vegetables, cars and artificial fibres, which people facing diminished purchasing power 
simply could no longer afford. Nevertheless, the newspaper expressed its confidence that 
most of the accusations made by De Stefani could be classified as a mere strategic measure to 
pave the way for beneficial treaty negations, and that in the end mutual interest would 
prevail.341 
 While the German press completely rejected De Stefani’s arguments, German 
government officials in charge of the treaty negotiations perceived them differently. In April 
1930, Hans Posse, director of the foreign trade department at the RWM and one of the leading 
figures of the Germany’s economic relations in the 1930s, called for a meeting with officials 
from the AA, RWM and RFM. In fact, every German expert was well aware that in the recent 
past, Germany had had a period of positive economic development. It was attributed not only 
to the Italians’ failure to maintain their protectionist battaglia framework, but also to 
Germany’s advances in applying customs policy to the effect of decreasing imports. One 
sector had been shielded in particular: German agriculture.342 Of course, rising agricultural 
protectionism in Germany was alarming news to Italian export interests, and the Banca 
d’Italia representation in Berlin reported every change in the protectionist framework.343 The 
degree to which agriculture was a bone of contention in the upcoming treaty negotiations with 
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Italy is shown by the fact that the inter-ministerial reunion did not want to formulate 
guidelines for the negotiations before the ministry of agriculture (Reichsministerium für 
Ernährung und Landwirtschaft, RLM) was heard.344 
 A major change for Germany’s stance in the trade negotiations with Italy was 
supported by an inter-ministerial dispute as well as a new initiative at the international stage. 
Negotiations at the League of Nations over co-ordinated actions against the economic crisis 
had recently gone in the direction of a global tariff truce (Zollfrieden).345 According to this 
international agreement, which the German government intended to implement, states were 
obliged to refrain from cancelling commercial treaties. This accord was intended to prevent 
placing further pressure on global trade. This meant a significant loss of bargaining power for 
Germany in the planned German-Italian negotiations, as the threat of cancellation had been a 
powerful advantage for the German government due to its importance as a trading partner (see 
Table 4). Under the new circumstances, the AA, the RWM and the RFM all believed that it 
would be rather unrealistic to insist on all the customs amendments demanded by the RLM in 
search of agricultural protection.346  This constitutes evidence that the RLM’s position of 
pushing for a cancellation or at least significant changes in the German-Italian commercial 
treaty did not find acceptance in the cabinet.347 
 German industry and commerce, unlike agriculture, were largely in favour of the 
established commercial relations. An evaluation of the German-Italian chamber of commerce 
among companies doing business in Italy showed that in 1930 more than 90 per cent of the 
companies opted for the renewal of the commercial treaty.348 Nevertheless, also in this sector 
with its seemingly lower level of open disharmony, collaboration still seemed far off from the 
plans of a German-Italian rapprochement elaborated on the political level. In the summer of 
1930, while the public was still engaged in the dispute over the commercial treaty, a 
delegation of 80 Italian business leaders travelled to Germany in order to visit various 
companies and industrial facilities. In the “Elektropolis” Berlin, for instance, the delegation 
planned to visit the facilities of the electro-technical companies Siemens, AEG and Osram. 
 While the German embassy in Rome highlighted the political dimension of the visit, 
and insisted that a favourable impression on the delegation would be in Germany’s 
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“substantial interest”, the goals of the Italian delegation were more related to business 
practise.349 Reporting from Germany, Corriere Della Sera gazed at the recent achievements in 
Rationalisierung – the scientific organisation of industrial production. While the concept 
originated in the US, it was in the German industry where it found “boundless distribution”, 
according to the Corriere.350 The ANFDAI (Associazione Nazionale Fascista dei Dirigenti di 
Aziende Industriali), an Italian business leaders’ organisation, formulated its goals for the visit 
as “technical co-operation and to facilitate the transfer of technical knowledge”.351 However, 
it seems that such transfers were not at all appreciated by representatives of the German 
industry. The RDI (Reichsverband der deutschen Industrie), the major interest group of 
German industry, had been involved in the planning of the visit and heavily opposed the 
intended visits of German factories as “way too far-reaching”.352 
 Further explanation of the industry’s defensive attitude toward too-close a technical 
collaboration is provided by a complaint of the company B. Braun Melsungen. The medical 
and pharmaceutical company (today one of the biggest hospital suppliers worldwide) used to 
consider interwar Italy a very important market; in fact, it opened its first foreign subsidiary 
there in 1925.353 In particular its medical yarns were hugely successful until the beginning of 
1931, when a previously unknown Italian product caused the company to seek support from 
Germany’s foreign ministry. The Italian Istituto Chimico Sanitario, so the reproach ran, had 
obtained a patent from Germany for the production of a yarn that counterfeited the Braun-
yarn. The Italian product had replaced the Braun-product quite successfully because what it 
lacked in quality it made up with protectionist support. In strict secrecy, the government had 
exerted pressure on the hospitals to use Italian products and to report physicians who deviated 
from the protectionist policy.354 
 That the hereby-exemplified link between opposition against transfers of technical 
knowledge and industrial protectionism was not an isolated case is demonstrated by an 
attempt of the Italian consulates in Germany to gain information from various German 
companies with a questionnaire. One company, Ihagee, a specialist in photo technology based 
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in Dresden with a subsidiary in Turin, suspected industrial espionage behind the questionnaire. 
The German consulate in Turin found the accusation feasible, and it speculated that the Italian 
government was collecting material for a law that would subject German subsidiaries in Italy 
to a special tax. Without probing the accusations, the German consulate recommended in any 
case that recipients of the questionnaire refrain from filling it in.355 
 Throughout 1931, complaints about protectionism increased as the impact of the world 
economic crisis unfolded. Banca d’Italia’s representation in Berlin reported for instance that 
the Reichslandbund, Germany’s major agricultural pressure group, presented the German 
government with an ultimatum. Although several German ministries warned of retaliation in 
case Germany raised its agricultural tariffs, “the Junker [landowner] remained again victors” 
asserting protectionist support for German agricultural production.356   
 South of the Alps, the German consulate in Milan observed that under the leadership 
of Italy’s ex-economics minister, Giuseppe Belluzzo, the Comitato per il Prodotto Italiano 
(Committee for the Italian Product) was founded. This committee launched a campaign under 
the banner “a consumer of foreign products is not Italian”, apparently not without success. 
The German Consulate in Genoa considered Fascist Italy’s striving to become economically 
“more and more independent from abroad” successful with regard to iron and steel production. 
The organisation of private businesses in syndicates – antecedents of the long projected 
corporazioni357 – had a particularly negative impact on the German iron and steel export, as 
the syndicates decided over the purchase of producer goods and therefore created an exclusive 
market for the Italian output.358 However, protectionism not only advanced in the sector of 
iron and steel, crucially important to a regime devoted to power politics; it also reached into 
more specialised sectors such as machine tools, as the German consulate in Milan reported. 
German exporters in this sector had also to face high customs barriers and government 
pressure on potential customers to buy Italian products. Furthermore, every machine able to 
earn a reputation on the Italian market in spite of those obstacles would be “counterfeited 
immediately”.359 
Certainly, these accusations exaggerated the dimension of counterfeiting, and to a 
certain extent rather represent alarming calls for government action as can be understand from 
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the above-mentioned report on protectionism in iron and steel. Here, the global “decline of 
demand” was held responsible for the increase of foreign competition also on the Italian 
market. This had led to a price slump in Italy, and, “rendered the otherwise effective 
protection of the national production by customs and other means illusory”. Therefore, it can 
be assumed that foreign products constantly managed to breach the defensive fence comprised 
of protectionism and counterfeiting due to lower prices. The successful attempts to compete 
on the Italian market had been described by the Italian side as “dumping”, and subsequently 
triggered further intensification of protectionism. 360  The thereby evolving spiral of 
protectionism had a firm lock on the German-Italian commercial relationship, which seemed 
very difficult to escape from. 
 
3. Attempt No 2: Political Rhetoric without Action 
An attempt to step back from the spiral of protectionism was made at the August 1931 visit of 
Reich Chancellor Brüning to Rome. It was the first official visit of a German head of 
government to Italy after World War I. Brüning’s plan of a German-Austrian customs union 
had caused serious disturbance on the diplomatic level, and there was a dire need to appease 
the important partner Italy, who was diametrically opposed to the union. Suvich feared in his 
memoirs that, if Austria was reduced to a state of dependence either to Germany or the Little 
Entente, it would be the end of Italian aspirations for Southeastern Europe.361 Besides the 
customs union, 362  the main economic issue, according to Posse, who organised the 
preparations for the visit, was the commercial treaty and the question of its extension.363 
 The newspaper Hartungsche Zeitung considered the meeting half sceptically, half 
optimistically: 
One cannot expect immediate results from the visit of the chancellor. First 
of all it is about setting the scene for a rapprochement. And this 
psychological act is being taken at a moment that we are halfway cut off 
from the world due to foreign exchange control, of highest symbolic 
importance.364 
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The newspaper’s optimism was based on the conviction that Germany and Italy to a large 
extent shared foreign economic interests. Both economies depended on foreign markets to 
issue bonds, and both possessed a relatively high rate of emigration. The deterioration of their 
overseas commercial relations, in particular with the US, had created opportunities to improve 
their mutual economic relationship. 
 Yet, the preparations for the visit on both sides demonstrated a lack of awareness 
regarding common economic interests. Mussolini’s prime informant on the development of 
the NSDAP between 1931 and 1933, and head of the Italian chamber of commerce in Berlin, 
Giuseppe Renzetti, disparaged, without mincing words, the current German foreign economic 
policy. “Conducted without a clear vision of the events”, Renzetti considered the policy, like 
its formulators, “undecided, disorganised, reckless”.365 Although he acknowledged the grave 
currency problems Germany had been facing since the onset of the economic crisis, Renzetti 
condemned the government for pinning its hopes on import restrictions, which had seriously 
damaged Italy’s exports. 366  However, Renzetti also saw a basis on which mutual 
understanding could grow. He reported to Mussolini that Italy’s position with regard to the 
international regulation of reparations – “un colpo da maestro” – had left a profound 
impression in Germany, which could be leveraged by the Duce.367 
 Likewise in Germany, an inter-ministerial meeting preparing for the visit to Italy 
recognised Mussolini’s good will in the negotiations over reparations and Italy’s loss of RM 
42 million due to the Hoover Plan for a moratorium on payments of war debts. German 
Foreign Minister Julius Curtius reminded the meeting that the deal, by which Germany paid 
reparations to Italy partly with coal deliveries, had for years worked well. However, the inter-
ministerial meeting agreed that at the upcoming negotiations Italy would try to improve its 
conditions for coal deliveries after the end of Germany’s reparations. This attempt had to be 
halted. Foreign Minister Curtius assumed that Italy, although it could import much cheaper 
British seaborne coal, would pay comparatively high prices for German coal in order to secure 
a continental supply.368 
 The distribution of coal between the two countries was more than a singled-out case to 
be addressed at the Rome meeting. For Posse, head of the trade department at the economics 
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ministry (RWM), the distribution was the fulcrum upon which Germany could insist on its 
surplus, and why at the same Italy was wrong to demand even a more balanced trade. In 
Posse’s view, Italian government and business circles claiming for an Italian surplus 
misjudged that the reasons for Italian deficits are the “natural scarcity of important raw 
materials and natural resources”. Interestingly, Posse based his claim on the scarcity of 
commodities such as cotton or mineral oil even though these commodities were equally scarce 
in Germany (with the exception of coal).369 Therefore, Germany’s mineral wealth of coal and 
Italy’s need for energy imports to pursue “power politics” bound the two countries together, 
and, at the same time, tore them apart. Posse, the mastermind behind Germany’s foreign 
economic policy, used the distribution of coal to legitimise a trade policy and the status as an 
industrial surplus economy for Germany, while he denied the same much-desired status to 
Italy. 370 
 Accordingly, the meeting in Rome ended in disagreement rather than the hoped-for 
closer economic collaboration. In sharp contrast to the opportunities outlined in the previously 
mentioned article in the Hartungsche Zeitung, Italian Foreign Minister Dino Grandi spoke of 
serious difficulties for the coal trade, whose conditions could no longer be guaranteed. 
Moreover, Mussolini and Brüning in a personal discussion agreed that the shared decline in 
trade with the US was not a lucrative opportunity for the bilateral German-Italian commercial 
relationship. Both heads of government declared that it would be “the essential task in the 
near future [...] to do everything to avoid the US losing interest in European affairs”.371 
Eventually, in a talk with his German counterpart Curtius, Grandi conceded that Italy would 
accept, for better or worse, German import restrictions on Italian cars and other industrial 
products, provided that Germany continued to import Italian agricultural products. 372 
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Although initially reluctant, Curtius did eventually request that the RFM in Berlin loosen the 
tight ministerial control on foreign exchange (Devisen).373 
 However, despite the foreign exchange made available to buy Italian perishables 
harvested over the past summer, and the attempt to further harmonise trade with a return visit 
to Berlin, no breakthrough was achieved. On the positive side, Karl Ritter, head of the 
commercial department of the AA (Referat für Wirtschaft), assured the Italian delegation 
consisting of Guido Jung, head of INE,374 Eugenio Anzilotti, director general at the MCorp,375 
and Adelchi Riccardi, commercial attaché at the Italian embassy in Berlin, with a positive 
assessment of the foreign exchange situation. He explained that the pressure on the 
Reichsmark had recently lessened, thereby creating new financial leeway for purchases from 
Italy. In return, the Italians offered to support Germany so as to prevent capital flight. Both 
parties, however, complained that import restrictions would hinder their trade still. Ritter, for 
instance, complained about Italy’s high tariff on radios, and suggested an adjustment which 
would keep tariff barriers against the strong US competitors, while sparing German exporters. 
The Italian delegation, in turn, complained that Germany had a veterinary agreement with 
Austria, which significantly facilitated cattle imports from Austria, while there was no such 
agreement in place for Italy.376 
 However, these were only minor technical issues of the commercial relationship; more 
fundamental disagreement persisted over the question of surplus and deficit in trade. Ritter 
insisted that the payment flow created by remittances of Italian foreign workers in 
Germany,377 and especially the expenditure of German tourists in Italy would compensate for 
the Italian deficit in trade. The Italian ambassador disagreed: in his view the impact of the 
economic crisis meant that the payment flow into Italy no longer had a compensating 
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effect.378 At a meeting in Rome early in 1932, Bonifacio Ciancarelli379 and Adelchi Riccardi 
said to a German delegation that they had the impression “that Germany still does not 
understand what is important to Italy. The entire basis of Italy’s foreign economic policy is to 
prevent increasing deficits in the balance of trade”. The German delegation’s heated reply 
“that Italy just does not understand [Germany’s] position”, which is “unconditionally obliged 
to have a positive balance” to meet its international liabilities, that is, its reparations 
obligations. 380  Yet, it seems that the German argument, repeated throughout the 1920s, 
struggled to convince those in Italy. Shortly before the meeting, the polizia politica, Fascist 
Italy’s secret police and later the template for Nazi Germany’s Gestapo, gathered information 
in the US that, “Germany is not poor, and its individual wealth is certainly higher than Italy’s 
and the Italians. […] It can pay, but does not want to”.381  Consequently, this evaluation 
undermined the legitimacy of the German surplus. To find a way out of this conflict of 
objectives, a new institutional basis had to be found. 
 
4. Attempt No 3: “Foreign Exchange War” 
 
On 5 March 1932, after “months of difficult discussions”,382 the governments in Italy and 
Germany finally amended the commercial treaty with an additional protocol. Expectations ran 
high. The national conservative newspaper Der Tag wrote that the protocol “reflects the idea 
that opportunities of collaboration between both countries exist”. 383  Again, the German 
consulate in Milan praised the compatibility of Germany’s and Italy’s economic interest in the 
world economic crisis. Both countries had to rigorously protect their currencies, and both 
were ravaged by severe capital poverty. Furthermore, both pursued an economic policy in-
between nationalization and economic individualism. Last, and not quite true, as 
demonstrated throughout the thesis, the consulate saw both countries as supporters of the 
current world trade order as they adhered to the most-favoured-nation obligation and refrained 
from autarchy.384 
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In terms of actual results, the German negotiators expressed their confidence that they had 
reached a relatively beneficial agreement for German agriculture. The tariff binding for 
certain agricultural products was relieved, thus providing protectionist support for the German 
producers facing international and especially Italian competition. The confidence of the 
German government officials was, of course, not shared by the Italian side. Foreign Minister 
Grandi, in a discussion with the German Ambassador Schubert (1930-1932), disparaged the 
protocol and the government member responsible, Minister of Corporations Giuseppe Bottai. 
The content of the protocol was for Grandi “very limited and charged with plenty of 
reservations, suitable to create mistrust”.385 
 The only aspect that escaped Grandi’s condemnation was the intended creation of a 
mixed commission of German and Italian producers. Apparently, this suggestion came from 
the Italian side, but was immediately welcomed by German negotiators. In autumn 1931, 
Germany and France had established a similar commission, which for Germany also served 
the task of safeguarding the access to one of his most lucrative export markets.386 The MAE, 
impressed with the results of the first meetings of the German-French commission, 387 
considered this form of economic co-ordination as much more promising than the present 
negotiation of commercial contacts by government officials.388 However, Grandi warned that 
even this last positive aspect of the protocol would lead to trouble if “ringing” declarations 
were not followed by quick implementations. Under the impact of the economic and social 
crises, he argued, governments must take care not to throw dust in the eyes of the people.389 
Ambassador Schubert was not amused by Grandi’s assessment, although he shared his wish 
for the immediate creation of the mixed commission. Schubert reckoned that, henceforth, 
economic collaboration could only function on an institutional basis, which broadly included 
private business. The present basis of commercial contracts between governments 
(depreciatively labelled “Wald- und Wiesenverträge”) was to him already “long outdated”.390 
 Surprisingly, private business in Germany was by no means happy with the protocol. 
The RDI told the cabinet that the declarations published after its conclusion were nothing but 
an “appeasement of industry to cover up the negative results”. Moreover, the government was 
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requested to cancel the establishment of the mixed commission as it would drain money and 
time from the involved companies for “absolutely unpromising negotiations”.391 The Siemens 
branch in Milan accused the German government and especially the embassy in Rome of 
responsibility for the awkward results of the negotiations. All the customs barriers that 
weighed so heavily on Germany’s exports to Italy had been maintained. The Milan branch 
requested the Siemens headquarters in Berlin pressured the government to refrain from 
ratifying the protocol.392 
 The government, meanwhile, rejected the criticism articulated by private business. 
Ambassador Schubert refused to speak of a negative result for German economic interests. 
The protocol had achieved all that he believed feasible under the given circumstances. 
Indirectly, however, Schubert admitted that the agreement had not been concluded bearing 
only economic interest in mind: “Political reasons have been expedient to strive for an 
agreement and to avoid a breakdown in negotiations”. Nevertheless, he held that in the long 
run the protocol would have “a favourable effect on the economic sphere”.393 The problem 
was that this time confidence in the future was replaced by frustration over the new 
institutional basis. 
 In Italy, especially export-oriented agriculture soon proved to be very displeased with 
the regulations of the protocol. The protocol had allowed Germany to increase restrictions on 
agricultural imports. In May 1932, Giuseppe Tassinari, leader of the fascist syndicate of 
agriculture,394 publicly declared that it “cannot be accepted that a country, exporting to Italy 
way more than it imports, inhibits almost existential Italian export”. The numbers Tassinari 
presented spoke volumes. In April 1932, Germany had imported 73 per cent less agricultural 
goods than in 1930. Moreover, Tassinari highlighted the importance of those imports by 
stating that in 1931 agricultural goods had still made up 58 per cent of Germany’s global 
imports. Now, on the verge of the Italian harvest, a continuing blockage would be unbearable 
to Italian economic interest. In general, Tassinari took the commercial difficulties with 
Germany as an argument against the production of agricultural goods for export, urging for 
the Italian soil to be used for grain and livestock instead, that is, to follow the path of autarchy 
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preset by the battaglia del grano of 1925. But for the moment, he demanded from the Italian 
government an “action of defence, and an immediate emergency reaction”.395 
 The reaction came swiftly. Within a week, the Italian government set up a plan to 
protect its “vital” exports. The basic policy measure was a “foreign exchange decree”, which 
would have allowed the Italian government to restrict imports from Germany by cutting off 
Italian importers of German goods from the foreign exchange supply. In an act of revenge, the 
measure basically imitated the German system of foreign exchange controls held responsible 
for the entire conflict and went even further. The measure unilaterally attacked imports from 
Germany, while Germany’s foreign exchange controls did not discriminate among countries. 
Ambassador Schubert warned that such “militant action would cause counter measures and 
that hereby [Germany and Italy] would get into a trade war with worse consequences for Italy 
than for Germany”.396 
However, while threatening the aforementioned act of revenge, the Italian side at the 
same time offered an institutional arrangement to solve the conflict: a payments agreement.397 
This idea, strongly supported by the agricultural lobby group Federazione Nazionale Fascista 
del Commercio Ortofrutticolo e Agrumario (FNFCOA), foresaw an agreement between 
German and Italian banks to substitute direct payments between exporters and importers of 
both countries with a clearing of export revenues between banks of each country. This would 
resolve the aggravating problem that importers of Italian goods in Germany obtained ever 
lesser amounts of foreign exchange. Importers had already started to use up their quotas of 
foreign exchange for the following months. Meanwhile, Italian exporters had extended credit 
to an almost prohibitive level, with further arrears putting their businesses at the risk of 
insolvency.398 In Munich, Cavalliere Zerioli, head of the Fasci di Monaco, told the Italian 
polizia politica that he too had been obliged to sell “wagons of good stuff for Reichsmark” 
without the possibility of converting the revenues into another currency.399 The payments 
agreement would allow export and import, without relying solely on scarce foreign exchange 
assets, thereby circumventing a major sore point between Italy and Germany. 
 While Italy sustained the threat of a foreign exchange decree, industrial companies in 
Germany showed solidarity with their Italian trading partners. The metal processing company 
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Böhme & Hennen (Dresden) urged the German government not to sacrifice economically 
important industries in Germany out of support for a policy, forced on the government by 
agricultural interest. The metal processing sector was described as having been severely hit by 
the economic crisis, especially by the almost complete closure of export markets in Africa, 
Australia and Asia. Italy, in contrast and in spite of its tariff increases, still offered valuable 
export opportunities. Therefore, the company warned strongly against any measure to protect 
agricultural interest, which could in turn lead to Italian import restrictions on German 
industrial products.400 The German trading company G.F. Stirn, based in Genoa, warned that 
the current policy would not only put German exports under pressure while the foreign 
exchange controls are in place. Their legacy would last longer as it would be “very difficult 
even in normal times” to win back the former position as a supplier of a certain good because 
in the meantime the gap would be filled by domestic productions or other competitors.401 
 Neither government dared to declare an open trade war, albeit for different reasons. 
For the fascist government, nothing less than Italy’s most profitable export market was at 
stake. Although Rome put the foreign exchange decree into practise, it was immediately 
suspended until further notice. Moreover, Bonifacio Ciancarelli (MAE) informally hinted that 
Italy could buy more coal if only Germany bought more agricultural products. For Germany, 
this was certainly a point to negotiate, as the export of coal played such an important role for 
the trade with Italy, but it was something else that triggered accommodation. Schubert 
emphasised that, “from a political point of view it is most undesirable if at the present 
moment, shortly before the conference of Lausanne, a trade war would break out between 
Germany and Italy”.402 
  Germany and Italy secretly negotiated a payments agreement that was signed on 15 
June 1932.403 As a first primitive form of a clearing system, Germany created bank accounts 
for “blocked currency” (“Sperrmark-Konten”). Potential German importers short on foreign 
exchange assignments could now pay in Reichsmark what they lacked in foreign exchange to 
the Reichsbank, and exporters could consequently be paid from the thereby collected funds. 
The same function was executed in Italy by the Istituto Nazionale per i Cambi con l’Estero in 
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combination with the Banca d’Italia.404 Furthermore, it was agreed that if the prospective 
funds allowed, Italy should use them to increase coal purchases. However, one suggestion by 
the Italian negotiators did not find favour with their German counterparts: to relieve the 
restrictions on tourism. As part of the foreign exchange controls, the German government had 
established the rule that only a very limited amount of Reichsmark (RM 200) could be taken 
abroad.405 Needless to say, that this was a thorn in the flesh of a country with such a great 
economic interest in tourism. 
 The strictly secret payments agreement406 did not remain secret; information leaked 
out quickly and not unintentionally. The mole was one of the major opponents regarding 
closer commercial collaboration with Italy. Interest groups of German agriculture,407 informed 
about the new institutional basis through trading companies, revealed the details of the 
agreement to the Dutch, French and Swedish governments. This indiscretion made it very 
difficult for the German government to explain the unilateral preference of Italy’s exports to 
the other major exporters of agricultural products to Germany. 408  Nevertheless, the 
government sought to stay its course against the opposition from German agriculture and 
European governments in order to assist Italy in selling its rich summer harvest. A ministerial 
decree established to favour German industrial over agricultural interest, and that in dire need 
of one of the few remaining markets for industrial exports, the payments agreement with Italy, 
and the beneficial position for its agriculture, would be kept.409 
 This climate of appeasement, encouraged by the recent support of the German 
government, seemed to provide an opportunity to call the mixed commission of German and 
Italian producers together. After several delays, Ludwig Kastl and Gino Olivetti finally met on 
29 July 1932 in Venice for a first organisational meeting. Kastl seemed to be well qualified, as 
he had work experience with both the economy and the government. He was the managing 
director of the RDI, as well as appointed delegate to the League of Nations, where he had led 
the negotiations over the Young Plan, which settled German reparation debt. His Italian 
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counterpart, Olivetti, was the long-serving president of Confindustria, the Italian employers’ 
federation (1910-34).410 
 While at the first meeting only organisational issues were addressed, and no questions 
of substance were put on the agenda, the looming conflict between the respective interest 
groups of each country resurfaced. The German delegation pushed to exclude the question of 
agricultural exports, but Italy, and especially Felice Guarneri – who thereafter became one of 
the major actors of the German-Italian economic relationship – insisted on its inclusion. As a 
compromise, two separate sub-commissions were established: one for matters of industry and 
one for agriculture. However, this compromise did little to smooth over differences regarding 
agriculture, and indeed the commission was unable to elaborate a programme comparable to 
that of the industry-commission. The latter was given the task to facilitate cross-country 
communities of interest. In addition, going beyond the bilateral relationship it was agreed that 
foreign economic policies should be harmonised vis-à-vis third-party markets.411 Although not 
much had happened yet, the commission expressed a desire to accomplish goals in a measured 
fashion. For the time being, it was decided that both technical sub-commissions would meet 
in Stresa (Lago Maggiore) in September 1932. 412  However, immediately thereafter the 
fledgling co-operation collapsed again. 
 The payments agreement concluded in June 1932 became something of a victim to its 
own success. Ritter argued that the pressure of other European exporters in search of a similar 
treatment had recently exceeded the tolerable. While this argument still revealed ongoing 
support by the German government for closer economic collaboration with Italy, another 
argument for the cancellation raises doubts about these supportive intentions. The summer 
months of July and August had seen such an increase of Italian agricultural exports supported 
by the new payments agreement that the balance of trade turned positive for Italy, a 
development completely unacceptable to German foreign economic policy. At first, Berlin 
tried to amend the agreement to restore a German trade surplus, but Rome refused. Therefore, 
in September 1932, the German government opted for the second, harsher choice: the 
unilateral cancellation of the payments agreement.413 From a rather technical dispute, the 
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matter had evolved into a political conflict, one in which the Duce himself tried to 
intervene.414 
 However, not only did Germany maintain the cancellation, it went even further. Early 
in September 1932, Banca d’Italia representative Cimino reported from Berlin that the 
German government was about to submit agricultural goods to import quotas. When Il 
Messaggero published the announcement of these sanction, it left Italy, according to the 
German embassy, in “utter dismay”.415  Already the practise of not providing a sufficient 
amount of foreign exchange to potential importers was described by Rome as prohibitive, but 
it had been rather broad and implicit still. The import quotas on agricultural products, that is, 
the administrative determination of maximum import quantities of certain goods, was 
considered an open blow against Italian economic interests.416 For the Italian negotiators, the 
quotas called into question the entire renegotiation of the payments agreement. 
Germany instead argued that only parts of the exports would be subject to quotas, and 
that negotiations should carry on. The Reichsbank was in general against quotas, and warned 
that it could not guarantee monetary stability in case of their application – a warning that was 
also perceived in Rome.417 After all, it was clear to the German embassy in Rome that, if the 
cancellation remained the last word, “Italy will respond with counter-measures, which will 
not only severely hit our economy, but must also harm politically to an utmost extent”.418 The 
embassy, in this instance, was backed by the Reichverband des Deutschen Gross- und 
Überseehandels, the lobby organisation of wholesale and foreign trade, which warned against 
the “great danger” the cancellation would cause.419  
 Nevertheless, to Rome the German proposal for an amended payments agreement, and 
especially the “Swiss clause” (Schweizerklausel) therein, was simply unacceptable. The 
clause, deriving from the German-Swiss commercial contract, established that a clearing 
system should not lead to a change in export composition, that is, the balance between 
agricultural and industrial imports should be maintained. Italy argued that this was a mighty 
sword in the hands of the German agricultural lobby as the world economic crisis weighed 
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heavily on Italy’s industrial exports to Germany. The clause would enable Germany to 
diminish Italian agricultural exports in accordance with the already-decreased industrial 
exports.420 That was more than Rome was willing to ask from Italy’s agricultural lobby. 
 From this point of barely concealed tensions, the conflict escalated into the “foreign 
exchange war” of September and October 1932. The Italian involvement in the conflict came 
in a renewed form of its earlier threat, a foreign exchange decree, which in June 1932 had 
resulted in a German capitulation. This time it was designed with an even greater hostile 
intent. While the German foreign exchange controls covered equally every country and every 
trading partner, thereby representing a matter of currency protection, the Italian foreign 
exchange decree, instead addressed solely Germany (and Yugoslavia).421 According to the AA, 
its one-sided orientation made it a “downright reprisal”.422 The German share in the conflict 
was certainly no less aggravating. The trade political committee (Handelspolitischer 
Ausschuss) – a government body founded in 1925 uniting the major representatives of foreign 
economic policy making, which became the “perhaps most important foreign economic policy 
institution” of the German government423 – ruled that the Italian decree should be answered 
with a complete cessation of payments to Italy.424 The Reich Chancellery warned that if the 
perilous Italian measure was left unchallenged, other countries like Switzerland, France and 
the Netherlands would be likely to introduce similar foreign exchange rules; indeed, they 
were already starting to talk about doing so. Consequently, Germany’s “entire trade surplus 
will [...] disappear very soon”.425 
 With the established commercial relationship in jeopardy, the technical dispute-turned- 
political conflict finally became a public event. The newspaper Die Welt am Montag led with 
the headline, “Mussolini bans German imports”. The article warned that companies from 
other countries like France, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and Britain had begun to breach the 
Italian market already, thereby making the German merchants victims of their government’s 
autarkic policies.426 Il Messaggero countered that Italy “was never an initiator of a restrictive 
commercial policy”. Moreover, what the German newspapers belittlingly described as a 
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“consolidation of the status quo” when they argued in favour of a German surplus in trade, 
was for Il Messaggero simply extremely damaging to Italy’s economic interests.427 
 It became clear that the stalled negotiations were in need of a real compromise if they 
were to begin to move again. Only an agreement that embraced the conflict in all its facets, 
thereby solving the foreign exchange problem, as well as the German quotas, could promise 
success. The German embassy, an incessant supporter of German-Italian reconciliation, feared 
that “an economic war of the worst type [...] will impinge on the Italians general political 
stance” with regard to Germany. Therefore, it strongly supported concessions in the thorny 
matter of quotas.428 In reviewing the Italian manoeuvres in the “foreign exchange war”, the 
Banca d’Italia summarised that “our action could not have been launched at a more opportune 
time”.429 
 A first breakthrough was achieved at a meeting of Bonifacio Ciancarelli (MAE) and 
Germany’s Ambassador Schubert. While Ciancarelli mitigated Italy’s refusal of any quotas, 
Schubert held out the prospect that Germany, firstly, could allow a free composition of 
industrial and agricultural imports (that is, no “Swiss clause” for Italy), and secondly, agrees 
to a relatively short period of cancellation.430 As a result of this meeting, a protocol was 
signed on 15 October 1932, which eliminated the mutual threats to the German-Italian trade 
and reinstalled the payments agreement of summer 1932, albeit with one major change: the 
introduction of the “Swedish clause” (Schwedenklausel). After other European exporters had 
responded to the special treatment of Italy with envy and demands for similar treatment, the 
negotiations with Sweden at the end of September spawned a system that allowed Germany to 
prefer unilaterally certain bilateral trade relations, without risking a deterioration of the trade 
balance. This ruse was made possible by establishing a German surplus in trade as a rule in 
the payments agreement with Sweden, and shortly thereafter, in the renewed agreement with 
Italy.431 The protocol set the year 1931 for the fixing of the balance of trade, when the ratio 
was 3 : 2 in favour of Germany.432 
 Both north and south of the Alps the protocol was received with provisional 
recognition mixed with a critical view on the long-term development. The stock markets in 
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both countries reacted to the news with significant gains.433 The German newspapers saw it as 
a fair compromise. The liberal premium newspaper, Vossische Zeitung, for instance, wrote 
that, “whereas Italy forbears from the planned reduction of its trade deficit with Germany, 
Germany forbears from the planned increase.”434 For the Frankfurter Zeitung, the agreement 
simply established international economic justice, because only with a positive balance of 
trade was Germany able to meet its liabilities.435  In Italy, too, the press tended towards 
appraising this agreement as a fair compromise. Corriere della Sera, for instance, claimed that 
Italy had cleared up for both countries an unfavourable situation, for which it was not 
responsible.436 However, at times reports hailed victory. Exceptional for its harsh tone was the 
Lavoro Fascista, writing that, “Italy had energetically fought back an attack of the German 
customs and financial policy [...] and did reduce the too reckless aggressor to its owing and 
appropriate position”.437 Polemics aside, in its unfettered support for rebalancing trade the 
article is one indicator that the general conflict over surplus and deficit was anything but 
resolved. 
Mistrust persisted not only in the nationalistic press, but also in public administration. 
After the end of the “foreign exchange war” the Banca d’Italia carefully studied Germany’s 
balance sheets produced by the Statistisches Reichsamt, and detected significant divergences 
with its own data. It suspected the German estimations of systematically overrating 
transportation costs, expenditure on tourism and the service of principal and interest in order 
to make the German surplus appear as small as possible. Actually, so the Bank reckoned, the 
situation was changing at the expense of Italy, because in 1932 German reparation payments 
were cancelled, thereby removing from the balance of payments one of Italy’s major items to 
balance the German surplus in trade (see Table 2).438 Another indicator for persisting mistrust 
was the short notice period required for the cancellation of the agreement. This was stipulated 
in order to quickly react to trade policy measures by the respective other. This had appeared 
necessary already in the following year, the year of the Nazi seizure of power. 
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Table 2: German exports and reparations to Italy 1925-1931 (in million RM)  
  reparations exports 
1925  56.4  422.6 
1926  69.9  486.1 
1927  74.9  461.5 
1928  110.1  546.9 
1929  131.1  602.4 
1930  69.9  484.1 
1931  37.4  340.8 





Chapter 3: Political Will and Economic Realities after the Nazi 
Seizure of Power 
 
Introduction: Institutions of the Economic Relationship before and after 1933 
 
Chapter 2 has shown how in 1929 new opportunities for the German-Italian commercial 
relationship arose. The fascist government altered its foreign economic policy by encouraging 
agricultural exports at the expense of its protectionist support for domestic industries as had 
happened with the “battaglia per la economia”. Germany, given its Europe-wide unchallenged 
demand for Mediterranean products provided by far the biggest market for Italian products. 
On the opposite side, Berlin was desperately looking for open markets for its industrial 
exports, which encountered ever increasing trade barriers on international markets. Above all, 
the German government needed international support for its battle against the vehemently 
opposed peace regulations obligating Germany to reparation payments and armament 
restrictions. 
 While the basic conditions were promising, there were also opponents of a 
compromise of “lemons for machines”. German agricultural lobby groups refused to accept 
any generous accommodation of Italian products on the German market, and even tried to 
push Berlin towards harsher import restrictions. Meanwhile Italian manufactures still caused 
suspicions in Germany that counterfeiting and discrimination hampered businesses and 
investments in the Italian market. The spiral of protectionism assured the continuation of the 
commercial deadlock. What was more, not only interest groups appeared irreconcilable. The 
question of surplus and deficit in trade, which had the potential to escalate into a “foreign 
exchange war” remained a sticking point between the two governments. 
 While the conflicts repeatedly led to the collapse of initiatives for better economic 
collaboration, government negotiations in 1932 created two compromise-facilitating 
institutions. The first was the German-Italian commission of producers, which gathered 
private business stakeholders to overcome commercial disputes, and the second was the 
payments agreement, which guaranteed German payments in spite of the harsh foreign 
exchange controls. The payments agreement was almost forced upon Berlin by the very 
demanding Italian negotiators. But the mechanism of the payments agreement also allowed 
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the fixing of surplus and deficit in trade, and was therefore potentially in the interest of the 
German government. 
Chapter 3 demonstrates the impact of the Nazi seizure of power on the newly founded 
commercial institutions. Of course, one would expect that Hitler’s regime would go even 
further than the last governments of the Weimar Republic, which had given a clear advantage 
to Italy’s export interest over some of its European competitors. Yet some crucial questions 
and demands had remained unanswered, and the Nazi regime was with Hjalmar Schacht’s 
“new plan” designing a foreign economic policy that would completely change Germany’s 
economic relations with Europe. To understand the changes after 1933, Chapter 3 investigates 
the first immediate responses to the Nazi seizure of power in the economic sphere. Thereafter, 
it looks at one of the booming sectors of the interwar period, artificial fibres. This scrutiny 
allows us to better understand the actual functioning of the economic relationship at the 
business level. Finally, Chapter 4 looks at the establishment of the commercial institutions 
that governed the German-Italian commercial relationship till the collapse of the “Axis” in 
World War II. 
 
1. Brothers in Mind Down to Business? 
 
Adolf Hitler’s election as Reich Chancellor in January 1933 excited public opinion in Italy. 
With a German government apparently closer to fascism, new initiatives for economic 
collaboration seemed possible. In a review of the Italian press, the Deutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung, a conservative newspaper owned by a group of large corporations (including the 
Stinnes group), detected everywhere in Italy the hope that the “Reich chancellor Hitler is 
proof for the fascists’ claim that our century will be under the banner of the fascists”. The 
Nazi government was expected to pay more attention to the relationship with Italy than had 
the previous governments of the Weimar Republic. However, on a more cautious note, the 
Italian press also warned Germany not to pursue “cruelties in the economic sphere” against 
Italy, as had happened before.439 By referring to a Renzetti report from Berlin, the MAE was 
convinced that a more solid construction of the Italian-German commercial relationship 
would, “demonstrate how two economies, inspired by the same basic principle, are most 
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suitable to fight and face the current difficulties.” A joint action should “stimulate the 
consumption of products to a vast extent, and support the entities of commercial exchange”.440 
 In Germany, despite the unquestionable seminal change of the year 1933, the same 
protagonists still steered economic relations, and the same divided attitude with regard to 
Fascist Italy prevailed. The embassy in Rome summarised the attitudes as almost entirely 
consisting of two diametrically opposing attitudes: 
 ...one, proclaiming the German-Italian front, and holding Mussolini as [Germany’s] 
 only friend, expecting from him the possible and the impossible; the other, who 
 discounts Italians as proved unreliable people, castigates their phoniness, and 
 highlights the difference between certain declarations of Mussolini and the actual 
 comportment,  for instance, of his delegates in Geneva.441 
Both attitudes were for Ambassador Ulrich von Hassell442 equally wrong, and he demanded a 
more realistic approach to build up the relationship on the shared goal, that is, the opposition 
to French ascendancy. And yet, he was also aware of the major obstacles still impeding the 
realisation of rapprochement: the “Austrian question”, and the “commercial annoyance” over 
the respective trading partners. 443 
 Hitler tended more towards an enthusiastic attitude. He had admired the Duce’s style 
of staging the masses and his behaviour as a genuine leader since the early movement days of 
the NSDAP.444  In 1931, he told Mussolini via their middleman Renzetti that Mussolini’s 
“sympathy for the national-socialist movement, [he] shared for fascism extraordinarily and for 
many years”.445 The actual depth of Hitler’s knowledge of the German-Italian commercial 
relationship in 1933 is very difficult to judge from today’s perspective. However, even if he 
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had known about the imbricated conflicts in the commercial sphere, it is likely that he would 
not have attached great importance to them. In a meeting with agricultural experts of the 
NSDAP he declared that he was “not thinking in the first instance of economic matters.” For 
his ultimate goal, a “new social order” for Europe, economic thinking was dismissed as 
“liberal games”.446 In his “second book”, written in 1928, Hitler did not attach importance to 
foreign commerce or economic aspects, and accordingly saw no “natural frictions” with 
Fascist Italy.447 
 The Duce, in contrast, did not share the same personal sympathies towards Hitler.448 In 
particular the fight over Austria’s independence blackened his view of the Nazi leader. 
According to Fulvio Suvich, under-secretary of state for the MAE and the mastermind behind 
Italy’s foreign policy with regard to Austria and Southeastern Europe, Mussolini portrayed 
Hitler as a “belva humana” (human beast).449 What the Duce did seem to have in common 
with the German dictator was that the quite-technical questions of foreign economic policy 
did not always catch his attention.450 According to a Roman coal trader interviewed by the 
polizia politica, the Duce “was not able to understand and foresee the consequences” of major 
changes in foreign commerce as he had to rely on his experts, and among those “nobody 
could pretend that he is competent”.451 When during World War II public spending as well as 
foreign debt got out of control, Mussolini commented that “financial problems do not exist for 
States. States collapse only under the weight of defeat or because of an internal disintegration 
of morale”.452 
 Feedback coming from private businesses regarding the Nazi seizure of power seemed 
to be in concordance with Mussolini’s ambivalent attitude towards Nazi Germany. The 
manufacturer Böhme & Hennen (Dresden) noted that several Italian customers expressed 
great admiration for Germany under Hitler’s reign, which was perceived as a “friendly and 
fascist nation”. Such compliments, however, were accompanied by worries about the frictions 
underlying the commercial relationship. Böhme and Hennen understood them as appeals to 
the German government to pay attention to Italy’s commercial needs and not to insult a 
                                                 
446 Quoted in Kaiser, Economic diplomacy, p. 61. 
447 Quoted in Kube, Pour le mérite, pp. 78-79. 
448 See Scarano, Mussolini e la Reppublica di Weimar, p. 535. 
449 Suvich and Bianchi, Memorie, p. 69. 
450 Chapter 4, Section 1 provides an example that it was even possible for a trade expert like Felice Guarneri to 
enact a policy different from what Mussolini had set out. 
451 Polizia Politica Milano, 17 May 1935, ACS, Ministero dell’Interno – Divisione Polizia Politica, busta 177. 
452 Quoted in Raspin, The Italian war economy, p. 118. 
97 
country that represents a viable export market for the sake of a “few hundred tons of 
vegetables and oranges” less on the German market.453 
 In Northern Italy’s industrial triangle, a certain level of scepticism regarding the 
economic relationship with Germany persisted. The information leaked through to the 
German embassy that Piero Puricelli, entrepreneur and president of the Milan fair, after a visit 
to Germany where he had also met Hitler did not waste too many positive words on his hosts. 
One should not be deluded by assumed similarities between the political systems, Puricelli 
insisted in a meeting with the Duce. Italy would be better off not unilaterally co-operating 
with an “alien nation”, whose economy and public finances are in precarious disorder. Instead, 
Puricelli urged the government to maintain a certain level of commercial openness, and 
develop closer ties with France. Puricelli’s remarks were paid careful attention in the AA 
because they were expected to represent a widespread attitude of business representatives in 
Italy’s industrial triangle.454 That this expectation was not exaggerated is supported by a report 
of the polizia politica, which concluded that, “economic circles look with suspicion at the new 
facts“.455 
 Nevertheless, enthusiasm was growing among the people for supposed advances of 
fascism in Europe, and to make a business out of it, Italy and Germany immediately began to 
negotiate a new tourism agreement. Italian demands that the German authorities facilitate 
tourism date to before the Nazis seized power. In 1931, Fulvio Suvich, then commissioner for 
tourism (Commissario per il Tourismo), had issued a warning that the German government 
intended to introduce a tax on its citizens abroad, which would cause “extremely noticeable 
damage” to Italy’s tourism industry.456 The tax proposal came at a very bad time, as shortly 
after the eruption of the world economic crisis, fascist Italy had been exploring tourism as a 
very lucrative business. In 1931, 240,000 German citizens travelled to Italy, equal to 
approximately 24 per cent of all the visitors to Italy. 457  An article in Echi e Commenti 
emphasised that tourism’s biggest advantage was that, unlike the export of goods, it brought 
in cash in local currency. Moreover, no primary products had to be imported, as in the case of 
industrial production in a resource-poor country. The article called on the government to 
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stimulate tourism and include it in the negotiations of commercial contracts. 458  Such 
government support was essential at this time because the collapse of the gold standard, with 
some countries, including Germany, introducing harsh foreign exchange controls, had made it 
very difficult for potential tourists to Italy to take money abroad.459 
 Previous to 1933, attempts to improve the institutional ground for tourism had failed 
due to largely incompatible expectations and international agreements. For the Italian tourism 
industry, the lump sum of RM 200 granted to every German tourist in Italy by Germany’s 
foreign exchange authorities was far from what tourists would have liked to spend. Already at 
the end of 1932, German ministries were cautiously optimistic that a higher amount of foreign 
exchange could be granted to German tourists, but only if Italy was prepared to increase its 
purchases of German coal in return. This was not too easy a requirement, as Italy still bought 
a significant amount of its coal from Britain, and did not intend to snub a crucial trading 
partner by shifting these imports to Germany.460 
 Only two months in office, the new Nazi government enabled a compromise by 
reducing the German demands.461 On 8 March 1933, both governments signed a treaty “to 
facilitate German tourist traffic to Italy”. Germany now allowed every tourist RM 500, and 
Italy declared it would buy coal to the tune of RM 5 million via the state railway company 
(Ferrovie dello Stato). Whereas Berlin was keen to make the agreement public as soon as 
possible, because similar negotiations with other countries were pending, Italian negotiators 
exhorted the German government to utmost secrecy in order to veil the coal deal from 
Britain.462 A solution to this dilemma was found by separating the agreement into two separate 
contracts, one for tourism and the other for coal.463 The local newspaper Trentino celebrated 
the treaty as “a present from Hitler”, a depiction little appreciated by the MAE.464 
 The success of the treaty did not stop either party from complaining about it. Already 
during the negotiations, the German delegation had failed to insist that Italy’s protectionist 
tariff rates on industrial imports be reduced.465 Once the agreement had been put into practice, 
it was only a few months until the MAE, at the height of holiday-time, complained in a 
memorandum about contradictory measures taken by German government institutions. 
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Whereas the German authorities had granted RM 500 per tourist and stay in Italy, they 
granted RM 1,000 for voyages to Austria, thereby adding fuel to the fire of the conflict over 
Austria’s independence.466 Moreover, Rome complained that German government officials 
had been refused permission to take their holidays in Italy.467 Confronted with the charges, the 
German government had to admit that such regulations did exist in the Southern states of 
Germany. However, it tried to talk its way out of the awkward situation by assuring the 
Italians that the Reich government had never instructed the states to introduce such 
regulations, but would now make sure that they were lifted.468 Although Italian authorities still 
continued to complain about several claims in German newspapers to boycott Italy as a tourist 
destination, they also admitted that these campaigns had no impact on the actual number of 
German tourists in search of la dolce vita.469 That said, the AA complained about the treaty, 
too. It argued that Italy did not have any reason to weep, as by the end of July, RM 8.7 million 
had been assigned for tourism, whereas Italy was per contract only obliged to buy RM 5 
million of coal for the entire year.470 
 Soon after the rejoicing over the new Nazi government abated, contradictory 
evaluations of the commercial relationship went public. In summer 1933, several articles 
appeared in Italy attacking the German foreign economic policy. Perhaps not surprisingly, one 
of those to comment was the ex-minister for national economy, Giuseppe Belluzzo, in the 
Gazzetta del Popolo. After a short introduction about the beneficial and reliable commercial 
relations with Britain and France, he claimed that the “excellent diplomats of Germany” were 
in fact commercial agents of Germany’s big businesses. In this role, their aim was to regain 
their pre-World War I dominant market shares in Italy.471 
 While this article could easily be shrugged off as an exaggeration and a propagandistic 
message from the pen of the president of the Comitato per il Prodotto Italiano (Committee for 
the Italian Product), several articles in Il Sole, the main newspaper of Milan’s business 
community, worried the Germany embassy. “In an almost grotesque manner [Il Sole] 
increases Germany’s advantages from the commercial relationship, and diminishes Italy’s”. In 
numbers, Il sole argued that Germany increasingly discriminated against imports from Italy, 
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which was unacceptable given that, for the period 1926-32, Germany had accumulated a 
surplus of RM 1,400 million in trade, of which half came from trading with Italy. The 
Frankfurter Zeitung emphatically contradicted this evaluation and argued that the value of 
Italy’s exports had remained the same since 1932, and that its deficit was actually falling 
constantly. In an interesting case of transnational interference, the German-Italian chamber of 
commerce in Milan published articles in the Milan based newspapers Sera and L’Ambrosiano, 
which provided the official Italian balance of trade for the month of August. Thanks to rich 
agriculture exports after the summer harvest, the balance of trade had turned out to be positive 
for Italy.472 This news was held up to win the battle against the Mcorp, which was suspected 
to be the agitator behind the Il Sole articles, over the correct evaluation of the balance of trade 
within the business community of Milan, the bottleneck of the German-Italian commercial 
relationship. 
 Italian sensitivities with regard to the balance of trade were also triggered by 
international calls for a boycott of German products in reaction to the atrocities against 
businesses of “Jewish ownership” after the Nazi seizure of power. In an article in the Polish-
Jewish newspaper Nasz Przeglad, Edoardo Kleinlehrer, the Italian correspondent for several 
Polish newspapers emphasised that, “the course of events in Germany cannot satisfy Italian 
fascism”. In addition to the already huge deficit, the German commercial policy would with 
its continuing restriction of imports from Italy, “render a close, intimate collaboration with 
Germany utterly problematic”. Instead, measures by “Jewish companies and shops in Rome, 
Milan, Turin and Geneva” were praised for not only having cancelled their commercial ties 
with German companies, but also having ensured that their orders from abroad were not 
transported via Germany. Moreover, Kleinlehrer suggested that Italian products could replace 
competing products from Germany on the markets of Southeastern Europe and the Eastern 
Mediterranean where boycott calls had been heard.473 The Banca d’Italia’s representation in 
Berlin reported that it is “beyond doubt that the German commercial surplus is reduced as a 
result of the foreign boycott in recent months“.474 
 Apparently, some members of the German business community discriminated against 
on religious grounds saw Fascist Italy as a haven from the cruelties in their home country. The 
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archives of the MAE preserve several requests by officials “with positions of first order in the 
German business environment” for political refuge.475 Richard Ginsburg, for instance, board 
member of the Mitteldeutsche Bodenkreditanstalt, intended to immigrate to Italy and transfer 
all his belongings from Germany.476 However, the case of the Eugen Rambow, vice-director 
of the Dresdner Bank, provides evidence of the persisting mistrust against the German 
business community irrespective of their religious persecution. The representation of the 
Banca d’Italia in Berlin, which managed Rambow’s request, felt obliged to warn the 
headquarters in Rome that, “those German Jews usually have an ambivalent character and 
especially those from Prussia would like to be most Prussian [prussianissimi]”. This character 
and the predilection toward Germany would remain “even if they at the moment speak about 
Germany and the Germans as a country and a people distant from them”.477 
 On the official level of the bilateral commercial relationship, Fascist Italy did not try to 
take advantage of the boycott calls against German products.478 Mussolini himself “warned 
[the German government] not to underestimate the Jews and Freemasons, from which a heavy 
offensive is to be expected”.479  According to the Suvich memoirs, Hitler personally told 
Mussolini that he was not preoccupied “with the economic consequences as the boycott would 
last only very briefly”.480 In April 1933 the MAE advised the INE to urge Italian exporters 
with Jewish business clients in Germany to interrupt consignments because payments could 
no longer be guaranteed.481 This warning was withdrawn after “no grave consequences with 
regard to our agricultural export are to be complained about”. For the MAE, all that mattered 
was that Italian economic interests be protected, and the remark that, “it can be that Jewish 
businesses were still threatened, but this is a question of domestic politics”482 shows that there 
was no support for former business clients. 
 After all, Germany remained by far Italy’s best client, and both the German press as 
well as foreign economic policy experts decried the continuing attacks against Germany and 
the balance of trade by Il Sole. The newspaper Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (DAZ), which 
focused to some extent on industrial interests, admitted that the public discourse in Germany 
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had used the current catchword “autarchy” all too haphazardly, thereby scaring actual and 
potential suppliers of the German economy. The ongoing complaints about Italy’s deficit, and 
the suspicion that Italy, “provides a surplus to Germany so that it is able to pay its debts to 
other countries with [Italian] money”, were described as “misunderstandings”. In reality, 
according to the DAZ, Germany’s surplus would not only decrease in absolute terms but also 
in proportion to the overall decrease of foreign trade.483 This assessment of the balance of 
trade was certainly not too far away from reality. The personal files of Karl Ritter, head of the 
commercial department of the AA, contain a hand-written balance sheet clearly indicating the 
falling surplus in trade with Italy. While in 1929 a surplus of RM 158.2 million was recorded, 
it went down to RM 31.2 million in 1933.484 Keeping this development in mind, it seems that 
the harsh accusations against the supposedly unfavourable balance of trade can be read as a 
way of developing one of the most lucrative markets for Italian agriculture, and of warning 
Germany not to revive agricultural protectionism in order to fight the economic crisis.485 
 In the same manner, on 27 February 1933, at the first workshop of the mixed 
commission of German and Italian producers in Venice, the Italian delegation led by Dino 
Olivetti tried to link industrial collaboration to questions of agricultural support. However, the 
German delegation refused to respond to this demand, explaining that they were not 
authorised to deal with questions of agriculture. Consequently, the refinement of the scope of 
the commission remained vague: first, to provide a basis for direct negotiations between 
representatives of each branch of industry; second, to discuss “general commercial and 
economic policy questions”; and finally, to co-ordinate a common approach for the upcoming 
world economic conference.486 For the latter two it was only agreed to commonly oppose 
attacks on the most-favoured-nation clause, and demand a settlement of “all political debt”, 
that is, the inter-allied war debts. 
 Most of the workshop, however, was absorbed by raising the issues in various industry 
branches. The German delegation addressed in particular the branches of radio technology, 
ignition systems, marble, textiles and fibre industry. The issues were manifold and ranged 
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from planned harmonisation of customs and prices, to closer cross-country collaboration 
between companies and the elimination of mutual competition on the German and Italian 
markets, but also with regard to third-party markets. For instance, Germany’s customs and 
import quotas of silk should be styled so as to consider Italy’s export interests, but at the same 
time exclude imports from Czechoslovakia. Similarly, both countries’ hemp importers should 
co-ordinate their purchases to put pressure on the world’s biggest supplier of hemp: the Soviet 
Union. The Italian delegation, on the other hand, was very keen to prevent German companies 
from undercutting the prices of Italian companies on the Italian market. This demand was 
expressed for everyday goods like porcelains, but also for goods of strategic importance such 
as chemicals. 487  While the protocol of the workshop might give the impression that an 
institution had been found to solve conflicts between private businesses of the two countries, 
the conflict over artificial fibres that broke out soon after the meeting proved that there was 
still unaddressed mistrust. 
 
2. Conflict over Artificial Fibres 
 
The industry of artificial fibres (rayon) was one of the booming industries of the interwar 
period. In 1928 global production saw, according to the Banca d’Italia, a rise from 34 to 169 
million kilogrammes. With fierce global competition, prices dropped by 20 per cent.488 It 
allowed geographically disadvantaged countries like Germany and Italy to supply their textile 
industries without importing natural fibres such as cotton. Thus, given a certain size of 
production, it provided the opportunity to increase export revenues without the heavy preload 
for companies and the central banks to allocate foreign exchange for the import of foreign 
natural fibres. Therefore, not surprisingly, the industry received considerable attention from 
both countries’ governments, particularly during the world economic crisis. In addition to the 
fiscal aspect, fibres such as casein – or milk yarn – were designed using the agricultural 
output as pre-product. This vertical integration created synergies, which also benefited the 
heavily protected agricultural sector.489 
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The rayon companies in Germany and Italy were quite modern and highly rationalised, in 
accordance with contemporary standards and in comparison to other sectors. In Italy, many 
small businesses popped up throughout the 1920s, while the major companies eventually 
evolved into being SNIA Viscosa and Châtillon. According to a contemporary German study 
of the Italian industry, represented on the world market with its sales cartels Italviscosa und 
Italraion, it was able to undercut the other competitors from Germany, the US and Japan. 
With its highly competitive prices, the industry grew despite global economic turmoil and 
tripled production between 1929 and 1936.490 In Germany, the big names were Vereinigte 
Glanzstoff-Fabriken AG, and later in the 1920s, the chemical giant IG Farben, which 
according to an Italian study aggressively undercut the prices of the Glanzstoff, always with 
the excuse of combating Italian dumping in artificial fibres production.491 At the same time, a 
new national champion emerged in Germany with IG Farben; it seems that Deutsche Bank 
was pulling out of its investment in Italy. The polizia politica regretfully estimated that most 
of the SNIA shares sold over the cause of 1931 were previously held by Deutsche Bank.492 
 Germany in the 1920s was in a way the Eldorado of the international rayon industry. 
Already quite a big market with a huge demand, it possessed the lowest customs barriers for 
artificial fibres in the world. After the outbreak of the crisis and the rise of protectionist 
borders in many former markets, international production flowed increasingly into Germany, 
thus alerting the authorities. In 1931 an international syndicate was founded in which the 
SNIA apparently took the lead.493 Apart from competing with the British Celanese Company, 
a giant in the sector, it provided a platform for all the stakeholders of the German artificial 
fibres market. The cartel’s task was to channel the imports to Germany in an acceptable way 
for the authorities worried about foreign exchange reserves and the domestic production in 
Germany. 
 However, the internationally co-ordinated action did not meet the planned goals, and 
imports to Germany continued to come. Then, in turning away from an international approach, 
in summer 1933 the RWM, under the new Nazi government, allowed every German member 
to cancel its contracts with the syndicate, thereby deciding its sudden end. One huge problem, 
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however, remained for the government in its search for political allies: How could the national 
market be protected against foreign competitors without violating Italian interests and risking 
political repercussions? The Italian stake was quite significant, constituted by a strong 
presence in this sector, and an even stronger conviction that it had the right to export to 
Germany because of its trade deficit.494 
  Rome favoured a settlement carried out by a mixed commission of German and 
Italian producers of artificial fibres, but this encountered resistance.495 The RWM replied that 
the question at stake went “far beyond the interest of the producing industries”. The 
ministries’ espousal of a national production was not in the first place a matter of support for 
the existing companies in Germany. It was primarily about creating new jobs.496 The two 
objectives of the Nazi government, to create jobs for the unemployed masses of the crisis-
shaken country, and to placate Italy as one of its few potential allies in Europe, were difficult 
to reconcile. To sort things out, Posse (RWM) favoured a meeting of government officials 
over a mixed commission of producers.497 
 Nevertheless, Germany complied with the Italian wish, and allowed a meeting of 
private stakeholders in the artificial fibres business, with government officials participating as 
observers. Two different approaches to the regulation of imports to the German market were 
considered at the meeting. The German suggestion was quite drastic. It still granted low tariff 
rates, but allowed for a quota of only 40 per cent of the annual imports of 1932. As against 
this was the Italian suggestion, which set 1931 as the year of reference and guaranteed a quota 
of 70 per cent. The reason was simple. After 1931 the Italian exports of artificial fibres to 
Germany had not increased in the same way as had exports from other European competitors 
(especially from France and the Netherlands). A reduction to 70 per cent of the 1931 imports 
would mainly diminish the other competitor’s exports, while leaving Italy’s exports fairly 
untouched. The suggestion was backed by Riccardi’s barely concealed threat that, if no 
acceptable solution was found, Italy would reconsider some of its own purchases in Germany, 
namely, its large orders of German coal.498 
 The meeting of private business representatives managed to hit on an agreement based 
on the German proposal, but did not achieve a breakthrough. The RWM expected from this 
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agreement that, “the Italian government will not make any difficulties”.499  However, the 
Italian industrialists did not inform their government, or at least so the German embassy in 
Rome reported. 500  Whether this proved a conflict between the industrialists and the 
government or, quite the opposite, a tactical manoeuvre by the Italian government to win time 
for protective actions, one can only speculate. The fact is, however, that the German 
government accused its Italian government of filibustering, and threatened to take unilateral 
steps of harsh quotas for artificial fibre imports. Upon this threat, the MCorp reacted with the 
counter-proposal that the matter should be solved with an immediate agreement on a short-
term basis, coupled with an additional long-term regulation. 501  The promise for better 
economic co-ordination, which had supported the creation of mixed commissions of business 
representatives, was not delivered. In the end, the governments intervened heavily in the work 
of the commission, which they had set up themselves to avoid government regulation, thus 
proving differing policy goals between private business stakeholders and the governments. 
 In December 1933, government negotiations hit upon an agreement that Berlin 
considered a huge concession to Italian interests. The Italian industry could freely suggest a 
quota for its exports to Germany. Further regulations allowed a very generous handling of 
transitional issues. Finally, it was agreed that in the case of cancellation the old legal situation 
– with the old beneficial rules for export into Germany – would be automatically restored. 
The last cornerstone of trust-building was laid by Berlin’s assurance that it would never 
conduct any measure effectively introducing an import ban. Yet, the protocol also stated 
where the German government stood firm. It refused to declare Italian imports as German 
products, thus allowing for a way to discriminate against the other major producers of 
artificial fibres. Finally, the compromise was only a short-term arrangement (valid for three 
months), and therefore still not the definite solution eagerly sought by the Italian 
government.502 
 What was refused on the official level of contract negotiations was not all. The 
implementation of the agreement immediately revealed that Germany was actually by no 
means interested in providing the huge concessions it had officially granted. In the very 
month the agreement had been signed, the RWM ordered that imports of certain segments of 
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artificial fibres (delicate fibres) be banned, and already obtained import permissions seized.503 
This “surprising measure” was received in Italy “with great dismay”. Germany argued that the 
quota assigned to Italy was a global quota, and that it was legally entitled to exclude certain 
segments as long as the assigned amount in weight was guaranteed with import opportunities 
for segments of thicker fibres. In the Italian interpretation of the contract, the assigned quota 
was to be equally distributed among the various segments.504 That this dispute was in fact 
more than a legal quibble over a minor technical issue is demonstrated by the fact that fewer 
export opportunities in the more delicate segments simply meant fewer fibres to be exported 
in total. The quotas were calculated by weight, and more delicate (that is, lighter) segments 
would allow for a higher total export. Therefore, Germany was still, despite the agreement, 
trying to diminish imports from Italy, while Italy was at the same time looking for ways to 
increase its exports.505 
The quarrels had a negative impact on private businesses in this sector on both sides. 
The Milan-based company A. Andreae & C. asked the German consulate in Milan for 
help.The company was connected with Germany, firstly, as it was of German origins, and 
secondly, because of its many clients in Germany. The crux of the latter relationship was that 
the company did not produce artificial fibres, but worked in the refinement of these fibres, and 
refined products were not included in the quota scheme at all. In order to demonstrate the 
prohibitive, and from the point of view of the governments certainly not-intended regulations 
of the quotas, the company argued that its customers in Germany were left without supply as 
there was no domestic German production of these refined products. The intention of the Nazi 
government to use the quotas for employment support was in this case reversed as the 
exclusion of the Italian production, vertically integrated with a German production, eventually 
put also German companies and jobs at risk.506 
 Given the various defaults on the agreement, Italy tried to re-negotiate at the earliest 
possible time. The provisional agreement expired in March 1934, but already well before that 
date the MAE delivered a diplomatic note stating that, “the agreement in its actual practise [...] 
has brought significant difficulties and various inconveniences, which have caused serious 
damage”.507 While the note came from the MAE, it was the MCorp that constantly pushed for 
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a new agreement, which this time should solve the matter once and for all. If no agreement of 
this kind could be found, the matter would “weigh heavily on the entire complex of issues 
with the government of the Reich, still to be solved.”508   
 Nevertheless, it seems that this time Rome was clearly shown the limits of actual or 
alleged concessions from Berlin. The latter wanted to prolong the regulations of the 
provisional agreement from December 1933. 509  While initially, the Italian government 
considered this solution out of the question, the resistance gradually wore down. At the end of 
March 1934, the German embassy could report that Rome had agreed to extend the 
established agreement for an indefinite period, thus making the pristine provisional agreement 
the ultimate regulation of the German-Italian artificial fibres business.510   
 The episode has clearly shown that the change to National-Socialism in Germany, with 
its apparent fascination for Italian fascism, did not necessarily lead to greater accommodation 
of Italian industrial needs. What at some stages during the conflict looked like a generous 
subordination of German economic interests, rather represented tactical manoeuvres to 
enforce the opposite. Based on the policy goal to favour national production in order to tackle 
the harsh consequences of the world economic crisis on the labour markets, government 
policies were different from the aspirations of the private stakeholders in the sector. 
Consequently, import restrictions tore apart existing transnational business networkst. 
Economic nationalism, which shaped the foreign economic policy of both regimes, thus 
weighed negatively on both economic performances. As we shall see below, this is not to say 
that the obvious conflicts immediately attracted the attention of the two dictators. 
 
3. A New Nazi Foreign Economic Policy 
 
Economic matters were not given priority by the dictators reaching out for each other in 
1933/34. Despite the official mutual praise, a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini was long 
in coming. Several bilateral conflicts, especially over the independence of Austria,511 and the 
concern about negative repercussions on the international stage, stalled the initiatives for a 
direct meeting.512  First, the pending disarmament issue had to be solved in order not to 
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provoke Britain’s and especially France’s concerns about a shared German-Italian standpoint 
in security matters. 513  That a meeting then became more likely was, according to a 
confidential report by the AA, not the consequence of a “special political occasion, or to 
achieve an urging political purpose, but resulted automatically out of the position of the two 
head of governments and the friendly relations between the two countries”.514 
 However, still in 1933 persisting tension only allowed for a visit of one of Mussolini’s 
major strategists for Austria, Southeastern Europe, and the relationship with Germany: Fulvio 
Suvich. He was joined by Consul Del Drago for commercial and Colonel Bianchi for military 
matters. The discussions Suvich led in Berlin, Cologne and Munich centred largely on three 
aspects: First, the League of Nations after Germany’s withdrawal; second, disarmament issues; 
and third, the “Austrian question”. 515  Surprisingly, the current issues in the economic 
relationship did not garner the importance that they had in the dossier set up by the AA for the 
preparation of the visit. 
The dossier provided arguments to counter the recent surge of indignation in Italy, 
accusing German companies and public authorities of using the export growth and job 
creation measures to discriminate against Italian products.516 The dossier suggested retorting 
the accusation by referring to a still-ongoing battaglia economica and its negative impact on 
imports from Germany. The reasons that Berlin did not protest against the battaglia yet were 
not such that, “the battle against foreign products did not exist, but only because we have seen 
that the battle is here to stay [...] and that the concerned circles did come to terms with it”. 
However, “the German industry had been damaged permanently”. The dossier also provided 
examples of good economic co-operation, for instance, the deal “tourism for coal” or the 
German marketing initiatives in order to accommodate products such as Italian rice. And yet, 
the examples stood out as exceptions to the general problem (exemplified by the conflict over 
artificial fibres) that the Italian government opposed any form of quotas, and therefore an 
important instrument for the German government to tackle its foreign economic problems. In 
conclusion, these difficulties were taken as a reason to think about “a general revision of the 
in many respects outdated commercial treaty”.517 
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The agenda for the meeting between Hitler and Mussolini in Venice looked quite similar. The 
topics included in the draft of the German embassy in Rome were, “Disarmament, the 
Austrian problem, the Southeast question, the League of Nations and the European economic 
situation”. Both sides prepared material on how tackling the latter issue would affect their 
mutual economic relationship. The outlook seemed very bleak. Mussolini speculated that, 
“regarding international economic relations, there is complete madness in Europe, which will 
eventually lead into the decline of the West“.518 
 For the Duce, Berlin-based Renzetti outlined in a report his suggestions for the 
German-Italian commercial relationship. Of course, spearheading the Italian propaganda in 
Germany, Renzetti’s suggestions were rather pompous and did not contain immediate, hands-
on measures. He supported the idea of developing the German market in order to 
accommodate more Italian products. This could happen either by exposing Germans in Italy 
(mostly tourists) to Italian products, which they would keep buying upon their return, or by 
providing potential export-products to Italian multipliers (such as staff members of the 
cultural institutes) in Germany. Ultimately, German-Italian joint ventures should facilitate 
imports from Italy to Germany. Although these plans were still far off, the likely threat to 
them was already very present. “A serious obstacle [...] represents, for now, the restricted 
disposal of foreign exchange”.519 
 What was a threat to Italy’s desired configuration of the commercial relationship was 
at the same time the major objective in the German preparation of the meeting. The positive 
balance of trade with Italy was paramount and out of the question. Italy`s demands for an 
even balance by raising Italian exports – “brought forward with ever increasing emphasis” – 
had to be answered with convincing counterbids. Therefore, it was agreed to offer the attempt 
to stimulate exports on both sides. In addition, the Italian resistance not only against the 
German foreign exchange controls, but also the second policy to guarantee a trade surplus for 
Germany – quotas – was rejected, as the Italian government too would start to implement the 
same measures.520 
 Taking the two preparations together, it appears that an overall increase of the 
German-Italian trade was likely. Paradoxically, that was not what either of the two regimes 
truly desired, but only the lowest common denominator. Rome was keen to increase its 
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exports to Germany to reduce its deficit. Berlin, however, was not eager to increase trade with 
Italy in any event, as it played only a minor role in Germany’s foreign commerce. Moreover, 
Italy offered almost only products that fulfilled no existential need in Germany. For Berlin, 
top priority was to protect the currency reserves, and therefore to keep a surplus in trade with 
Italy. Between these opposing goals there remained only the inclination to increase trade, 
without, however, either Italy reaching an even balance, or Germany diminishing the risk to 
its beneficial balance of trade. 
 Perhaps the contradiction vis-à-vis the development of trade was one of the reasons 
why economic matters were not given the same importance at the meeting of the dictators on 
14/15 June 1934 as they had had in the preparations. According to the polizia politica, it was 
rumoured that the visit, “pursued as principal objective negotiations regarding the economic 
situation of the Reich”. 521  Instead, barely any economic matters were discussed. The 
“Austrian problem” and the hereto associated “Southeast question” dominated the agenda. 
Nevertheless, even several aspects of this doubtlessly most urgent conflict were carefully 
avoided, and in the AA’s confidential protocol both dictators emphasised repeatedly that 
Austria, “must not be any hindrance”. With regard to the commercial relationship, the 
protocol only provided the claim that, “everything should be tried to support common interest 
and to eliminate possible differences”.522 In the end, it seems that the grand lines drawn by the 
dictators in Venice were still too broad to touch on the rather technical economic matters. The 
matter was redirected to the experts.523 
 While the dictators in Venice put up a brave front, over the summer of 1934 Hjalmar 
Schacht – reinstalled by the Nazi government at the top of the Reichsbank in 1933, and 
nominated economics minister in 1934 – implemented the “new plan”. The job-creation 
measures and the early armament initiatives of the Nazi regime had created a buoyant demand, 
especially in raw materials. Thereby, Germany’s central foreign economic problem during the 
Great Depression again gained momentum: the risk of running out of foreign exchange (see 
table 3). Therefore, the “new plan” effectively guaranteed state control over the entire flow of 
imports into Germany. Supervision institutions (Überwachungsstellen) replaced the disused 
foreign exchange authorities. While state control of cross-border transactions used to be 
interventionist, it now became a precondition for a transaction, thus confronting trade with a 
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whole new dimension of administrative burden.524 In addition, Schacht expanded the export 
subsidy scheme and supported clearing agreements in order to stimulate trade without the 
flow of foreign exchange.525 
 
Table 3: Development of Germany’s and Italy’s balance of trade 1929-1937 
 Germany Italy 
 Import Export Balance Import Export Import Export Balance Import Export 
 Value (million RM) 1929 = 100 (%) Value (million Lire) 1929 = 100 (%) 
1929 13,447 12.663 -784 100 100 21,665 15,236 -6,429 100 100 
1930 10,393 11,328 +935 77.3 89.5 17,347 12,119 -5,228 80.1 79.5 
1931 6,727 9,206 +2,479 50 78.7 11,643 10,210 -1,433 53.7 67.0 
1932 4,666 5,677 +1,011 34.7 44,8 8,268 6,812 -1,456 38.2 44.7 
1933 4,204 4,871 +667 31.3 38.5 7,432 5,5991 -1,441 34.3 39.3 
1934 4,451 4,167 -284 33.1 32.9 7,667 5,225 -2,442 35.4 34.3 
1935 4,159 4,270 +111 30.9 33.7 7,790 5,238 -2,552 36.0 34.4 
1936 4,218 4,768 +550 31.4 37.7 6,039 5,547 -492 27.9 36.4 
1937 5,468 5,911 +443 40.7 46.7 13,837 10,429 -3,408 63.9 68.4 
Source : Economic Committee, ‘Commerce exterieur de certains pays’, 29 Jun 1938, LON, R4402. 
Berlin gave the starting signal for the “new plan” with the temporary suspension of all 
payments agreements it had concluded with its major European trading partners in order to 
adjust them with the new regulations. The Reichsbank explained the measure to the Banca 
d’Italia as necessary because German importers had abused the regulatory framework to an 
extent that rendered foreign exchange controls ineffective. 526  By contrast, the secretly 
convening trade political committee (Handelspolitischer Ausschuss) did not show so much 
consideration for Italy. It concluded that there is “general agreement that economic reasons do 
not contradict a reduction of imports from Italy”. At the same time, the committee agreed that 
the Nordic and Southeastern European countries527 should be, “practically not affected by the 
new plan”, clearly indicating that Italy’s export needs were not made a priority under the 
“new plan”.528 
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Of course, the suspension of the payments agreement met with dismay in Italy, where the 
trade deficit was even higher than in Germany (see Table 3). 529  Rome had a certain 
understanding of Germany’s monetary problems, and the Italian government assured 
Germany that it would do everything possible to stabilise the Reichsmark. For instance, it was 
implied that there might exist loopholes in the supervisory framework, allowing 
circumvention of the foreign exchange controls, which could be fixed. Nonetheless, Finance 
Minister Guido Jung considered the measures carried out by the “new plan” as unacceptable. 
Bonifacio Ciancarelli (MAE) added that it was not even in Germany’s economic interests.530 
With its emphatic opposition, Italy clearly stood out from the other nine states whose 
payments agreements had been suspended without great uproar.531 Certainly, for Italy the 
German market was of relatively greater importance, and as la Stampa put it, “with its 
negative trade balance it had to protect itself against the autarchy plan of Germany”.532 
 Italy’s protest and Germany’s reaction to this revealed the similarity of their respective 
foreign economic policies, and, at the same time, how difficult a rapprochement would be, 
given the nationalistic approach underlying these policies. In his comment on Schacht and the 
“new plan”, Alberto De Stefani wrote for the Corriere della Sera that this, “important man 
who manages the economic prospects of Germany” is doing nothing other than implementing 
the tactic, which “became popular everywhere in the world”, and which is pursued by Italy 
under the name, “even trade balance tactic”. 533  While there was agreement about the 
similarity of goals, strong disagreement persisted about the extent to which the goals were 
achieved. The AA argued that against the trend of Italy’s overall balance of trade – which was 
constantly deteriorating – the deficit with Germany was actually getting significantly 
smaller.534 By contrast, Eugenio Anzilotti (MCorp) presented to Ambassador von Hassell a 
very different estimation, by which in the first four months of 1934, compared with the same 
period of 1933, Italy’s deficit had increased by Lire 30 million.535 The question of which of 
these estimations is closer to the truth is nearly impossible to address for the historian. 
Already a contemporary expert like Adelchi Riccardi, the Italian commercial attaché in Berlin, 
admitted after he recognised the vast differences between German and Italian balances that he 
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“was not able to identify which estimation was correct”.536 In any case, both estimations were 
to some extent fabricated in order to show that the respective other was closer in achieving its 
goals, thereby legitimising countermeasures. 
 It was not only the goals of foreign economic policy, but also the means which 
increasingly resembled each other. Simultaneous the Italian opposition against the “new plan”, 
Berlin complained about the projected introduction of quotas in Italy.537 Similar to Germany’s 
reaction, for instance, against the inflow of artificial fibres, Rome planned quotas to protect its 
market and national production. The public legitimisation accused especially the Japanese 
exporters of “dumping”. Therefore, the Italian administration stressed that the quotas did not 
officially aim at the imports from Germany,538 but the veto against their introduction clearly 
shows that Berlin still considered Italian quotas as a serious threat. In the subsequent heated 
debate, which was also conducted via the press, the Berliner Tageblatt accused Italy of 
adopting the same measures it had previously emphatically combated. However, the 
accusation of incoherence was not all. Rather, the newspaper also denied Italy’s right to 
introduce quotas because even a protectionist Germany would still be Italy’s best customer, 
whereas this was not a given the other way around.539 
 Regardless of the German opposition to quotation, Italy certainly had to act, as the 
constantly falling gold reserves of the Banca d’Italia reached dangerous levels during the 
summer of 1934 (see Table 3). In an informal meeting between Posse (RWM), who was well 
aware of the increasing Italian deficit, and his counterpart at the MCorp, Alberto Asquini,540 
the latter did not hesitate to contemplate Italy’s “faillite”. 541  The possible target for 
countermeasures was easily identified in the trade deficit with Germany. Therefore, the 
MCorp sent to Berlin a delegation, which met for negotiations with officials from Schacht’s 
RWM on 12 to 14 July 1934. Against all hopes, Posse again rejected an even balance of trade. 
He argued that tourism alone, which was not included in the balance of trade, had created a 
flow of payments worth a total of RM 30 million, approximately half of Germany’s surplus in 
trade. Furthermore, the recent autarkic initiatives in Italy, such as, for example, the 
monopolization of synthetic dyes imports, were expected to put Germany’s exporters under 
pressure. 
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Moreover, the meeting in Berlin, with its analysis of current commercial conflicts, provides 
insights into how the autarkic measures taken by each government to reduce the outflow of 
foreign exchange had torn businesses apart. In glass tubes, for instance, the company Schott in 
Jena complained that the Italian glass pipe industry profited from a system that obliged Italian 
customers of these products to buy from Italian companies only. In reply to this accusation, 
the Italian negotiators pointed out that a similar system existed in Germany for raw and 
processed sponges, and that the Italians had simply adapted it.542 Even though this is rather a 
modest instance, it shows how differently transfers within the German-Italian relationship 
could be applied. This case, taken from the commercial sphere, did not support the 
rapprochement, countering research into the German-Italian relationship that has been carried 
out in several other fields, but rather legitimised confrontational action against the trading 
partner. 
 To find a solution to the problems brought by autarchy and the falling foreign 
exchange reserves, the Italian delegation suggested principally three options: further 
monopolization of domestic production and imports, harsh quotas or the introduction of a 
general clearing agreement, covering the entire German-Italian trade. All of them represent 
varieties of economic nationalism,543 and the first two had clear limits in the German-Italian 
case. Posse described them in an earlier discussion as, “shocking examples for the extent of 
commercial confusion in Europe and the governments’ attempts to protect the domestic 
economy at any cost and without respect to established economic links”.544 As it was the only 
option left, the Italian suggestion for a full-fledged clearing agreement seemed to persuade the 
German experts. Such an agreement offered the possibility of granting concessions to Italy 
without the liability of granting them to other trade partners as a consequence of the most-
favoured nation clause. Finally, then, there had appeared on the scene a way out of the 
impasse to which the conflict of commercial goals had led Germany and Italy. 
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4. The Clearing Agreement of 1934 
 
With the idea to subject all trade and payments (for tourism, interest, etc.) to a bilateral 
clearing agreement, Germany and Italy took part in a global trend (see Chapter 1).545 When in 
summer 1934 Eugenio Anzilotti, director general at the MCorp, suggested coming to terms 
with a clearing agreement, it was clearly an expression of a strategy that sought to secure a 
vital export market. The German market provided more than ever the biggest export prospects, 
and the previously mentioned conflicts show the degree to which the access to these markets 
was endangered by foreign exchange controls and other means of restricting imports. 
Branches that put pressure on the Italian authorities included agriculture, the automotive 
industry, artificial fibres, transportation and the state railway company.546 For Germany, which 
had pushed successfully for a clearing with its major trade partners and creditors France and 
Switzerland,547 an agreement with Italy apparently had only minor importance. In general, an 
open door was something that Germany’s trade experts were ready to provide. A “policy of 
accommodation on a small scale” offered to Hans Posse the opportunity to, “push through the 
rejection of Italy’s first priority”, an even balance of trade, without grave political damage.548 
Accordingly, the German embassy replied to Anzilotti’s proposal by stating that a clearing 
would be possible, but only if Italy was willing to compose trade and payments in the 
envisaged clearing agreement so that in the end a certain foreign exchange surplus 
(“Devisenspitze”) was guaranteed for an unrestricted disposal of the Reichsbank.549 
 Certainly, Italy was rather reluctant to accept these terms, since it meant that the deficit 
in trade with Germany – combated ever since the outbreak of the world economic crisis – 
would be institutionalised in a legal contract. The MAE argued that, “Italy too is not a 
capitalist country which has huge amounts of savings to transfer abroad; therefore the theory 
that the debtor can only pay in goods, strongly supported by the Germans, applies also to 
us”.550 Anzilotti implied in a discussion with Ritter in Berlin that if Germany maintains this 
demand, it shall be answered with further quotas on imports from Germany.551  Over the 
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following weeks, the Italian commercial experts insisted on the urgency of coming to an 
agreement. Rome offered a foreign exchange surplus of two per cent, but that was still far off 
from the 20 per cent Berlin demanded.552  The AA reacted late and expressed a general 
overload with commercial negotiations, thereby lacking the capacity to send official 
representatives to Rome. However, the MAE responded quickly and sent a delegation to 
Berlin. 553  In addition, the MCorp considered the introduction of a compulsory clearing 
(“Zwangsclearing”) in order to reduce Italian assets which were blocked in Germany as a 
result of foreign exchange controls. The funds had grown with the rise of Italian exports in the 
harvest months of summer 1934. In fact, during this month the balance of trade had turned 
positive for Italy. 
 To Ritter, and the commercial department of the AA, the compulsory clearing was an 
effective threat. While Germany still faced a difficult foreign exchange situation, and the 
surplus in trade with Italy dwindled in summer 1934, the compulsory clearing bore the 
potential to make out of an established spring of foreign exchange yet another outflow. 
Furthermore, the plan foresaw to establish the Reichmark’s exchange rate on the basis of the 
Milan stock exchange price, and not on the basis of the more favourable price at the Berlin 
stock exchange.554 Not least, Ritter feared that the Italian compulsory clearing would offer 
incentives to third countries (in particular France and Britain)555 to adopt similar measures, 
thereby forcing Germany fiscally to its knees.556 
 Fears became reality when Italy introduced the compulsory clearing on 3 September 
1934. Italian businesses importing from Germany were obliged to pay solely in Reichsmark in 
order to reduce the funds at the Reichsbank. Any other direct or indirect payment was 
prohibited.557 The German newspaper Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung wrote about this measure 
that it, “gave the involved German-Italian business circles cause for serious concern”. Clearly, 
the state of affairs did not satisfy the commercially interested public either in Germany or in 
Italy, where the entire press demanded a general revision of the German-Italian commercial 
relationship.558 Under pressure from the public as well as the Italian government, the German 
trade political committee decided only one day after the introduction of the compulsory 
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clearing over the German requirements for a German-Italian clearing agreement. Firstly, and 
above all else, the committee demanded a foreign exchange surplus at the free disposal of the 
Reichsbank of nine to ten per cent (thereby cutting its previous demand by half). Furthermore, 
the exchange rate should not be calculated on Milan rates.559 Finally, the deal combining 
Italian coal orders with German tourism should be calculated in an additional agreement.560 
 The latter demand was initially rejected by Italian Finance Minister Guido Jung as he 
expected other coal exporters, namely the United Kingdom and Poland, to ask for a similar 
treatment, which then could hardly be ignored. The Italian Ambassador Vittorio Cerruti, 
however, affirmed in a meeting with Ritter in Berlin that Mussolini would keep a secret 
“gentlemen agreement”561 over coal orders and hinted that, if finally the desired clearing 
agreement were established, Italy would immediately place a coal order of two million tons. 
Nevertheless, the value of the coal exports was potentially getting smaller for Germany 
because Rome – against the emphatic opposition of Ritter – was no longer willing to accept 
the established practise of payments for coal, which used to be carried out in free foreign 
exchange up to 20 per cent.562 
 The Italian side led the final stage of negotiations confident of its current bargaining 
power, and it paid off. The agreement was signed on 26 September 1934. Finally, Italy could 
benefit from a full-fledged clearing, which subjected all payments deriving from the exchange 
of goods and services to mutual compensation, and which so far was refused consistently by 
Germany. The agreement also fulfilled some of the German demands. The settlement 
guaranteed a ten per cent foreign exchange surplus for the unrestricted disposal of the 
Reichsbank, and excluded the risk of third-party claims on the basis of the most-favoured-
nation clause. However, it was agreed that the surplus first had to be used to liquidate the 
Italian balance at the Reichsbank. Moreover, the AA admitted that the institutionalised trade 
surplus, fixed at a rate of 4 : 5 in favour of Germany, was regrettably less than what Germany 
had been able to demand from Italy in 1932, when a German surplus of 3 : 2 had been 
established. Against the original German intention, the exchange rate was established taking 
into consideration Berlin and Milan rates. 563  Finally, to Italy’s benefit, two additional 
                                                 
559 The Reichsbank denied the Reichsmark exchange rate in Milan. It argued that due to Germany’s foreign 
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agreements were concluded. The first agreement guaranteed the interest payments on the 
Dawes- and Young loans. The second additional agreement provided a more generous foreign 
exchange allocation to German tourists, which now could dispose of over RM 500, whereas 
previously it was only RM 200. On the surface, every indication was carefully avoided that 
Italy guaranteed in return further orders of coal.564 
 To the Giornale d’Italia, the new agreement closed an apparent gap in the institutional 
fabric of the German-Italian commercial relationship and ended a phase which had been 
started with the “new, restrictive commercial policy of Germany”: the “new plan”.565 While it 
was only set up as a provisional arrangement, the clearing agreement of September 1934 
clearly marked an institutional milestone of the German-Italian commercial relationship. 
Indeed, it provided the institutional basis for the commercial relationship between Germany 
and Italy till the defeat of the “Rome-Berlin Axis” in 1943.566 
 
                                                 
564 AA, ʻAufzeichnung zum Abkommen vom 26 Sep 1934’, PA-AA, Rom-Quirinal 943B. 
565 ʻL’accordo italo-tedesco firmato a Berlino’, Il Giornale d’Italia, 29 Sep 1934. 
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Chapter 4: Continuing Conflicts and New Collaboration 
 
Introduction: From Hitler’s Seizure of Power to the Commercial “Axis” 
 
Chapter 3 showed that with the erection of the Nazi regime in 1933, new opportunities for the 
German-Italian commercial relationship indeed arose. Berlin went beyond the concessions of 
preceding German governments described in Chapter 2. German tourists were allowed to 
spent more money in Italy, and the German market was prepared to accommodate previously 
unknown Italian products such as rice. Conversely, Italy shifted more of its coal imports to 
Germany. Furthermore, the fascist government refused to take advantage of the international 
boycott calls against German products after the atrocities against the Jewish community in 
Germany. 
 Nevertheless, in spite of the courtesies on the official level, the concessions were often 
undermined by the actual implementation of the agreements. While Italian officials 
complained about de facto suspensions of the support granted to tourism and artificial fibres 
exports, German authorities likewise criticised ongoing Italian protectionism for domestic 
industries. However, the most recurring conflict concerned the balance of trade. Rome strove 
unceasingly for a reduction of its trade deficit, and Berlin justified Germany’s surplus in trade 
by recourse to the need to balance payment flows and its possession of coal. 
 The new foreign economic policy of the Nazi regime, the “new plan”, even bore the 
potential to escalate the conflict beyond the achievements the fascist government had 
negotiated with the last governments of the Weimar republic. At first, the “new plan” gave 
advantage to the economic interest of Northern and Southeastern European countries, and 
even accepted that imports from Italy may be curtailed in order to protect the dire German 
foreign exchange reserves. Only with a vigorous defence of its imports to Germany, Italy was 
able to gain back its position among the top-priority trade partners of Germany. Rome 
demanded an extension of the 1932 payments agreement into a full-fledged clearing 
agreement. 
 But can the 1934 clearing agreement be considered a success, as was suggested by 
Tatarra?567 Already the run-up to its conclusion, with the Italian party driving a hard bargain, 
casts doubt on the notion that what Tatarra calls a success is what all the contractual parties 
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actually wanted in the first place. To address this question, further inquiry into the nature of 
the commercial relationship under clearing conditions is necessary. 
 Therefore, Chapter 4 not only looks at the performance and evolution of the 
commercial institutions created with the clearing agreement, it also includes experiences from 
businesses under clearing conditions. Of crucial importance is the devaluation of the Lira, 
which happened in 1936 and changed the rules of the game. Lastly, Chapter 4 evaluates the 
fundamental changes this development had on the composition of trade to come to an 
assessment of the economic foundations of the “Rome-Berlin Axis” in 1936. 
 
1. Evolving Institutions in the Commercial Sphere 
 
The perceptions surrounding the clearing agreement of 1934 were quite diverse. It received 
widespread assent in Italian government circles, which considered it a “solution that took 
Italian interests thoroughly into account”. However, the exact consequences were difficult to 
foresee. Especially Hjalmar Schacht’s “new plan” still caused mistrust in Italy.568 The journal 
Affari Esteri articulated the risk by accusing the “new plan” (quite correctly) of effectively 
suspending the most-favoured-nation clause, and calling into question the benefits granted to 
Italy in previous agreements. For Affari Esteri “all this proves, also in this field, Germany’s 
unilateral and egoistic vision of international problems”. 569  The German government, 
nevertheless, was rather reluctant to see in the clearing agreement a path of long-term success. 
The conditio sine qua non, a surplus in trade, was guaranteed, but it was small and certainly 
tended to further decrease. Moreover, the exchange rate mechanism established by the 
clearing agreement was in favour of Italian interest.570 
 That a certain degree of uncertainty persisted concerning the effects of the clearing can 
be demonstrated by comparing the expected development as outlined by the trade experts with 
press opinions. Whereas the AA expected a decline of the trade volume, as had previously 
happened after the introduction of a clearing between France and Italy, 571  the Giornale 
d’Italia expected the opposite. Coming from the assumption that it was in Germany’s interest 
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to export more, an overall trade expansion was proclaimed the logicical consequence, as 
under the clearing scheme this was only possible by increasing imports from Italy.572 
 However, in its initial phase the clearing agreement, which subjected the entire flow of 
goods and payments to public control, created rather more huge administrative challenges 
than new opportunities for trade expansion. The MCorp complained, only one week after the 
clearing came into force, that the lack of organisation within the German control authorities 
virtually constituted an import ban on Italian products.573 Moreover, it was hinted that the 
restrictions were not only a consequence of poor organisation. By referring to the more 
beneficial allocation of foreign exchange for imports from Yugoslavia, Hungary, Romania, 
Bulgaria and Greece, it was argued that Italian imports were disadvantaged.574 In artificial 
fibres, a sector of all-too-well-known quarrels, the discrimination even had been affirmed by 
withdrawing already granted foreign exchange allocations.575 
 The Italian export institute tried to combat potential acts of discrimination by 
circumventing German public authorities and building direct ties with the natural allies of the 
Italian economy: the importers of Italian goods in Germany. In several cases, the latter had 
received hostile responses by German authorities when applying for foreign exchange 
assignments for trade with Italy. Then, the office for foreign exchange control (Reichsstelle 
für Devisenbewirtschaftung, RfD) reported that the Italian export institute had requested every 
company in Germany facing complications when applying for foreign exchange to report it 
directly to the Italian institute. Such a transnational constellation of interest was for the RfD 
“not to be tolerated”, and accordingly it attempted to cut those ties.576 
 Private business certainly suffered in both countries under the administrative 
difficulties. The German consulate in Milan “constantly received complaints about trade-
restricting consequences of the agreement”. The formalities under clearing conditions 
represented for many small- and medium-sized companies – constituting the Italian economy 
to a large extent – too big a burden due to a lack of financial and personelle capacities. 
Consequently, many potential deals had fallen through. Moreover, complaints over payment 
delays became frequent. At a time of already-scarce credit the tedious procedure connecting 
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the importer, the two banks (Reichsbank and Banca d’Italia) and the creditor, which could 
take up to six weeks, at a high level of uncertainty, caused a huge financial risk for companies. 
In addition, any payment via the new clearing scheme involved relatively high fees, which 
were set at 0.6 per cent of the trade value, and which had to be added on top of the usual 
transaction costs. While these complaints only represent the most common submissions to the 
consulate, various other administrative difficulties encumbered private businesses.577 
 Of course, business clusters with trade relations to both countries emphatically 
complained about the clearing. For instance, the trade companies of Trieste complained that 
they were existentially threatened by the clearing agreement. As it did not cover payments for 
non-Italian goods, it rendered Trieste’s established transit trade, delivering goods coming from 
Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean to the German market, nearly impossible. 
Only the annual amount of Greek and Turkish tobacco commissioned in Trieste for the 
German market amounted to between Lire 40 and 60 million.578 For the Italian government, 
the only solution left to this dilemma was to provide foreign exchange to the trading 
companies in order to enable them to buy the goods first, and then sell them to Germany. 
However, given the dire foreign exchange reserves of the Italian treasurer this option was 
impractical. For the German government too, the situation created problems as some of the 
long-established trading companies in Trieste were actually in German hands and now faced 
liquidation. Nevertheless, in spite of this negative impact, the government speculated that the 
positive aspects for the German economy would prevail, as weakening the port of Trieste 
would eventually benefit the ports of Germany’s North-Western coastline (Hamburg and 
Bremen), which were competing for the very same trade connections. For the sake of the trade 
business of the German ports, therefore, the sacrifice of a few German companies in Trieste 
was a price Berlin was willing to pay.579 
 Another complaint made by the association of German iron and steel producers (Verein 
Deutscher Eisen- und Stahl-Industrieller, VDEStI) shows that the clearing conditions 
provided an opportunity to intensify autarkic policies at the expense of the trade partner’s 
export. Deliveries to Italy often stalled at the border due to administrative formalities. One of 
the requirements, a signature of the importer at the border, was for the VDEStI a dangerous 
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means suitable to subordinate economic collaboration to autarchy. In this sector of strategic 
importance for the fascist regime, where efforts for an autarkic national production were 
strong,580 the formal requirements enabled companies to delay the roll-out of German goods 
on the Italian market, thereby increasing coasts for importing companies, and thus reducing 
the competitiveness of German goods in the long run. In this case, private businesses became 
accomplices of the fascist government, which by the commercial contract was legally bound 
to buy in Germany, but still searched for ways to circumvent these obligations in order to 
pursue its autarkic goals. The VDEStI suggested stopping this practice with retaliation, for 
instance, by blocking some of the trains with Italian perishable goods at the border.581 
 The hereby exemplified aspect of retaliation within the German-Italian economic 
relationship had an impact on the formulation of autarkic policies in Nazi Germany as in 
Fascist Italy, which is overseen by research with a focus on one national case only. The 
complicated implementation of the clearing agreements created sentiments in Italy that, in the 
end, it was the “new plan” and its limitations on Germany’s imports, which caused the 
problems.582 Consequently, in a discussion between the Italian commercial attaché in Berlin, 
Adelchi Riccardi, and Eugenio Anzilotti (MCorp) the idea was elaborated that an approach 
equal to the “new plan” should be attempted by Italy’s foreign economic policy.583 The result 
was a new scheme of Italian quotas. Introduced early in 1935, it officially aimed at a drastic 
reduction of imports to Italy, thereby engendering considerable opposition from Italy’s major 
trading partner: Germany. 
 The new quota scheme marked a turning point in Italy’s foreign economic policy. Up 
till this point Finance Minister Guido Jung had regularly blocked any attempt in this direction 
– which was advocated in particular by the MCorp – insisting instead on a strict deflation 
policy in order to protect the value of the lira. However, after Jung had lost the Duce’s trust in 
1935 because of his resistance against proliferating state capitalism, and made way for his 
successor Paolo Thaon de Revel, a new consensus emerged that massive import restrictions 
could serve the same purpose.584  The state of Italy’s foreign exchange reserves certainly 
demanded further action. Capital flight, a poor harvest, and the end of the holy year in 1934, 
which marked a sharp drop in tourism to Italy, all caused serious strains to the balance of 
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payments (see Table 3). As obtaining foreign exchange became the quintessential mission of 
Italy’s economic policy, the bankers, and according to the judgement of the German embassy 
especially Alberto Beneduce,585 head of the giant state holding IRI (1933-1939), as well as 
Vicenzo Azzolini, governor of the Banca d’Italia (1931-1944),586 came now into power.587 
 Although the German embassy expected some legal action soon, the publication of the 
quota scheme on 18 February 1935, surrendering Italy’s entire import to state control, came 
quite out of the blue. The reason for the abrupt implementation was that once rumours about 
import restrictions had reached Italy’s business cycles, companies immediately tried to take 
advantage of the old legal framework and ordered relentlessly from abroad.588 Thereby, the 
Italian government felt compelled to implement the scheme even earlier than initially planned. 
The German embassy called the new regulation, “profoundly rigorous [and] suitable to disturb 
significantly German-Italian commerce”.589 In its thoroughly negative assessment the embassy 
was seconded by many practitioners of Italy’s export business. The polizia politica detected 
widespread displeasure not strictly with “the dispositions of the law, but with the complete 
intellectual insufficiency of the officials charged with the application”.590 
 Complications were not long in coming. From the Swiss-Italian checkpoint at the 
border in Chiasso reports arrived that German goods were denied entrance to the Italian 
market. Moreover, the German participation in the Milan fair, according to its self-depiction 
“the most important Italian market for the development of commercial ties between Italy and 
Germany”,591  was called into question as German exhibition material was halted by the 
import restrictions. To defend its status as the major importer to Italy, the AA denounced a 
violation of the commercial contracts. Furthermore, it tried to influence regulation by 
recalling the German quotation of 1932 (while of course not mentioning the quotas of the 
“new plan”), which, in spite of regrettable collateral damage for the German economy, had 
taken Italian export interest into special consideration.592 
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Rome tried to ease the discontent of its major trading partner, holding out the prospect of a 
special treatment for Germany. However, the not-yet-elaborated special treatment was 
supposed to be granted to every trading partner connected with Italy via a clearing 
mechanism. 593  For a real and exclusive enhancement of Germany’s position, the Italian 
government insisted on a re-adjustment of the clearing agreement of 1934. It was deemed 
“unbearable” that at the time of its stipulation, “both parties had granted each other entirely 
free rein to restrict imports with quotas on foreign exchange allocations or goods”. This 
constructional defect had allowed the German administration to manipulate foreign exchange 
allocations in order to hostilely freeze Italian assets deriving from exports of goods to 
Germany. Therefore, Rome suggested integrating fixed and guaranteed quotas of foreign 
exchange for imports from Italy into the legal framework, while Italy would in return offer a 
system of import licences (Einfuhrscheinregelung).594 
 What was articulated on the official level as a critique of the clearing agreement was in 
fact a condemnation of the “new plan”, and the Italian quotas set up with exactly the latter as 
a template preconfigured a substantial change in the German-Italian trade. The Italian finance 
ministry plan ultimately aimed at an even balance of trade. The severe Italian quotas, reaching 
a 75 per cent reduction for certain products, did not touch equally on Italy’s import. Half-
finished and finished goods were more restricted than raw material imports, thereby providing 
opportunities for domestic industries heavily supported by the regime’s autarkic policies.595 In 
the event that Italian exports to a raw material supplier fell short of Italy’s import demand, the 
plan foresaw loans granted by the supplier. In fact, the bankers now spearheading Italy’s 
foreign economic policy had already put out their feelers on obtaining loans, for instance, 
from the US or France. Only as a second option – ideally to be avoided – a devaluation of the 
lira was considered.596 
 To German commercial interests the Italian quotas constituted a substantial risk. 
Throughout the economic crisis, German industry had desperately sought sales markets in a 
world of ever-growing protectionist barriers. According to the German consulate in Milan, 
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while Germany’s total export decreased,597 exports to Italy rose from Lire 1006.06 million in 
1933 to Lire 1211.46 million in 1934. They consisted of approximately 55 per cent half-
finished and finished products, that is, a share even higher than the share of half-finished and 
finished products in Italy’s total imports. The consulate described this export as, “no less vital 
for Germany for Germany” than the export of certain Italian products to Germany, which 
were impossible to shift somewhere else. Of course, Germany not only exported 
manufactured products, but also large amounts of coal. However, the consulate considered the 
export of raw materials of minor value because every exported machine would most likely 
stimulate further orders to maintain or extend use, whereas this was not the case with less-
interconnected raw material exports. In a situation where most of the German companies 
operating in Italy were not far from running at a loss, the outlook on Italian quotas aiming 
particularly at German half-finished and finished products was grim, to say the least.598 It 
seemed as though Italy had turned a commercial weapon adapted from Germany against its 
creator. 
 Both countries had introduced quotas consequent to a sense of massive burden 
associated with the balance of payments, and both had turned an emergency measure into a 
long-term commercial policy, albeit with different ends. Nazi Germany used the quotas of the 
“new plan” to shift the geographical distribution of its trade to regions like Southeastern 
Europe, which could provide natural resources needed by industry and domestic consumption, 
and moreover, offered the opportunity to combat the post-war order of Europe with the 
political leverage of economic concession.599 Fascist Italy, instead, used the quotas to change 
the exports of its pre-eminent trading partner, Germany, in accordance with its commercial 
needs. 600  This pursuit was hard for Berlin to oppose, as it recently lost quite a bit of 
bargaining power vis-à-vis Italy. Early in 1935, the latter had achieved an even balance of 
trade in trade negotiations with France and the United Kingdom. 601  And while German 
foreign trade experts again declared an even balance of trade with Germany unacceptable,602 
they could not prevent the re-opening of the institutional arrangements of the German-Italian 
commercial relationship. 
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Three weeks of drawn-out negotiations in Rome produced the “secret agreement for the 
regulation of the merchandise traffic”, signed on 16 April 1935. In general, both parties 
agreed to keep the volume of trade at its 1934 level. Carl Clodius, who became under the Nazi 
regime deputy head of the department for trading politics at the the AA and can be considered 
the mastermind behind Germany’s “new economic order” of Europe during World War II,603 
considered it a success that the established ratio in trade (20 per cent trade surplus for 
Germany) was principally kept. Nevertheless, at the same time Germany was now legally 
obliged to grant 10 per cent of the thereby collected foreign exchange on tourism to Italy, 1.5 
per cent on repayment of Italian receivables, and 2 per cent on interest and dividends. All in 
all, it came down to a meagre surplus of 6.5 per cent (or RM 16 million).604 In addition, the 
Italian delegation could defend its system of import quotas against the German intention for a 
less-restricted access. A series of half-finished and finished products, typically imported from 
Germany, such as pipes or agricultural machines were restricted by up to 20 per cent.605 
 Taking the bilateral concessions together, the “secret agreement” appears to be a fair 
compromise, and perhaps this is why it turned out to be a success. German-Italian negotiators 
repeated the procedure semi-annually from then on, meeting to correct the flaws in the 1934 
clearing agreement that had been discovered since the last meeting. In addition, Berlin and 
Rome both established permanent government committees to deal with their commercial 
relationship, and set up bilateral sub-committees of experts as, for instance, the “German-
Italian Sub-Committee for the Examination of Customs Queries”. After many humble 
attempts since the outbreak of the world economic crisis, finally, an institutionalised 
framework for the co-ordination of commercial interest emerged. However, the government 
officials were well aware that the contractual vision of how the German-Italian trade should 
look like was not necessarily what was taking place at the level of actual business practise. 
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2. Industrial Co-operation 
 
In order to coherently assess the effects of the institutional changes to the German-Italian 
commercial relationship brought forward by the seminal clearing agreement of 1934, it is 
necessary to include the perspective of private business. Moreover, this perspective also 
provides the opportunity to detect contradictions between the different institutional steps 
towards the “commercial axis”. 
 The case of the German company BEWAG, for instance, shows that the aspect of the 
1932 clearing agreement, supporting closer collaboration between private businesses was not 
necessarily taken up by the clearing agreement of 1934. As described above (see Chapter 2), 
the negotiations in 1932 had created a mixed commission of German and Italian producers, 
which was intended to encourage potential cross-border joint ventures. An example was the 
BEWAG (Berliner Städtische Elektrizitätswerke AG), a Berlin-based energy company created 
in 1931 when the communal power plants were privatised. A group of Italian banks bought a 
chunk of the company’s shares worth a total of RM 6 million. While to the mayor of Berlin, it 
was not entirely clear who was behind the consortium, he supposed that the Banca 
Commerciale Italiana had taken the lead. Then, after the 1934 clearing agreement was 
implemented, this and similar ventures were not encouraged. Quite the opposite, the 
regulations provided the possibility that the German surplus on the clearing accounts could 
and should be used to buy up shares hold by foreign companies. The mayor of Berlin 
expressed that the “city of Berlin is very keen to repatriate the Italian shares”. Moreover, he 
added that, “important national factors” would support the deal, and that the city treasurer had 
already discussed the details with Carl Clodius from the AA’s commercial department.606 The 
example shows that the continuing development of the institutional arrangements regulating 
the flow of payments did not, as initially planned, lead to further entanglement of businesses 
but rather created the possibility for Germany to buy out Italian shareholders, and for Italy to 
balance its deficit with Germany. 
 An example from the Italian aluminium industry illustrates that also in a joint venture 
created on the Italian market, Italian shareholders made use of the clearing agreement in order 
to get rid of a no-longer-required German partner. By the late 1920s, Montecatini, the biggest 
Italian company in chemical production, planned to diversify into aluminium production. 
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However, there was insufficient technical knowledge in Italy, and therefore Montecatini 
sought to co-operate with the German Vereinigte Alluminium Werke (VAW). 607  Both 
companies had close ties with their respective governments. The VAW was largely owned by 
the German state,608 and Montecatini’s president Guido Donegani became a strong supporter 
of the fascist regime.609 The VAW produced at the time around 80 per cent of Germany’s 
aluminium, and possessed with the “Haglund-process” a highly interesting patent for Italy 
because no coal was used for the production of aluminium.610 Both companies founded the 
Società dell’Aluminio (SIDA), a water-powered aluminium factory in Mori, with the Italian 
Montecatini holding 60 per cent and the German VAW 40 per cent of the company’s shares. 
Moreover, VAW constructed largely on its own account an aluminium oxide (the most 
important primary product) factory, the Società Italiana Alluminia (SIA). 92.5 per cent of the 
company’s shares were held by VAW, and its only customer was SIDA.611 
 Problems arose because, according to VAW, not long after the launch of the production, 
SIDA, and ultimately its majority stockholder Montecatini, started to pressure SIA to lower 
the price for its aluminium oxide. SIDA argued that it was exposed to liquidity risk. By 1934 
SIDA completely halted payments upon which VAW decided to transfer its payments to the 
German-Italian clearing agreement in order to safeguard liquidity. Montecatini objected to the 
use of the clearing, which to VAW exposed a plan to deliberately drive SIDA into insolvency 
in order to take over the company entirely at a bargain price.612 In a series of law suits that 
followed, VAW first successfully took legal action against a confiscation arranged by 
Montecatini. Nevertheless, Italian courts judged the clearing agreement as inadequate to 
facilitate payments of the German-Italian joint venture, whereby insolvency became 
inevitable. Already while the auction of the insolvency estate was still under way, production 
in the SIDA and SIA factories was re-launched, under the control of Montecatini. For the 
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outraged VAW it was clear that it was a “most unlawful” auction, and its venture in Fascist 
Italy ended with the statement that, “with all our connections with the global industry [we] 
had never a reason to consider such things possible, and even less to witness them being 
realised”.613 
However, the evolving legal framework not only encumbered joint ventures of 
German-Italian companies, but also the relationship of separated companies, connected by 
trade and payments. Especially, the implementation of the “new plan”, which froze assets of 
Italian companies in Germany, stirred up protest. The case of the Italian slate dealing 
company Arata based in Chiavari (Genoa) shows that a German company willingly took 
advantage of the opportunities provided by the “new plan”, even if it meant destroying 
established relations with Italian partners. The Arata had significant claims deriving from 
commercial loans to German companies, which were blocked by the “new plan” in 1934. 
However, Arata was not only creditor, but also, by sentence of a Genoese court, debtor to the 
German company Drettler.614 In this tripartite composition of debt, the Italian Arata suggested 
to compensate its far-bigger claims with its debt to the German company Drettler. However, 
the latter refused to consent to the deal, thereby giving rise to the suspicion that it acted out of 
“amor patrio”, and solidarity with the other German companies in debt by hiding behind the 
legal possibilities of the “new plan”. The discontent was even stronger because Drettler also 
refused to increase its slate orders from the Arata to wind down credit. Instead, it voluntarily 
shifted its huge demand for slate to France.615  The case, therefore, shows how easily a 
German company could dismiss its established trade relationship with an Italian company if 
the legal framework set the right incentives. The obvious political attraction of both 
dictatorships failed in this case to have any impact. 
 The case of the Arata was not an isolated one, and many companies shared the 
discontent with the “new plan”. In Trieste, an entire group of companies and natural persons 
appointed the lawyer Paolo Reiser to step up the fight against the frozen assets in Germany. 
The overall amount of Italian money at stake was with reference to the Financial Times 
estimated at RM 138 million, a sum large enough to be considered by the MAE as 
“rilevantissima”. The companies in Trieste were particularly concerned as they feared that the 
blocked money could be spend against them, that is, on subsidies for German companies 
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related to the ports of Hamburg and Bremen, Trieste’s rivals for the commerce of 
Southeastern Europe.616 The German government, so went a report of the MAE, replied to the 
accusations by denying any wrongdoing.617 In view of this perceived ignorance and the large 
amount of private money at stake, it is no surprise that the Italian government decided to use 
the threat of import quotas against Germany. 
 The quota system, however, was a difficult commercial weapon to wield in an area of 
interconnected economies. In the case of car manufacturing, quotas hurt companies in both 
countries. In the 1930s the German market for cars was not yet as developed as the US market, 
but it was growing despite the maelstrom of the depression. Italian car manufactures 
participated in this promising market and increased exports, for instance, between 1933 and 
1934, from 589 to 1,913 vehicles.618 FIAT, moreover, established in 1929 the KRAFTAG, a 
subsidiary in Berlin, which built up a taxi fleet of more than 1,000 vehicles in the capital city, 
all provided by FIAT.619 The German quotas on car imports, implemented equally out of 
domestic support for the car manufacturing industry in crisis620 as of fiscal constraints, hit the 
lucrative Italian business hard, but not alone.621 A large amount of the steel processed by the 
North Italian factories of FIAT was actually produced in Germany.622 Therefore, the quotas 
directed against Italian car imports, caused not only inevitably frustration of the Italian 
manufactures and the government in need of export revenues, but in the form of reduced 
demand or retaliation also a blowback against German steel producing companies. 
 The Italian quotas of 1935, established as an act of revenge against the “new plan”, 
were by no means less harmful to established trade relations between private companies. The 
major interest group of Germany’s trading companies, the Reichsverband des Deutschen 
Groß-, Ein- und Ausfuhrhandels (RDGEA), which represented approximately 50,000 
companies in 1930,623 complained to the RWM that the Italian quotas were for its members a 
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“matter of deepest concern”. Theoretically, the Italian government had granted quotas of 100 
per cent of the 1934 trade volume to German companies. However, those 100 per cent were 
termed as a “mirage, a misguiding”, of which the German government was not aware. In fact, 
100 per cent were only granted for orders of the same product and by the same Italian 
purchaser. Moreover, more complex products, consisting of multiple components, were object 
to multiple quotas. In the end companies had to make do with sometimes less than ten per 
cent of their 1934 deliveries, even though they felt entitled to export 100 per cent. Moreover, 
RDGEA members reassured them that they had enough potential orders from Italy to use up 
the entire 100 per cent.624 The victims of this practise were in this case the German and Italian 
companies whose trade relations had been crippled. 
As the previous examples of this chapter have shown, businesses were sometimes 
victims, and at other times free-loaders of each regime’s nationalist foreign economic policy. 
What could have caused this varying attitude? Evidence can be adduced from situations where 
several companies from different sectors interacted simultaneously with the other country. 
The 1936 voyage of German industrialists to Italy provides a telling case for this approach. 
The Italian embassy in Berlin outlined the need for such an exchange in that, “by consequence 
of the autarkic tendencies of each of our regimes, it is more and more difficult, as shown be 
the recent negotiations, to find goods to exchange”. In order to overcome this growing 
commercial distance, it was called necessary to “get to know each other better”.625 
 The initial idea was developed by Giovanni Bonmartini, an aviation and motorcycle 
entrepreneur, who represented this sector at the MCorp. The latter ministry involved the 
Italian federation of employers, Confindustria, in order to collect interest from various sectors 
of industry. Confindustria’s president Giuseppe Volpi, then, pulled his transnational strings 
and managed to win support of Hjalmar Schacht, who integrated German business cycles.626 
The list of German participants can be read as a cross-section of German industry interested in 
Fascist Italy. The delegation was headed by Ernst Trendelenburg who, after a successful 
career at the RWM and the League of Nations, had recently become a representative of 
Reichsgruppe Industrie,627 the Nazi federation of employers and the International Chamber of 
Commerce. 
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The dual function of Trendelenburg, to provide expertise on the interface between business 
and politics on the national as well as international level, parallels the twofold expertise of the 
delegates, who were representatives of big corporations, and at the same time important 
officials at Nazi Germany’s cooperative institutions. Hans Berckemeyer, for instance, was 
chairman of the supervisory board of Kokswerke und Chemische Fabriken Ag, a 
pharmaceuticals and chemical company, as well as treasurer of the Reichsgruppe Industrie. 
The roughly 20 participants represented the sectors: machines, fibres production, wood and 
pulping industries, print, food and beverages (brewing), various segments of the chemical 
industry and electro-engineering.628 Ludwig von Winterfeld, director of Siemens-Schuckert-
Werke AG, deserves to be singled out as he was also the president of the German-Italian 
society (Deutsch-Italienische Gesellschaft). 
The voyage turned out to be a manifesto of Italian industrial propaganda.629 It started 
in picturesque Venice, which since the early 1920s had hosted Marghera, an industrial port 
specialised in chemicals. From there the industrialists travelled through the industrial triangle 
with longer stops in Milan and Turin, and eventually reached Rome. Visits to industrial sites 
were always rounded off with festive gatherings and many toasts to the productive 
achievements of fascism in order to convince Germany’s business leaders about Fascist Italy’s 
economic capacities (in fact, it was hinted the some doubts still persisted). The timing of the 
voyage in this regard was very important. According to Bonmartini, it was meant to take place 
while the League of Nations sanctions imposed on Italy after its invasion into Ethiopia were 
still in place.630 “If there would be deficiencies in our industries, the official blame could be 
shifted on the sanctions”, argued Bonmartini.631 
 While the actual visit is interesting for a study of the performance of fascist 
propaganda, for the intended assessment of business under foreign economic policy the 
voyage’s programme provides more valuable insights. The list of factories to be visited was 
drafted by Bonmartini and other Italian industrialists. However, the draft failed to receive the 
consent of the fascist government. The Commissario Generale per le Fabbricazioni di Guerra 
(CoGeFaG), an armament institution that later evolved into the Ministero della Produzione 
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Bellica, intervened with an approval of the Duce, and struck several companies and facilities 
from the programme. In Turin the visit of the biggest artificial fibres producer Snia Viscosa 
was prohibited as was in Pisa Stabilimenti Piaggio, an aviation company at the time. Naples, 
and the two companies Romeo (aviation) and Silurificio (steal) based there were deleted from 
the programme. Only the non-military part of the industrial port in Marghera was opened to 
the visitors.632 
 CoGeFaG’s interventions indicate that the closer a sector was aligned to the strategic 
plans of the fascist regime, the more likely it was that the regime imposed a logic that differed 
from the one that usually organised the commercial relationship with its German 
counterpart.633  With regard to the initial question, what could have caused companies to 
become either freeloaders or victims of the official foreign economic policy, it seems that the 
answer depends on whether or not the strategic orientation of the government could be 
aligned with the companies’ plans for corporate development. The mistrust of government 
authorities with regard to its trading partner Germany reached from the artificial fibres sector, 
where it represented a fierce competitor on the world market, to the sectors with strategic, that 
is, military value. That this mistrust was mutual is supported by a legitimising note by the 
CoGeFaG; Italian companies „had never achieved, if it was not in the evident interest of the 
German company, to visit factories in Germany“.634 Of course, these attitudes had a major 
impact on the composition of trade at the time of the official formulation of the “Rome-Berlin 
Axis”. 
 
3. Changing Trade and the Devaluation of the Lira in 1936 
 
The shared policy of autarchy changed the economic role Germany and Italy assigned to each 
other. This had become quite obvious by the time the voyage of German business 
representatives was planned, and Berlin demanded the inclusion of agricultural interest 
groups.635 Back in 1932/33, when the mixed commission of producers was established, it was 
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Rome that so strongly insisted on allowing agricultural interest to join the platform of 
primarily industrial reconciliation. That now Berlin lobbied in favour of an inclusion of 
agriculture shows the degree to which the fascist regime’s pursuit of a German market capable 
of accommodating Italian agricultural products had come to fruition. Agricultural imports into 
Germany had grown so large that they represented just too-important an issue for Berlin to be 
left outside of the voyage of corporate Germany to Italy. 
 The trade numbers back this assessment. 636  Overall, both countries’ respective 
significance in trade increased over the period of investigation, while still the German market 
was far more relevant for Italy than the other way around (see Table 4). According to the 
German statistics, imports from Italy grew, while Germany’s total imports decreased in 
volume. They increased from 3.7 per cent (1933) to 4.5 per cent (1935) of Germany’s total 
imports. The same development characterised exports to Italy, which increased from 4.6 per 
cent (1933) to 6.5 per cent (1935) of total exports. Regarding Italy, imports from Germany in 
relation to Italy’s total imports first increased dramatically from 12.1 per cent (1933) to 16 per 
cent (1934), and then stayed on the same level in 1935 (Jan-Sep). Exports to Germany 
increased steadily from an already high 14.6 per cent (1933) of Italy’s total exports to 15.8 per 
cent (1934) and 17 per cent (Jan-Sept 1935).637 
 However, the increasing mutual importance was not even the most striking feature of 
the development of trade. Rather, it was its composition. During the period of investigation, 
Germany turned from its ever-aspired-to position as a surplus exporter of finished goods into 
an involuntary supplier of a rapidly industrialising country. Between 1933 and 1935 alone, 
exports of raw materials and half-finished products doubled from RM 53,8 million to RM 101 
million, with exports of coal almost tripling from RM 25.8 million (1933) to 69.4 million 
(1935). At the same time, export growth of finished products nearly stalled, and grew only 
from RM 169.4 (1933) million to RM 174.5 million (1935). Furthermore, growth within the 
segment of finished products was quite differing. The German industry was still welcomed to 
increase its export of machine tools, which were necessary to build up domestic productions, 
aspired to by the regime’s autarkic policies. Accordingly imports in this segment increased 
from RM 5.6 million (1933) to RM 15.1 million (1935). In contrast, exports of textile 
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machines (RM 5.7 million to RM 3.8 million), dyes (RM 9.6 million to RM 8.1 million), and 
cotton products (RM 4.1 million to RM 2.7 million) dropped between 1933 and 1935, proving 
the sectoral success in driving back the former foreign supplier.638 Italian advances appear also 
in League of Nations statistics, which show that while general industrial production in 1936 
was still suffering from the great slump (1929 = 100, 1936 = 87.5), machinery production in 
1936 had not only made up the losses, but was stronger than before the crisis (1929 = 100, 
1936 = 115.3).639 
 With regard to the structural assessment of Italy’s exports to Germany, the very 
beneficial situation granted by Berlin appears in stark relief. Despite the dire state of 
Germany’s foreign exchange reserves, and the harsh import restrictions to remedy this 
deplorable state, Italian luxury products kept their high shares. The biggest position among 
Italian exports, southern fruits, alone accounted for RM 34.9 million in 1933 (21 per cent of 
Germany’s imports from Italy), and was nearly unrestricted. In addition, exports of other 
products that did not satisfy any existential needs in Germany grew. Exports of silk and floss 
silk, for example, rose from RM 10.6 million (1933) to RM 23.2 million (1935). Another 
sharp rise was recorded for exports of hemp and similar fibres, from RM 9.2 million (1933) to 
RM 16.7 million (1935), which the German authorities had shifted from other countries (esp. 
the Soviet Union) to Italy as a matter of good will.640 An equal preferential treatment was 
given to tourism, which provided in addition to Italy’s export of goods a major source of 
revenue. From 1933 (Mar-Dec) when only 50,081 Germans had travelled to Italy spending 
RM 16 million, this source effervesced, and in 1935, 140,766 German tourists spent RM 38.1 
million (a sum already topped after the first nine months of 1936).641 
  The Italian trade experts were well aware of the degree to which this trade structure 
appeased Italy, and how much the exported goods remained a luxury for its customer. The 
Italian embassy in Berlin considered those Italian products, which were “not necessary to the 
German economy”, but “which however maximally requires Italian labour, and minimally 
requires foreign products” as the “economically most important” export goods. In order to 
safeguard this highly valuable export, it was even suggested that the Italian colonies and 
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especially Ethiopia, the recently integrated masterpiece of Italy’s African empire, should be 
offered to Germany as an export market for its industrial output in order to prevent any 
German restriction of imports from Italy.642 
Certainly, the huge concessions Germany made to its trading partner Italy were not 
primarily the result of economic logic, neither the one of liberal free trade nor autarchy. A 
policy of quid pro quo, which granted the expansionist fascist dictatorship greater economic 
leeway, provided a way for Germany to find an ally for its political fight against the post-war 
order of Europe. However, the political and the economic rapprochement did not necessarily 
happened at the same speed. An episode from May 1936 – the official proclamation of the 
“Rome-Berlin Axis” was only four months away – revealed that on the economic level the 
actors were not pushing for closer collaboration. On the contrary, the AA discussed how to 
proceed against Felice Guarneri, who was in charge of Italy’s foreign exchange reserves, and 
who was accused of using his power to effectively suspend the painstakingly negotiated 
treaties over trade and payments. 
 The very technical dispute, related to machinery imports into Italy, ultimately came 
down to the accusation that Italy, and explicitly Guarneri, would circumvent the rules in order 
to water down Germany’s contractually guaranteed trade surplus.643 The accused did not even 
deny that the actual practise of trade differed from the development theoretically demanded 
by the treaties. But this result was to Guarneri the consequence of contracts “practically 
impossible to respect”.644 The AA was perplexed by Guarneri’s autonomous behaviour, and 
Karl Ritter, head of the commercial department, “had to conclude that Mussolini is not 
sufficiently aware of the stance of Guarneri and his subsidiary authorities”.645 Consequently, 
the embassy in Rome was instructed to intervene directly with the Duce against Guarneri’s 
behaviour in order to bring the economic collaboration up to the speed (at least officially) at 
which the political collaboration between the dictators was taking place. The diplomatic note 
was intended to express Berlin’s irritation that, “after Germany throughout the last year had 
taken care of Italian needs in the institutionalisation of trade to a great extent, the Italian 
government is unwilling to keep the agreements”.646 
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While up to this point, the economic rapprochement that had taken place since 1929 reads 
largely like a series of German concessions to its trading partner Italy, a major turning point in 
autumn 1936 changed the course: the devaluation of the lira. Ever since the eruption of the 
economic crisis, the Italian currency was under pressure. The fascist government and the 
Banca d’Italia still ruled out devaluation in spring 1935, thus taking part of the “gold bloc” 
formed by France and other countries remaining on the gold standard. The preparation for the 
invasion into Ethiopia in summer 1935, however, changed not only Italy’s relationship with 
the two other major European colonial powers; it also required a different monetary policy in 
order to finance armament efforts. The decision was made to abandon the gold backing of the 
currency to “facilitate the utilisation of the reserves of the Banca d’Italia”,647 but the already-
looming measure to devalue was yet delayed. It only came in the aftermath of the devaluation 
of the franc, 648  which Paris decided on 25 September 1936, and which also sparked 
devaluations in Switzerland, the Netherlands, Latvia, and Greece. 
Immediately after this decision with global ramifications was made, Hjalmar Schacht, 
economics minister and president of the Reichsbank, met with Ambassador Bernardo Attolico 
to discuss the consequences for the German-Italian commercial relationship. For Attolico, the 
devaluation, publicly underpinned by the US and the UK, represented a concerted action by 
the Western powers to “completely destroy the present system of quotas and foreign exchange 
controls”.649 On the monetary level, thereby, a trench widened between Nazi Germany as the 
major supporter of this policy on the one side and the “democratic currencies”, as Attolico put 
it, on the other side. Schacht proclaimed publicly that he would defend the German approach 
against the French pressure “with claws and teeth”.650 What he of course did not mention was 
that Nazi Germany also supported an act of speculation against the franc, adding decisively to 
the decision to devalue.651 In this growing polarisation, the Italian ambassador was confident 
that Schacht would be mindful of the “evident solidarity [...] between Germany and Italy”. 
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Nevertheless, asked by the German government about how Rome would react to the 
devaluation, Attolico only provided an opaque and evasive answer.652 
 In fact, Italy took the same road as the countries of the former gold bloc, and decided 
to devalue the lira on 5 October 1936, only five days after the conversation between Schacht 
and Attolico. The decision came very abruptly, and the German business community in Italy 
according to the Milan consulate was drawing an “alarmist scenario”. At worst, the 
introduction of an additional currency for foreign trade had been expected, but for a 
devaluation of 50 per cent in relation to the Reichsmark no precautions were adopted.653 The 
German chamber of commerce in Italy added that the “prices in Italy represent due to the 
achievements of Italian competitors the absolute limits of profitability”. If goods imported 
from Germany would lose dramatically in competitiveness due to their higher prices, this 
would “necessarily mean the collapse of many import companies” and the loss of an entire 
market to domestic production or other countries with devalued currency.654 In addition, it 
was feared that Italy’s export industry, boosted by a devalued lira, could undercut German 
products on third party markets.655 
 Yet, the alarmist scenarios depicted by German companies demonstrate a lack of 
understanding of the institutional setting of the German-Italian economic relationship, which 
provided a precious advantage to Germany. 656  According to the logic of the clearing 
agreement, a reduction of Germany’s exports to Italy would automatically provide the 
possibility for Berlin to equally restrict “luxury” imports from Italy, as essential for the Italian 
foreign economic policy as they were dispensable for a German economy preparing for 
war.657  Therefore, it was in Italy’s own interest to prevent German products from losing 
competitiveness, because it would in the end also harm its own export in its most important 
                                                 
652 AI Berlino to MAE, MFin, 1 Oct 1936, ASMAE, AC, Germania, 1936, pos. 25-56. 
653 GK Mailand, 20 Oct 1936, PA-AA, Rom-Quirinal 963b. 
654 Deutsche Handelskammer für Italien to RWM, 10 Oct 1936, PA-AA, Rom-Quirinal 939a. 
655 AI Berlino to MAE, Sottosegretariato per gli Scambi e le Valute, 26 Oct 1936, ASMAE, AC, Germania, 1936, 
pos. 1-6. 
656 That is not to say that in the few weeks between the devaluation and the re-regulation of the commercial 
relationship no harm was done. Reports reached the authorities that several Italian exporters had unjustifiably 
raised their prices. Cf. AI Berlino to MAE, Sottosegretariato per gli Scambi e le Valute, 26 Oct 1936, ASMAE, 
AC, Germania, 1936, pos. 1-6. 
657 By 1936, with Nazi Germany getting involved in the Spanish civil war, armament production and war 
preparation was in full swing. See for Nazi Germany, R. J. Evans, The Third Reich in Power 1933-1939 (London, 
2008), pp. 612-712. 
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market.658 Devaluation, which had served already many countries in gaining new strength to 
tackle the global economic crisis, was thus a blunt sword in Italy’s hands. 
 It did, however, change the German-Italian economic relationship significantly, and 
added the last cornerstones to the fundamentals of the “economic axis”. On 24 November 
1936, the two permanent government committees came together in Rome to align the 
institutionalised commercial relationship with the new reality of a devalued lira. The 
negotiations with representatives from all relevant ministries, the central banks, railway and 
shipping administrations took more than two weeks and established with a dozen of contracts 
the new status quo.659 The RWM emphasised the genuine desire of its Italian counterparts “to 
come to a friendly solution with us”.660 Although the Italian delegates denied their capacity to 
exercise an impact on prices of German products in Italy, they agreed to make a sacrifice. 
They declared their willingness to apply the Italian quota scheme in order to ascertain that the 
value of Germany’s exports did not fall behind the level of 1934. Henceforth, no matter how 
much the prices of German products appreciated on the Italian market due to the devaluation 
of the lira, the government had to guarantee purchases of the more expensive products. If the 
Italian market ran out of capacity to accommodate a certain German good, it was agreed that 
the government committees would meet again in order to find other ways to compensate, for 
instance, by extending import quotas of other products. Only as a last resort would Berlin 
make use of its ability to restrict Italian imports. To cushion the short-term irritations of the 
devaluation, several transitional measures were adopted, all of which went towards smoothing 
out the earlier trade restricting measures as, for instance, the Italian quota scheme.661 
 That is not to say that the Italian delegation did not try to see what was in it for Italy’s 
commercial interest. Indeed, several facilitations could be achieved for its agricultural exports; 
for instance, the German trade authorities in this segment now treated companies owned by 
Italian citizens as if they were owned by German citizens. In addition, the authorities 
promised to remove any hidden measure preventing a full exploitation of the quotas granted 
to Italian products. And yet, the documentation of the negotiations in 1936 reads more like a 
dismantling of the protective walls, which Rome had previously erected in order to take the 
                                                 
658 GK Mailand to AA, 15 Oct 1936, PA-AA, Rom-Quirinal 939a. 
659  The contractual framework of December 1936 went far beyond regulating the consequences of the 
devaluation. It also covered issues such as the integration of the Italian colonies into the bilateral economic 
relationship, the rivalries between both countries on the markets of Southeastern Europe, and the development of 
tourism. Thus, it serves as a major caesura for the other thesis chapters as well, and legitimises the period of 
investigation, which ends with the year 1936. 
660 RWM to all subordinate bodies, 18 Dec 1936, PA-AA, Rom-Quirinal 939a. 
661 MAE, ‘Protocollo Confidenziale’, 7 Dec 1936, ASMAE, AC, Germania, 1936, pos. 1-6. 
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profits deriving from the beneficial development of trade. One suggestion of the German 
delegation was even perceived as a violation of Italy’s sovereignty. In order to employ the 
Italian quotas in accordance with Germany’s commercial interest, it was suggested to place 
them under the administration of the German chamber of commerce in Italy. However, for the 
Italian delegation any measure following the “principle that a foreign body administers in 
Italy” was out of the question.662 
Moreover, in as much Italy had to open up to trade with Germany as a consequence of 
the devaluation and the logic of the clearing, it also further decreased its trade relations with 
other countries. While Germany benefited from volume quotas, which, as described, could be 
adjusted to prevent market difficulties, most of Italy’s other trading partners (especially the 
countries supporting the League of Nations’ sanctions) were only granted value quotas, which 
caused a sharp reduction of imports to Italy after the devaluation of the lira.663 Tragically, the 
Franc-devaluation, which was orchestrated by the Western powers to encourage a global wave 
of monetary reconciliation, not only increased tensions between the blocs, but also welded 
even closer together the two economies of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. 
 
                                                 
662 MAE, ‘Osservazioni sul progetto germanico del verbale delle decisioni dei due comitati governativi’, 3 Dec 
1936, ASMAE, AC, Germania, 1936, pos. 1-6. 
663 RWM to all subordinate bodies, 18 Dec 1936, PA-AA, Rom-Quirinal 939a. 
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Conclusion Part I: The Economic Foundations of the “Rome-
Berlin Axis” 
 
Table 4: German-Italian trade (percentage quotas on total trade and rank among trade 
partners) 1929-1936 
 Germany (rank of Italy)(1) Italy (rank of Germany)(2) 
 imports exports imports exports 
1929 3.3 (8) 4.5 (7) 14.2 (2) 11.7 (2) 
1930 3.5 (7) 4.0 (9) 14.1 (1) 12.6 (1) 
1931 4.0 (6) 3.6 (11) 14.5 (1) 10.6 (3) 
1932 3.9 (6) 3.9 (10) 13.1 (2) 11.3 (1) 
1933 3.9 (5) 4.7 (8) 14.8 (1) 11.9 (1) 
1934 4.2 (4) 5.9 (4) 15.7 (1) 15.8 (1) 
1935 4.5 (4) 6.5 (3) 18.3 (1) 16.2 (1) 
1936 4.9 (3) 5.1 (4) 26.8 (1) 19.5 (1) 
 
Sources: (1) R. Jasper, Die regionalen Strukturwandlungen des Deutschen Außenhandels von 1880 bis 1938 
 (Ph.D. Diss., Freie Universität Berlin, 1996). 
 (2) G. Federico, Il commercio estero Italiano: 1862-1950 (Roma, 2011). 
 
In the period between the onset of the world economic crisis and the official proclamation of 
the “Rome-Berlin Axis” (25 October 1936), Germany’s and Italy’s mutual importance in trade 
increased in spite of the huge impact the great slump had on both economies (see Table 4). 
Can the clearing agreement leading to this development, therefore, be described as a 
“successful story”, as suggested by Tatarra? There is certainly much evidence that supports 
this argumentation: for instance, the increasing trade volumes after 1933 (see Table 5), 
analysed in this thesis and in Tatarra’s rather macro-economic analysis.664 Nevertheless, the 
institutional approach to the study of commercial relations adopted in this thesis clearly 
demonstrates that the initially aspired-to development of trade as expressed in the negotiations 
leading to the institutional milestones, and the actual outcome were by no means the same. 
                                                 
664 Tattara, ʻPower and Tradeʼ, p. 497. Tattara admits the explanatory limitations of his approach: “to discuss it in 
terms of relative prices is, in fact, only a small part of the story, and not by any means the most important one”. 
See ibid., p. 459. Equally positive in his general evaluation of the clearing is Bientinesi, La politica commerciale 
italiana, pp. 231-232. 
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That is, even though the trade volume increased, this is not what either Berlin or Rome 
desired in the first place, and therefore it is perhaps too bold to speak of a “success”. 
 
 Table 5: Germany’s balance of trade with Italy 1929-1936 (million RM)    
   exports imports balance 
1929   602  443  +159 
1930   484  365  +119 
1931   340  268  +72 
1932   223  181  +42 
1933   227  166  +61 
1934   246  185  +61 
1935   278  187  +91 
Jan-Sep 1935  192  136  +56 
Jan-Sep 1936  180  155  +25 
 
Source: RWM to DB Rom, ‘Übersicht 5, Handelsverkehr Deutschlands mit Italien’, 17 Dec 1936, PA-AA, Rom-
Quirinal 939a. 
  
The series of institutional milestones, from the payments agreement of 1932, to the clearing 
agreement of 1934, and the commercial contract bundle of 1936, which eventually led to the 
“commercial axis” were all reactions to an undesired trade reality. These legally constituted a 
new reality, which was again counteracted by the actual development of trade. The regular 
adjustment of institutional arrangements proves that an ongoing conflict stood at the basis of 
the commercial relationship, a struggle that was not resolved with the rising trade volume. A 
key element in this conflict was a very similar foreign economic policy deriving from 
nationalistic thinking in response to shared economic constraints. In both countries, raw 
materials and foreign exchange were scarce, and in order to develop their economies and 
especially their industrial production in accordance with their self-proclaimed expansionist 
destiny, a surplus in trade was made top priority. Berlin felt entitled to a surplus in trade as 
Germany possessed coal, and benefited from the “influence effect”; that is, the breaking off of 
commercial relations was a greater threat for the Italian economy than for the German. 
However, in their bilateral relationship only one country could pursue this policy. 
 Nevertheless, it was clear to trade experts in both countries that Italian exports to 
Germany were as essential for the Italian treasury as they were a luxury to Germany because 
the exported goods like Mediterranean fruits and vegetables fulfilled no existential need. That 
the German government treated the country to such luxury, and indeed even extended it in 
spite of the serious economic turmoil, illustrates that it was not solely economic 
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considerations that led Berlin to do its share in increasing imports. In the end, it appears that 
the huge concessions in the commercial relationship were driven by political considerations. 
Mussolini’s foreign policy intended to make Italy the “peso determinante”665 between the 
evolving political blocks, and Berlin strived to use its economic power as a trump card. 
However, this does not mean that economic considerations played no role. Concessions were 
made, but at the same time Berlin strove to shape the institutional framework of bilateral 
commerce to prevent potential negative consequences on its industrial export and its trade 
surplus. These goals were given priority over an extension of trade volumes. Apparently, 
however, these hopes were not realised. 
 Rome, instead, succeeded in reducing the ever-contested trade surplus of Germany. 
Hence, substantial evidence supports the description of the development of trade as a success 
at least for Italy. The world economic crisis severed many established economic connections, 
and some of Italy’s traditional sources of revenues (e.g. the remittances of emigrants in the 
USA) fell short. New opportunities had to be found. With the onset of the crisis, the fascist 
regime relied increasingly on agricultural export, but also on tourism,666 and in both areas 
Germany provided the biggest opportunities. Accordingly, the initiatives in the institutional 
construction of the German-Italian commercial relationship were often launched by Rome. If 
the opposite party showed reluctance, the initiatives were supported by force, as in the case of 
Italy’s compulsory clearing (Zwangsclearing), a measure which could have marked the end of 
Germany’s commercial expansion in the 1930s if other countries had followed suit. Instead, 
Berlin capitulated, generously accommodating Italy’s commercial interest, thereby increasing 
the trade volume. 
 However, this obvious success for Italy was only one side of the coin, as exports are 
only one part of trade. With regard to imports, initial aspirations and the actual outcome 
differed. Although in many fields domestic productions supported by the protectionist regime 
managed to replace German industrial exports, thus altering Italy’s import composition to 
more raw materials (coal) and investment goods, the devaluation of the lira in 1936 changed 
the game. Whereas under the logic of free trade, devaluation could have increased the 
competitiveness of Italian industrial production vis-à-vis the German, the Italian government 
                                                 
665 H. James Burgwyn, Italian foreign policy in the interwar period, 1918-1940 (Westport, Conn., 1997) p. 68. 
Steiner puts a stronger emphasis on economic and political dependencies that led Mussolini to manoeuvre 
between the blocks. Steiner, The Lights that failed, p. 244 
666 As a PhD candidate at the European University Institute in Florence, I should mention at this point that the 
first game of Calcio Fiorentino in the twentieth century, after it was forgotten for 200 years, took place in 1930 
and became a major tourist attraction. 
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now, under the conditions of the clearing agreement, encouraged imports into Italy for the 
sake of its own export interest. This led to new reservations on the side of Italian business 
representatives facing industrial competition, which could draw on the legacy of Germany’s 
“industrial domination” before World War I, and which persisted throughout the period of the 
“Rome-Berlin Axis”.667 
 The experience of businesses as presented in this thesis substantiates the claim that the 
institutional construction of the German-Italian commercial relationship cannot be appraised 
as a mere success story. A regulatory framework that subjected the entire flow of goods and 
payments to state control created huge administrative burdens for small- and medium-sized 
companies and hampered trade opportunities. For big companies, which could afford the 
rising transaction costs, prospects depended on their stance towards the nationalist foreign 
economic policy by the regimes, which cut deeply into transnational production networks. 
The more closely an industrial sector was aligned with the strategic goals of the regimes the 
more likely it was that state intervention would change the rules that had previously 
constituted the relationships between businesses in both countries. This happened in sectors 
considered strategic because of their importance to armament production, such as iron and 
steel, chemicals and aviation, but, moreover, also in sectors where German and Italian 
products competed in the hunt for foreign exchange, as in artificial fibres and cars. Both 
sectors provide examples how import quotas, designed to safeguard the balance of payments 
and support domestic productions, destroyed a transnational, vertically-integrated production, 
and turned businesses in both countries into victims. Opportunities for better economic 
performance were clearly passed over. 
 Transnational solutions to transnational problems were attempted, albeit only half-
heartedly. Co-ordination on the government level worked fairly well, with several mixed 
committees of government officials being set up to address various issues of trade under 
clearing conditions. However, attempts to spread the competencies of administrative bodies of 
business representation over the borders, as in the suggested administration of Italian import 
quotas by the German chamber of commerce in Italy, were categorically rejected. Even the 
mixed commission of producers, established by the governments specifically to deal with 
matters of shared economic interest, represented little more than lip service. It was designed 
with the French-German mixed commission of producers as a template. But whereas the 
                                                 
667 Rieder, Deutsch-italienische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, p. 103. 
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German-French original, focusing largely on coal and steel, was due to the distribution of 
mineral resources considered economically viable even against deep political mistrust,668 the 
German-Italian adaptation was in spite of the political rapprochement rendered impotent 
because the autarkic policies of both regimes favoured disentanglement over collaboration 
between industries. 
 With regard to this shared foreign economic policy approach, it has been argued that 
the Italian plans for autarchy prevailed over the German plans,669 an assessment that this 
thesis calls into question. As has been shown, the devaluation of the lira in 1936 diminished 
Italian capacity to support domestic production over imports from Germany, thus putting the 
admittedly impressive successes of earlier years into perspective.670 However, and far more 
importantly, the visions of autarchy did not envisage a closed economy on the territory of 
either Germany or Italy only. As the introductory quote from the Vossische Zeitung on the 
German-Italian economic relationship in 1932 made clear, “two countries alone are too weak 
to form a new economic area”.671 In 1936, Mussolini declared publicly that, “no nation in the 
world can realise the ideal of economic autonomy on its own territory”.672 Therefore, the 
varying concepts of autarchy almost always contemplated a larger European economic area, 
with either Berlin or Rome at the centre. However, in the shared periphery, constituted by the 
crisis-ridden countries in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, the concepts of 
a Großwirtschaftsraum (larger economic area) or a Spazio Vitale (vital space) stood in 
competition. The following parts of my thesis will analyse the relationship between the 
German plans for a larger autarkic economic area and those of Fascist Italy, thus posing the 
question of whether the partial Italian success in the bilateral commercial relationship was 





                                                 
668 It is noteworthy that an institution such as the French-German mixed commission, which preconfigured with 
its focus on coal and steel production the early steps of European integration after 1945, was also adapted by the 
two major right-wing regimes, though with a different scope and varying success. 
669 Tattara, ʻPower and Tradeʼ, pp. 457-500. 
670 A contemporary estimation reckoned that Italy reduced the volume of its total imports between 1929 and the 
end of 1936 by 42 per cent. See Kestenholz, Aussenhandel und Aussenhandelspolitik, p. 66. 
671 ‘Der unerklärte Handelskrieg’, Vossische Zeitung, 4 Mar 1932. 
672 Quoted in Petri, Von der Autarkie, p. 123. 
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Part II: Ambivalent Co-Ordination at the International Stage 
1929-1933 
 
Chapter 5: The International Implications of the German-Italian 
Economic Relationship 
 
Introduction: The Big Picture 
 
The analysis of the commercial foundations of the Rome-Berlin Axis in Part I has raised one 
crucial question: why did German foreign economic policy grant such a favourable trading 
position to Italy, which evidently neither corresponded to the needs nor the capabilities of the 
German economy? An answer to this question requires a perspective which goes beyond the 
bilateral German-Italian economic relationship. The previous part has already touched on 
international implications where it was necessary to explain the institutional steps in the run-
up to the “Rome-Berlin Axis” of 1936. However, the focus was always on the bilateral 
relationship. In contrast, Part II explicitly deals with the triangular relationship between the 
German, the Italian and the international economy between 1929 and 1933. 
 Chapter 5 conveys the big picture of the international dimension. It first looks at how 
international economic relations changed in the aftermath of the seminal crisis of 1929, and 
how Germany and Italy responded to the global trend of economic regionalism. In this regard, 
the thesis addresses the role of the USA as the economic superpower after World War I. For 
both countries the US was the most important trading partner in 1929, but no longer so by 
1936. While transatlantic commercial ties diminished, a region on the European continent 
gained popularity for Germany’s and Italy’s foreign economic policies: Southeastern Europe. 
It was one of the regions worst affected by the global economic slump. Chapter 5 analyses the 
dire consequences of the Great Depression, and contrasts this development with the renewed 
economic (and political) interest Germany and Italy showed for the region. Moreover, it adds 
the suspicious reactions by the victorious powers of World War I. Lastly, Chapter 5 introduces 
the international platform that became a central reference point for the discussions on 
economic change in Southeastern Europe: the economic and financial organisations of the 
League of Nations. 
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1. Towards Regionalism 
 
With the world economic crisis of the 1930s, attempts to revive the gold standard came to a 
sudden end. The pre-World War I global monetary system had facilitated the first wave of 
modern globalisation (roughly 1870-1914).673 In reaction to the German and Austrian banking 
crisis during the summer of 1931, the governments in both countries introduced foreign 
exchange controls to avoid capital flight. By this means, they effectively left the gold standard, 
which consequently led to bank runs and currency crises in other countries. In September 
1931, the British government made the decision to suspend the gold standard, with another 24 
countries immediately following its example.674 
 At this point in the argument it is not necessary to delve into each country’s 
deliberations on whether or not to leave the gold standard. To understand the course of the 
global economic crisis, however, it is important to note that with the collapse of the gold 
standard the conviction that the world’s economic problems should be solved with an 
internationally co-ordinated action lost ground. In response, countries concerned with the 
recovery of their national economies imposed rather diverse protective measures to tackle the 
crisis. This development shattered the once-integrated world economy into a set of “areas”, 
which were characterised by the same monetary and commercial system. A few countries in 
Europe, with France taking the lead, stuck to the gold standard and formed the “gold bloc”. 
Britain, its colonies/dominions and other countries dependent on commercial ties with the 
British market, formed the “Sterling area”. Its members co-ordinated their foreign exchange 
controls, used the sterling as currency or pegged their own currency to the British pound. 
 Subsequently, international trade diminished because trade was increasingly carried 
out within these areas. Colonial powers fostered trade within their empire to circumvent the 
new constraints that weighed heavily on commerce between different exchange control 
regimes. Some regions, like the newly founded states in the Eastern Mediterranean that were 
mandated by the League of Nations to Britain and France, were increasingly merged into an 
imperial commercial system.675 Germany, with a legacy of pre-war economic engagement in 
                                                 
673 Cf. World Bank, ed., Globalization, Growth, and Poverty (Washington DC, 2002), pp. 24-26; C. Torp, 
ʻWeltwirtschaft vor dem Weltkrieg. Die erste Welle ökonomischer Globalisierung vor 1914ʼ, Historische 
Zeitschrift, 279 (2004), pp. 561-609. 
674 Cf. Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo, The world economy, p. 103. 
675 Cf. S. Pedersen, ʻThe Meaning of the Mandates System. An Argumentʼ, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 32 
(2006), pp. 560-582. 
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the Eastern Mediterranean (with the railway-project Bagdadbahn an outstanding example), 
and Italy, with a quite-recent economic interest deriving from claims on the Mediterranean 
shore, faced new borders that determined more than ever the flow of trade. Therefore, they 
were bound to advance their economic interest at the League of Nations, which oversaw the 
mandate system. 
 Globally speaking, the trend of the international economy disintegrating into distinct 
blocs was not limited to Europe and its “periphery”. Other trading areas emerged with the US, 
Japan or the Soviet Union as their “centres”. To the supporters of global economic co-
ordination like the economic intelligence service of the League of Nations, it appeared that the 
idea of international free trade was replaced by the idea of autarkic economic areas – a 
development that was considered one of the biggest threats to the recovery of the international 
economy.676 
 Germany and Italy represent special cases in this global trend toward regionalism. In 
both countries, the idea of international free trade had been heftily criticised by nationalistic 
counter-movements before the onset of the crisis, and was consequently buried when its 
desatrous effects seemed to prove the daunting accusers right. Economics Minister Walther 
Funk proclaimed proudly at the height of Nazi-domination over Europe that Italy and 
Germany had been the first countries to “protect” the world from international finance.677 
 Germany did not become a member of one of the already-mentioned currency and 
trade areas. It refused to follow the example of the pound or the dollar because devaluation 
would have increased the burden of its relatively high foreign debt. In addition, this measure 
could have been perceived by foreign countries as a signal of German economic weakness.678 
Instead, the government opted for harsh foreign exchange controls in order to protect the 
import-dependent economy against a further decrease of the already-low foreign exchange 
reserves. Furthermore, foreign payments were subjected to administrative control as importers 
were only granted a limited amount of foreign exchange to pay for their orders, and exporters 
had to surrender their revenues to the central bank. In accordance with this administrative 
takeover of international payments, the regulation of trade became a matter of political and 
                                                 
676 Quoted in Petri, Von der Autarkie, p. 38. 
677 W. Funk, Das wirtschaftliche Gesicht des neuen Europas (Berlin 1942), p. 10. For the underlying ideological 
foundations of the German-Italian economic relationship, see the prologue to this thesis. 
678 Cf. Boelcke, Deutschland als Welthandelsmacht, p. 17. 
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diplomatic negotiations, which subsequently established a system of bilateral agreements: 
Germany’s Reichsmark Bloc.679 
Italy in this regard stayed between the blocs, as it co-operated with the remaining 
supporters of the gold standard, but soon adopted a trade policy quite similar to Germany. Its 
initial adherence to gold seems at first sight rather incomprehensible given that the country, 
with its low foreign exchange reserves, carried a burden similar to that of Germany.680 
Explanatory factors for this decision include the vital economic ties with other countries 
remaining on gold, the still-high share of agriculture in the national economy,681 hopes to reap 
after the crisis the benefits of adherence in the form of better credit abroad,682 and Mussolini’s 
policy of economic nationalism.683 In the early 1930s, the Duce considered stability and the 
international value of the lira a source of national pride, and he prioritised stability over more 
realistic considerations that could have led him to the British approach of devaluation in order 
to gain international competitiveness.684 Instead, Mussolini decreed harsh cuts in wages and 
salaries. As this policy showed only limited effect between 1929 and 1932, with wages 
thereafter again on the rise, Italy moved to a policy of foreign exchange controls and bilateral 
trading agreements, that is, towards the German approach.685 
 While Italy’s policy approach to the international economy increasingly resembled that 
of Germany, at the same time both countries’ ties with the political, military and economic 
superpower after World War I, the US, diminished. In order to better understand their vision 
of foreign economic entanglement, it is necessary to look from which point they departed. In 
the period under investigation (1928-1937), Italy’s imports from the US fell from 17.6 per 
cent to 11.1 per cent of its total imports, and Italian exports to the US dropped from 10.7 per 
cent to 7.5 per cent of total exports.686 As was shown in the previous chapter, Germany 
increased over the same period its role both as a supplier and as a customer of the Italian 
economy. Similarly, between 1930 and 1938, Germany’s imports from the US fell from 12.6 
                                                 
679 Cf. Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo, The world economy, pp. 150-152. 
680 The countries of the gold standard were confronted with a run on their foreign exchange. See H. James, 
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682 So the judgment of the US Ambassador in Rome. See US Embassy Rome to FDR and Secretary of State, 22 
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685 Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo, The world economy, pp. 154-155. 
686 Federico, Il commercio estero, pp. 126-131. 
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per cent to 7.4 per cent of its total imports. Its exports to the US diminished from 5.7 per cent 
to 2.8 per cent of total exports.687   
The US government rose up against this trend. It blamed publicly protective measures 
against its exports, and identified the recent fascination for autarchy in Germany and Italy as 
preparing the ideological ground for economic disintegration. The US ambassador in Rome, 
for example, reported that with the advances of the heavily artificial fibres-production, “Italy 
can reduce its cotton purchases from the United States by 50 per cent within two years”. Even 
more threatening, the Italian artificial fibres industry had received “inquiries from 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, Spain, Belgium, Holland and Switzerland for the 
establishment of plants in those countries”. The result would be an “enormous inroad upon the 
cotton export trade of the United States”.688 
 The accusation of protectionism was certainly not far from reality. The German 
embassy in Rome reported in 1929 that the Italian automobile club had launched a campaign 
against foreign cars on the Italian market. The campaign was supported with articles in 
several big newspapers, and the wording as well as the cited cases of the different articles 
resembled each other to an extent that the embassy suspected the Italian government of being 
behind the campaign. While these attacks, which foresaw a public list to name, shame and 
fame owners of foreign cars, were aimed at German exports too, the campaign targeted 
mainly cars produced in the US.689 
 In Germany, the protectionist tendencies against US exports reached a new level with 
the implementation of Hjalmar Schacht’s “new plan” in 1934, which first led Germany to 
withdraw from the 1923 trade agreement with the US. Secondly, the “new plan” prompted 
Cordell Hull, secretary of state and one of the main proponents of liberal free trade, to refuse 
most-favoured-nation status to Germany in an agreement based on Germany’s new foreign 
economic policy.690 Eventually, trade languished, and discrimination against US trade became 
a perennial accusation of American politicians. 
 For the US, there was certainly more at stake than a few percentage points in trade. US 
corporations had invested heavily in the German economy throughout the 1920s, with 
ramifications that went beyond the German market. The Banca d’Italia, Italy’s central bank, 
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closely monitored the different levels of US investment in Germany (direct investment, sales 
companies and commercial representatives) because it mattered “not only for this country, but 
for the entire European continent”. In this report, issued in 1930 by its Berlin branch, the 
Banca d’Italia anxiously declared that US corporate involvement “aims at controlling the 
local industry and consequently destroying it in the exclusive interest of the American 
industry”.691 
 The exaggerated statement of the Banca d’Italia still shows that in the midst of the 
economic turmoil of the Great Depression, the US also made use of protectionism. In fact, 
several voices in Germany and Italy tried to legitimise protective measures in their country by 
referring to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, and set out to justly compensate the 
damage that increasing US tariffs on more than 20,000 imported goods had caused to 
European exporters. The Italian newspaper Il Messaggero, for example, claimed “Italian 
machines for Italian soil”, pronouncing a halt on the import of agricultural machines, which 
was perceived by the German embassy as a direct reaction to the US tariff act.692 
 Certainly, US foreign economic policy in the Great Depression found itself in a 
dilemma. On the one hand, the government could stick with Hull’s approach of free trade and 
open markets, whereby it ran the risk of exclusion from markets with protective walls and 
bilateral commercial treaties superseding the MFN clause. On the other hand, the US could 
discreetly adapt the same measures to keep its vital markets open for its production surpluses. 
This strategy, however, could have undermined the credibility of the US in the global debate 
over the ideal constitution of the international economy.693 A solution to this dilemma was not 
in sight. 
 Perhaps the dilemma was one reason that no open trade war broke out between 
Germany as well as Italy on the one side and the US on the other side. Although both sides 
proclaimed opposition to each other’s approaches, they equally shared a considerable interest 
in their mutual economic relationship. The US remained a vital supplier of many goods that 
had not been replaced by the new surrogate products developed with strong backing by 
autarkic policies. In addition to its role as an exporter, the US and especially New York still 
played a role as a financial centre, albeit at a decreasing level. Throughout the 1920s it had 
allowed Italian banking, and subsequently Italian business, to expand in many regions 
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worldwide.694 As Di Quirico has pointed out, “the history of the Italian economic expansion 
abroad was above all the history of the expansion abroad of the large Italian banks and of the 
industrial and commercial activities that they undertook or supported”.695 Even after the war 
in Ethiopia, which at first sight had ruined Italy’s international reputation, the MAE and the 
MFin acknowledged a plan that would maximize benefits from the recent bull market for 
Italian securities in New York after the end of the war.696 
 North of the Alps, German government officials sent out messages to the American 
public asking for confidence in spite of the current irritations. Hjalmar Schacht, for instance, 
gave an interview to the Evening Standard in 1933, in which he declared that Germany would 
remain a “committed supporter of the gold standard”, and that he would oppose a closed 
“European gold bloc” that excluded the US.697 To the board of economic warfare, his visit 
“was nothing but a propaganda campaign designed to create sympathy for the Nazi regime in 
American business circles”.698 On the other side of the Atlantic, big US corporations with 
overseas investments persistently articulated a genuine interest in maintaining a good 
relationship in spite of the growing political and economic tensions in order to prevent further 
damage to their property.699 
 Nevertheless, even as the ideological differences failed to lead to a complete halt in the 
economic relationships between the US on the one side and Germany as well as Italy on the 
other, tensions reached a degree of open discontent on third-party markets. As has been shown 
in Part I, Germany and Italy were at the forefront of tackling the widespread severe foreign-
exchange situation with bilateral barter agreements. By early 1937, more than 170 clearing 
agreements had been signed worldwide, with only a few trading countries departing from the 
trend and one especially noteworthy exception.700  The US had not joined the trend, and 
defended the liberal idea of free and open trade against clearing agreements. The economic 
battle between the US and the pioneers of bilateralism broke out in Latin America701 as well 
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as Asia,702 but it was in one region where it especially clashed with the economic and political 
expansionist drive of Germany and Italy: Southeastern Europe. 
Much of the money invested in the countries established in the aftermath of World War 
I came from the United States. According to German estimations from 1932, in Austria, 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the US was the single largest creditor (US investments in AT: 
RM 412 million; CS: RM 232 million; YU: RM 180 million). In Bulgaria and Hungary, 
British investments slightly topped the American investments (US investments in BG: RM 53 
million; HU: RM 350 million) and in Romania France’s investments (US investments: RM 83 
million).703 Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the grave economic difficulties of the region, 
and the subsequent initiatives of Germany and Italy, caused mistrust. When in 1931, the 
Hungarian government, under heavy financial pressure, declared that it would stop payments 
for all its long-term government bonds except for the League of Nations loan, a group of 
American banks intervened at the Department of State (DOS) and the League of Nations. The 
banks flatly opposed the discriminatory procedure, and in case of its acceptance they 
demanded at least that the League assume financial supervision of the recalcitrant debtor.704 
 This example highlights the US involvement in the financial and economic activities 
of the League, which is quite noteworthy given that it never joined the international 
organisation as a full member.705 Especially concerned was the DOS with the discussion of 
clearing and compensation agreements which were “vitally affecting American trade and 
financial interests, also because they seem to be seriously modifying both the course of trade 
throughout the world and the method of conducting trade and arranging payments 
therefore“.706 With the US involvement, the League of Nations gained in the 1930s a pivotal 
role as a forum for the competing ideas on how to find ways out of the world economic crisis. 
When hereafter the thesis discusses the German and Italian initiatives for a more bilateral 
approach to foreign economic relations, it is important to keep in mind that the initiatives 
were developed with an eye on the US and their ongoing resistance to German and Italian 
bilateralism. Even for the analysis of the actual expansion into Southeastern Europe and the 
Eastern Mediterranean in Part III of the thesis, the US opposition to deviations from the most-
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favoured-nation clause is crucial to an understanding of the design of the commercial 
instruments facilitating the economic expansion. A proper description of the role of 
Southeastern Europe requires first the setting out of the manifestations of the economic crisis 
in one of the world’s most affected regions. 
 
2. Crisis and Opportunities in Southeastern Europe 
 
When Germany and Italy adapted their foreign economic policies to the world economic crisis, 
Southeastern Europe707 was not yet part of one of the trading areas separating the global 
economy. World War I and the subsequent peace agreements had established a series of new 
borders within the territories of the extinct Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. The 
smaller successor states were integrated into a system of political alliances (e.g. the Little 
Entente between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania under the auspices of France) to 
guarantee the post-war order. However, the new borders put a heavy burden on the 
commercial networks established under imperial rule. A series of small domestic markets 
replaced the larger Habsburg and Ottoman economic areas. In addition to previously existing 
formal trade barriers (e.g. customs frontiers), informal institutions such as the extraordinarily 
strong economic nationalism hampered development through trade and economic 
integration.708 
 Moreover, the specific trade pattern between the region and the more industrialised 
countries exposed them to hefty risks. Interwar politicians, their economic advisers and 
business representatives expected Southeastern Europe to undergo a transition phase of 
economic development. Local attempts at industrialisation offered opportunities for industrial 
countries to export investment goods, and conversely, to import agricultural products and raw 
materials for domestic consumption. Foreign companies invested especially in oil, coal, 
electricity, steel, as well as some metallurgical and basic investment goods industries.709 
Ulrich von Hassell, who was before his post as German ambassador in Rome deployed in 
Belgrade, admitted retrospectively that the economic wonders projected into the region’s 
future had often been exaggerations. Nevertheless, he called for the German economy to 
                                                 
707 For a discussion of the spatial construct “Southeastern Europe” see the Introduction, ection 3. 
708 Cf. Teichova, Matis and Pátek, Economic change; H. Schultz, History and culture of economic nationalism in 
East Central Europe (Berlin, 2006). 
709 See R. Nötel, ‘International Credit and Finance’, in M. C. Kaser and E. A. Radice, eds., The Economic 
History of Eastern Europe 19191975, Vol. 2, (Oxford 1986), pp. 170295. 
158 
maintain interest. He rejected the popular argument that the industrialisation efforts would 
harm prosperity in the more industrialised world through increasing industrial competition 
and declining agricultural exports due to a rising living standard in the region. If the 
relationship is governed in respect of the principle of recognising “[one’s] own interest in 
supporting the natural development” of other countries, even larger opportunities would 
emerge.710 
 This specific trade pattern exposed the primary producers of Southeastern Europe to 
the price fluctuations on the international commodity markets. Throughout the 1920s, world 
commodity prices lost ground, and the difference between prices for industrial and 
agricultural products, that is, the gap between the European economic “centre” and the 
“periphery” widened.711 Explanations as to what might have caused the crises are manifold, 
and the discussion is still ongoing. Overproduction, which was certainly not the only cause, 
was deemed crucial by many contemporary commentators. The German-Italian chamber of 
commerce, for instance, identified the hasty industrialisation caused by the readjustment of 
former war industries to commercial production as the root cause. This development had put 
prices under pressure, and ultimately created the bubble that burst in 1929.712 
 Regardless of whether the plummeting prices in the commodity sector are the only 
explanation for the crisis, this development had an immense impact on the countries in 
Southeastern Europe, and dramatically worsened their terms of trade. In addition, the harvest 
of 1932 was a huge disappointment. Wheat production fell behind the annual average of 1926 
to 1930 in every country (except for Bulgaria). Romania collected only 20 million quintals, 
compared to its average of 30 million.713 On top of regional factors, the global trend of rising 
protectionism and the erection of trade barriers added to the steep decline in trade. As Table 6 
shows, exports between 1928 and 1932 decreased by up to 39 per cent in Austria and imports 
by up to 55 per cent in Hungary. The breakdown of trade hit Southeastern Europe particularly 
hard. Public finances were already under pressure from monetary stabilisation efforts, capital 
flight after the collapse of the regional banking giant Creditanstalt, the devaluation of sterling 
                                                 
710 Von Hassell, Südosteuropa, pp. 3-4. 
711 See Aldcroft, Europe’s third world, pp. 52-57; M. Kopsidis, ʻMissed Opportunity or Inevitable Failure? The 
Search for Industrialization in Southeast Europe 1870-1940ʼ, EHES working papers in economic history, 19 
(2012), p. 2. 
712 Jahresberichte der deutsch-italienischen Handelskammer (1932), p. 17-25 
713 Preparatory Commission of Experts, 19 Oct 1932, LON, R2671. 
159 
and a halt on German reparation payments following the Hoover moratorium. With trade in 
steep decline, a complete financial collapse loomed.714 
 
 Table 6: Decrease of trade in Southeastern Europe 1928-1932 (in percentage quotas) 
Decrease of: Romania Yugoslavia Hungary Czechoslovakia Austria 
Exports 18 26 31 38 39 
Imports 51 39 55 39 33 
 
Source: BdI Berlino (Zanchi) to BdI (Azzolini), 21 Jan 1933, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Fondo Istcambi, 
busta 43. 
 
In order to tackle these challenges, governments enacted a shared set of measures. 
These did not follow a strict ideology, but nevertheless arose from a common logic, and added 
to the construction of a group of ‘crisis countries’. The fear of inflation was pervasive, and 
currency protection became paramount. International trust needed to be restored to secure 
international lending. Therefore, monetary policies clung to the gold standard and introduced 
harsh foreign exchange controls. In a climate of existential economic problems and a 
pernicious “each for himself” mentality, (not only) economic nationalism spread and paved 
the road for a rapprochement with the nationalistic regimes in Germany and Italy.715 Moreover, 
the two countries in the West gained attraction as they possessed only scarce resources in food 
and raw materials and could, accordingly, stimulate vital commodities exports. Conveniently, 
and with far-reaching consequences for Europe’s economic relations, Germany and Italy 
increased their interest in the countries in crisis too. 
 Both countries had established commercial ties with the region long before the onset 
of the world economic crisis. In Germany, already before World War I these ties played a 
pivotal role in the formation of Mitteleuropa.716 This spatial concept, strongly influenced by 
the long nineteenth century rise of new international powers in the East and West, called for 
an economically integrated confederation of European states, with Germany at its centre, to 
counter the rising global competition.717  However, the importance given to Southeastern 
Europe in foreign policy conceptions should not disguise the fact that the region remained of 
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limited relevance for Germany’s actual commerce. True, its trade with the region increased 
throughout the decade before the War, but it was in part a restructuring from Austria (which 
itself was part of Mitteleuropa) to the smaller countries within the empire, and the growth 
rates of trade always remained below Germany’s general trend. As the growth rate of exports 
was significantly closer to the level of Germany’s total exports than that of imports, it can be 
surmised that Germany saw in the region primarily an outlet for its surplus industrial 
production.718 
 The German economy lost its favourable position as the main industrial supplier of 
Southeastern Europe when the treaties of Versailles stipulated the expropriation of German 
foreign interest and rescinded its MFN status in trade. Consequently, banks, industries and 
trading companies from victorious allied countries breached into former German positions.719 
After 1925, when Germany regained its freedom of trade, Berlin increasingly used its 
reinvigorating economic strength720 for an “economic version of German power policy”721 
which clearly aimed at a revision of the post-war order, not solely, but particularly in 
Southeastern Europe. Within this politicisation of foreign trade, the concept of Mitteleuropa 
remained highly influential. 
 Since December 1926, the concept gave inspiration to the Mitteleuropäischer 
Wirtschaftstag (MWT), a lobby organisation promoting the peaceful economic penetration of 
Southeastern Europe. Uniquely for a lobby group, it gathered not only representatives of big 
business, but also agriculture, public administration and the military.722 Hans Posse, as head of 
the RWM foreign trade department and delegate to the League of Nations of eminent 
importance for this thesis, mentioned as one of the biggest advantages that the orientation 
towards Southeastern Europe could “build on the consent of the entire economy”.723 Central 
in many versions of Mitteleuropa promoted by the MWT or other followers of the idea was 
the Anschluß of Austria.724 This conjunction, emphatically rejected by the guarantor powers of 
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the post-war order, was also combated by Mussolini’s foreign policy by all means at its 
disposal. 
 Italy’s foreign trade with the region showed a similar tendency to politicisation 
throughout the 1920s. Parts of the Italian corporate world, namely the big insurance 
companies like Generali or Riunione Adriatica, had already established relations since the 
early nineteenth century.725 But only with the advent of fascism did the region gain its great 
popularity in foreign economic policy planning, which stemmed from a combination of 
political considerations and trading potential. Italy, albeit among the victorious powers of 
World War I, had left the following peace negotiations with a feeling of having been 
defrauded. This sentiment grew under fascism into a firm conviction that the reshaping of 
borders in post-war Europe and beyond clearly disadvantaged Italy. Claims on the terra 
irredenta, regions with an allegedly Italic population and historical ties with the peninsula, 
shaped fascist policies towards economic expansion into Southeastern Europe and the Eastern 
Mediterranean. The terre irrendente of the upper Adriatic became part of a seldom-evoked but 
ever-present plan for an Italian Mitteleuropa.726 
 However, the desire for economic expansion was not solely inspired by irredentism. 
The region offered Italy significant commercial opportunities to export its industrial products 
(in particular textile and machines) and to import greatly needed goods such as grain, timber, 
oil and tobacco. In addition, local banks, under strong German influence before World War I, 
encouraged investors from the victorious states to replace German interest, thus creating 
opportunities for Italy’s financial industry.727  The expansion of Italian businesses, always 
burdened by a lack of capital and organisation,728 leaped up in 1926, the year when Mussolini 
adopted the “quota 90” and a draconian deflationary policy, which forced companies to merge 
and to rationalise their work processes.729 
 As Germany renewed interest in Southeastern Europe after 1925, contact in the 
region’s markets with Italian representatives became more frequent. However, the foreign 
policy of Germany’s Prime Minister Stresemann (1924-29), who was one of the main 
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promoters of a German ‘economic power policy’,730 took careful precautions not to create 
conflicts with Italy in Germany’s relations with Southeastern Europe.731 Table 7 shows that 
Germany’s share was generally higher than Italy’s, which is not surprising considering 
Germany’s larger sales market and its more diversified industrial export. Nevertheless, in a 
few segments (e.g. wheat) Italy imported in absolute terms more than Germany, which still 
bought to a higher extent overseas.732  Overall, the share of the rivals on the markets in 
Southeastern Europe remained largely constant throughout the late 1920s.733 One tendency, 
however, clearly distinguished Germany’s and Italy’s trade relationships in the years leading 
up the world economic crisis. While Germany recorded a surplus in trade, Italy generally ran 
a deficit (with temporary exceptions in trade with Hungary and Romania). The reasons for 
Italy’s performance were manifold and span from economic factors, like the Italian industry’s 
complete dependence on raw material imports, to more political causes. 
Table 7: Germany’s and Italy’s trade with Southeastern Europe 1927-1930 (percentage quotas 



















Import from D 16.7/19.8/21 17.8/19.5/20 12.3/13.6/15.6 22.3/25.1 


















Import from IT 4/3.3/3.5 4.7/4/4.4 12.9/12/10.8 8.7/7.9 









Source: Istcambi, ‘Commercio Estero’, 4.32, Archivio Storico Banca d’Italia, Carte Beneduce, cart. 283. 
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Among the political causes were Mussolini’s diplomatic manoeuvres against the “Little 
Entente”, which are especially interesting for the triangular relationship with Germany. The 
AA recognised in 1928/29 a surge in Italian diplomatic action in the capitals of Southeastern 
Europe and especially in Bucharest and Budapest. While Hungary was considered by 
Konstantin von Neurath, Germany’s ambassador in Rome and Hitler’s first foreign minister, 
already a “strong corner pillar” in Rome’s strategic planning, Romania was still to be included 
in a pact brought against Yugoslavia and ultimately France.734 Precisely as Romania and 
Hungary received greater diplomatic attention, Italy’s trade changed from surplus to deficit. It 
thus seems that Italy used its imports for political leverage. Neurath was quite sceptical about 
what he called a “fantasy construction” because Italy was “neither in its inner political 
structure nor as an economic entity” consolidated enough to become a centre of gravity in 
European power politics. 735  Nevertheless, the AA was interested enough in the exact 
procedure of Rome’s approach that it instructed its embassies in the concerned countries to 
discreetly provide detailed accounts of the Italian initiative.736 
 In conclusion, it can be said that Germany’s and Italy’s rising economic interests in 
Southeastern Europe at the outbreak of the world economic crisis was to a large extent based 
on political considerations rather than on hard economic facts and figures. This conclusion 
can be drawn not only from the various, purely political considerations integrated into the 
conceptions of foreign economic policy, but is also supported by the actual development of 
trade with Southeastern Europe, which neither reflected the importance it received in foreign 
economic policy planning nor replaced the ties with the industrialised western world. For 
1929, the League of Nations estimated that it was still the US that exported more than any 
other country to Germany. While the country group of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, 
Hungary and Romania did constitute Germany‘s main customer, it was in part due to 
Germany’s position as intermediary for many products, which the Southeastern European 
countries bought in third-party countries. For Italy’s commerce, this country group played 
even a less-important role, being only the fifth-important supplier and purchaser.737 What 
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mattered in the aftermath of the world economic crisis was political will, which made the 
region economically interesting. As the political and economic future of the region in crisis 
was fundamentally shaped under the auspices of the League of Nations, the German and 
Italian interest in the work of the first international organisation increased. 
 
3. The League of Nations’ Search for Economic Relief 
 
The League of Nations, founded after World War I in Geneva, was the first international 
organisation to broker world peace. Moreover, during the world economic crisis it became an 
important platform for those concerned with co-ordinating an international response.738 Yet, 
the first “Conference with a View to Concerted Economic Action” in February 1930 
disregarded a truly international perspective.739 The League’s own report on the conference 
speaks regretfully of a strictly European affair. Moreover, it deplored that the recent sharp rise 
of tariffs in the US had poisoned the atmosphere of the conference.740 The battle against the 
spiral of increasing tariffs and other protectionist barriers became one of the primary concerns 
of the League’s agenda. Therefore, the League officials, largely adhering to a liberal order of 
world trade,741 witnessed sorrowfully the breakdown of an arranged global tariff truce.742 
 A second element in the League’s diagnosis of the root causes of the crisis appeared 
not much later, in the commercial convention signed on 24 March 1930. The convention, 
pieced together after the failed February conference to prolong existing commercial 
agreements and prevent unilateral tariff increases, argued that special attention should be 
dedicated to, “adjusting the economic relations between industrial and agricultural countries.” 
The question had been put on the agenda by the “States of Eastern Europe and the Danube 
basin”. This country group argued that the agricultural protectionism of Western countries 
would significantly contribute to their economic troubles.743 The perception of shared export 
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difficulties triggered solidarity between the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, 
which even flouted the political coalitions formed by the Versailles treaties. 
In July 1930, representatives from Yugoslavia, Romania and Hungary met in 
Bucharest to agree on a common foreign economic policy. The meeting gave rise to a series of 
follow-up conferences, eventually joined by Bulgarian and Polish officials, thus forming a 
group sometimes referred to as the “agrarian bloc”. 744  Later, the group was joined by 
Czechoslovakia as well as Latvia, and constituted a permanent committee whose members 
agreed to inform each other about any bilateral commercial negotiation they conducted.745 
The Neue Zürcher Zeitung, as one of the major Swiss quality newspapers well informed of the 
current developments in Geneva, reported that out of this pooling of interests, the crisis-ridden 
countries had gained new strength. In dealing with the League they noticed that, “due to their 
united position their demands attracted much more attention”. Guided by the conviction to 
constitute a sales area potentially more interesting to Central Europe than the US, the interest 
group not only had envisaged a common export organisation for the region’s crops, but also a 
joint reduction of industrial imports to exert pressure on the European countries accused of 
closing their markets for agricultural imports.746 
 The League, constantly countering rising protectionism, took the accusation seriously. 
Its statistical surveys 747  demonstrate that while the conditions of wheat production 
deteriorated in Southeastern Europe, the production in Western European countries (except 
England & Wales) actually increased (see Table 8). With its unique international perspective 
on the problem, the League clearly saw the shortcomings of “national measures to restore 
monetary and financial stability”. Of course, protectionist measure helped to ease pressure of 
agricultural lobby groups in Western Europe, but the increased competition added to the 
already-falling export revenues in Southeastern Europe. Therefore, economic and social gains 
in the West further stressed the financial situation in Southeastern Europe. 
 
 
                                                 
744 AA to various embassies, 4 Aug 1930, PA-AA, Rom-Quirinal 946a. 
745 Comité Permanent D’Etudes Economiques Des Etats De L’Europe Centrale Et Orientale, 16 Feb 1931, LON, 
R2904. 
746 ‘Die osteuropäische Wirtschaftföderation’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 17 Nov 1930. 
747 In general the League’s surveys introduced a new area of statistical reporting, and are still of great use for 
scholarship. Cf. S. White, ‘The League of Nations. A Primer for Documents Research’, available: 
<http://www.princeton.edu/~sbwhite/un/leagwebb.html> (retrieved 16 Jul 2015). 
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Germany 33.7 42.3 50.7 
France 73.7 71.9 90.2 
Italy 60.7 66.5 72.4 
England & Wales 12.9 9.8 11.1 
 
Source: Preparatory Commission of Experts, 19 Oct 1932, LON, R2671. 
  
The League had a clear idea of the tensions arising from the relationship between the 
industrial “centre” and the agricultural “periphery”, not only from the trade flows, but also 
from the related financial flows. It had administered many of the loans granted by 
international lenders to the region to support the economic reconstruction in the newly 
founded nation states.748 If the revenues from agricultural exports continued to fall, thereby 
adding to the already-high financial burden on public households, the League warned that 
defaults could no longer be prevented. For the League this risk, “demands that the balance of 
payments be righted by the creditor countries either receiving relatively more imports 
compared with their exports, or by readjusting their debt claims“.749 
 It is thus that in spite of its global focus, the League, and especially its economic and 
financial organisations (EFO), became particularly concerned with the primary producers of 
Southeastern Europe.750 The situation was grave indeed. According to Karl Blessing, German 
delegate to the Bank for International Settlements, Hungary, for instance, had “lived in the 
past years perhaps more than any other country from foreign loans and foreign bonds”, and 
turned into a “hopeless case”. Blessing reckoned that only fundamental changes in the 
commercial order of the Danube basin and especially its connection with the “Central 
European industrial area” (Mitteleuropäisches Industriegebiet) could solve the crisis.751 
While in this statement Blessing evoked the idea of Mitteleuropa as a solution to the crisis, 
the countries in Southeastern Europe were the ones to come up with the idea of getting a grip 
                                                 
748 The loans granted under the auspices of the League include: Austrian 6 per cent guaranteed loan, Bulgarian 7 
per cent refugee loan, Bulgarian 7.5 per cent stabilisation loan, Greek 7 per cent refugee loan, Greek 6 per cent 
stabilisation loan, Hungarian Government 7.5 per cent loan. Cf. League Loans Committee, 18 Jul 1932, LON, 
Comité pour la Restauration des Pays de l’Europe Centrale et Orientale, R2923. 
749 Preparatory Commission of Experts, 19 Oct 1932, LON, R2671. 
750 See Clavin, Securing the world economy, p. 180. 
751 Blessing (BIZ) to Hedding (LON), 14 Oct 1931, PA-AA, R105.728. 
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on the crisis by changing the distribution of the European economy between the “periphery” 
and the “centre”. At the agrarian conference in Warsaw (28-30 August 1930), representatives 
of Baltic, Central and Southeastern European countries752 broadly formulated two sets of 
measures. Firstly, they proposed a scheme to establish an international organisation granting 
agricultural credit, and secondly, they argued for preferential treatment of the region’s grain 
exports by Western European import policies. With the financial collapse looming, the 
Warsaw conference members urged the League to look into the proposal.753 
 For the hesitant League, however, the notion of preferences involved a fundamental 
change in orientation, as it meant shifting a central pillar of international economic relations: 
the most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause. A preferential system could, by definition, only work 
if the advantage offered by a certain importing country to Southeastern Europe’s grain would 
not automatically have to be offered to any other grain exporter. Nevertheless, as the scheme 
seemed to offer the sorely needed increase of agricultural prices, the League took the matter 
up for further consideration. 
 Among the various bodies of the League, several were particularly concerned with the 
crisis in Southeastern Europe. 754  The inter-governmental financial committee (FC), 
constituted by officials delegated by national governments, oversaw the loans granted under 
the auspices of the League, advised governments on monetary and fiscal policies, and was 
charged with the task to organise an international agricultural mortgage credit scheme.755 By 
the League’s constitution, the FC could only provide advice, while the council, as one of the 
League’s principal organs (along with the assembly and the permanent secretariat), took 
decisions. However, the council followed the advice of the FC almost without exception, “so 
that in practise the centre of gravity in the domain of finance [was] rather more with the 
financial committee”. The League offered this evaluation of the Committee’s functional reach 
when the US official Norman H. Davis joined it in 1931, while the US still refrained from 
acceding to the League.756 The economic committee (EC), similarly constituted as the FC, but 
                                                 
752  The Polish government invited representatives from Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. 
753 MAF to various ministries, 25 Oct 1930, ASMAE, AC, Italia, 1930-31. 
754 It should be mentioned as well that even contemporaries dealing with the League’s economic and financial 
organisations confused denominations and institutional classifications, and reproduced these inaccuracies in the 
documents consulted for this thesis. For a concise overview of the opaque structure of EFO, see P. Clavin and J.-
W. Wessels, ʻTransnationalism and the League of Nations. Understanding the Work of Its Economic and 
Financial Organisationʼ, Contemporay European History, 14, 4 (2005), pp. 465-492. 
755 MAF to various ministries, 25 Oct 1930, ASMAE, AC, Italia, 1930-31. 
756 LON to Norman Davis, 5 Aug 1931, Library of Congress, Norman H. Davis Papers, Box 34. 
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even more successful in institutional growth (both in membership and reach), analysed the 
development of commerce and took up the matter of agricultural preferences.757 In addition to 
the two inter-governmental committees, staffed with experts employed by national 
governments, the League employed its own officials who ran the “sections”, as the different 
functional agencies of the League were called. The economic and financial section served as 
the secretariat to EC and FC and offered a significant amount of guidance.758 According to 
Alfred Husslein, an official at the economic and financial section of German origin, the 
problem of “Mitteleuropa” stood out on its agenda.759 
 Not less important, the Commission of Enquiry for European Union (CEEU) was 
established to translate Aristide Briand’s seminal plan for a union of Europe into action. After 
a request of 27 countries at the eleventh session of the League’s assembly (9 September to 4 
October 1930) it merged with the work of the League, and became increasingly engaged in 
questions of credit and preferences for the Southeastern European countries in crisis.760 These 
issues became so prominent that later, in 1932, when under rising political tension the pan-
European idea seemed rather remote, many members of the CEEU hoped to “revive with the 
problem of Mitteleuropa” its ailing work.761 Common to these bodies was that they had rather 
an advisory function and could not put a scheme directly into force. Nevertheless, by 
recommending one approach as most promising, the international organisations could make 
an impact on the formulation of national policies and, moreover, provide international 
legitimacy between different national approaches competing on the international stage.762 
 As preferences for Southeastern Europe’s agricultural exports were about to gain a 
foothold at the League, the importance of two countries increased. Germany and Italy were 
not only already the two main importers of grain from the region; they even bore the potential 
to further increase imports by reducing protectionist barriers and shifting their imports from 
overseas markets to Europe (see Figure 2). Their decisive position as trading partners was also 
recognised in Southeastern Europe. The Romanian president of the League’s general 
assembly (1930-32), Nicolae Titulescu, promoted the image of a house, with the Southeastern 
                                                 
757 ‘Évolution De La Politique Économiques Et Commerciale’, 19 Jun 1931, LON, C.E.U.E./E.E./1-13. 
758 Cf. Clavin and Wessels, ʻTransnationalism and the Leagueʼ, p. 472-475. 
759 A. Husslein, ‘Die Organisierung Mitteleuropas’, 8 Mar 1932, PA-AA, R105.590. 
760 Kratel (Geneva) to AA, RWM, 1 Oct 1930, PA-AA, R118.419. 
761 Dufour-Feronce (LON) to von Bülow (AA), 12 Mar 1932, PA-AA, R105.590. 
762 FC, Report on its 45th session, 24 Mar 1932, PA-AA, R118.479. The thesis does not claim to deal with every 
international organisation working on the crisis in Southeastern Europe. It represents, however, the 
administrative bodies most concerned according to the consulted documentation in German, Italian, US, and the 
League’s archives. 
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European primary producers as the basement, Germany and Italy comprising the main floor, 
and France, UK, US and all the other countries constituting the roof.763 Therefore, a solution 
to the ultimate problem, the plummeting prices of Southeastern Europe’s agricultural goods, 
seemed to the experts at the League barely possible without the involvement of Germany and 
Italy. The two countries with aspirations to revise the international post-war order recognised 
the means for political leverage that had fallen into their hands. Accordingly, they intensified 
their ambitions at the League, and their mutual relationship at the international organisation 
became closer. 
 
Figure 2: Surplus and deficit of grain (wheat, barley, maize) production in 1930 
 
Source: AA, ʻVerteilung der Aus- und Einfuhr der Südoststaaten’, PA-AA, R105.591. 
 
                                                 
763 AA to DG Bukarest, 31 Jan 33, PA-AA, R118.378. 
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Chapter 6: Political Revisionism and International Economic 
Rescue 
 
Introduction: Towards International Collaboration 
 
Chapter 5 demonstrated the increasingly parallel nature of the German and Italian reaction to 
the global trend. Italy maintained longer than Germany a certain degree of commercial 
openness towards the countries remaining on the gold standard, while eventually it also 
adapted a foreign economic policy exhibited by Germany. Both countries not only saw their 
commerce with their former major trading partner, the US, languishing, but also experienced 
rising political tensions with the international superpower over accusations of protectionism 
and discrimination. 
 Moreover, Germany and Italy shared a fascination for closer ties with Southeastern 
Europe. The intense interest derived from political as well as economic motives. Politically, 
the post-war reconstruction of borders in Southeastern Europe had created a map that was 
anathema to Berlin and Rome. In economic terms, the developing countries offered Germany 
and Italy much-needed raw materials and markets for their industrial surplus production. 
However, despite similar economic and political motives, Rome first adopted the strategy of 
using its import capabilities for political leverage – a strategy that is further investigated in 
Chapter 6. 
 While the political and economic projections in Germany and Italy grouped the 
countries of Southeastern Europe into a cluster, the countries themselves acted together. A 
crucial factor was the shared self-perception as crisis countries. As a result of the indeed harsh 
economic consequences of the crisis, they pooled their efforts and advanced their economic 
interest at the League of Nations. It is thus that the international organisation founded after 
World War I to guarantee international peace and stability became concerned with the 
economic crisis in Southeastern Europe. 
 Chapter 6 analyses in detail the League’s different initiatives to solve the crisis on 
behalf of Germany, Italy and the Southeastern European states, as well as their interrelations. 
In order to better understand the connections between the initiatives at the national policy 
level and in the international organisations, it is first observed who represented Rome and 
Berlin in Geneva. Afterwards, the analysis turns to the commercial instruments discussed as a 
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means to battle the crisis: customs unions and preferential agreements. The overarching 
question is how the institutions were constructed that were about to govern the triangular 
economic relationship between Germany and Italy in Southeastern Europe. 
 
1. Intensifying Contact at the International Organisation 
 
During the world economic crisis, Italy was solidly represented at the League. It was one of 
only four members (together with Britain, France and Japan) who had profited from ongoing 
committee membership. Its nationals were widely engaged in the various organisational units 
of the League, to the extent that the fascist element at the international organisation started to 
concern Britain. For instance, when the succession to the vacant chief post in the financial and 
economic sections was discussed in 1930, the Italian candidate Pietro Stoppani, who initially 
had good prospects, seemed politically unacceptable to London. Instead, a compromise was 
found in that the unit was split into a financial section, led by British economist Alexander 
Loveday, and an economic section, led by Stoppani.764 
 As the literature on Stoppani points out, the fear of fascist leanings of the Leagues’ top 
official was exaggerated. On the contrary, Stoppani repeatedly proved to be an adherent to the 
liberal US-trade policy established by Cordell Hull, and his initiatives to dismantle 
protectionist frameworks roused opposition in Berlin and Rome.765 And yet, a depiction of 
Stoppani as an internationalist counterpart to the Duce, whose loyalty was uniquely with the 
League, does not do justice to his complex agenda. Contrary to the League’s documentation, 
one can learn from the archives in Italy and Germany that Stoppani was especially concerned 
with the situation in Southeastern Europe, and maintained ongoing communication with the 
Italian government over the matter. His subordinate Alfred Husslein believed that Stoppani 
and the Italian government shared the conviction that in order to lift the countries out of the 
crisis, Germany and Italy had to be included in any possible initiative.766 Moreover, before 
Stoppani’s career leap to the top of the economic section, he travelled in 1930 to Berlin to 
meet officials of the RWM and the AA not only to discuss the upcoming Warsaw conference 
of the “agricultural bloc”, but also to recommend himself as a candidate for Berlin.767 
                                                 
764 See Clavin, Securing the world economy, p. 34. 
765 Cf. Clavin and Wessels, ʻTransnationalism and the Leagueʼ, p. 482. 
766 Dufour-Feronce (LON) to von Bülow (AA), 12 Mar 1932, PA-AA, R105.590. 
767 Husslein (LON) to AA, 23 Aug 1930, PA-AA, R118.418. 
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For other senior Italian officials at the League, the question of loyalty was less ambiguous.768 
Fulvio Suvich, under-secretary of state for the MAE, took the chair of the financial committee 
in 1932. As has already been mentioned in Part I, Suvich was involved in the construction of 
the bilateral German-Italian commercial relationship, but he was also the mastermind behind 
Fascist Italy’s policies concerning Austria and Southeastern Europe.769  His expertise and 
affiliations made him indispensable for both the international organisation and the fascist 
government. As a board member of the Austrian national bank he was an important expert for 
the League’s committee administering the internationally granted loans, but his affiliation to 
the League served also for the top MAE official to promote Italy’s ambitions for Southeastern 
Europe. 
 Furthermore, Giuseppe De Michelis held among several other affiliations at the 
international organisations 770  the position of president of the International Institute of 
Agriculture in Rome. Although the Institute was an independent institution (and had been 
founded already in 1905), its work was largely intertwined with the League’s tasks, and it 
benefited from permanent representation at the League’s conferences. Representation was 
often carried out by De Michelis.771 By this means, Rome was able to influence with a loyal 
supporter of fascism the work of the League in order to pursue Italian interests. For instance, 
in the midst of the world economic crisis, De Michelis propagated in discussions on reform 
paths the Italian corporativismo as an ideal form of economic constitution. Thereby, he was 
not unsuccessful in increasing the international reputation of Fascist Italy.772 His work in this 
regard was backed by the nearby Centro Internationale Di Studi Fascisti in Lausanne.773 
International reputation was in dire need because the world economic crisis weighed heavily 
on Italy as well. Mussolini, well aware of the fact, urged his first reluctant Foreign Minister 
                                                 
768 The US delegation preparing for the world economic conference in 1933 gave a vivid example of how Fascist 
Italy tried to keep a coherent stance at the international organisations. The US consul spotted one “young man 
from the Foreign Office” whose only task was to keep all the experts properly in line with Rome’s strategy. See 
Memorandum by the Consul at Basel, European Views on the Conference, 6 Oct 1932, FRUS, 1932 I. 
769 See Cuomo, ʻTrieste, l’Italiaʼ, p. 57; Cf. Suvich and Bianchi, Memorie, p. 79. 
770 De-Michelis was also a member of the Sub-Committee for Economic Co-ordination under the auspices of the 
CEEU. See LON, Directeur de la Section des Relations Economique to national governments, 17 Jun 1931, LON, 
R2909. 
771 AA, report on Grandi visit to Berlin, 24 Oct 1931, PA-AA, R105.641. Accordingly, the International Institute 
of Agriculture was notorious for its fascist leanings. See Clavin, Securing the world economy, p. 85. 
772 Kratel (Geneva) to AA, RWM, 1 Oct 1930, PA-AA, R118.419. According to Liebscher, certainly a lot more 
could be said on the cooperative propaganda of Fascist Italy at the international institutions. Although not 
explicitly dealing with the topic, her dissertation introduces an opening for discussion. See Liebscher, Freude 
und Arbeit, p. 111. 
773 LON to MAE, 28 Aug 1931, ASMAE, Fondo Società delle Nazioni, busta 98. 
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Dino Grandi (1929-32) to take the economic and financial pressure into account, and embrace 
a pro-League strategy.774 
Germany was accepted as a member of the League only in 1926, but soon after staffed 
its entitled posts with highly capable experts. Ernst Trendelenburg, state secretary for the 
RWM and the driving force behind Germany’s commercial contracts in the Great 
Depression,775 acceded to the economic committee. In November 1932, he was called to join 
the League’s secretariat as under-secretary general and was replaced with Hans Posse, head of 
the foreign trade department at the RWM. That Berlin delegated an equally competent, high-
level official to the League highlights that in spite of public criticism of the League’s 
efficiency, its work on economic and financial matters was considered important indeed.776 
This was explicitly demonstrated when in 1932, during the succession of the League’s 
secretary-general, Berlin and Rome held an informal meeting on how to reform the top 
governing level of the League. The AA stated that the potential successor Joseph Avenol was 
not in Germany’s interest, but it could nevertheless accept the French candidate, “if Germany 
were represented by an under-secretary-general who [...] would be the head of an influential 
department (economic- and financial section)”.777 
 Moreover, Paul A. Kempner, since 1922 a partner in the bank Mendelssohn & Co, was 
appointed German consul general in Geneva and member of the financial committee in 1932. 
In addition to his engagement in private banking and the League, he also joined meetings of 
Mitteleuropäischer Wirtschaftstag (MWT), the major lobby group promoting Germany’s 
commercial expansion into Southeastern Europe.778 Apart from the committees, the bustling 
Clemens Lammers joined the CEEU where he became a member of the more exclusive Sub-
Committee for Economic Co-ordination.779 That he was an influential representative of the 
German industry, with affiliations in the boards of the chemical giant IG Farben and the 
central lobby group RDI, illustrates, together with the appointment of Kempner, that 
                                                 
774 See Scarano, Mussolini e la Reppublica di Weimar, p. 245; Torunsky, Entente der Revisionisten, p. 223. 
775 For Trendelenburg, Germany’s commercial contracts had to serve simultaneously German interest as, “pure 
foreign policy, economic policy and financial policy”. He argued that the “greatest potential for friction” was in 
differentiating “economic and foreign policy interests”. Quoted in Spaulding, Osthandel and Ostpolitik, p. 111. 
776 DK Genf to AA, 15 Nov 1932, PA-AA, R118.462. 
777 AA to DB Rom, 17 Aug 1932, PA-AA, Rom-Quirinal 802A. Mussolini declared with regard to the succession 
that he “attaches special importance to proceed in conjunction with Germany“. However, the Duce’s reassurance 
could not entirely convince in the AA. Because of the recent conflict over foreign exchange and quotas in the 
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with the United Kingdom). See DB Rom to AA, 21 Sep 1932, PA-AA, Rom-Quirinal 802A. 
778 ‘Präsidialsitzung des Mitteleuropäischen Wirtschaftstages’, 28 Nov 1935, PA-AA, R105.360. 
779 LON, Directeur de la Section des Relations Economique to national gouvernements, 17 Jun 1931, LON, 
R2909. 
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Germany’s corporate world acknowledged the importance of the League’s economic and 
financial work. 
As for the financial and economic sections, the German representation lagged far 
behind. This was particularly regrettable as with these sections, “the League of Nations 
developed a distinct and increasing influence”, according to Kempner’s evaluation. The 
already-mentioned economic section member Alfred Husslein was praised as highly skilful, 
but his sphere of influence was limited to economic-theoretical work. Kempner was especially 
upset with the financial section which “resembles an English-French club with a few neutral 
members”. Not a single German official was among the members of the section. 780  To 
advance German interest at the international organisations support was very much needed. 
 The initiative for a closer German-Italian co-ordination was taken up in autumn 1930 
over the claim of the Southeastern European states to fight the economic and financial crisis 
with preferential treatment of their agricultural products. The League accepted the plea at the 
“Second International Conference with a View to Concerted Economic Action” in November 
1930.781 A committee was formed to develop strict criteria for the acceptance of preferential 
regimes, as they would alter the MFN clause, the fundamental principle of international 
commerce, which the League intended to keep. Under its Chairman and Swiss delegate to the 
League, Walter Stucki, the “Stucki-Committee” elaborated that preferences should be 
legitimate if they are limited in time, only intended to stabilise prices, that is, not to increase 
production, and most importantly, receive acceptance by all the international trading partners 
possessing MFN-status in the countries establishing a preferential system.782 
 The idea was immediately and eagerly taken up by Berlin, much to the regret of its 
political opponents. The Polish government, very active in formulating a common position of 
the region’s “small” countries, pointed out the antagonism between the “Warsaw” and the 
“German conception” to organise the European economy. Berlin pushed the argument at the 
CEEU that a preferential system including only the primary producers makes economically 
little sense and that economies with a large deficit in agricultural production (such as 
Germany) had to be included. 783  In addition, the German government reassured the 
                                                 
780 Kempner to AA, 19 Aug 1932, PA-AA, R118.482. 
781 AA, ‘Aufzeichnung 2. Konferenz für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit in Genf’, 17-26 Nov 1930, PA-AA, 
Rom-Quirinal 946a. 
782 The Stucki-report became one of the most widely used documents by German representatives to legitimise 
preferential access of Southeastern Europe’s grain to the German market. Cf., for instance, AA, ʻAufzeichnung 
zur Präferenzfrage’, 1 Apr 1932, PA-AA, R106.131. 
783 CEEU, ʻRéunion pour l’Ecoulement des Stocks de céréales de 1930’, 23 Feb 1931, LON, C.E.U.E., vol. 281. 
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agricultural countries that it was just supporting their request at the various League bodies 
working on the matter. Nevertheless, this support was granted on two conditions, which were 
“obvious” for Berlin. First, Germany’s commercial relations with other markets would not be 
harmed, and second, the agricultural countries suggest “reciprocal concessions” granted to 
Germany’s industrial export.784 
 The AA and the RWM admitted that there was a political agenda behind the economic 
rescue plan. The two crucial authorities reckoned that, “those countries, which gain increasing 
economic importance as sales areas for the Southeastern States, must for the same reason gain 
increasing political weight, and this would imply that the political weight of Germany, and of 
Italy too if it joins as a sales market, increases in Europe”.785 Posse claimed that the German 
government’s two major foreign economic goals in Southeastern Europe were firstly, a trade 
surplus as high as possible to meet Germany’s liabilities and the challenge of mass 
unemployment, and second, to prevent “encirclements by the construction of European blocs”. 
To tackle the latter all that was necessary was to demonstrate that, “the German Reich in spite 
of its financial and economic weakness is not willing to neglect its power as a sales 
market”.786 Of course, this agenda was not publicly stated, and Berlin instructed its embassies 
in Central and Southeastern Europe to avoid giving the impression that the conception 
differed from the plans developed by the agrarian export countries.787 
 However, at the same time Pierre-Étienne Flandin, French minister of commerce and 
industry, travelled the capitals of Southeastern Europe to promote his alternative plan for 
economic recovery. Basically, his plan replaced the envisaged preferential import tariffs with 
import quotas for agricultural products. Extension of credit was an essential part of his plan, 
and he hoped that greater financial capabilities would allow Southeastern European primary 
producers to support agricultural sales, the construction of storage facilities and the purchase 
of agricultural machines. The French plan, therefore, prescribed an extension of credit as a 
first cure against the crisis, whereas the plan of the affected countries and Germany foresaw a 
stimulation of trade in the first place, with financial recovery ideally to follow. Technically, a 
combination of both approaches, with the financially strong France supporting financial 
stability, and Germany, as the biggest importer of the region, granting new export 
opportunities, could have been the ideal remedy. But Berlin scented “the French intention [...] 
                                                 
784 AA to various embassies in Northeastern and Southeastern Europe, 9 Oct 1930, PA-AA, Rom-Quirinal 946a. 
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to hinder a solution of the problem which would open Germany greater possibilities for 
industrial sales in Southeastern Europe than France”, and therefore showed only “strongly 
reduced” interest in the Flandin-plan.788 
To keep the plan for agricultural preferences alive, Berlin needed more allies. The 
main agricultural deficit countries in neighbouring Europe, Italy and Austria, ranked highly as 
potential candidates. Italy seemed especially approachable because on the eleventh session of 
the League’s General Assembly (10 September-4 October 1930) its representatives had 
signalled their intention not to agree with a bloc formed only by the Southeastern European 
countries in crisis while excluding major European powers. As in the German argumentation, 
no solution was expected from a mere extension of foreign loans, and the “decisive word” had 
to belong to the neighbouring importing countries. 789  The possibility to co-operate with 
Germany in dealing with the crisis in the “periphery” was according to the German embassy 
in Rome “congenially welcomed”.790 
 However, in a meeting between Karl Ritter and Giuseppe De Michelis in connection 
with the Assembly, unforeseen difficulties arose. The head of the commercial department of 
the AA suggested to Rome’s extended arm at the League that Italy should conclude 
commercial contracts on a preferential basis with Romania and Yugoslavia. De Michelis 
evaluated rather sceptically the project’s feasibility. He assumed that the countries granting 
preferential treatment to only a few select trading partners would need to rely on exceptions to 
the MFN clause. In the case of his own country, De Michelis feared retaliations by Italy’s 
other trading partners deprived of their MFN status in Italy. Given De Michelis’ reluctance, 
the matter was adjourned to the next conference under the auspices of the League.791 
 The failed attempt to convince Italy on commercial preferences caused irritation in 
Berlin as well as the Roman embassy, and it was put into question if the “francophile” De 
Michelis was a “suitable middleman” to develop a common German-Italian position. Since it 
could hardly be expected that he “responded to German wishes” 792 , the AA suggested 
involving Angelo Di Nola, Italian delegate to the economic committee, who actively 
advocated a joint action.793  In fact, the co-operation between Di Nola and Posse at the 
economic committee helped to keep the matter on the agenda, but the meeting at the 
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economic conference in Geneva in November 1930 still ended in disappointment. The MAE 
had sent the head of its commercial department, Bonifacio Ciancarelli, who proved to be 
“very reserved if not to say negative“ regarding preferential treatments. Accordingly, 
throughout the conference the German delegation reported disruptive behaviour, especially by 
De Michelis. It was deplored that he not only stayed away from the official workshops of the 
conference, he also missed the simultaneous German-Italian bilateral meetings. Moreover, 
with his carping and reckless rejection of agricultural preferences, he disavowed other Italian 
speakers, who expressed more nuanced positions.794 
 Certainly, Berlin acknowledged the threat of overseas retaliation caused by European 
preferences, but it raised doubts as to this being the only explanation for Italian hesitance. The 
MAE had argued that only informing Italy’s major trading partners in the Americas 
(especially Argentina and the US) about the intention to establish a European preferential 
system would provoke the introduction of a similar system on the American continent, which 
would harm Italy’s vital commercial interest. Italian aloofness for the German plan, however, 
seemed not only to build on concerns for overseas markets, but also on mistrust. Ciancarelli 
voiced at the League’s Assembly (November 1930) the suspicion that, “Germany conducts at 
least a feint action”.795 To Ernst Eisenlohr, present in Geneva as an AA delegate, the fear of 
overseas retaliation was only pleaded. In fact, Italy opposed the German plan, which also 
foresaw a preferential treatment of Yugoslavian grain, because it would strengthen the 
bargaining power of a country that was a very important trading partner and the central target 
of revisionist claims of Fascist Italy.796 
 The stalled initiative to co-ordinate a joint action demonstrates the amount of mistrust 
prevailing in Italian government circles vis-à-vis the German economic plans for Southeastern 
Europe. This assessment weighs even more heavily when looking at other, more political 
issues concerning Southeastern Europe where German-Italian co-ordination at the League 
worked fairly well. In reporting from the League’s session of January 1931, the Italian press 
praised the successful delegation, which had released the fascist country from international 
isolation and advanced it to the ever-desired status as a “grande Potenza” in Europe.797 The 
Italian delegation had earned respect for arbitrating the situation of the German-speaking 
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minority group in Upper Silesia, which became part of Poland in accordance with the peace 
treaties following World War I.798 Moreover, in the preparation of the disarmament conference, 
Italian Foreign Minister Dino Grandi worked closely together with his German colleague 
Julius Curtius. They achieved that the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš, who 
was running with French backing for the position as head of the conference, had to give up his 
ambitions. While in this manoeuvre Grandi was still annoyed about Curtius restraint, which 
had culminated in the “strange suggestion” to leave the “honour to fight the candidacy of 
Benes” to Italy,799 a simultaneous joint action at the CEEU proved to be a breakthrough. 
  The institution, which engaged in the design of a new economic order for Europe, 
entered in January 1931 into controversy about the accession of new members. Grandi and 
Curtius backed an invitation of Russia and Turkey to join the CEEU as full members.800 
Yugoslavia and Romania immediately opposed the idea, and received support from the 
founding father of the commission, Aristide Briand. Nevertheless, Britain joined the ranks of 
the German-Italian front, thus tipping the scales for the revisionist powers.801 Grandi hailed 
the success of his request, which was hoped to “considerably reduce the primitive pan-
European programme”. According to Grandi, France has “felt seriously threatened in its 
European policy at Geneva by Italy”, and for the first time Italy had “forced Germany to dare” 
acting against France.802 In view of the common future, Grandi rhapsodised that “we have 
driven a nail into the wall, on which we can attach many things”.803 
 German Foreign Minister Curtius shared Grandi’s victorious mood. However, he also 
directed his colleague to an article in Il Popolo di Roma speaking of “unlimited co-
operation”,804 and added that it was in both countries interest not to appear as overly close 
allies and that co-operation could for the time being “not go further than the questions of 
common interest at the League of Nations”. 805  The celebrated convergence of interest, 
however, did not last very long, and in March 1931 Rome discovered that its designated 
partner for an international action against France had been discreetly pursued a plan, which 
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put its own goals for Southeastern Europe under existential threat: the plan for a German-
Austrian customs union.806 
 
 2. Customs Unions – A Political Response to Economic Crisis 
 
Austria was the launching pad of every country’s economic endeavour in Southeastern Europe 
during the interwar period. 807  Together with Czechoslovakia, Austria was the most 
industrialised country among the successor states of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. Its 
businesses nurtured close economic ties with the region, and the banks worked as 
intermediaries of credit between the financial centres of the West and the debtors of the 
region.808 Although the main protagonists of the project had held informal meetings dating 
back to 1927, strictly secret preparations accelerated with the outbreak of the crisis. The 
economic situation of Austria was especially grim, and the League stated that it was “bound to 
suffer more than any other country from the slump in trade between European States, who are 
forced by the economic crisis to withdraw into themselves”.809 In 1930, Hans Posse, one of 
the major supporters of the union, demonstrated the relevance of the project when he averred 
that, “making headway in the Central European area [...] seems to me to be at the moment 
Germany’s chief problem in economic policy.”810 Posse’s words indicate that already at the 
planning stage, the focus was beyond Austria and clearly concentrated on a large-scale 
German economic expansion into the region. 
 In order to prepare the implementation of the plan for the foreseeable storms of 
international opposition, the German government tried to focus the League’s discussion on the 
economic advantages of customs unions as a means against the crisis. Already in autumn 1930 
– when the publication of the German-Austrian project was still half a year away – Foreign 
Minister Julius Curtius spoke in front of the eleventh General Assembly about the 
“uneconomical situation” that some countries possess money and capital in abundance 
without the possibility to stimulate economic activities across borders. While customs unions 
in general were described as a solution to this problem, Curtius referred to his Austrian 
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colleague Johannes Schober, who had argued to start first with regional customs unions 
uniting economically less distinct countries.811 
Despite the precautionary manoeuvres at the League, the news of the German-Austrian 
plan, which in March 1931 leaked out to the public even before the scheduled proclamation at 
the CEEU, landed like a bombshell.812 The impact in Italy was so strong that the German 
admirers of the Duce feared long-term damage to the German-Italian relationship. Reich 
Chancellor Brüning had pursued the project for domestic political purposes as well. His 
minority government relied on the small, right-wing parties, and with the customs union 
Brüning intended to offer them a concession to their nationalistic claim on the smaller 
German-speaking state. However, the most extremist among the nationalistic movements, the 
NSDAP, showed no enthusiasm for the customs union. On the contrary, Giuseppe Renzetti 
reported that Hitler and other members of the NSDAP were outraged by the “bestial way” in 
which the government fished for voters among the nationalists. Hitler denied that either 
Germany or Austria would derive benefits from the customs union because “one does not 
sharpen a sword by uniting two which do not cut”. Instead, Germany should incorporate other, 
more suitable, countries within the customs union like Britain and Italy. Hitler warned against 
the Southeastern European direction of the customs union, and suggested that Germany 
should loosen its interest in this region in order not to risk rivalries with Fascist Italy under the 
admired Mussolini.813 
 South of the Alps, the proclamation of the customs union provoked immediate 
reactions. On 11 April 1931, an inter-ministerial commission was formed including 
government officials of the ministries of foreign affairs, corporations, agriculture and finance. 
Guido Jung, head of INE and Italy’s future finance minister, as well as Giuseppe De Michelis 
took the lead. The commission intended to clarify the consequences for the Italian economy of, 
firstly, a “small” customs union including only Germany and Austria; secondly, an Italian 
accession to this customs union; and lastly, of a wider union taking in Southeastern European 
countries. The outlook was all but gloomy. Already the “small” customs union was expected 
to be a significant threat to Italy’s economic interest. According to the INE, more than half of 
Italy’s total export to both countries was at stake due to their potential substitution by German 
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or Austrian goods.814 In addition, further threats would occur from the harmonisation of tariff 
rates within the customs union, and the subsequent renegotiation of commercial treaties with 
Italy, in which it would face a negotiation partner backed with the bargaining chip of an even 
larger common market.815 
There were very few arguments that put forward advantages for Italy’s trade relations. 
De Michelis argued in a study on the customs union shortly after the inter-ministerial meeting 
that it was not to be taken for granted that the renegotiation of commercial treaties would 
inevitably worsen Italy’s conditions.816 Instead, he imagined that the union, in all probability 
facing heavy international opposition, had a strong interest in being recognised by one of the 
major European powers, and this trump card could help Italy in turning to its benefit the 
renegotiation of commercial contracts.817 
 The second option, Italy’s accession to the customs union, offered according to the 
ministerial commission only very few benefits, if any at all. With regard to exports, some 
Italian goods were already not dutiable, as in the case of raw materials, or faced only small 
duty rates, as in the case of its major export article: agricultural goods. On the import side, in 
turn, Italy would need to tear down its “heavily protective” tariff barriers around its industrial 
production, thus risking that the German export of finished products, which already made up 
more than half of imported products, would have a free hand to gain market domination.818 
Ultimately, De Michelis feared, this would transform Italy into a “subsidiary economy” of 
Germany.819 
 Lastly, the third option, a “large” customs union uniting Germany and Austria with the 
states of Southeastern Europe and beyond, was considered by all Italian experts as nothing but 
great damage to Italy’s foreign economic interest. The danger was twofold. Italy’s industrial 
exports to Southeastern Europe could lose their competitiveness and its vital agricultural 
exports to Germany and Austria be squeezed out by cheaper products from the region.820 The 
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Banca d’Italia collected estimations of every Italian good exported to its best client Germany, 
and how it would stand the new competition by customs-free products from Southeastern 
Europe. The anticipated consequences were very serious. 821  In order to prevent this, an 
immediate reaction was deemed necessary. It seemed obvious that the established economic 
foreign policy of commercial contracts and financial investments faced clear limitations when 
it had to separate Southeastern European countries from the German-Austrian union. If Italy 
wanted to compete with such an initiative, the inter-ministerial commission proposed to the 
Italian government to undertake vigorous steps and to construct an “accurate and suitable 
customs union” itself.822 
 However, the ideal geographical range of such a counter-strike proved to be a matter 
of discussion. The question was whether Italy should strive for a customs union with all or 
only a few of the Southeastern European countries. In Romania, Virgil Madgearu, an 
influential economist and left-wing politician, dropped a hint that it would be interesting for 
Romania to become part of a customs union with Italy and Yugoslavia.823 But the Italian 
government was undecided on how to react to this suggested coalition, as it feared political 
resistance by other European powers. Yugoslavia, too, was undecided. The German-Austrian 
project was considered a threat to Yugoslavian interest as it “would definitely clear paths for 
Germany towards the East”.824 As well, Belgrade showed scepticism not only towards the 
Romanian suggestion, but also to the general idea of a customs union, as it expected that a 
union between an industrial economy and a producer of raw materials and agricultural goods 
was not beneficial for the latter in as much as it would predetermine the balance of trade and 
hinder development efforts.825 
 Given the resistance, a direct confrontation with the German expansion into 
Southeastern Europe would surely encounter, De Michelis developed a plan for an alternative, 
more feasible project: an Italian-French customs union. He argued that the French market 
would offer Italy better access to badly needed raw materials, less competition in industrial 
production and prospects for capital investment. Nonetheless, the French market was not even 
close to offering the same export opportunities for agricultural commodities as the German 
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market. Therefore, Di Michelis’ argumentation could not disguise the character of the Italian-
French customs union as a political counter-strike to the formation of the German-Austrian 
customs union, which hardly complied with Italy’s established commercial orientation. In the 
background, the German market and its ties with the Italian economy always loomed, for 
instance, when De Michelis argued that a common Italian-French market would be big 
enough to force Germany to improve conditions for imports from Italy.826 
The argument that the single market created by a customs union offered greater 
bargaining power was also brought forward in contemporary German research literature 
discussing the rise of European Großwirtschaftsräume (greater economic areas). In the 
description of the Italian Großwirtschaftsraum, which was considered as under construction 
mainly in the Middle East and the “Danube area”, Krüger argued that Italy would act “short-
sightedly” if it “helped to defraud the German-Austrian customs union”. It would be through a 
strong German economy only that the markets of Romania and Hungary could be opened up 
as well to Italy’s foreign trade. Even more, Italy could benefit not only from better market 
access in Southeastern Europe, but also from an extension of trade with Ukraine and the 
Caucasus. Otherwise, an “almighty Kremlin can still lead a weak Germany and Italy by the 
nose”.827 
 While economic theorising suggested that an accession would be in Rome’s interest, 
according to professionals governing Germany’s foreign trade it was not appropriate to 
include Italy in the customs union. A representative of the Banca d’Italia in Germany reported 
that Carl Duisberg, head of the chemical giant IG Farben, argued strongly in favour of 
including France in the customs union thus expressing a popular view among German 
industrialists, which – in stark contrast to agricultural interest groups – were very fond of the 
customs union.828  Whereas it seems that to German industrialists Italy’s accession to the 
customs union played no big role, it was explicitly rejected by government trade experts. 
When Richard Schüller, head of the commercial department at the Austrian foreign 
ministry,829  made the suggestion to remove all the customs barriers between Austria and 
Italy, 830  his German colleague Karl Ritter argued that customs difficulties would surely 
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outweigh the opportunity to “win Italy for Geneva” (that is, the League of Nations), and 
ultimately put the entire project at risk. Moreover, Italy was considered inapt for the union for 
a variety of reasons, not economic ones alone. Ritter’s remark, that the “domestic and 
parliamentary” goals of the customs union could hardly be achieved together with Italy, 
unveiled a political agenda – emphatically denied on the public stage – which aimed at the 
Anschluss of Austria.831 
 In the end, it was due to the deterioration of the economic crisis following the collapse 
of the Creditanstalt and a joint European action that the project of the German-Austrian 
customs union failed. Berlin had sought to use the CEEU as a platform to defend the customs 
union by emphasising its purely economic character. 832  The institution was strategically 
selected because the economic experts at the CEEU repeatedly argued that a single European 
market created with a customs union would be the ultimate weapon against the crisis.833 Yet, 
to the opponents of the project, the economic argumentation was nothing but window dressing. 
The governments of Britain, France, Czechoslovakia and Italy subscribed to a petition of the 
League’s council, which requested a legal analysis by the Permanent Court of International 
Justice.834 For the League as guarantor of an international order, the essential question was 
whether or not the customs union violated Austria’s obligations under international law. Italy’s 
Foreign Minister Grandi asserted at the League’s Council that, “it is difficult to distinguish 
between economic and political questions”, thus rejecting the argument urged by the signatory 
states.835  In addition, while legal examination was under way, France also used financial 
diplomacy to put the Austrian government under pressure as Vienna was in the aggravating 
economic crisis strongly dependent on foreign loans. Both attempts were successful, thus 
turning the project into a “complete failure”.836 
 Germany’s reputation was seriously damaged, not only on the international level, 
where desperately needed loans dried up,837 but also in its relationship with Fascist Italy. For 
Grandi, the German venture had jeopardised “the fertile beginnings of a collaboration, which 
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the Italian government holds possible and useful for both countries”.838 Also in Germany, 
Italy’s support for the petition at the international court caused anger. The German 
representative denounced the argumentation of the Italian appellant Scialoja as clear proof 
that the request for legal examination was nothing but a political manoeuvre.839 
 However, in spite of these disruptions, attempts at co-operation did not break down 
entirely. What kept them alive was certainly a shared opposition to the French influence in 
Southeastern Europe and, therewith functionally linked, a common goal for their work in the 
League’s organisations fighting the economic crisis. Ambassador Schubert argued that it was 
in Germany’s hands “to clear the shadow between Germany and Italy”. 840  When Reich 
Chancellor Brüning was given instructions for his voyage to Rome in August 1931, the 
customs union and the subsequent irritation had top priority. The official version read that the 
project had neither aimed at the political accession of Austria, nor prepared a commercial 
expansion into Southeastern Europe, which would harm Italian economic interest.841 
 Nevertheless, the customs union left a legacy of mistrust on the co-ordination over 
Southeastern Europe. The German embassy, for instance, reported in spring 1931 that Rome 
was preparing discretely its own version of a regional economic pact, which certainly had 
been boosted by the attempted customs union. While to Schubert, many of the details were 
unclear, he reported that the project generally foresaw trade stimulating measures between 
Italy, Austria and Hungary. He reassured the AA that it was not directed against Germany, but 
counteracted the French influence in the region.842 His assessment was not quite adequate. 
 Simultaneously, an inter-ministerial reunion led by Dino Grandi united the “who’s 
who” of Italy’s foreign economic policy making to discuss an appropriate initiative. Grandi 
asked the experts to, “formulate an economic bloc which counterbalances the one 
contemplated by Germany”. De Michelis argued to conclude contracts with Austria and 
Hungary as quickly as possible, and Giuseppe Bottai, minister of corporations, suggested 
including Yugoslavia for the sake of the Italian industry. Overall, the Italian industry was 
given utmost importance in the formulation of the project, because Bonifacio Ciancarelli 
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(MAE) insisted that he first consult the Confederazione Nazionale delle Industrie before 
initiating negotiations.843 
 Rome’s attentive, yet suspicious appraisal of Germany’s plans for Southeastern Europe 
continued when Berlin launched a new initiative for international assistance to Southeastern 
European economies in the summer of 1931. This time, international reservation and 
opposition should be prevented by carefully anticipating any argument against the project. 
The League’s economic and financial organisations and the CEEU, whose initiatives for 
economic rapprochement had largely stalled, seemed to offer the opportunity to transform a 
German plan into an international plan. Italy, with its similar economic interest in 
Southeastern Europe and a prominent representation at the international organisations, was 
the given ally for this manoeuvre. 
 
3. Second Effort: Commercial Preferences 
 
While the prospects of the German-Austrian customs union worsened, Germany concluded 
commercial contracts with Romania (27 June 1931) and Hungary (18 July 1931), establishing 
preferential treatment of certain commercial goods. 844  In order to achieve international 
acceptance, the contracts tried to deviate as little as possible from the most-favoured-nation 
clause. Romania was granted a 50 per cent reduction of customs duties for its barley exports 
and a 60 per cent reduction for maize. The importance of these two commodities is 
highlighted by the fact that barley and maize exports made up roughly 80 per cent of 
Romania’s total exports, with Germany buying up to 70 per cent of Romania’s barley and 30 
per cent of its maize. Berlin chose these two commodities not only because of domestic 
demand. As there were very few countries with a considerable interest in barley and maize 
exports to Germany, Berlin reckoned that for these commodities the exception to the MFN 
clause would be regarded by its other trading partners with “benevolent neutrality”.845 
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Slightly different was the preferential treatment granted to Hungary. It reduced customs duties 
for Hungarian wheat by 35 per cent.846 Unlike barley and maize, Germany’s import of wheat 
did not come almost completely from Southeastern European countries. As Table 9 shows, it 
came mainly from overseas. Therefore, the wheat preference not only bore the potential to 
significantly change Germany’s foreign trade, but also to cause opposition by major overseas 
trading partners enjoying MFN status. In addition, Berlin inserted in the German-Hungarian 
contract its intention to grant preferences on wheat to Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as 
well. Apart from this Southeastern European group, other countries were explicitly excluded 
from the possibility of asking for preferential treatment for their exports to Germany.847 
 
 Table 9: Germany’s wheat import 1928-1930 
 1928  1929  1930  
From: Tons (%) Tons (%) Tons (%) 
Romania 4,213 0.1 11,070 0.4 24,200 2 
Yugoslavia 3,034 0.1 6,227 0.3 7,790 0.6 
Hungary 892 - 29,857 1.4 19,647 1.6 
Argentina 766,975 30 967,300 48 335,420 30 
US 499,012 20 230,230 11 180,850 16.5 
Source: AA to various embassies, 6 Aug 1931, PA-AA, R118.374. 
 
Of course, the offer to help the countries in crisis did not come without a call for 
reward. Both commercial contracts established that Romania and Hungary lowered a 
“considerable amount of [...] industrial tariffs”. 848  In the Hungarian case, especially 
machinery exports potentially profited from lower customs duties. In order to prevent likely 
opposition from other states with industrial export interest in Southeastern Europe, the 
lowered tariff rates were not only granted to Germany, but to all states that had MFN status in 
Romania and Hungary. Therefore, the reward was, strictly speaking, no preferential treatment 
of Germany’s industrial exports, but rather a general reduction of customs duties. Moreover, 
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in order to comply with the League’s requirements for preferences (laid out in the Stucki 
report), the contracts applied only for two years. The limited period should assure the 
international community that the German contracts did not represent a permanent deviation 
from the MFN clause, but only a legally and temporarily confined exception in order to tackle 
the worst consequences of the world economic crisis.849 
With these precautions carefully built into the contracts, Berlin, Bucharest and 
Budapest set up a road map to seek international acceptance. They agreed to submit the 
contracts first to the “Co-ordination Sub-Committee on Economic Questions” of the CEEU. 
Through the Sub-Committee, the matter should be forwarded to the highest decision level of 
the CEEU. Finally, the CEEU should recommend the matter for decision at the twelfth 
Assembly of the League (7-29 September 1931).850 Even though the contracts were quite 
limited in scope, the AA urged the German representatives at the international organisation to 
display them as the first stage of an act of European solidarity,851 which would eventually lead 
to a “single European market”.852 In addition, the German government attempted to back the 
initiative at the international organisations by approaching the other potential big European 
importer of grain from Southeastern Europe: Fascist Italy. 
 Shortly before the meeting of the Sub-Committee in late August 1931, Italian Finance 
Minister Jung met in Berlin Economics Minister Ernst Trendelenburg, Karl Ritter from the 
AA and Clemens Lammers, representative of the German industry (RDI) and German 
delegate to CEEU’s Sub-Committee of Economic Experts. 853  Lammers, who almost 
singlehandedly led the discussion, stated that immediate action in the crisis-shaken region was 
needed, and that the interests of Italy and Germany could correspond.854 To find a way out of 
the crisis, he was convinced that some sort of economic-geographic reshaping of the region 
was inevitable. This statement made Jung suspicious because it seemed to him that the idea of 
a German-Austrian customs union, whose realisation had just failed not least because of 
Italy’s opposition, was still alive in Lammers’ thinking. Lammers tried to dispel these qualms 
by embedding the instrument of the customs union into a broader European context. He called 
on the reunion to refraim from condemning the instrument in general, but to judge each 
version of a customs union on the basis of the degree to which it would stimulate Europe’s 
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growth. Nonetheless, his argument could not convince Jung entirely. He mentioned with 
doubt Lammers’ tight-lipped and evasive response to his question of what the members of a 
customs union could do to protect the “vitality of particular branches of industry, which 
secured political independence” of a member state.855 
The second instrument suggested for the economic reshaping of the region, 
preferential treaties, was relatively less contaminated with mistrust. Jung expected that this 
instrument would also be able to support Italy’s exports to Romania, where it faced heavy 
competition. The Italian adoption of preferential regimes was strongly supported by Lammers 
and Ritter, but this was not meant as an altruistic move to share the markets of Southeastern 
Europe. Firstly, Lammers articulated that Italy’s given markets would lie in the “Near East” 
(thereby implying not to implement them in European countries belonging to the German area 
of interest). Secondly, Jung estimated that Germany was in the primarily seeking potential 
allies to support the international acceptance of its preferential contracts. 
Jung considered it a cunning plan that Berlin granted preferential treatment for 
agricultural imports, while only asking in return for lower tariffs for every state possessing 
MFN status. The German industry had undergone massive rationalisation throughout the 
1920s, a move that had significantly cut the costs of German goods. Consequently, Jung 
estimated that the German industry could be assured of its competitiveness, and become the 
greatest beneficiary once customs duties went down, even without asking for exclusive 
preferential treatment in Southeastern Europe. The Italian finance minister was not alone in 
his assessment. The New York Times wrote in an article on the preferences for Hungarian 
wheat that Germany is “apparently confident of her ability, on account of her proximity and 
the good-will she will enjoy, to compete with any other manufacturing nation in the 
Hungarian market”.856 
 Jung certainly favoured the instrument of preferential regimes over customs unions. 
However, a system of open preferences to be acknowledged by all MFN parties still appeared 
risky for Italy. Especially from Argentina, Italy’s major grain supplier and favourite market 
for Italian foreign investment, Jung feared retaliation in the form of commercial preferences 
between Argentina and the US.857 Given the Italian concerns about overseas markets irritation, 
it was clear to the AA that Rome was far from unbridled in its enthusiasm for the preferences. 
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Yet, it still considered Italian opposition as unlikely because the contracts Germany concluded 
with Romania and Hungary left Italian foreign economic interest relatively untouched.858 This 
evaluation turned out to be true when Italy openly backed the contracts in Geneva.859 
The CEEU’s Sub-Committee on Economic Questions took up the matter at its meeting 
starting 31 August 1931. In monitoring the recent international development, the Sub-
Committee observed that there were actually three types of preferential systems currently 
under way. The first was the reduction of tariffs as foreseen in the contracts between Germany 
and Romania as well as Hungary. The second preferential system was detected in the 
contracts France had concluded recently with Hungary and Yugoslavia which foresaw the 
partial refund of tariff duties. Finally, the third preferential system was currently in the making 
between Italy, Austria and Hungary.860 After comparing the three preferential systems the 
Sub-Committee stated that, “the agreement between Germany and Romania, already 
concluded, appeared to embody as completely as possible the conditions in regard to principle 
and the practical conditions recommended by the Committee on Cereals“, which had initiated 
the League’s support for preferential treatment. Therefore it would “constitute a model 
agreement” in the view of the organisation in search of a pan-European economy.861 
 While the German plan gained wide acceptance as best practice, it also faced 
opposition. The Czechoslovakian representative demanded preferences from Germany also 
for his country’s barley exports, given that the commodity was regularly traded between the 
two countries. The Turkish representative, furthermore, argued that the restriction on a few 
types of grain was unfair and that his country’s agricultural export (e.g. tobacco, raisins) 
should receive preferential treatment too.862 Perhaps the stiffest opposition came from the 
USSR. Its representative argued that the USSR would constitute together with the Danube 
countries an entity which, “is now being artificially split up into two groups, one of which, 
consisting of all European countries [...] to be given preferential treatment, and the other, 
consisting only of the USSR, to be deprived of this advantage“. The CEEU was accused of 
having “geographical leanings and would seem to desire to change the map of Europe”. More 
to the point, the contracts were bluntly called an “economic war”.863 
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Nevertheless, at this point the German development of preferential contracts in accordance 
with the requirements of the League paid off. The pleas were turned down by several 
members of the Sub-Committee, who argued that none of the three was among the signatory 
states that had initiated the request for preferential treatment at the League. In the case of 
Czechoslovakia, Berlin could refer to the League’s “Stucki Report", which associated 
Czechoslovakia with the countries having import requirements of grain (like Germany and 
Italy).864 With regard to the Turkish claim, for the time being no other agricultural goods were 
considered for preferential treatment. As a first success for Germany, the Sub-Committee 
agreed to accept a statement prepared by Berlin’s extended arm at the international 
organisation, Hans Posse, which acknowledged the preferential contracts, and requested a 
decision from the plenary CEEU.865 
 Within the same month, the preferential contracts successfully completed the 
institutional procedures. Both the CEEU and the Assembly of the League acknowledged that 
they complied with the principles laid out by the League of Nations,866 and represented an 
instrument to reach – as the British government put it – “the ultimate goal […], the widest 
possible collaboration of the nations of Europe in the sense of making Europe a single 
market”.867 The positive judgment of the international organisations at hand, Berlin, Bucharest 
and Budapest planned to set the preferential contracts into force by 15 November 1931.868 
However, some countries outside Europe, quite relevant for the German export, started to 
combat the initiative in spite of the blessing it had received from the international organisation: 
Argentina and the US. 
 Buenos Aires from the beginning had expressed discomfort with the German plan to 
buy more wheat from other countries. Ritter (AA) had tried to quell the qualms by reassuring 
the Argentinian government that Germany would continue to import wheat from the Amerikas. 
Overall, he tried to talk down the German advantages and draw a heroic picture of Germany 
being the first to accept the sacrifice suggested by the international organisation to help the 
European and ultimately, the international economy. The effort Ritter put into this statement 
made sense, as he was aware that continuing opposition to an important trading partner with 
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MFN status could bring an end to the “relief action”.869 Italian Foreign Minister Dino Grandi 
hinted that Argentina would most likely stop opposing the initiative if the preferences were 
just labelled as quotas. However, for the German government this seemed neither technically 
suitable,870 nor would it correspond to the League’s rules for a deviation from the MFN clause. 
The US, in contrast, had long waited to comment on the preferential contracts, which 
had led some actors in Europe’s capitals to believe that it could eventually grant approval. The 
contrary occurred. The State Department made it clear that it would not accept a preferential 
regime linking only a few European countries. It would, however, reconsider its rejection in 
case the preferences for Southeastern Europe would be part of a larger Pan-European 
solution.871 
 Given the international resistance, frustration about the stalled initiative abounded in 
European capitals. Suggestions reached Berlin on how to react from Romania, but also from 
Yugoslavia, though as yet it did not have a preferential contract with Germanyt. Similar to the 
Italian suggestion, Bucharest and Belgrade argued to re-brand the preferences, for instance, by 
just calling them quotas. Yugoslav foreign ministry Vojislav Marinković argued that if “one 
superficially assured their [US] quotas, they would shut up”.872 Nonetheless, the AA had to 
send out a word of warning to the states craving for preferences and pushing for 
implementation. As matters stood, the German-American commercial contract would prohibit 
the initiative, and Berlin was bound to respect this agreement.873  
 Opposition to the initiative emerged from a number of places, and not on the 
international stage alone. The RDI, a major interest group of German industry, filed an 
objection to the AA to scrap the contracts altogether. The RDI argued that it “had not 
supported the conclusion of preferential contracts from the outset”, and only stayed co-
operative to comply with the German government’s request to pay consideration to the 
“political circumstances”. Now, however, Italian Finance Minister Guido Jung once-issued 
warning appeared to be justified. The US had started to establish a preferential regime to 
boost trade with Argentina by granting preferences to Argentinean cereals and US artificial 
fibres. To the RDI, it was clear that such a regime would derail the contracts with Hungary 
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and Romania.874 Moreover, the RDI reckoned with “substantial frictions” not only in the 
relations with the US, but also with the USSR and important British Dominions. Prospects for 
expansion on the markets in Southeastern Europe were in this case clearly rejected in 
consideration of overseas markets.875 
 Certainly, the German government did not really want to sacrifice its economic interest 
with a so-called relief action for Southeastern Europe. When Pietro Stoppani, head of the 
League’s Economic Section, warned that only securing the sales of Southeastern European 
agricultural exporters with preferred access would not be enough, and that instead the price 
for cereals from the region should be raised above market level, the AA flatly rejected the idea. 
State Secretary Bernhard Wilhelm von Bülow, a leading official of the AA,876 argued that if 
Germany had to pay grain prices above the usual market levels, the extra revenue would not 
be at the disposal of the countries in crisis, but immediately leave as repayments to the 
countries’ creditors. Then, “we (and Italy) would carry the main burden of expenses”, whereas 
the creditors were spared to make a sacrifice. Stoppani was according to Bülow’s judgement 
“visibly impressed” by how much the “the economic side of the Danube problem was 
interconnected with the financial”.877 
 Meanwhile, the financial prospects for the region darkened. Early in 1932, the 
League’s FC was particularly concerned with the situation in Hungary and Austria, where 
financial collapse with all the feared ramifications for international financial markets loomed 
large. In a letter to all the members of the FC (except for the German member Paul Kempner), 
Alexander Loveday warned that only in January, the Austrian national bank lost foreign 
exchange to the amount of 39 million Schilling, with the foreign exchange controls proving 
largely inefficient.878 The broadly shared conviction that the problem was twofold, and the 
deteriorating situation in Austria and Hungary demanding an immediate solution, led to a 
British proposal which by no means persuaded. Broadly speaking, the proposal argued that 
the two layers of the problem – trade and finance – were connected in that in the countries of 
the region879 the currencies became unstable. Therefore, the countries should form a “unified 
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economic area” with a customs union.880 The sticking point was the intention to exclude any 
big European power from the economic area-in-the-making. 
 Berlin and Rome, which had always declared the particular importance of the German 
and the Italian markets for a relief action, felt harmed by the proposal and reacted with harsh 
opposition. Il Popolo d’Italia ridiculed the plan, stating that it would yoke the plough before 
the oxen.881 Bülow deplored an “isolation of Southeastern Europe from German export, and 
thereby a severe damage of the German economy”. Moreover, he anticipated not only damage 
to his country’s economic interests, but also difficulties for the member states of customs 
union, which lacked an “absorptive industrial region”.882 To Bülow, “a customs union requires 
a certain equilibrium between agricultural and industrial production”. Not even the accession 
of Germany was considered to be sufficient; it needed “another country with agricultural 
deficit, like Italy”. He was convinced of “a broad consistency of German and Italian 
interest”883 in opposing the project. The MAE was pleased to acknowledge that the AA “is 
associating with the Italian argument”.884 Although the proposal was submitted by Britain, 
both Rome and Berlin suspected the French government to be behind the plan, which would 
strive for a “reduction of the Anschlussgefahr [the threat of a German annexation of Austria] 
and Hungary’s revisionist policy”, according to the AA.885 
 Indeed, while Paris had supported initially the idea of preferential treatments, and even 
had started to conclude preferential contracts with Hungary and Yugoslavia on its own, in 
spring of 1932, under the new Prime Minister André Tardieu, it took a different view. His 
name eventually became associated with the plan of an economic bloc uniting the 
Southeastern European countries only. 886  It was designed to help the countries in crisis, 
without granting Germany and Italy better access for their industrial exports. Yet, still they 
were asked to contribute with their markets and stimulate growth by placing more orders of 
agricultural goods and livestock in the customs union.887  The French government would 
complement the plan with financial stimulus.888 To Ambassador Schubert, Tardieu was driven 
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by political considerations as well as “pushed by his bankers”, who feared for their loans 
granted to the region. Moreover, in this regard, “France was in concordance with England, 
where the local banking industry harboured the same fears”.889 The League took up Tardieu’s 
suggestion, and much to the disdain of Italian Foreign Minister Grandi, especially its top 
official the Italian Pietro Stoppani took a large share in the design of the plan.890 
 The shared opposition to the Tardieu Plan stimulated co-operation between Germany 
and Italy.891 According to Grandi, it even rendered irrelevant the still-existing frictions over 
the question of preferences.892 Nevertheless, the Italian delegation in Geneva also warned that 
too firm an opposition could result in international isolation.893 Hence, a cautious, if not to say 
veiled, approach was adopted. 
 
 
                                                 
889 DB Rom to AA, 25 Mar 1932, PA-AA, R105.591. 
890 Cuomo, ʻTrieste, l’Italiaʼ, p. 62. 
891 Cf. Iaselli, L’espansione economico-finanziaria, p. 52; Elvert, Mitteleuropa!, p. 185. 
892 AI Berlino to MAE, 20 Mar 1932, ASMAE, Archivio Grandi, busta 34. 
893 Posse to AA, 17 Mar 1932, PA-AA, R105.590. 
197 
Chapter 7: From International Co-Ordination to Confrontational 
Bilateralism 
 
Introduction: Circumventing International Opposition 
 
Chapter 6 showed that both Berlin and Rome considered as decisive the economic and 
financial work of the League of Nations. Both governments send skilful delegates to Geneva, 
who held important positions in domestic policy, too. Thereby, and by intertwining the work 
of organisations closer associated with the respective national regime such as the International 
Institute of Agriculture, they created opportunities to turn a matter of national interest into a 
matter of international concern. The governments’ dedication to the economic and financial 
work of the League was seconded by the corporate world, which likewise tried to establish 
links with the international organisation. Unfortunately, co-ordination over economic 
initiatives in Southeastern Europe seemed more difficult for Berlin and Rome than over more 
political issues, such as the position of German-speaking minorities in Poland or the accession 
of Turkey to the Commission of Enquiry for European Union. 
 Berlin was in 1931 forging ahead in Austria, thereby destroying the recent trust Rome 
had built up. The project of a German-Austrian customs union not only failed dramatically, it 
also left a sense of menace in Italy, whose elites feared exclusion from the markets of 
Southeastern Europe. The second commercial instrument suggested by Berlin as a way out of 
the economic crisis in Southeastern Europe was relatively less contaminated. Commercial 
preferences, strongly supported by the Southeastern European states, also appeared to Italian 
foreign trade experts as a suitable means to strengthen Italy’s ties with Southeastern Europe. 
Even the League supported the system Germany had established with Romania and Hungary 
on condition of fulfilling a set of requirements. One unmet requirement, however, the positive 
acknowledgement by all countries possessing MFN-rights with regards to the markets 
establishing a preferential system, proved to be a lethal blow. The US and Argentine 
opposition stalled the German initiative. 
 Two broad lines developed out of the increasing German-Italian co-ordination and the 
growing antagonism with internationalist initiatives at the League, which constitute the 
following chapters. The first was a process of bilateral co-ordination before and during the 
economic conferences held through 1932 (London, Lausanne, Stresa), and the second, a 
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growing tendency by both governments to discretely orient their foreign economic policy vis-
à-vis Southeastern Europe in bilateral terms, though still building on the instruments that were 
discussed previously on the international stage. 
 
1. A Common Stance at the International Economic Conferences? 
 
To overcome the dispute that the Tardieu Plan for Southeastern Europe had caused between 
France and Britain on the one side and Germany and Italy on the other, the British 
government invited the four powers to a conference to be held in London on 6-8 April 1932. 
The conference was intended to prepare for the launch of an economic bloc of the five 
“Danubian” states: Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Romania. Immediately 
after the invitations were sent, the Italian ambassador in Berlin, Luca Orsini, and Gerhard 
Köpke, head of the department for Southeastern Europe at the AA, agreed to support 
Bulgaria’s accession to the economic bloc.894 Apparently, they hoped from the more loyal 
government in Sofia better representation at the negotiation table. Moreover, international 
backing came from the League’s Financial Committee, which had recommended including 
Bulgaria in the “Danubian” plans.895 
 The economic bloc of the five did not act in unanimity. The Banca d’Italia acquired 
information collected by Deutsche Bank on the relative degrees to which the “Danubian” 
capitals endorsed the Tardieu Plan. In Yugoslavia, for instance, the government showed 
“undivided enthusiasm”, whereas the Hungarian government was much more hesitant. Both 
governments acknowledged their important commercial flows with Germany and Italy, 
apparently without fears that the Tardieu Plan could cause frictions.896 The perception in 
Prague, the capital of the most industrialised country of the bloc, was quite polarised. Right-
wing activists agitated against the Tardieu Plan, which was accused of constituting not only a 
union of lower customs barriers, but also a union of “joint liability”, which would in the long 
run put Czechoslovakian economic interests at risk. The German embassy in Prague 
                                                 
894 Köpke (AA), 26 Mar 1932, PA-AA, R105.590. 
895 ʻRiunione speciale del Consiglio della Lega per l’esame del rapporto del Comitato finanziario’, Il Popolo di 
Roma, 3 Apr 1932. 
896 Deutsche Bank, ‘Wirtschaftliche Mitteilungen’, 31 Mar 1932, Archivio Storico Banca d’Italia, Fondo Studi, 
cart. 154, fasc. 1. 
199 
suggested triggering fears about being held responsible for other countries debts in the 
potential member states of the Tardieu-bloc.897 
While undermining trust in the Tardieu Plan among the potential member countries 
was only a supporting action, the big showdown was scheduled for London. Shortly before 
the conference, Posse (RWM) and Wiehl (AA) met Anzilotti (MCorp) and Ciancarelli (MAE) 
in an effort to develop a joint strategy. Posse argued that France – out of political 
considerations – would try to maintain Austria and Hungary in the Little Entente, thereby 
cutting off the “newly created Danube area from Italian and German influence”. Britain, by 
contrast, was primarily concerned with, “safeguarding English assets invested in the Balkans”. 
Everything that hitherto had been attempted to improve the economic situation in 
Southeastern Europe was not much more than patchwork. Neither the instruments suggested 
by Germany and Italy, nor any of the League of Nations’ plans, carried prospects of 
significant change. Therefore, Posse claimed that the time had “come to overcome shyness”. 
Germany and Italy should strive for a real customs union together with Austria and Hungary, 
which would eventually be joined by other Southeastern European states.898 
 Ciancarelli, however, threw a wrench into Posse’s grand plan. He warned of the 
massive opposition that the plan would cause among Italy’s industrialists, fearing that the new 
common market would cut their competitiveness massively. They felt threatened by German 
industrial predominance, particularly in branches of rearmament, “a segment much larger than 
the actual weapon industry”, which also included branches such as energy, steel and chemical 
production.899 Posse tried to allay the fears by holding out guarantees for Italian firms to 
become exclusive suppliers of the Italian market. Nonetheless, it appears that a shared answer 
to how the economic map of Europe should be redesigned was more difficult to find than 
agreeing on how it should certainly not look. Accordingly, the meeting concluded with the 
agreement merely to keep “closest contact” at the London Conference and beyond, and to 
bring down the Tardieu Plan.900 
 The London conference failed, and thus turned out to be a German-Italian success.901 
Both maintained their position that the Tardieu Plan was unsuitable to restore the “Danube-
credit”; that is, to allow Southeastern European states to service their debt. The German 
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delegation at the conference argued that the focus on the financial side of the problem was 
misleading. “The history of financial relief actions for Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Greece 
of the past ten years proves [...] if the credit is used up, the situation is still the same or rather 
worse, because the countries are then burdened with new principals and heavier interest 
burdens”. To ask from Italy and Germany to solve the ultimate problem of creating growth by 
opening up their markets for agricultural imports from the Tardieu-bloc, without asking for 
better access to Southeastern European markets in return, would be out of the question. Both 
countries would be equally in the straits of the world economic crisis. The German delegation 
reckoned that with the reduction of customs barriers within the Tardieu-bloc, Germany and 
Italy would lose up to 50 per cent of their current exports to competitors from the 
industrialised member states Austria and Czechoslovakia.902 The argument was convincing. 
On the first day after the failed conference, the London based Financial News wondered in 
criticising the British foreign policy if it had been “really conceivable” to ask such a burden 
from Italy and Germany.903 While apparently the City of London’s support for the Tardieu 
Plan vanished, Wall Street reacted with disappointment, and blamed Germany for prolonging 
the financial turmoil in Southeastern Europe.904 
 After Berlin and Rome achieved their short-term goal, the weeks following the 
London Conference illustrate the obvious lack of a shared German-Italian vision for 
Southeastern Europe. To no avail, the diplomatic missions repeatedly requested information 
on the promised memoranda for the economic re-organisation of the region. Both observed 
that London and especially Paris had lost interest in an immediate solution for the region.905 
This development caused a potential threat for Germany’s and Italy’s stance. After both had 
shattered the most recent attempt for a relief action, it was their turn to deliver a roadmap to 
recovery. Otherwise, they would provide an opportunity for their political opponents of the 
London conference to undermine the trust of the Southeastern European countries in Germany 
and Italy.906 
 Moreover, also in Germany and Italy investors had financial claims in Southeastern 
Europe that were threatened by defaults if no solution were to be found. In a meeting between 
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Dino Grandi and Heinrich Brüning, the chancellor estimated that in case of defaults one 
billion Reichsmark of “national wealth” (Volksvermögen) would be lost, an amount which 
appeared surprisingly substantial to the Italian foreign minister.907 For Italy, Grandi broadly 
quantified in a meeting with Ambassador Schubert the investments at stake at two billion Lire, 
with “very unpleasant” consequences in the aftermath of defaults. On the same occasion, 
Grandi reassured Schubert that he considered the position of the German government with 
regard to the “question of reparations” as “only just”.908   
 Thereby, he signalled a second field of German-Italian co-ordination at the 
international stage, which was still intertwined with the economic re-construction of 
Southeastern Europe. While the “Danube question” was left unanswered in spring 1932, the 
matter of reparations became highly topical. Several expert commissions concluded that 
Germany even after the end of the Hoover moratorium, which had put all payments deriving 
from war debts on hold, would not be able to meet its reparation liabilities. The question was 
due to be solved at the Lausanne Conference (16 June-9 July 1932), and the German 
government took the utmost care not to lose Rome’s “valuable support”.909 The preparation of 
the conference coincided with the Italian desire for a payments agreement, which would grant 
a favourable position to Italian export interest in spite of the dire fiscal constraints of the 
German government (see Chapter 2). In May 1932, Ambassador Schubert had warned that, 
“from a political point of view, it is most undesirable if at the present moment, shortly before 
the conference of Lausanne, a trade war would break out between Germany and Italy”,910 and 
in fact, the payments agreement was signed on the opening day the Lausanne Conference. 
 The conduct of the conference, however, was characterised by a development which 
was by no means in accordance with Italian aspirations and financial interests.911 The German 
government achieved a suspension of all its reparation obligations. Italy now was obliged to 
abandon its claims for reparations while it was still heavily burdened with inter-allied debt 
deriving from warfare, and did not receive any support from the German government to 
alleviate this debt. But the more “general and lasting disappointment” occurred in the context 
of the “vittoria tedesca” over reparations; the German government had abandoned the 
common German-Italian position in the “Danube question”, and agreed with the French 
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legation on a proposal for Southeastern Europe.912 Still in the course of the conference, the 
Italian delegation started to oppose the German-French proposal, which suggested a 
“collective convention” reuniting all major European stakeholders in the economic 
reconstruction of Southeastern Europe. With several manoeuvres, the Italian legation 
sabotaged the elaboration of a substantial roadmap. 913  Accordingly, the final act of the 
Lausanne Conference only relegated the task to the national governments, urging them to 
establish a “Central European Economic Commission”, which should develop a collective 
action.914 The meeting of the commission was scheduled to be held in September 1932 at the 
Italian lake town of Stresa.915 
 To understand the deep Italian disappointment over Lausanne, it is necessary to 
explain why Fascist Italy was such a reliable partner for the German government fighting 
against reparations. After all, Italy as a victorious power of World War I benefited from 
German reparation payments. Nevertheless, as indicated in a preparatory document for the 
Stresa Conference, Italian political and economic elites were quite aware that the reparations 
and other forms of private debt in Germany put heavy pressure on the purchasing power of 
Italy’s long-standing, number-one customer. Italy’s exporters hoped, therefore, that once the 
debt burden was lifted, typical Italian export goods would see a growing demand in Germany. 
Furthermore, the Italian support against reparations could benefit Italian exports goods in that 
they had the potential to gain ‘politically correct” popularity in Germany.   
 The argument that Italy would profit from greater purchasing power in Germany 
stimulated Italian support for the abolishment of reparations, but it also had implications for 
the situation in Southeastern Europe. Italian agricultural interest groups reckoned that debt 
relief would spur German industrial expansion in Southeastern Europe, and that the thereby-
collected revenues would be used to order from Italy luxury items like wine and southern 
fruits. However, at the same time, the German government acknowledged that agricultural 
interests stood in opposition to Italian industrial interests, arguing against a “German industry 
relieved from the burden placed on it in consequence of Germany’s debt situation”, which 
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would rival the Italian manufacturers on the markets of Southeastern Europe.916 This example 
highlights quite well the grave difficulty, if not impossibility, for the Italian economy to 
formulate a coherent standpoint vis-à-vis Germany. 
 Given the undesirable outcome of the Lausanne Conference, the Italian government 
elaborated its roadmap for the upcoming Stresa Conference. Every form of a “Danube-
federation” even “if it includes other states (Italy, Germany, Switzerland, France, Poland)” 
was to be combated. Instead of multilateral European regimes, the Italian representatives 
should bring back to the table the idea of bilateral preferential treatment. Surprisingly, this 
approach reads almost like an adoption of the preferential treaties that in 1931 Germany had 
attempted with Hungary and Romania. The roadmap foresaw bilateral preferential 
arrangements to boost agricultural exports from Southeastern Europe, while the countries of 
the region lowered their import restrictions for half-finished and finished goods. The latter 
concession would be granted to every exporter enjoying MFN status, thus preventing acts of 
retaliation.917 At an inter-ministerial reunion,918 Ciancarelli emphasised that an advantage of 
bilateral regimes was that it allowed the union of countries that had a “possibility to get 
along”. With this comment, he was referring to the expectation – equally present in the 
German conception – that bilateral preferential regimes would manifest a certain centre-
periphery rift between the manufacturer of half-finished and finished goods on the one side 
and the commodity exporter on the other side.919 
 With the disappointment over the German behaviour in Lausanne and a roadmap 
designed to undermine the conclusions drawn there for Southeastern Europe, it is no wonder 
that German officials seeking bilateral co-ordination before the Stresa Conference (5-20 
September 1932) encountered difficulty. Without success, Schubert attempted to hear from 
Suvich about the planned Italian stance.920 Only a few days prior to the start of the conference, 
a repeatedly delayed meeting of top officials could finally take place. As before at the London 
conference, the German delegation consisted of Wiehl (AA) and Posse (RWM) who met their 
Italian counterparts Ciancarelli (MAE) and Anzilotti (MCorp). This time, the Duce joined the 
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meeting. While it began with mutual assertions that the broad consensus reached with the 
London conference still existed, and that neither Germany nor Italy were willing to help 
Southeastern Europe only to allow the countries in crisis to pay interest to foreign holders of 
their debt, it eventually reached the point of substantial disagreement. The Italians 
categorically rejected any collective agreement, whereas the German legation argued that only 
with such agreements the US objection against regional economic blocs within Europe could 
be set aside.921 
According to Ciancarelli, another difference concerned the evaluation of potential 
retaliations. He concluded that, “the idea of preferences is spreading over various areas of the 
world (South- and Central America, Ottawa, Britain-Argentina-Denmark, Baltic States, 
Belgian-Dutch agreement)”, and that this development would be “more dangerous for Italy 
than for Germany because of its substantial export interest overseas”. Posse acknowledged the 
rise of these economic blocs, and he argued for their inevitability, regardless of preferences 
for Southeastern Europe. Germany and Italy had to be interested in not being isolated, in 
Posse’s view. Ciancarelli nevertheless asserted that, “greater economic areas” 
(Großwirtschaftsräume) make more sense between complementary economies than between 
the “essentially equal economies of Germany and Italy” (a remark that was crossed out by the 
German editor of the meeting’s protocol).922 Mussolini observed that, “it is always rather 
difficult to find an agreement when it comes to economic questions”.923 
 The Duce’s judgment was accurate not only with regard to bilateral German-Italian co-
ordination, but also for the entire Stresa Conference. Its decisions did not provide the long- 
expected broad consensus on the best cure for the economic crisis in Southeastern Europe. 
Under the direction of French delegate Georges-Étienne Bonnet, a draft convention was 
elaborated that rather patched together the previous approaches: financial help and support for 
agricultural exports with preferences. All the European countries were meant to take part, and 
manifold were the single measures suggested to revive trade. Most of them were quite 
common and adhered to the League’s suggestion to replace instruments like foreign exchange 
controls with a more liberal foreign economic policy. “The re-valorisation of cereals”, 
however, was, according to the German delegation, the only really new and directly 
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applicable instrument.924 Exact quotas stipulated what could be exported in which preferential 
conditions. Moreover, the Italian delegation suggested that the re-valorisation should be 
supported with a “monetary fund”925 to be established with contributions from all European 
countries. The German delegation initially accepted this suggestion, and yet, over the course 
of the conference it repeatedly argued that Berlin’s current financial leeway would prevent it 
from contributing to the fund. With this argumentation, the German delegation saw a similar 
stance by the British government, and faced heavy opposition by most other participants who 
accused Germany of putting at risk the entire scheme. Nonetheless, the German delegation 
insisted on its lack of financial capabilities,926 and achieved for Germany an exemption from 
contributing to the fund, provided it still opened its market for preferential access of 
Southeastern European grain.927 
 The German government’s contribution to the Stresa Conference can be labelled as 
half-hearted at best. Berlin’s approbation lasted as long as the notion of preferential treaties 
found international legitimacy, but any financial sacrifices were carefully avoided. Backing 
for the idea by the other potential big grain importer Italy was no longer needed. Moreover, 
considerations not to lose Italy’s support at the international stage were already in decline 
after the settlement of Germany’s reparations at the Lausanne Conference. The German 
authorities were well aware that under this development Germany’s reputation in Italy 
suffered. According to the AA, the Italian delegation in Stresa tried to be “part of every relief 
action”, and influence them to “prevent a strengthening of German and French influence” in 
Southeastern Europe.928 
 What both governments still shared was the conviction that practical results from the 
Stresa Conference were highly uncertain. For Suvich, the conference “had no chance of 
success” because – in addition to the Italian manoeuvres – London refrained from engaging in 
the continent’s affairs, and the member countries of the Southeastern European bloc remained 
in partisan deadlock. 929  The AA too proved to be rather sceptical about a quick 
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implementation. Several steps had to be taken, and an acceptance of both the CEEU and the 
League of Nations was still due.930 Meanwhile, the impetus to follow an international path in 
dealing with Southeastern Europe lost ground in Germany and Italy concurrently. 
 
2. Hiding from International Responsibility 
 
Simultaneous with the German exemption from contributing to the Stresa “monetary fund”, 
the German representatives at the League discreetly retreated from the international financial 
supervision of the countries in crisis. The manoeuvre was intended to take political advantage 
of national resentments against the League’s debt restructuring programmes in Southeastern 
Europe. It, moreover, paved the way for the bilateral economic expansion of Nazi Germany, 
which is discussed in Part III. To understand fully the tactical retreat between late 1932 and 
early 1933, it is necessary to take into account the previous work of the League’s financial 
supervision. 
 As already noted (see Chapter 5), the League supervised a series of loans to the 
successor states of the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman Empires. National budgets faced 
financial turmoil especially after the crash of the Austrian Creditanstalt in June 1931, and the 
debt repayment of Southeastern European states became a matter of international concern. 
The League’s Financial Committee (FC), presided over at the time by Mussolini’s long arm at 
the League Fulvio Suvich, gained in importance as it participated in many of the initiatives to 
secure international lending to the region. Shortly after the crash of the Creditanstalt, Arthur 
Salter, who had served in the 1920s as head of the economic and financial section of the 
League’s secretariat, and advised several governments on stabilising their currencies, 931 
suggested that the FC should be empowered to grant loans to countries in crisis out of its own 
budget. 932  While the transformation into an organisation that resembled the International 
Monetary Fund was still a pipedream,933 the competences of the FC were already significant. 
It did supervise the internationally granted loans, gathered information on national budgets 
and economies and recommended programmes to reduce deficits. What is more, with the 
financial crisis the League’s assistance in administering national budgets became known to 
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the public. In Bulgaria, for instance, where the collaboration with the League surfaced only in 
1932, it “had been hidden during six years from the public and even from most members of 
the Cabinet”.934 
 At its meeting in January 1932, President Fulvio Suvich instructed the FC to find a 
way out of the vicious cycle in which the countries in crisis were caught. Foreign exchange 
controls had served as an immediate countermeasure to prevent foreign exchange reserves 
from continuing to fall due to the depressed wholesale prices. However, the longer the 
controls were in force, the more pressure they put on trade. To find a way out, Suvich 
proclaimed that the primary concern of the FC should be “defending the currencies of the 
countries under its control” in order to prevent defaults on foreign debt.935 Thereby, the FC 
faced a sometimes- opposing agenda in the capitals of Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Greece, 
where national governments asked for assistance by the FC to achieve relief from the 
servicing of their foreign debt in the form of new loans or internationally accepted moratoria. 
 For the FC, Austria and Greece constituted in spring 1932 “the two urgent cases”. In 
Greece, the deficit was growing due to an unfavourable development in the balance of 
payments as the invisible receipts from shipping, tourism and remittances were losing their 
significance. Thus, foreign exchange reserves continued to fall, and the Greek government felt 
compelled to ask the three governments represented on the International Financial 
Commission in Athens (France, Britain, Italy) for a suspension of the external sinking funds. 
Similarly, Austria had “already been compelled to arrange for a Stillhalte covering the 
principal of most of her banking debts”. Albeit inevitably, the arrangement further 
undermined the trust of international lenders and aggravated the difficulties in receiving 
foreign financial assistance necessary for structural reforms. 
 Thus, the FC attempted to collect loans among hesitant creditors on the condition that 
all the measures were accepted: “the League may suggest for assuring a sound administration 
of the public finances and of the National Bank”.936 It was established that the amount of 
foreign exchange acquired with the assistance of the FC was on no account to be used to fill 
up gaps in the government’s regular budget. Instead, the national government was required to 
sell the foreign exchange to the central bank, where it was supported by an advisor delegated 
by the FC. The received amount in national currency was then to be channelled into major 
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public works, which ultimately should boost growth. For the FC it was clear that this 
programme would “strengthen the control of the League and would increase the power of the 
League`s representatives“.937 Given the powerful position of the League’s representatives, it 
was potentially of great interest for governments of countries economically interested in 
Southeastern Europe to send delegates. 
 In the case of another applicant for League assistance, Bulgaria, tensions arose 
between the government and the central bank on the one side, both of which favoured a 
moratorium, and the FC militating against this solution on the other side. The situation was 
alarming because recently the balance of payments had conveyed a rising deficit that had to 
be covered by the treasury. 938  To get an accurate overview of public finances, the FC 
nominated the committee’s German member, Paul Kempner, to carry out a mission to Sofia. 
Kempner informed the AA that, “various creditors in France, England and other countries 
either have suggested this procedure to the concerned countries or support it”. In addition, he 
asked the AA if he should accept the nomination. Technically, he could legitimise a rejection 
of his nomination with work overload at his bank. However, he warned that this might 
undermine Germany’s influence at the FC. This would happen at a particularly inopportune 
moment because, according to Kempner’s judgment, the instrument of preferences was just 
about to gain acceptance at the FC.939 
 Kempner’s nomination was approved, and turned out to be successful in the eyes of 
German authorities. The German delegation in Sofia argued that since Germany is a League 
member, “it can only be right if we are well represented in its bodies, and in the FC this goal 
seems to be achieved”. While the work on the ground was considered a success, negotiations 
with creditors were still pending. The German delegation detected hopes in Sofia that 
Kempner’s expertise would bring advantages for Bulgaria in the negotiations with its 
creditors, which would ultimately benefit Germany’s position in Bulgaria. 940  Indeed, the 
numbers the delegation reported to the FC left some room for confidence in Bulgaria’s budget. 
The treasurer could dispose of unexpectedly high gold reserves of 1.5 billion Leva and an 
positive trade balance of 1.2 billion Leva for 1931.941 
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However, the hopes for a positive fiscal development remained unfulfilled, and by May 1932, 
another delegation of the FC had to travel to Sofia. This time, they were joined by Ernst 
Trendelenburg, state secretary in the RWM and under-secretary-general of the League, who 
insisted that he did not come as a representative of the FC. In view of the budgetary situation, 
the delegation called for energetic measures without delay because, “the state is spending on 
an average some 110 million Leva a month more than it receives”. Declining exports had not 
been accompanied by a parallel decline in imports.942 As the FC’s evaluation of the Bulgarian 
budget turned more negative, the communication between Sofia and the international 
organisation became tenser. The Direction de la Dette Publique (Sofia) deplored that it had 
not been involved in the compilation of the final report to the League, as up to this point it had 
been common practice. Moreover, it considered the critique of the report to be “very 
exaggerated”.943 
 In Romania, the relationship between the FC and the national government requesting 
technical assistance by the League in autumn 1932 was somewhat different, in that for the 
first time the request was not formulated in connection with applying for a foreign loan.944 
Instead, according to the AA, the Romanian government pursued the goal of “demonstrating 
to the French that in the long run they will not be able to finance their allies in the 
Balkans”.945 Hence, the League’s operations touched on the cracks in the postwar order of 
Europe, which was challenged by Germany and Italy. The delegation sent to Bucharest 
consisted of a French, a British and an Italian League official and Paul Kempner. The experts 
detected stupendous grievances in public governance. Particularly striking was the ministers’ 
occupation with administrative detail. The finance minister, for instance, showed the 
delegation 220 inheritance tax matters on his table about which he personally was obliged to 
decide. Given this overload, he long ago had decided to work at home instead of in the 
ministry. Moreover, the administration of the region previously belonging to the Austro-
Hungarian Empire still adhered to the then-known administrative tradition, thus shattering 
Romania into different administrative entities. While this anecdotal evidence served only to 
clarify the need for technical assistance, most of the delegation’s detailed account ascertained 
information on all segments of Romania’s economic administration. And this information, 
although it had been classified as secret, was not only reported to the FC, but via Kempner 
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also to the AA.946 It was at the disposal, then, of those institutions designing the plans for 
economic expansion into Southeastern Europe. 
 The January 1933 agreement between the Romanian government and the League 
implemented a far-reaching international supervision, which eventually triggered national 
resentments. The agreement provided for the instalment of several technical advisers to 
improve Romania’s public governance. The League’s Council was instructed to recommend 
an expert in fiscal matters, a treasury and budgetary expert, an audit and accountancy expert 
and a financial advisor responsible for co-ordinating the different international advisers within 
Romania’s state mechanism. 947  The German representatives involved in the negotiations 
between the Romanian government and the FC attested that some of Romania’s demands 
hardly complied with the agenda of the League. For instance, the Romanian government 
wanted to reduce the technical collaboration to three years, whereas the FC deemed five years 
necessary. Under-Secretary-General Trendelenburg recommended that the AA support the 
Romanian demands in spite of the current financial problems because, “Romania is at heart a 
beautiful and rich country”, thereby addressing the country’s vast natural resources (like crude 
oil).948 In addition, the Romanian ambassador in Berlin had requested from the AA support for 
a financial supervision of the League that was “as sparing as possible”. This request met with 
the approval of State Secretary Bernhard Wilhem von Bülow.949 Consequently, a German 
representative took the matter up at the League’s Council meeting and expressed the hopes of 
the German government that a form of co-operation would be found, “which involved no 
interference with Romania’s sovereign rights”. 950  Finally, the FC took up Kempner’s 
suggestion to reduce the League’s supervision to four years.951 
 At this point it appears that the League’s work on international financial relations had 
fulfilled the needs of the AA. It had provided substantial information on the internal economic 
constitution of the countries in the vanguards of Germany’s recent plans for economic 
expansion. Moreover, it had offered the opportunity to act in the tough negotiations as an 
honest broker, taking into consideration the creditor’s interests in financial stability 
represented in the FC,952  as well as the supervised countries’ interests in retaining their 
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national sovereignty. From then on, however, being a member of an institution whose 
proposed reforms embraced many unpopular measures like harsh government budget cuts 
carried the risk of losing this barely secured position in the region. Representatives of the 
MWT, a lobby group of Germany’s big business, returned from a research mission to 
Yugoslavia and Romania in November 1932 doubting “if with regard to German interest, 
[Germany] should participate in the commissions for the improvement of finances in 
Southeastern Europe”. Should it come to it, Berlin would have a “shared moral responsibility” 
for measures perceived in the crisis-torn countries “as intolerable pressure”.953 
 Accordingly, Ritter told Trendelenburg that the AA does not comply with 
Trendelenburg’s suggestion to support the work of the League in Southeastern Europe with 
additional human resources. If the work of the League proceeded as usual then the current 
German representatives could remain in office, taking due care, however, that they acted as 
members of the League and not as representatives of the German government. If the 
relationship between the international organisation and the debtor countries deteriorated, 
however, Germany’s goal would “not automatically and necessarily correspond with League 
policies“, argued Ritter. Therefore, the government “would not like German representatives to 
be part of the sanctions of the League”.954 State Secretary von Bülow legitimised this step in a 
letter to Trendelenburg in that Germany has “suffered enough under foreign control and 
should generally strive to put up resistance against an all too strong desire to control by a few 
other governments and the Secretariat of the League”.955 
 In Geneva, the gradual German withdrawal was met with discomfort and attempts at 
curtailment.956 It was feared that without German participation the reform programmes would 
appear as of a “merely inter-allied character”. Moreover, Germany possessed the biggest 
market for Southeastern European goods and hence was an indispensable part of every 
regional economic plan. German participation, for instance, was demanded for the nomination 
of advisers to be sent to Romania.957 Moreover, for Trendelenburg, it was clear that when 
Secretary-General Avenol asked him in March 1933 to lead a delegation to Bulgaria, where 
tensions rose over the government’s plan for a moratorium on its foreign debt, he could hardly 
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refuse. Yet, he used his acceptance to legitimise the fact that Germany did not replace 
Kempner, who officially declared that he was tied up with his business and could not take up 
his assigned position as representative for Bulgaria.958 Moreover, upon his arrival in Sofia, 
Trendelenburg declared that he did not come as part of the League delegation (consisting of 
French, Italian and British officials), but “only for personal information”.959 As is further 
analysed in Part III, Bulgaria played a special role for Nazi Germany, and came more under 
economic influence than any other country in the region. 
  Although the German standpoint caused much disagreement, it was implicitly backed 
by the mastermind of Italy’s international financial relations and financial expert at the 
League, Alberto Beneduce. 960  He too condemned the ever-growing diffusion of FC 
competencies. While the FC’s technical assistance had initially only dealt with the budget, it 
subsequently spread over economic and monetary matters. Therewith, the FC would assume a 
responsibility which it hardly could fulfil, argued Beneduce.961 
 The withdrawal of Nazi Germany went on, and Kempner also retreated from the 
mission the FC sent out to Greece. There, the German finance ministry (RFM) expected 
negotiations to be especially lengthy, as the Greek government remained steadfast with regard 
to the raising and transfer of funds to service its debt. The dimension of the Greek case is 
highlighted in that the FC, in addition to officials among its ranks, also nominated 
representatives from the League’s secretariat and with Royall Tyler even an American 
expert.962 The German delegation in Athens assessed that, “it would be in Germany’s interest 
[...] if the German member of the Financial Committee could adopt a welcoming attitude 
towards Greek necessities and requests”.963 Kempner then declared his intention to bring to 
bear suggestions from the German legation in Athens at the FC,964 but apart from that, the AA 
and the RFN instructed him to reduce participation in the assemblies of the FC. Moreover, he 
was to show restraint over the question of what the FC could contribute to the world 
economic conference to be held in London in June 1933.965 
                                                 
958 AA, 25 Mar 1933, PA-AA, R118.484. 
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de certaines experts gouvernementaux, 4 Jun 1932, LON, Financial Comittee, 1296. 
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In conclusion, the tactical retreat from the League’s financial supervision foreshadowed the 
withdrawal of Nazi Germany from the League in November 1933. Looking back, the AA 
described this step as logical because the work of the League was considered to be ailing 
since the beginning of 1933.966  After the climax of co-operation with the economic and 
financial organisations of the League over the question of preferences for Southeastern 
Europe, the League quickly lost relevance when its work spelled, instead of opportunities for 
commercial expansion, tensions with the people of Southeastern European over questions of 
debt and payments. Subsequently, the relationship was completely cut, and attempts by 
League officials to revive Nazi Germany’s collaboration at least with the EFO failed. 
 The strategy of Fascist Italy differed slightly in this regard. It continued to participate 
in the League even through its aggressive war on Ethiopia, only to quit in 1937 when the 
contradictions with the international organisation founded to guarantee global peace became 
too strong. Even the most conciliatory members of the League had to acknowledge that the 
“entrenchment of Italian and German economic nationalist and imperialist ambitions had 
proven beyond the EFO’s means”.967 
 Some of the strategic elements that characterised Germany’s relationship with the 
League during the phase of its tactical retreat were also applied by Italian representatives. For 
instance, like the German officials Kempner and Trendelenburg, Suvich used the missions he 
undertook as president of the FC to the countries in crisis to acquire information for his 
government. In the case of an inquiry in Hungary, he acted openly in the interest of Italian 
exporters. 968  When the FC established its programme for financial reforms to solve the 
conflict “between the creditors and the Hungarian Government”,969 the relationship between 
the latter and Rome was characterised by the same secret consultations as those that took 
place between the governments of Germany and Bulgaria. Budapest emphatically urged 
Rome to place an Italian League official at the delegation dealing with Hungarian debt. 
Moreover, it warned Rome not to risk the good reputation of Italy’s top officials Stoppani and 
Anzilotti with an involvement in the matter.970 As in the case of Austria, Suvich was asked to 
use his affiliation with the FC to solve a problem with the Italian-Austrian railway company 
Danube-Save-Adriatique. Due to the financial crisis in Austria, contributions from the 
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Austrian side had been delayed and subsequently caused “huge difficulties” for the 
company.971 
 The cases of Hungary and Austria are crucial to understand Italy’s foreign economic 
policy in Southeastern Europe. Along with the political elite in Hungary, Fascist Italy shared a 
firm belief of lost national homeland through the peace contracts after World War I. The 
independent state of Austria, on the other hand, was to be supported in order to prevent a 
much-feared Anschluss to Germany. The support for Austria came in various forms and was 
perceived in Germany with mistrust. When the FC elaborated an extension of credit for 
Austria, the German member Kempner opposed the measure, and the Vossische Zeitung, as a 
liberal mouthpiece far away from the forefront of German claims on Austria, wrote that, “we 
would like to support Austria [...] but we would refuse to grant indirect financial aid to the 
aggressor in Rome and his Viennese apprentice”.972 As the following chapter shows, Rome 
organised in the slipstream of the League’s discussion on preferences its own version of 
bilateral preferential contracts with Hungary and Austria. These contracts not only triggered 
rivalries with Nazi Germany in Southeastern Europe, but would also serve as an institutional 
role model. 
 
3. Hidden Preferences: The Brocchi Contracts 
 
The previous analysis of the relief actions for Southeastern Europe revealed that Fascist Italy 
adopted quite an ambiguous position with regard to the commercial preferences for 
Southeastern European exports. Initially, after the plan had been added to the international 
agenda at the Warsaw agrarian conference in 1930, Italy remained rather aloof. This changed 
when bilateral commercial preferences could serve Rome’s initiative to sabotage the 
multilateral plan for Southeastern Europe as envisaged by the Stresa Conference in 1932. 
However, although the attitude changed, the major argument against preferences remained the 
same: the fear of retaliation harming Italy’s still-significant economic interest in overseas 
markets (see Table 10). As such, an ideal version of a preferential system for Italy would 
consist of secretly granted benefits, which would not cause any interference with the MFN 
status of third-party countries. The template for such a system was found in the negotiation of 
a new commercial contract between Austria and Hungary. 
                                                 
971 M. Fall (President Danube-Save-Adriatique) to Ciancarelli, 26 Apr 1932, ASMAE, Carte Suvich, busta 13. 
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Table 10: Share of Italy’s major overseas trading partners (percentage quotas of total trade) 
 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
Import from US 17.6 16.1 14.1 11.2 13.4 15.0 
Export to US 10.7 11.8 10.8 10.1 9.3 8.8 
Import from Argentina 8.4 6.2 4.0 4.8 4.1 3.0 
Export to Argentina 7.9 7.5 6.8 8.0 5.5 6.2 
 
Source: G. Federico, Il commercio estero Italiano: 1862-1950 (Roma, 2011), p. 126-131. 
 
As a consequence of the German-Austrian customs union, Austria had cancelled 
several commercial contracts, and renegotiations with its trading partners became necessary. 
In the negotiations with Hungary in summer 1931, the two countries sharing the firm 
conviction that the remapping of Europe after World War I had destroyed their established 
economic network developed a scheme of indirect preferences. They mutually granted 
favourable export credit rates for certain goods specified in import quotas. Thereby, they 
rendered trading between their countries more attractive as the interest rate was lowered to 2 
per cent (whereas more than 10 per cent was usual in trading with other countries). To finance 
the scheme, the import quotas granted to each other were designed in that the revenues from 
customs duties offset the expenditure for the more favourable loans. The advantage was that 
contrary to customs preferences, those benefits did not have to be offered to all trading 
partners with MFN status. While at first only the export of a few products should be supported 
with cheaper credit, it was soon enlarged to a series of agricultural goods in Hungary and 
manufactured goods in Austria.973 The government in Budapest appeared to be a driving force 
behind this preferential scheme. It did not stop with implementing it in Austria, but also 
introduced it to Rome, where it was eagerly taken up. 
 Subsequently, Italy secretively negotiated in spring 1931 with Hungary and Austria a 
scheme of export credit preferences.974 As early as summer 1930, the Italian government had 
received calls for political collaboration combined with requests for financial assistance from 
                                                 
973 DG Wien to AA, 15 Jun 1931, PA-AA, R240.889/1. 
974 As a result of the secret proceedings, the analysis is slightly biased in sources from German institutions. 
According to the German legation in Vienna, sources were acquired confidentially via informants in the Austrian 
federal chancellery and the ministry for trade and traffic; see DG Wien to AA, 17 Oct 1933, PA-AA, R240.910. 
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which analyse the learning process leading to an adaptation of Italian plans by Nazi Germany. Moreover, the 
description of the tripartite contracts from an Austrian-Italian perspective is included already in an unpublished 
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the crises-stricken governments in Vienna and Budapest. However, Foreign Minister Grandi, 
while he was travelling at the time the Danubian capitals, asked himself “if we are really in 
the position to resolve it, especially when already our similar action in Albania is slowed 
down because of a lack of means”.975 Then, as has been shown above, the proposal of the 
German-Austrian customs union alarmed the entire Italian administration and fostered the 
disposition to look out for new opportunities to connect Southeastern Europe with Italy.976 
The Hungarian suggestion of 1931 allowed the fascist government to support its closest allies 
in the region in their fight against the downfall of exports at – ideally – almost no cost. On the 
Italian side, the Triestinian Igino Brocchi, state counselor at the ministry of foreign affairs, 
became the mastermind behind the negotiations of the tripartite agreement.977 It was also 
Brocchi who gave his name to the first fruits that ripened from these negotiations: the Brocchi 
contracts.978 
 The application of the Brocchi contracts was fraught with difficulties, as it was kept 
confidential and required a complex system of certifications that also rendered it quite opaque 
to its participants. According to a major Italian business representative, Alberto Pirelli, the 
confidentiality was intended to forestall repercussions for Italy’s trade interests in other 
countries. 979  In the sceptical judgment of Ritter (AA), who merely relied on leaked 
information by the Austrian administration, for each and every trade operation the participants 
had to acquire 18 permissions. Nevertheless, in spite of foreseeable troubles this would cause 
for the flow of trade, Ritter argued that the system, “if it finds acceptance in Europe”, could 
be “applied by Germany especially with the Southeastern countries and Italy”.980 
 Similar to the strategy the governments of Germany, Romania and Hungary adopted 
for their preferential contracts in 1931, the Italian government tested the possibility of getting 
League of Nations’ approval for the Brocchi contracts. Giuseppe De Michelis presented the 
                                                 
975 Dino Grandi, report on voyage to Budapest and Vienna, 7-17 Jun 1930, ASMAE, Archivio Dino Grandi, busta 
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Montenegro, ʻDie Entwicklung eines multinationalen Unternehmens in den zwanziger Jahren. Die Societa 
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980 AA (Ritter), ʻDie österreichisch – ungarisch – italienischen sogenannten Dreiecks-Verträge’, n.d. [presumably 
August 1931], BArch, R 43-I/81. 
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scheme as a means of helping the countries in crisis at a meeting of the agrarian committee of 
the CEEU in Geneva, adding that Italy was against any form of open preferences. However, 
according to Karl Ritter, the scheme met with severe criticism by delegates from Switzerland, 
the Netherlands and especially France who denounced it as “hidden preferences”, which 
ought to be ruled out.981  In addition to these member countries of the League, the US-
Department of Commerce (DOC) argued that the scheme subsidised grain exports in Hungary. 
One wheat exporting company based in the US allegedly faced losses of 70 per cent and 
requested an intervention of the DOC in Europe.982 
 In spite of the criticism brought forward, different sub-committees of the CEEU did 
contemplate the Brocchi contracts as one of several types of preferential systems suitable to 
stimulate ailing prices in Southeastern Europe. Although in a meeting of the Sub-Committee 
on Economic Questions, the German contracts with Romania and Hungary were still 
considered as best practice,983 the Brocchi contracts supported the argument – widely shared 
among the experts – that custom duties were not the only possible arena for preferences. They 
could, as the French representative at the CEEU Francois-Poncet, pointed out, also comprise 
transport facilitations or financing on advantageous terms.984 Even Secretary-General Avenol 
acknowledged in a meeting with Stoppani that the Brocchi contracts were an economic relief 
action. Nevertheless, Avenol thus considered the contracts insufficient in range (as they only 
included Austria and Hungary), suitable to create political mistrust and ineffective because 
they could create difficulties for the Hungarian service of debt.985 
 Once again the League faced the central dilemma of its economic and financial work 
in the Great Depression. While it could not ignore certain deviations from the MFN clause in 
the ongoing development, at the same time it tried to keep a liberal and multilateral approach 
to the international economy. 986  This dilemma resulted of course from the opposing 
conceptions at different national levels, which the League tried to bring into accord. Avenol 
and Stoppani, for instance, attempted to convince De Michelis that the plan brought forward 
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by French Prime Minister Tardieu in 1932, which they considered a “realistic vision”, would 
possibly blend in with the Brocchi contracts.987 However, what had started as an attempt to 
keep Italy at the negotiation table in Geneva also would have reduced significantly the means 
for political leverage inherent in the Brocchi contracts. 
 Therefore, according to Grandi, the Tardieu Plan triggered rather a bilateral extension 
instead of a multilateral integration of the Brocchi contracts.988 The system was enlarged, and 
Fascist Italy signed new contracts with Austria and Hungary in February 1932. However, the 
contracts providing transport and financing facilitations still bore evidence of the League’s 
proposals on how to set preferences into practice without harming the MFN clause. Two 
financing institutes were established, the Société Italo-Autrichienne pour faciliter les crédits à 
l’Exportation with branches in Milan and Vienna, 989  and the Società Anonima Italo-
Ungherese per Facilitazione di Credito al’Estero with branches in Milan and Budapest. The 
share capital of the two institutes was held by the three big Italian banks (Banca Commerciale 
Italiana, Credito Italiano, Banco di Roma) and an Austrian, respectively a Hungarian bank. 
The new facilitations granted not only favourable credit rates for exporters; it also created a 
financial instrument that provided additional credit to goods in a consignment, which reduced 
the potential risk of volatile transportation costs. Overall, the organisation of transport 
facilitations played an important role. A “tariff council” was established to harmonize cross-
border collaboration between the different national means of transportation (especially 
railways), and funds were granted for the construction of warehouses and free ports.990 
 The extended Brocchi contracts laid the groundwork for Fascist Italy to travel further 
down the road of bilateralism.991 The contracts were carefully designed to portray the Italian 
government as a stalwart adherent to international free trade and a liable partner because it 
complied with obligations deriving from the MFN-clause. However, the German embassy in 
Rome referred to confidential sources in the Italian administration that were all-too-aware that 
many of the benefits in fact did not comply with the “spirit” of the MFN clause.992 The 
application was accorded a new initiative at the League in favour of bilateral preferential 
agreements for the crisis-shaken countries in Southeastern Europe: the release of the Danube 
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memorandum.993 It suggested concluding preferential agreements, but only to those countries 
running a deficit in trade with Southeastern European grain exporters. In Germany, this 
strategy was perceived by Alfred Sohn-Rethel, an expert at the MWT, the main advocacy 
group of Germany’s commercial expansion into Southeastern Europe, not as an opportunity 
only. In general, broader support for the preferential idea was desirable; however, the Italian 
conceptualisation represented a potential threat because it would exclude big surplus exporters 
such as Germany.994 The German embassy in Rome shared the concerns of Sohn-Rethel.995 
 With the Brocchi contracts, Fascist Italy not only drifted, albeit secretly, from the 
international economic order as envisaged by the League; it also increased tensions with the 
German advances in Southeastern Europe.996 The AA, an active spectator of the negotiations 
between Rome, Budapest and Vienna, increasingly faced difficulties acquiring information 
about the actual mechanism set into motion by the contracts. On the official level, the Italian 
and Hungarian governments played down in talks with German representatives the content as 
well as the chance of further extension of the contracts.997 Moreover, apparently measures 
were taken to close the leaks in the Austrian federal administration the AA had been using to 
get insider information.998 Even businesses and private persons in Italy seem to have been 
bound to secrecy.999 Presumably, the increasing secrecy took its toll in the AA’s suspicion that 
the Brocchi contracts were only the beginning of a much deeper integration of the tripartite 
relationship, namely the construction of a customs union.1000 
The Italian government tried to quash, apparently without success, these concerns by 
referring to the monetary problems such a union would face. Immediately after Italy laid with 
the Brocchi contracts the foundations for a development leading to Fascist Italy’s greatest 
economic influence in Southeastern Europe, Grandi recognised that the German government 
attempted “to discourage the Austrian and Hungarian governments from a more substantial 
and general accord”. The cooperative associations of the Italian economy reckoned with a 
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development where it was very difficult to co-ordinate Italian and German economic interests 
in the region.1001 German-Italian rivalries for the markets of Southeastern Europe, which will 
be set out in the following part of the thesis, were in full swing. 
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Conclusion Part II: The Triumph of Bilateralism 
 
Part II has highlighted that it was one region in particular where Germany’s and Italy’s 
international foreign economic initiatives came in contact after the onset of the world 
economic crisis: Southeastern Europe. While the US – in 1929 the major trading partner for 
Germany as well as Italy – noted with discontent how its trade with both had withered, the 
Southeastern European states witnessed rising attention. This renewed interest amidst an 
unfolding economic and financial catastrophe derived from political and economic 
considerations. Rome and Berlin shared the political view that by building up stronger ties 
with the region, opportunities would arise to confront the contested post-war order of Europe. 
In economic terms, the region offered much-needed raw materials and the opportunity to 
benefit from local industrialisation efforts.   
 Luckily for Germany and Italy, the crisis-ridden agricultural countries of Southeastern 
Europe pooled their demand for economic support with an initiative, giving Germany and 
Italy powerful political leverage. To advance the initiative, the “agrarian bloc” chose the 
international platform that had since the end of World War I taken an active interest in their 
development: the League of Nations. The economic and financial organisations of the League 
administered many of the loans granted to the newly-founded states after the war, oversaw 
monetary stabilisation efforts and monitored economic development. After 1930, various 
bodies of the League discussed proposals of Southeastern European states, which demanded 
that the prices of their export goods be supported in order to guarantee their financial stability. 
As Germany and Italy possessed the largest import requirements for the typical export goods 
of the region, they became crucial for any relief plan for Southeastern Europe. Thereby, 
opportunities for a beneficial co-ordination of Italian and German initiatives at the League 
emerged. 
 However, the first successes of this liaison were not achieved over Southeastern 
Europe’s economy. Both supported the accession of Russia and Turkey to the Commission of 
Enquiry for European Union merely to undermine the French position. Another, more 
important field of collaboration helps us to understand the generous German accommodation 
of Italy’s export interest in the bilateral economic relationship as investigated in Part I. Before 
1933, Germany’s foreign policy considered Mussolini and his delegates in Geneva as 
important allies in the fight against reparations. At the same time, the Lausanne Conference 
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settled Germany’s obligations in 1932, and Germany and Italy signed a payments agreement 
that for the first time granted a position to imports from Italy that was not in accordance with 
economic logic and the German imports-reduction policy. 
 While there was a convergence of interests with regard to the question of reparations, 
this was not the case for the discussion of initiatives for Southeastern Europe’s economic 
recovery at the League. A German economy freed from reparations and other forms of debt 
would have had more purchasing power and hence was supported by Italian agricultural 
interest groups. They even supported a larger German share in Southeastern European trade 
because it was hoped that the profits Germany made by exporting to the region would be 
spent on orders of more luxury goods from Italy. Needless to say, this was not what Italian 
industrialists with expansionist desires for Southeastern Europe wanted. Part II was able to 
show that after the failed project of a German-Austrian customs union, suspicions prevailed in 
Italian government and business circles that Germany’s economic initiatives in the region 
bore a menacing character for Italy’s industrial interests. 
 Accordingly, the attempts at co-ordination over the League’s work on the economic 
crisis in Southeastern Europe could not reach the level of co-operation and the success of 
prior initiatives. The German bid to support prices in Southeastern Europe with preferential 
treatment of grain imports from the region found acceptance at the League and could have 
transformed a German initiative into an act of international solidarity. The Italian delegates 
acknowledged the plan and agreed that as a net importer of grain, Italy could benefit from the 
initiative, too. Yet, they hesitated to join ranks with Germany. 
 The reasons behind the reluctance are twofold and derive from international as well as 
more bilateral factors. Firstly, Italian representatives always warned that the implementation 
of a preferential regime between a few European countries would cause opposition by 
countries that feel excluded and being infringed in their rights deriving from the most-
favoured-nation clause. For Italy’s commerce, they feared especially retaliations from the US 
and Argentine. In fact, the US opposed the German preferential scheme and brought it thereby 
to fail. Secondly, also in the suggested preferential system, Italian foreign trade experts 
detected a mechanism which was suspected of diminishing Italian prospects on the markets of 
Southeastern Europe. In an open and multilateral strategy, Berlin had asked in return for its 
preferential treatment of agricultural goods from Southeastern Europe only for a general 
reduction of customs duties on industrial imports. Potentially, not only German manufactures, 
but every exporter would have benefited from this development. Nevertheless, Italian experts 
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expected (not without reason) that the German industry would still be the largest profiteer as it 
had undergone large-scale rationalisation throughout the 1920s and could now optimistically 
face competition. 
 Given the failure of the League strategy, the last chapter of Part II showed how in 
response a more bilateral strategy gained hold. Germany retreated from the League after the 
Nazi seizure of power in 1933, not without taking advantage of the national resentments 
against the League’s financial supervision. Nazi Germany’s representatives pretended to act in 
the name of the debtor countries in the last meetings they attended, whereby Berlin’s 
reputation in Southeastern European capitals was enhanced. This allowed for a deepening of 
the relationship between Germany and each of the states in crisis, as is further analysed in Part 
III. Even clearer was the turn to bilateralism in the Italian Brocchi contracts. Against the idea 
of an open and multilateral preferential system as discussed at the League – which would have 
the potential to be acknowledged by the US – Rome granted a series of hidden preferences to 
Austria and Hungary only, which were supposed to be the most important allies of fascist 
Italy in the region. 
 The Brocchi contracts serve as a central point of departure in Part III, which analyses 
the triangular economic relationship of Germany and Italy in Southeastern Europe and the 
Eastern Mediterranean after 1933, and contrasts it with the development of the bilateral 
economic relationship of Part I. The description of the preferential mechanism has shown that 
although Italy did follow a bilateral path, the Brocchi contracts still bore evidence of the 
previous discussions of the League on how to solve the crisis in Southeastern Europe. Part III 
keeps track of this legacy. Moreover, the investigation of the political goals Italy pursued with 
the Brocchi contracts revealed the strong anti-German character of the alliance. At the same 
time, Part I has already demonstrated that Nazi Germany’s foreign economic policy – the 
“new plan” – prioritised Southeastern Europe over Italy. Therefore, further analysis is 
necessary to understand how the growing rivalries on the markets of Southeastern Europe 







Part III: The Quest for New Markets 1933-1936 
 
Chapter 8: Hinterland/Retroterra – Entangled Economic 
Expansion in Southeastern Europe 
 
Introduction: Economic Expansion after 1933 
 
The seminal year 1933 saw at its beginning Hitler’s appointment as Reichskanzler and the 
changes the Nazi seizure of power brought to Germany’s attitude to international relations. 
Germany retreated within the same year from the first international organisation found to 
guarantee peace and economic development: the League of Nations. But this was not the only 
setback for interwar internationalism in 1933. In June 1933 the world economic conference in 
London attempted to find an internationally co-ordinated answer to the Great Depression and 
failed decisively.1002 The United Nations commemorated the dire consequences: “worldwide 
unemployment and collective insecurity. Thereafter, the economic and financial organisations 
of the League of Nations decided to focus more on the co-operation of individuals rather than 
of States”. 1003  Regionalism had won over internationalism in ruling the international 
economy.1004 Henceforth, the exchange of goods and the movement of capital was subdued to 
political guidance.1005 
 Despite the unquestionable importance of these events, some elements in Germany’s 
and Italy’s economic relationships with the world transcended the watershed of 1933. The 
following section on the German-Italian relationship on the markets of Southeastern Europe 
and the Eastern Mediterranean will show the degree to which the entangled economic 
expansion after 1933 built on the experience acquired in dealing with the economic and 
financial work of the League. German and Italian League experts like Hans Posse or Fulvio 
Suvich, to name only the most prominent ones, became high profile officials in the 
administration of foreign commerce after they had moved from Geneva to their respective 
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capitals.1006 They brought with them valuable and sometimes confidential information they 
had acquired in dealing directly with national governments and economies in crisis. 
Furthermore, the commercial instruments applied after 1933 still bore evidence of various 
preferential systems elaborated before 1933. 
 The history of the German-Italian involvement in the economic and financial work of 
the League helps, therefore, to tackle the central question of Part III: how did the ambiguous 
commercial relationship of Germany and Italy develop in their shared periphery, which was at 
the same time characterised by co-operation and fierce rivalries, and what was the impact of 
this dimension on the foundation of the “Rome-Berlin Axis” in 1936? 
 
1. Transfer of Commercial Policy 
 
The history of international action to rescue Southeastern European countries in economic 
crisis has illustrated how the recipients of aid participated in the formulation of the right 
remedy. It was the recipients who promoted preferences to be granted by the industrialised 
“centre” of Europe to the primary producers in the periphery. At the League of Nations, the 
idea of preferences collided with the idea of liberal free trade, with the latter eventually losing 
ground. Its key structural feature, the most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause, no longer seemed 
to be of paramount importance in the self-centred fight of nation-states against the crisis. Yet, 
it was maintained at least on the official level. On the fringes of this discussion, Italy, together 
with Hungary and Austria, elaborated a system of commercial contracts that secretly granted 
preferences without harming the MFN status of external trading partners. Hungary, as has 
been shown, was not a passive recipient of an institutional framework built by an expansionist 
regime. On the contrary, Budapest decisively initiated what became known as the Brocchi 
contracts, and it did not stop after it had approached Fascist Italy. 
 The new Nazi government had only been in power for half a year when several private 
and public actors reached out for a closer commercial collaboration between Germany and 
Hungary. The chemical giant IG Farben employed an agent in Hungary to ferret out the 
reasons for the recent market losses of its products and ways to employ its assets deriving 
from exports, which were blocked because of the Hungarian foreign exchange controls.1007 
Previously, German agricultural protectionism in the early stages of the world economic crisis 
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had caused Hungarian disappointment with the German trading partner, and subsequently 
paved the ground for a growing Italian share in Hungary’s agricultural exports and industrial 
imports.1008 The report by IG Farben (which the company also made available to the AA) 
suggested that the central aim of Germany’s commercial policy should be the stimulation of 
agricultural imports.1009 In the same vein argued Werner Daitz, head of the foreign trade 
department at the NSDAP office of foreign affairs (Außenpolitisches Amt), and thus one of the 
masterminds behind the Nazi conception of a “greater economic area” (Großwirtschaftsraum), 
who travelled to Budapest in June 1933. Moreover, he claimed to break “with the old 
prejudices deriving from the system of the most-favoured-nation clause”.1010 The Hungarian 
government certainly welcomed the visit of the German commercial experts. Earlier in 1933, 
shortly after the Nazi seizure of power, Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös had reassured Hitler 
that Hungary “always looks to Berlin with a certain hope and sympathy”, and that it would be 
in “Germany’s interest that this sympathy is not disturbed in any way by uncertain economic 
relations”.1011 Hitler, in return, had reassured Gömbös that there was no doubt that Germany 
would grant preferences to Hungary.1012 
 While both governments with a strong revisionist agenda for Europe showed interest 
in supporting their relationship with stronger economic ties, it was the Hungarian government 
which momentously suggested how this could be carried out. Finance Minister Tihamér 
Fabinyi spoke of “a big thing” if “Germany would consider a generous preferential treaty 
modelled on the Hungarian-Italian or the Hungarian-Austrian treaty”. The government 
expressed its hopes that Germany would be “attentive to the Hungarian desire”,1013 and send 
officials to Berlin. That the delegated experts entered Germany under false names highlights 
the secrecy and the charged political content both parties attached to the negotiations.1014 
 In response to the aspirations expressed by the Hungarian government, the AA 
instructed Karl Schnurre at the German embassy in Budapest to devise a plan. While Schnurre 
was to have an impressive career in the Third Reich, becoming a major architect of the Hitler-
Stalin-Pact, and eventually head of the commercial department of the AA,1015 in 1933, he was 
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still but a counsellor at the embassy in Budapest. Nevertheless, his analysis was eagerly 
anticipated not only by the commercial experts in public service, Karl Ritter (AA) and Hans 
Posse (RWM), but also by Max Hahn, managing director at the MWT. Schnurre worked 
closely with Etienne De Winchkler, Hungarian minister of trade and traffic and delegate to the 
League of Nations.1016 The two experts co-operated in strict secrecy, not only circumventing 
other members of the Hungarian delegation to the League in Geneva, but also some members 
of the Hungarian government.1017 
 Schnurre’s concept complied with the Hungarian desire to receive the same sort of 
preferential treatment as the Italians had granted. He took the Italian Brocchi contracts, which 
he considered ponderous, as a template and tried to improve them. As in the Italian system, 
the instruments for preferential treatment consisted of export premiums for transactions 
between Hungary and Germany and the mutual reimbursement of costs. The premiums were 
to be used to enhance the competitiveness of Hungarian products either by lowering the costs 
of production or transportation. The ratio of reimbursement would be largely in favour of 
Hungary, and as in the Brocchi contracts calculated on population figures. For the 
administration of the system in Hungary, Schnurre suggested the same institutions that had 
been created with the Italian-Hungarian preferential system. As its ideal counterpart in 
Germany, he brought the Reichsbank into play for the reason that it would allow them to 
“avoid creating the impression that this is new”. In general, Schnurre was convinced that his 
concept allowed them to “even better disguise the preferences towards third states” than the 
Brocchi contracts because, for instance, it aimed at financing the preferential system by 
releasing the German assets blocked in Hungary after the introduction of Hungarian foreign 
exchange controls, and no transaction had to be made that could cause mistrust by third-party 
states with MFN rights.1018 
 In return, Schnurre calculated that Hungarian import quotas could boost the sales of 
German products such as automobiles, textiles, steal and paper, which had been largely 
disadvantaged because of the preferences granted with the Brocchi contracts for Austrian and 
Italian industrial goods. Ultimately, the Hungarian economy should be restructured: there 
would be a move away from the domestic industrialisation predominant in the second half of 
the 1920 and early 1930s and a development towards satisfying the German demand for 
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agricultural products. Schnurre particularly favoured the production of oilseeds and especially 
soy seeds, an idea which was elaborated by the experts of the MWT.1019 Schnurre’s concept, 
therefore, underlined the role of the Hungarian economy as a primary producer and recipient 
of industrial products from Germany with only limited domestic industrial development.1020 
  The draft for a new German-Hungarian commercial contract came at exactly the same 
time as the Nazi government’s decision to redefine the role of Germany within the 
international economy. In a session on 4 October 1933, the new cabinet under Adolf Hitler 
approved a law drafted by the RWM. Hans Posse, state secretary at the economics ministry, 
explained the draft and the future challenges Germany faced. In his view, the constant 
dissolving of the MFN clause and the growing difficulties in trade with one of Germany’s 
major sales markets, France, would call for an “active commercial policy” on the basis of 
reciprocity. Especially interesting in this regard were markets where “the domination [...] by 
the German businessman seems likely”. For Posse – as for Hitler – these markets could be 
found especially in Southeastern Europe. There, Italy’s approach would set standards for 
Germany’s foreign economic policy, argued Posse.1021 
 The orientation towards the path already followed by Fascist Italy paved the way for 
the implementation of Schnurre’s concept. On 17 January 1934, an executive meeting of 
ministers and state secretaries from the AA and the ministries of finance and economics 
declared “that political considerations [...] demand to conclude with Hungary an exceptional 
commercial relationship”. Finance Minister Schwerin von Krosigk brought his concerns to the 
table that the preferential treatment (worth RM 15 million) would be too expensive a policy 
for Germany’s public finances. However, eventually he was persuaded that the concept did 
not burden the government budget to the full extent of the preferences because it used the 
frozen German assets in Hungary,1022 which was estimated at RM 60 to 75 million.1023 Shortly 
thereafter, the major steering institution of Germany’s foreign trade, the trade political 
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committee (Handelspolitischer Ausschuss), decided that the preferential concept should be 
applied for a new German-Hungarian commercial contract.1024 
 The contract was signed on 21 February 1934.1025 It bound Germany and Hungary 
more closely together at the expense of other trading partners because it stipulated that the 
granted concession could not be compromised by concessions made in any other commercial 
contract.1026 A confidential note by the AA reveals that this clause – and indeed the entire 
contract – intended to “strengthen Hungarian independence, not only from the Little Entente, 
but also from Italy”.1027 This political agenda had a huge economic impact. While in 1933 
Germany had had a surplus of RM 3.9 million, in 1934, Hungary almost doubled its exports 
to Germany and achieved a trade surplus of RM 24.3 million.1028 Furthermore, already when 
the Hungarian and the German government were coming to terms with the new contract, 
German authorities mentioned internally that the preferential concept should also be applied 
to other countries in Southeastern Europe such as Yugoslavia.1029 
 While in Germany the Brocchi contracts served as a template for the Nazi foreign 
economic policy devoted to the idea of an economic expansion into Southeastern Europe, in 
Italy exactly this scenario stimulated an extension of the Brocchi contracts.1030 The extension 
culminated in the Rome Protocols, signed on 17 March 1934 between Italy, Austria and 
Hungary.1031 The multilateral contract broadened and intensified the Brocchi provisions with a 
series of open and hidden preferences granted to the contractual partners. Applying the Rome 
Protocols, Fascist Italy reached the closest approximation to an Italian economic Mitteleuropa. 
Imports from Austria, for instance, started to rise again and grew from L. 175,253,000 in 1933 
to L. 371,292,000 in 1936. The growth rate exceeded that of imports from Germany, France 
and the Netherlands. At the same time imports from Belgium and Britain decreased. Italian 
exports to Austria only started to rise again in 1934, from L. 122,400,000 to L. 193,408,000 in 
1936. However, at the same time exports to most other countries (except Germany) fell 
sharply.1032 League of Nation statistics for Hungary reveal that Italy’s share in Hungary’s 
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imports rose from an average for the years 1925-30 of 4.8 per cent to 8.5 per cent in the first 
half of 1935 and the share in Hungary’s exports from 6.2 per cent to 14.4 per cent.1033 All in 
all, it can be concluded that the impact of Italy’s preferential systems was stronger on the 
import side, that it indeed shifted trade from Western Europe to Austria and Hungary and that 
it did not work as a countermeasure to balance the strongly increasing importance of Germany 
as a sales market. 
 The question of whether the Rome Protocols can be seen as a success or as an 
expensive and ultimately failed experiment – with Italy’s increasing share in trade with the 
member countries seen as being due to other causes – already preoccupied contemporary 
theorists, and is still somewhat open in current historiography. Whereas most commentators at 
the time, such as the Italian minister of foreign trade and exchange, Felice Guarneri,1034 or the 
Czechoslovakian professor of economics, Antonin Basch,1035 proved to be rather sceptical 
about the impact, current scholarship, on the contrary, suggests that the Rome Protocols had a 
direct positive impact on Italy’s foreign commerce.1036 For other perspectives than the Italian, 
an answer to the question of success or failure is more obvious. For instance, in the summer of 
1935, Hungarian Minister for Agriculture Kálmán Darányi observed that, “our export of 
livestock both to Italy as well as Germany has reached the maximum numbers established in 
the quotas”. Therefore, he rejected the claim that “the tripartite Pact of Rome did not satisfy 
expectations”.1037 
 The assessment as success or failure for Italy also depends on whether the outcome is 
compared with economic or more political visions about the expected performance. Of course, 
the prices Italy paid for Austrian and especially Hungarian export goods were well above the 
current world market prices due to the granted preferences, and therefore degraded Italy’s 
terms of trade. 1038  Yet, already before signing the protocols the MAE spoke of “new 
sacrifices”,1039  thereby implying that Rome deliberately chose this development to allow 
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governments with fascist leanings to remain financially independent from other states.1040 In 
this regard, it seems that a negative assessment solely on economic terms falls short of the 
mark. 
 Whatever the real impact of the Rome Protocols was, there is no doubt that the 
German government perceived this development as an Italian success and a potential threat. 
“We have no friends left” complained a government official at the AA after the news of the 
Rome Protocols reached Berlin.1041 Officially, Berlin protested to Rome against a violation of 
Germany’s economic interest in the region,1042 but there is little doubt that in fact the Rome 
Protocols were perceived primarily as an instrument to prevent the Anschluss of Austria. The 
man in the middle, Hungarian Prime Minister Gömbös – although not completely innocent 
with regard to the German-Italian frictions – argued strongly for a “reparation of the broken 
Axis Berlin-Rome”.1043 
 Disappointment, of course, prevailed on both sides. After information about the secret 
proceedings between Berlin and Budapest leaked, Rome approached Budapest to get details 
on the concessions granted with the envisaged German-Hungarian commercial contract. After 
the German authorities in Hungary had halted this attempt, Rome deplored a breach of the 
common German-Italian practice that each government inform the other about any foreign 
economic policy initiative in Southeastern Europe. The German government was well aware 
of the hostile message it sent out. Nonetheless, it felt entitled to unilateral action because 
Rome had failed to inform Berlin about manoeuvres intending to make the Adriatic port of 
Trieste the exclusive hub of Austria.1044  In the infrastructural connection of Southeastern 
Europe with its major markets, fierce rivalries between Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy 
evolved, which were as in the case of preferential treatments stimulated by German-Italian 
transfers. 
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2. Connecting Southeastern Europe with the World – Hamburg/Bremen vs. 
Trieste 
 
Competition between the German ports of Hamburg and Bremen and the Italian ports Trieste 
and Fiume (today Rijeka) reached its climax shortly after the Nazi accession to power and the 
subsequent commercial expansion into Southeastern Europe. However, the causes of the 
conflict were long-standing and deep-rooted. Prior to World War I, Trieste had been the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire’s gateway to the Adriatic. As a major commercial hub, it possessed 
great strategic importance for the government of the k.u.k. Monarchy, which invested in the 
infrastructural connection of the port with its commercial hinterland, spanning from Southern 
Germany deep into the Balkan peninsula. A direct railway connection, the Südbahn, ran from 
Vienna all the way south to Trieste.1045 
 While the Südbahn had connected Trieste closer to the centre of the empire, the 
aftermath of the Great War, defined by a redrafting of Europe’s political map, pushed Trieste 
back into the periphery. A series of new borders in Central and Southeastern Europe cut 
through Trieste’s traditional commercial networks. Moreover, it now belonged to Italy with an 
already-established commercial infrastructure (with major ports in Genoa and Venice), and a 
composition of trade different from the sort Trieste had specialised in while still part of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. Nevertheless, more to the advantage of Trieste, access to the 
Adriatic was a strategic asset when the Italian government intensified commercial relations 
with Southeastern Europe in the 1920s,1046 and could be thrown in the balance when trying to 
turn commercial negotiations to Italy’s favour. Correspondingly, Austria’s government and 
business circles complained that, “the suffocating Austrian economy was deprived of its 
natural centre of expansion”.1047 
 To regain Trieste’s strategic importance for the new states of Southeastern Europe, its 
old infrastructural connections had to be revitalised. Therefore, in 1923 the Italian 
government founded together with representatives from Austria, Yugoslavia and Hungary the 
railway company Donau-Save-Adria Gesellschaft (DOSAG), which incorporated the old 
Südbahn. 1048  According to Fulvio Suvich, its sphere of influence reached as far as 
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Romania. 1049  Igino Brocchi, who, as the mastermind behind Italy’s preferential system 
familiar with Hungary’s and Austria’s economy,1050 represented Italy on the board of the 
company.1051 Contracts regulated a harmonisation of tariffs for cross-border trade and how the 
Southeastern European states were permitted to make use of the port of Trieste. With these 
arrangements Trieste flourished. For instance, the tobacco Southeastern Europe and Germany 
ordered in Greece and the Middle East was increasingly shipped via the Italian port.1052 In 
1925, however, Hamburg and Bremen transformed the market. Previously, the German ports 
had played no major role due to monetary instability (German hyperinflation 1921-1924) and 
international regulations restricting Germany’s foreign commerce. 
 The competition of the German ports posed a serious threat to Trieste’s business model. 
Stakeholders in Trieste’s port business, like Antonio N. Cosulich, representative of one of the 
big shipping companies, had placed great hope in Trieste’s self-conceived competitive 
advantage to constitute the central gate for trade between Southeastern Europe and the Eastern 
Mediterranean (Levante) as well as the Far East.1053 Both the German and the Italian press 
acknowledged that these hopes had been based on assumed location advantages due to closer 
physical proximity (for the Austrian market, the difference was approximately 500 kilometres 
compared with the North Sea ports). However, the advantage was reduced by two other 
geographical factors. First, the Alps separated Trieste from the markets of Southeastern 
Europe, whereas there was no such elevation between the North Sea and the Balkan peninsula; 
second, the German ports benefited from what the newspaper Il Popolo di Trieste called a 
“splendid position of channels and inland waterways”.1054 The Italian business paper Il Sole 
once referred to the network of ports and channels between the North Sea and the Danube as a 
polyp with his tentacles clawing for Europe. 1055  With these two physical advantages, 
Hamburg and Bremen were able to undercut Trieste’s freight rates. Even for shipments from 
the Egyptian port of Alexandria to Vienna or Budapest, the route via Hamburg/Bremen was 
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potentially cheaper than via Trieste.1056 Between 1924 and 1926 the port of Trieste saw its 
handling reduced by 22 per cent.1057 
 Worried about Trieste’s future, Italian authorities took the initiative. One potential 
solution to secure a certain market share was international co-operation. Certainly, a price war 
was not in the interests of either of the competing ports. Furthermore, as has been 
demonstrated above, Gustav Stresemann’s foreign policy, which aimed at using Germany’s 
economic relations with the world to strengthen its international position, facilitated 
settlements of commercial disputes.1058 Accordingly, Italy pushed for co-ordination at a series 
of conferences starting in the second half of the 1920s. At the conference of Munich in June 
1928, representatives of national governments and railway companies from Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Germany and Italy decided how to organise the market. 
A Frachtgleichheitslinie (line of equal freight rates) divided Czechoslovakia into a northern 
part, belonging to the German ports, and a southern part where traders were supposed to make 
use of Trieste (see figure 3). Contracts regulated that the freight rates could only be changed 
in concordance with the Frachtgleichheitslinie. To carry the co-operative spirit of the Munich 
conference into the future, all the stakeholders present in Munich founded the Zweckverband 
zur Regelung des eisenbahntarifarischen Wettbewerbs im Güterverkehr (administration union 
for the regulation of railway tariff competition in freight traffic). 1059  In conclusion, the 
German railway authorities were confident that the freight rates would develop “peacefully, 
steadily and without aggressive intervention […] whereby not only the needs of railway 
administrations, but also business circles are met”.1060 
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Figure 3: A contemporary map of Czechoslovakia with the Frachtgleichheitslinie 
Source: ‘Zur Einigung im Tarifkampf Hamburg-Triest’, Berliner Tageblatt, 25 Jul 1928. 
  
Italian authorities, too, considered the geographical division of port hinterlands a 
success. However, their aspirations went beyond Czechoslovakia and even Southeastern 
Europe. In a meeting of Italian government officials led by Ciancarelli with representatives 
from the railway company, port administrations and shipping companies, of which the 
protocol leaked to the German Consulate in Trieste, hopes were expressed that Germany too 
could be divided up with a Frachtgleichheitslinie. Bavarian business circles in particular had 
shown interest in making greater use of Trieste, and the transalpine consortium, a lobby group, 
was instructed to investigate ways of encouraging closer Bavarian-Adriatic integration. Yet, at 
the same time the Italian experts did not have great hopes for success. They regretted that 
“today, Bavaria depends more than ever on Berlin, and Berlin is less distant from 
Hamburg”.1061 
 With the world economic crisis, however, attempts at international co-ordination, 
which had defined economic areas along lines of transportation costs rather than national 
borders, floundered. Even shortly before the crisis, Italian exporters had planned to ship their 
goods intended for the Scandinavian market, and South-African fruits intended for the Central 
European market, via Hamburg. Re-nationalisation, prevalent in so many patterns of reactions 
to the economic crisis, made these plans obsolete, and Trieste was endowed with handling the 
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goods.1062 Yet, these efforts had only a limited impact. Between 1929 and 1930 the port of 
Trieste lost 20 per cent of its traffic on land and on water.1063 
The German ports intensified their efforts, taking advantage of the political squabbles 
between Germany and Italy over Austria’s independence. Initially, the Italian representatives 
in the Zweckverband had asked to divide the Austrian market along geographical lines as had 
happened with the Czechoslovakian market, but encountered German opposition. Austria was 
therefore not divided, but nevertheless awarded to Trieste’s sphere of interest by obliging the 
German ports to keep their rates 12 to 15 per cent above those of Trieste.1064 However, when 
in September 1931 the Banca d’Italia discussed the possible repercussions of a German-
Austrian customs union, it was convinced that sooner or later this plan would include a 
railway union, which would ultimately close off the Austrian market from Trieste. 1065 
Accordingly, the Italian reaction to the customs union had to forge a new strategy if the port 
of Trieste and the plans for an Italian expansion into Southeastern Europe were to stay alive. 
 In 1931, Igino Brocchi developed a plan to subsidize transportation via Trieste. The 
idea was to use the DOSAG to co-ordinate preferential freight rates to be granted to the 
participants of the international consortium. In order to prevent competitors for Southeastern 
Europe’s trade by rail from claiming a violation of their MFN-rights, preferences were only 
provided on those sections of the transportation network where no competitor operated, and 
where consequently nobody could complain about unfair treatment. 1066  Furthermore, the 
DOSAG planned to establish a lending business, which would provide generous loans to the 
participating railway companies.1067 
 The initiatives on how to circumvent the MFN clause highlight that the German-Italian 
battle for Southeastern Europe’s trade routes was intertwined with the previously analysed 
discussion at the League of Nations on how to deal with the economic crisis in the region. 
This discussion came across Southeastern Europe’s railways twice. Firstly, in analysing public 
expenditure in the crisis states under its supervision, the Financial Committee of the League 
suggested that the budget could be improved especially by reducing expenditure for railway 
                                                 
1062 GK Pretoria to AA, 2 Jun 1930, PA-AA, R240.707. 
1063 DK Triest to AA, 8 Jan 1931, PA-AA, R242.669. 
1064 Reichskanzlei, 4 Aug 1931, BArch, R 43-I/81. 
1065 BdI, ʻRipercussioni di eventuali unioni doganali fra stati della europa centro-orientale sull’esportazione 
italiana’, 19 Sep 1931, Archivio Storico Banca d’Italia, Carte Beneduce, cart. 283. 
1066 DB Rom to AA, 30 Jul 1931, PA-AA, Rom-Quirinal 926b. 
1067 Cosulich to Suvich (MAE), 3 Aug 1932, ASMAE, AC, Italia, 1935, pos. 28 T.A. 
238 
administration.1068 Secondly, where the discussion centred not so much on public debt, but 
more on how to generate growth in the ailing economies, it was exactly in the sector of 
transport infrastructure that a path out of the crisis was forged. Casimiro Buttini, the Italian 
expert at the League dealing with public works, reported that the proposed major investments 
in railways and inland navigation could be adapted at the same time to support the transit 
traffic between certain countries and to drain off parallel traffic to other countries. That 
Buttini developed his argument on the basis of “suggestions of Danubian states”, and that 
these suggestions seemed to him “particularly interesting in regard of the international 
political problem”, highlight that in Geneva the economic interest of Southeastern European 
states in economic crisis met with political considerations on behalf of Italy.1069 
 The German commercial experts also took the opportunity to use infrastructure 
investments in order to gain international acceptance for preferential treatment. Thereby, the 
markets of Southeastern Europe and the ports in Germany and Italy grew closer, and at the 
same time the competition between the latter reached a new level. At the Lausanne 
Conference in summer 1932, German-Italian co-operation over war debts ended, to the bitter 
disappointment of Italy (see chapter 7). Moreover, representatives of Banca d’Italia 
recognised that with Lausanne, the Reichsbank and the Reichsbahn, both “equally vital for the 
German economy, regained their independence”. The Reichsbahn was relieved of any 
reparations obligations and administrative control.1070 Simultaneously, the Zweckverband, the 
administrative union of the Southeastern European, Italian and German stakeholders in the 
railway network, was dissolved. Furthermore, the Reichsbahn cancelled the contract, which 
had awarded Austria’s commercial traffic to Trieste by keeping the rates for handling in 
Hamburg and Bremen well above the Italian rates.1071 
 In Italy, many of the stakeholders in Trieste’s transit business felt threatened by the 
recent aggressive manoeuvres in Germany, and put pressure on the government in Rome not 
to give up on co-ordination. Cosulich argued that it was necessary to seek a new railway 
agreement with Germany. The ongoing and treaty-breaching practice of “price dumping” in 
railway transportation, Danube navigation and shipment had to be stopped.1072 Rather than 
speaking of his company’s interest, he emphasised that support for Trieste was a question of 
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national interest. The “importance of those countries, justifies the great attention the Italian 
government has dedicated […] to determine the political economy to be given to Central 
Europe”.1073 
Attempts at co-ordination were made in a series of meetings in Cologne (1932), 
Budapest (1932), Garmisch (1933), Rome (1933) and Munich (1934). The frequency of the 
conferences suggests that an agreement over various issues such as the legality of tariffs, 
harmonisation of tariffs, or marketing arrangements over spheres of interest was rather 
difficult to find.1074 Finally, the Italian protocol of the 1934 conference of Munich concluded 
that after Germany’s representatives had previously conducted the negotiations quite rigidly, 
they now were driven by a “very conciliatory spirit”. That they were ready to come to an 
acceptable agreement proved for the Italian delegation that “the basis of their instructions 
derived from political factors”.1075 
 However, despite the official proclamations in the name of closer collaboration 
between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, the rivalries between the ports persisted in disguise. 
In December 1933, the city of Hamburg reported to the German government that, “Italian 
circles have made huge funds available to investigate handling in the German North Sea 
ports”. The judgment stood: “traffic espionage to a very high extent”.1076 That in fact Italian 
authorities were very keen to receive first-hand information is revealed by a report from the 
pen of Giovanni Host-Venturi kept at the archives of the MAE. Host-Venturi, an activist who 
fought for Italy’s terra irredenta, and who later became secretary of the merchant marine, 
travelled to Hamburg and Bremen to study in particular the organisational aspects relevant for 
Italy’s Adriatic ports. He gathered information about the handling of cotton in Bremen (a 
sector deemed particularly relevant for Trieste), and the inter-organisational collaboration 
between Hamburg and Bremen, believed to be a role model for the collaboration between 
Trieste and Fiume.1077 
 In addition to the secretive action directed against its competitors, the Italian 
government also pursued a confidential agenda in dealing with clients in Southeastern Europe. 
The bid to win the commercial traffic of Austria and Hungary basically consisted of space and 
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money, and was formulated in connection with the Rome Protocols (see Section 1). The first 
offer foresaw the creation of free ports within the port of Trieste, which would grant Austrian 
and Hungarian sovereign territory in Italy. Austrian business circles acknowledged that the 
instrument allowed different tariffs in Trieste, which would significantly reduce transaction 
costs on the trade routes with Austria and Hungary, without harming the rights of third 
parties.1078 Nevertheless, the instrument encountered scepticism from the outset in spite of 
repeated Italian offers.1079 
 Relatively more successful was the second instrument: abatements (reductions) on 
railway tariffs. In February 1934, the Austrian government and the Magazzini Generali di 
Trieste (warehouses of Trieste) signed an agreement that substantially reduced transaction 
costs for shipment via Trieste for a series of basic commodities (e.g. coffee, tea, cocoa, spices). 
The novelty was that the abatements were granted secretly. That the transaction was processed 
by Magazzini Generali, an institution that supposedly attracted less international attention 
than a major government institution, can be interpreted as an attempt to hide the deal. In 
addition, Cosulich suggested to the MAE “in order to avoid demurs by third parties” not to 
publish neither the annex with the details of the tariff reductions, nor any reference to it in the 
text of the protocol, but only an adjusted version, innocent of any mistrust-causing content.1080 
In fact, the German business press1081 as well as the government1082 failed to identify who 
financed the system, or precisely how it was carried out. 
 However, it was quite apparent that the Italian abatements met with success. The 
Austrian business press reported that in the first four months of 1934, significantly more 
goods were traded via Trieste than in the same period in 1933.1083  The success was so 
remarkable that even German freight forwarders previously based in Hamburg started to 
relocate to Trieste to benefit from the abatements.1084 This development rattled the ports at the 
North Sea, and stimulated an institutional transfer similar to the above-addressed construction 
of the German-Hungarian commercial contract early in 1934. 
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In Hamburg and Bremen, public as well as private actors rose up against the abatements paid 
in Trieste. The Handelskammer Hamburg (Hamburg Chamber of Commerce) submitted a 
petition to the RWM in which representatives of trade, maritime shipping and freight 
forwarding demanded that “also in Germany a fund has to be set up, to grant the same 
abatements for shipment to Austria”.1085 The reaction of the German government came swiftly. 
Less than a month after the publication of the new Triestinian abatements, the AA informed 
the Hungarian government about the creation of the Hanseatischer Abwehrverband 
(Hanseatic Defence Association, HAV). The HAV established branches in Hamburg and 
Bremen, and adopted the same measures as Trieste by paying premiums for the shipment of 
certain goods. It was designed as a private institution although its “funds, as noted strictly 
confidential, are released by the Reichsregierung and the Reichsbahn”. Given its private 
character, the AA considered Austria and Italy deprived of any legal means to complain 
because, “no formal breach of the commercial contracts exists, and proof that resources [of 
the HAV] draw on public funds cannot be provided”.1086 
 In Italy, the creation of the HAV made headlines. The Triestinian newspaper Il Piccolo 
wrote about the colossi of the North defending themselves, and tried to learn who financed the 
HAV. The article excluded the German government because of the “friendly relations” 
between Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Furthermore, it also believed that the Reichsbahn 
was beyond suspicion because of the international agreements it had concluded.1087 Somewhat 
less naïve was the Italian government, which immediately judged who was behind the 
financing of the association: the German government and the Reichsbank. The MAE noted 
that commercial agents by order of the HAV had started to approach Austrian exporters to 
lobby for the German ports.1088 
 While the Italian abatements were used as the template for the institutional transfer 
from Fascist Italy to Nazi Germany, certain elements changed. To the advantage of Trieste, 
interested parties just had to notify the authorities about their intention to make a transaction 
via Trieste in order to benefit from the Italian premiums. The HAV, in contrast, only granted 
benefits after a complex and rigid bureaucratic procedure.1089 Nevertheless, this advantage for 
Trieste was largely outweighed by the innovative approach used by the architects of the HAV 
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to acquire funds for the Hanseatic bid. As in the new German-Hungarian commercial contract, 
the benefits offered to potential clients in Southeastern European countries could tap the 
assets that derived from previous German exports and that were blocked due to foreign 
exchange controls. This was made possible with a functioning clearing system.1090 Italian 
authorities and private companies condemned this win-win concept, accusing Germany of 
distorting competition,1091 and deplored at the same time that Italy’s clearing agreements with 
Austria and Hungary made it difficult to adopt this new financing method for Trieste’s 
traffic.1092 
 While Trieste could hardly win the battle of the ports by financial means, there was 
still an ideological asset. German businesses after 1933 were facing an international boycott 
movement in response to the politically orchestrated violence against the Jewish community, 
and Trieste tried to benefit at the expense of its German competitors. Many members of the 
business community of Southeastern Europe’s textile industries belonged to the Jewish faith. 
Of course, the atrocities in Germany did not remain unheard along the Danube. In this 
situation, representatives from Italy (and particularly from the long-established Triestinian 
logistics company Francesco Parisi) quietly and quite successfully convinced merchants in 
Southeastern Europe to order their cotton using the port of Trieste instead of Bremen. They 
were helped by a certain Dr. Redlich, a former director of the Transportbank who fled Nazi 
Germany because of religious persecution, and who shared his knowledge of Germany’s 
hidden transportations subsidies.1093 
Meanwhile in Bremen, a commission was sent out to Austria, Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary in May 1934 to investigate the recent losses on the cotton markets of Southeastern 
Europe.1094 For the commission it quickly became clear that, “the Jewish question everywhere 
plays the decisive role. With nearly the same transportation costs, procurement is 
predominantly via Trieste”.1095 Together with the RWM and the Reichsbahn, the German ports 
agreed to install an agent like the one the Triestinian company Francesco Parisi employed.1096 
In addition to the German adoption of Italian measures, Trieste soon again lost its position 
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because of a fading boycott movement. In Hungary, where in order to advance Hitler Prime 
Minister Gyula Gömbös took an antisemitic tone.1097 Jewish business men were put under 
pressure. By the end of 1935, 85 per cent of cotton orders in Hungary came via Bremen,1098 
and the branches of Francesco Parisi reported significant losses on the other markets too.1099 
 The major beneficiary in the battle of the German and Italian ports was the 
Southeastern European customer. German and Italian agents involved in the payments of the 
abatements reported that several times transactions had been subsidised not because the client 
had to be convinced to change hub, but only to keep a client who already made use of the 
supported port. Thereby, even those clients who had probably never considered shifting their 
transactions to another port could benefit from the German-Italian rivalries. 1100  In Italy, 
Senator Federico Ricci warned that the Austrian government would take advantage of its 
strategic position between the two dictatorships and ask for “ever more concessions”.1101 In 
addition, Austria and Hungary not only profited from the reduction of transaction costs, but 
also from investments in transportation, which were stimulated by the fierce competition. The 
project of a joint Italian-Hungarian shipping company, for instance, failed because the 
Hungarian stakeholders had in the meantime accepted an apparently better offer by German 
investors.1102 
The battle of the ports, like the construction of the German-Hungarian commercial 
contract, shows that institutional settings that were developed first in Fascist Italy in reaction 
to international responses to the crisis, and then adopted by Berlin’s foreign economic policy 
experts, facilitated the onset of Nazi Germany’s economic expansion into Southeastern 
Europe. The transfers, however, did not add to closer political collaboration promoted at the 
level of official foreign policy. On the contrary, the transfer increased rivalries and changed 
the rules of commerce in Europe. It seems from the examples of Austria and Hungary that 
Nazi Germany was able to use the new rules to its advantage. To further examine this 
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argument, however, it is necessary to take a closer look at other Southeastern European 
markets. 
 
3. Institutional Competition in Fascist Italy’s Best Market: Yugoslavia 
 
In 1933, the AA estimated that, “Germany and Italy are on every market of the Southeast 
fierce rivals”. The situation in Yugoslavia, however, was peculiar in that it was the only 
market (except Albania, which is addressed below) where in 1933 the Italian economy was 
better positioned than the German one.1103 The state of Yugoslavia, which had come into 
existence after World War I as a merger of previously separated territories, had been a central 
cornerstone in the security architecture created by the Versailles Treaties. Economic ties with 
France had been vital throughout the 1920s, but the collapse of agricultural prices brought 
about by the world economic crisis and the failure of the French market to cover up the price 
erosion with increased orders, caused tensions within the territory of Yugoslavia. Nationalist 
movements, especially strong in the predominantly agricultural regions, not only began to call 
into question the existing economic and political status quo of the state, but also sought a 
potential realignment with the biggest markets for Yugoslav products: Italy and Germany. 
 Notwithstanding political rivalries over Italian claims on terre irrendente in 
Yugoslavia, Fascist Italy was Yugoslavia’s long-standing primary customer. Facilitated by a 
relatively strong presence of its financial industry, Italy imported particularly large amounts of 
timber and live-stock. Moreover, Yugoslavia provided minerals, in parts, with great 
importance for an Italian industry with a very limited domestic resource base.1104 Italy, on the 
other hand, exported to Yugoslavia roughly half the value of its imports only.1105 The already-
substantial deficit increased even further as competitors from other countries fought 
vigorously for market shares in Yugoslavia to escape the great slump. Italian textiles were 
challenged by a growing domestic production, Italian cars by US vehicles and Italian 
foodstuffs by Greek rice and Spanish fruits. Furthermore, in the past, Yugoslavian exporters 
had more often shipped their goods to international customers via Italy, which had slightly 
reduced the Italian deficit in trade with Yugoslavia.1106 
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In contrast, Germany was strong on the export side. It competed with Czechoslovakia to 
become the largest exporter to Yugoslavia, and ran a large surplus in trade. Many actors were 
involved in the systematic development of the market for German products, not only from 
commercial business strictu sensu, but also from the sphere of cultural production.1107 The 
Zagreb-based periodical Novosti observed in 1931 that the “German penetration of our 
territories in the name of culture and business since the end of World War I was never so 
intense and diverse as in recent times”. German publishing houses hastened to open up 
branches in Yugoslavia, and filled the bookshelves with German literature. Moreover, German 
musicians and artists toured the stages of the country, providing a positive image of Germany 
at a time when, according to Novosti, sympathies for France were waning.1108 That this effort 
paid off was for the AA demonstrated by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Bogoljub Jevtic, who had 
studied in Germany, and who had declared himself in favour of an alignment with Germany 
even against French resistance.1109 The German delegation in Belgrade reported that potential 
stakeholders would demand the foundation of a German-Yugoslavian trade association. The 
delegation supported the demand because it considered the German-Yugoslavian relationship 
to be built “today, first and foremost, if not completely, on the economy”.1110 
 Despite the many German-Yugoslav bottom-up initiatives, it was the Italian 
government that first used the opportunities provided by the necessary renegotiation of 
commercial contracts after the outbreak of the economic crisis. When Italy concluded a new 
commercial agreement with Yugoslavia in May 1932,1111 the newspaper Industrie und Handel, 
a major mouthpiece of Germany’s business circles, reported that, “it is highly relevant for 
Germany to pay close attention to these events”. The Italian government would try to support 
the export interests of Italian companies in textiles, iron and steel as well as machinery. 
However, “far more relevant” than the projected trade figures was the establishment of a 
permanent “Yugoslav-Italian economic council”. Such a council, which Italy had also created 
with other countries, was believed “suitable to reduce German influence”.1112 
 The AA, too, described the commercial agreement as an Italian success. According to 
a document by the Yugoslavian ministry for commerce and industry, Rome had played its 
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major strength: an Italian market hungry for Yugoslavian goods. The fascist government had 
threatened to use its cooperative structures to put pressure on importers of Yugoslavian goods 
if Italian companies were not considered more often for public calls for tenders.1113 Major 
fascist industry associations had demanded that the current commercial relationship be revised 
because while Yugoslavian imports from Italy had shrunken, Italian imports from Yugoslavia 
had actually increased, even though typical Yugoslavian goods were available in large 
amounts on the world market.1114 In view of the new commercial agreement the German 
embassy in Rome noted that “for valuable concessions, Italy paid apparently relatively little”. 
The embassy speculated that the return service if at all consisted of “hidden preferences”. It 
was convinced that trade would develop very positively for Italy.1115 
 The careful observation of the commercial institutions designed by Italy allowed the 
German experts to tackle the two major problems the MWT detected in an analysis of 
commercial opportunities in Southeastern Europe. Yugoslavia, so believed a commission of 
MWT experts travelling the region in November 1932, could have a bright future. “The 
overall impression of the country has the appearance of an unfinished experiment”. To 
stimulate growth was “apart from the necessary extension of transportation infrastructure 
especially a problem of capital procurement”. The experts noted that even though Yugoslavia 
imported more from Germany than from any other country, no branch of a German bank 
existed in the country.1116 To address the deficit in financial representation, it was decided to 
use the German assets worth RM 30 million, which had been blocked with the introduction of 
foreign exchange controls.1117 The MWT analysis of the conditions of growth in Yugoslavia, 
and the advantages Germany could bring into play, highlight the suitability of the institutional 
transfers discussed in the previous two chapters to alter Germany’s share in the Yugoslav 
market, and simultaneously aggravate German-Italian rivalries. 
 Already in the lead-up to a new German-Yugoslav commercial contract over the 
course of 1933, stakeholders in the bilateral trade had discussed how to apply the two 
instruments: transportation subsidies and the utilization of frozen German assets. Both Italy 
and Germany were trying to use strategic investments to connect the Yugoslav transportation 
network with their domestic network. The shipping company Bayerische Lloyd, a direct rival 
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of the Donaudampfschiffahrtsgesellschaft (which was financed with Austrian and Italian 
capital), pressured the German government to pay close attention to transportation issues 
when negotiating a new commercial agreement. The aim was to open up, and possibly secure, 
Yugoslav inland waters for the ships of the Bayerische Lloyd.1118 With regard to the frozen 
German assets it seems that the plan to use them for the creation of a German bank was still 
far from maturity. In 1933, a representative of the Dresdner Bank in Belgrade negotiated over 
the funds placed by German investors especially in railway construction.1119 According to the 
MAE, he failed to reach an agreement. Yet, these negotiations were enough for the MAE to 
induce Italian banking circles “to create in Belgrade an Italian bank which would do the work 
attributed to the Dresdner Bank”.1120 
 While it seems that the established institutional framework did not provide sufficient 
support for the deployment of frozen funds, the new German-Yugoslavian commercial 
contract signed on 1 May 1934 proved to be a turning point. Like the German-Hungarian 
contract, it was designed with the Italian Brocchi contracts as a template, and established a 
clearing mechanism together with a set of hidden preferences. The preferences were financed 
with blocked assets in Yugoslavia. To the AA, although the contract with Yugoslavia was 
signed after the one with Hungary, the former was even “more important for our entire foreign 
economic policy in Southeastern Europe”. Indeed, several concessions had not been granted 
to Hungary in order not to give away capacities needed for Yugoslavia.1121 Karl Ritter, head of 
the commercial department of the AA, even lied to the Hungarian ambassador that the 
contract with Yugoslavia would “not be an important political event”, but the usual “Wald- 
und Wiesenverhandlung” (colloquial for ordinary and trivial negotiations) in the framework of 
the most-favoured-nation clause. 1122  For Berlin, relations with Budapest were politically 
already favourable and economically of minor importance. A stronger bond with Belgrade 
would not only allow the subvertion of the Little Entente, but supposedly also bring about 
substantial commercial advantages.1123 
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Fascist Italy was not able to counter the German advances in the institutional competition. It 
has been shown how the new commercial contract between Nazi Germany and Hungary set 
off an extension of the preferential trade bloc between Italy, Austria and Hungary. However, it 
also reduced Rome’s leeway to offer preferential access to the Italian market to other 
countries. In fact, Italy, which had already imported more from Yugoslavia than any other 
country in pre-crisis times, now had to reduce its imports for the sake of the Rome Protocols. 
All that was left was to witness how the German bid prevailed.1124 What was more, the new 
contract not only stimulated Yugoslavian trade with Germany, the requirements of the clearing 
also made it impossible to pay for Yugoslavian exports if the goods were transported via 
Trieste, thus rendering the established transit trade of Trieste impossible.1125 
  Rivalries are strikingly illustrated in the 1934 report of the Italian company Italrayon 
to the ministry of corporations on the actions of a German company on the Yugoslavian 
artificial fibres market, a branch in which Italy had become world market leader after World 
War I (see Chapter 3). Italrayon observed that many Yugoslavian purchasers had recently 
turned to German viscose producers. In the case of the purchaser Jugoceska, the initiative was 
taken by the chemical giant IG Farben, which already had commercial links in the field of 
paints and was now trying to break into the market of artificial fibres by asking the companies 
to “express their desires regarding the price”.1126 When Jugoceska asked and received a 10 per 
cent discount on the current price of the Italian products, Italrayon accused the competitor of 
“price-dumping”. Moreover, a government journal promoting trade with Germany addressed 
Yugoslavian industrialists directly, promising German direct investments and new 
factories.1127 
In Fascist Italy, it was recognised with disappointment that both government and 
private institutions were involved in the planning and implementation of Germany’s 
commercial expansion. The Italian legation in Belgrade reported that Germany was building a 
research centre to study sales management in Yugoslavia. The centre recruited its researchers 
from among the ranks of former Serbian officers of the Austro-Hungarian Army.1128 This 
system of recruiting local experts with traditionally close ties with Germany was also used to 
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facilitate Germany’s commercial expansion into Romania, Bulgaria and even into Turkey. 
From the knowledge collected at the centre of the former Ottoman Empire, Germany’s foreign 
economic experts aspired to access markets in the Eastern Mediterranean.1129 
 Other institutions involved in the broad initiative were trade fairs. The Leipzig trade 
fair, one of the main Central European trade fairs since medieval times,1130 established what 
the Italian consulate in Dresden sceptically referred to as a propaganda office in Belgrade. 
Again, the Yugoslavian capital was only the seat of the institution, while its scope was the 
entire region. The importance given to this office is underlined by the fact that the president of 
the trade fair also personally ran the office in Belgrade.1131 Representatives of the Italian 
industry complained, for instance, that the Leipzig trade fair informed potential trading 
partners of the German economy about the system of Sperrmark. This subsidy scheme 
employed funds blocked in Germany after the introduction of foreign exchange controls in 
1931 to support the export of German goods. While the German government justified the 
scheme as a reaction to the unilateral devaluation of the pound and the dollar, to the Italian 
government it was nothing more than price-dumping.1132 
 There is evidence that the enthusiasm of trade fairs for the idea of a commercial 
Mitteleuropa was not always well received by the German government. The Breslau trade fair 
together with Yugoslavian merchants planned to establish in addition to its regular exhibition 
activities a permanent export promotion service. According to the Breslau chamber of 
commerce, several other trade fairs somewhat surreptitiously had already created similar 
services.1133 However, Carl Clodius from the AA urged the Breslau trade fair not to pursue its 
plan because, “the task is already fulfilled by sufficient official and private organisations”.1134 
While this episode displays a moment of dissent between the German government and private 
stakeholders in the commercial expansion into Southeastern Europe, it also shows that there 
was a clear division of power between the leading government and the executing business 
sphere. This resulted in a more coherent German foreign economic policy. 
 The Italian economic relationship with Yugoslavia, on the other hand, gives the 
impression that the government was lacking a policy that took into account all stakeholders. 
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In 1934, the MAE approved a plan for the foundation of an Italian-Yugoslavian chamber of 
commerce.1135 However, at the beginning of 1937, the MAE informed the cabinet that the 
plan had not yet become a reality.1136 Actors from the private sphere, too, such as the Imprese 
Italiane All’Estero (Italian Enterprises Abroad, IIE), complained about the government’s 
performance. The IIE had been founded in 1929 by the banks Banco Di Roma and Credito 
Italiano and the industrial enterprises FIAT, Edison (electrotechnology), Strade Ferrate Del 
Mediterraneo (railways) and Societa Trentina Di Elettricità (power generation). Its task was 
to seek out, administer and finance large private and public works abroad, especially the 
construction of railways, ports and electrical installations. Its first president was no less an 
entrepreneur than Alberto Pirelli.1137 In 1935, under the presidency of Giovanni Agnelli, it 
obtained a major concession for port and street constructions in Yugoslavia.1138  For this 
purpose, a corporation was set up under Yugoslavian law so that IIE could benefit from the 
privileges the Yugoslavian government granted to domestic corporations working in public 
supply. However, this construction proved to be incompatible with the clearing mechanism of 
the Italian-Yugoslavian commercial contract. It proved almost impossible to pay for machines 
leased in Italy, to pay the salaries of Italian workers in Yugoslavia or transfer the profits to 
Italy. 1139  Anzilotti, director general at the MCorp, explained to the disatisfied IIE 
representative Adolfo Eibenstein the “impossibility of using the clearing as well as the 
ineptness to accept payments in kind, given that the clearing already now is at a huge deficit 
to our disadvantage”.1140 
 In 1936, the unsatisfactory performance of the institutions governing Italian-
Yugoslavian commerce triggered an attempt by FIAT to take over government functions. 
Already for many years active in Yugoslavia, with factories in Belgrade and in Zagreb,1141 
FIAT planned to invest in two business segments: public transportation and motor vehicles. 
The latter was considered particularly lucrative because it promised large-scale armament 
contracts. FIAT noted that its brand image and the distribution of its vehicles in Yugoslavia 
were quite positive, yet it would be even better if “Germany and France [did not practise] a 
policy of government subsidies”. Therefore, FIAT demanded that Italy too should offer 
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preferential treatment. Preferences could be implemented when renegotiating the Italian-
Yugoslavian commercial contract. FIAT was clearly not satisfied with the current performance 
of Italian government authorities because it requested that the MAE authorise FIAT “to 
immediately initiate concrete negotiations with the government in Belgrade” on behalf of the 
Italian government. In fact, FIAT seems to have been in contact already with the Yugoslavian 
government, because it communicated with Rome in the name of Belgrade.1142 
 In contrast, the institutional foundations of the German-Yugoslavian commerce – in 
particular, the clearing agreement – were tinkered with constantly by government officials. 
The MWT, in an executive meeting with major government officials and representatives of 
large corporations, gave a positive appraisal of the development of the clearing agreement 
with Yugoslavia. From the perspective of Germany’s commercial interest, the effect of the 
clearing was that of a “suction cup”, which strongly encouraged the adjustment of productions 
“to mutual needs”. Everywhere in Yugoslavia customers would be ready to change to German 
brands because “almost every child knows the current foreign exchange surplus provided by 
the agreement with Germany”. 1143  The modifications made to the German-Yugoslavian 
clearing agreement were carefully studied by Istcambi, Italy’s foreign commerce institute in 
charge of supervising the clearing and payment agreements.1144 
 With the institutional advances, and with Fascist Italy concentrating on building its 
African empire by invading Ethiopia, Nazi Germany achieved the dominant position in 
Yugoslavia’s foreign commerce. Yugoslavia was part of the international community which 
punished Italy for its aggression by imposing economic sanctions. Nationalist tensions 
increased in Yugoslavia as the Croatian population with strong economic ties with the Italian 
peninsula did not support the sanctions.1145 The German market in this situation provided an 
opportunity not only to compensate for missing Italian orders, but also to stabilise the 
established political system. Prince Paul of Yugoslavia expressed his gratitude for Germany 
compensating the losses on the Italian market, and – despite French and Czechoslovakian 
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opposition – proposed a major deal worth RM 8 million to construct a metal factory in 
Bosnia.1146 
 The German penetration of the Yugoslavian market was thus largely successful. Indeed, 
The Times estimated that Germany’s exports in the year 1936 increased by a massive 110 per 
cent.1147 On the import side, too, the German market increased its importance for Yugoslavia. 
According to German statistics, in 1929 only 8.5 per cent of Yugoslavian exports went there, 
while Italy was buying 24.9 per cent of Yugoslavia’s total exports. By 1935, this ratio had 
turned around with Germany as the biggest customer taking on 18.7 per cent, while Italy’s 
share of 16.7 per cent was reduced to the second place (see also table 11).1148 At this point, 
Italy had lost a means of political leverage that its dominant share in Yugoslavia’s foreign 
commerce had once guaranteed. 
 
4. Collaboration among Equals or Subordination? 
  
The story of fierce rivalries between Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in the markets of 
Southeastern Europe would not be complete without a description of the attempts to solve 
these conflicts. 1149  One actor who was particularly eager to lead the co-ordination of 
Germany’s and Italy’s foreign economic policies to the advantage of both parties was Ulrich 
von Hassell. In 1932 he was appointed Germany’s ambassador to Italy. In their first meeting, 
the Duce told von Hassell that the constant talk about co-operating needed to be imbued with 
meaning. Germany and Italy could operate together in the Danube basin if they agreed on 
spheres of interest; not geographical spheres, but fields of activity petaining to the economic 
specialisation of each country. Mussolini gave the example that Southeastern Europe should 
become the exclusive domain of German chemical manufactures and, at the same time, of 
Italy’s textile industry. The plan included a precise co-ordination of both countries’ exports in 
terms of scale and destination in Southeastern Europe.1150 
 In the summer of 1933, von Hassell sent a more detailed programme for economic co-
ordination along the lines of industries to Berlin. There it met with refusal, and the AA argued 
against the plan’s technical feasibility. The first option, an obligation for German companies 
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to export less to Southeastern Europe in favour of Italian competitors, was rejected outright. 
The second option, a voluntary renunciation of export opportunities on behalf of German 
producers, was described as unrealistic because the AA deemed the German government’s 
control of the private economy to be insufficient to induce such political considerations into 
the decision-making process of businesses active in Southeastern Europe.1151 Moreover, even 
if some form of voluntary renunciation could be found, the AA was sceptical that the vacant 
commercial opportunities would be taken up perforce by Italian businesses. On the contrary, 
in the case of textiles it seemed more likely that Czechoslovakian and Austrian manufactures 
would breach the markets, and in the sector of machinery – potentially of great interest for the 
German industry – a withdrawal of Italian products could make way for Swiss, Austrian or 
US machines.1152 Nevertheless, even though it tore the plan apart, the AA kept it on the 
agenda for German-Italian co-ordination in order not to upset its author: Mussolini. 
 This demonstrates that in the run-up to the “Rome-Berlin Axis” of 1936, official 
declarations of German-Italian co-ordination belied a certain level of mistrust on both sides. 
Gerhard Köpke, head of the department for Southeastern Europe at the AA, for instance, 
indirectly dismissed Mussolini’s plan as an honest attempt for co-ordination when he put “the 
blame for that in this regard nothing has happened […] on the Italian government”.1153 The 
AA was especially wary of the Italian experts, Giuseppe De Michelis, Eugenio Anzilotti and 
Fulvio Suvich, who were held responsible for Italy’s ambiguous standpoint at the League of 
Nations, and who now oversaw Italy’s foreign economic policy in Southeastern Europe.1154 
 Italian government circles as well remained suspicious of Nazi Germany’s foreign 
policy goals. Von Hassell, though he mostly acted as an advocate for Fascist Italy when 
reporting to Berlin, admitted to nagging mistrust in Rome.1155 In his memoirs, Suvich recalled 
that special envoy to Southeastern Europe, Herman Göring, assured the Italians that Germany 
did not intend to disturb their interests in the region “where it had gained a foothold”. To 
Suvich, this was clear enough a statement that Italy should be satisfied with what it had 
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achieved, and from now on it should leave the region to German expansion.1156 Given the 
level of distrust prevailing among government authorities, the AA favoured a regulation of the 
commercial rivalries in Southeastern Europe by the involved industries, and forwarded the 
task to the mixed commission of German-Italian producers meeting in Venice in February 
1933.1157 
 However, while the AA welcomed the work of the mixed commission on the bilateral 
commercial relationship (see Chapter 3), it stated that, “discussing the question of economic 
collaboration in the Danube basin, nothing has came of it”. German industrialists present in 
Venice reported that apparently their Italian counterparts were not granted “approval from 
above” to make binding commitments. Mussolini, in a meeting with von Hassell, did not even 
try to disguise the fact that the Italian industrialists had not been empowered to negotiate over 
Southeastern Europe, and added that the “directives of economic policy had to be defined 
from above”. 1158  The Italian negotiators in Venice, Felice Guarneri and Dino Olivetti, 
complained that the German industrialists only pushed for an agreement over Southeastern 
Europe because they had been instructed to do so by the German government, without 
actually being interested in the matter.1159 Accordingly, mistrust not only prevented closer 
government co-ordination, but also closer private co-ordination, as Italian industrialists 
suspected their German counterparts in the mixed commission of intransigence in 
Southeastern Europe. 
 In spite of these obstacles, Hassell called for actors on both sides not to be blind to the 
fact that there was a consensus on certain issues. First and foremost, in order to topple French 
supremacy on the European continent, Berlin and Rome had to take joint action.1160 For this 
purpose, Hassell stated that among the agrarian countries of the region, Hungary and Bulgaria 
were to be supported in the first instance. Moreover, both Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy 
would reject the formation of a bloc, namely the “small economic Entente”.1161 In the same 
vein, they would reject any plan resembling the Tardieu Plan for economic reconstruction of 
Southeastern Europe, which had proposed a regional agreement on a preferential basis, 
excluding the major powers. To increase bargaining power in negotiations with the region, 
von Hassell suggested that the governments should always inform each other on matters such 
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as the termination of commercial contracts and countermeasures against discrimination or 
restrictions.1162 
 Von Hassell’s suggestions basically shaped the half-hearted attempts at co-ordination 
between 1933 and 1936. In August 1936, the German government had come to the conclusion 
that a co-ordinated action could actually benefit the recent German trade expansion facilitated 
by bilateral treaties, clearings and preferences. If this practice spread internationally with the 
assistance of Italy, Germany could consider changing the hidden preferences it had granted to 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia to open preferences because it would no longer have to 
fear retaliation from third parties.1163 Also the MAE, when it acknowledged in October 1936 
the success of Germany’s commercial contracts, expected that the “economic progress in 
Danubian states could be achieved best with maximum agreement between Italy and 
Germany”. As in von Hassell’s concept, mutual consultation and information about the 
conclusion of contracts, as well as joint actions against the international opponents to a 
bilateral order of international commerce, were key components for the MAE.1164 
 This consensus was made official policy in the series of protocols that constituted the 
economic “Rome-Berlin Axis” in December 1936 (see for the implications on the bilateral 
relationship in Chapter 4). From then on, the two expansionist regimes were obliged to inform 
each other about further commercial advances in Southeastern Europe.1165 What they still 
lacked, though, was a mechanism to co-ordinate and possibly redistribute the market shares 
they possessed. Instead, the 1936 “protocol on the co-operation regarding transportation”, 
which intended to solve the conflict between the ports of the North Sea and the Adriatic, only 
referred to a distribution of the markets along geographical or product lines. 1166  Both 
distributions had been suggested earlier, and both had already been shrugged off as 
impractical or undesirable. 
 How much a real geographical distribution was contradicted by the ongoing practice in 
Southeastern Europe can be grasped by looking at the situation in Albania. After the collapse 
of the Ottoman Empire, the small Southern Balkan country became a favoured destiny of 
Fascist Italy’s foreign economic activity. In 1929 almost half of Albania’s imports came from 
Italy (see Table 11). The government paid for imported goods and infrastructure services with 
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money it had borrowed in Italy, thus becoming more and more dependent on its Adriatic 
neighbour.1167 The US Council on Foreign Relations wondered why the League of Nations 
“allowed the country’s destiny to be placed in the hand of the Credito Italiano and the Banca 
Commerciale Italiana”.1168 In addition to goods and services, Italian government and military 
experts, Italian soldiers and workers flowed into Albania, exerting ever more influence. After 
1927 and the “Pact of Tirana”, Albania became de facto an Italian protectorate. Nevertheless, 
neither the Albanian King Zog nor his subjects submitted completely to Rome, which caused 
a great deal of misgiving.1169 
 Despite the fact that the Nazi German government acknowledged Albania as part of an 
Italian sphere of interest, and trade relations were of only limited importance to the German 
economy, the German embassy in Tirana and German companies tried to use to their 
advantage the opportunities offered by the Italian-Albanian frictions. The embassy informed 
Berlin about the “bad and insincere mutual relationship between Italy and its Albanian ally”, 
and said that Rome regretted its large financial investments.1170 In order to secure the meagre 
yields, Rome influenced procurement procedures to protect Italian companies. Siemens-
Bauunion, a German construction company, complained to the AA that although it had won 
the bid to construct a hydroelectric power plant in Korçë, the contract was awarded to the 
Società Generale Italiana di Elettricità Milano, which had not even taken part in the 
tender.1171 
 However, this strategy had its limits. The polizia politica reported in 1935 that an 
attempt to monopolise Albania’s trade to the advantage of Italy failed because many 
representatives of the Albanian economy feared that they would lose their commercial 
freedom. 1172  In 1935, the German embassy, together with Mehdi Frashëri, the then new 
Albanian prime minister, tried to circumvent the Italian grip on the Albanian economy. 
According to Frashëri, public opinion in Albania was undivided in its “unconditional trust in 
the sincerity, objectivity and accuracy on behalf of Germany”. Therefore, he urged the 
German government to send an expert commission to Albania to prepare the ground for closer 
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economic collaboration. In order to hide the official character of the commission he suggested 
that it could be disguised as a university delegation. The embassy supported Frashëri’s 
proposal, saying that it would be a good idea to “take the chance to collect useful information 
and connections in order to achieve a preferential position” on the Albanian market.1173 The 
Albanian trade statistics show that this strategy achieved some success. Already in 1936, 
while Fascist Italy was invading Ethiopia, Albania ran for the first time a positive balance in 
trade with Italy, and German (and Japanese) goods increasingly forced Italian exports out of 
the market.1174 
 To some extent, the development in Albania resembles the situation in Yugoslavia as 
described in the previous chapter. Taken together, the examples cast doubt on whether real 
economic collaboration to the advantage of both parties, as intended by the protocols of 
December 1936, was at all possible. Although in both markets Fascist Italy’s position had 
been stronger than Germany’s at the beginning of the world economic crisis, and German 
authorities even acknowledged the countries as part of Italy’s spazio vitale, it was not able to 
counter the trade expansion of Nazi Germany as of 1934. 
 That instead of co-ordination among equals, the German-Italian economic relationship 
rather turned to subordination, with Fascist Italy taking a minor role, can be demonstrated 
with the development in those countries, which departed from the general trend. In Austria 
and Hungary, Italy was actually able to increase its share in trade (see Table 11). However, in 
light of the analysis of the bilateral German-Italian economic relationship between 1934 and 
1936 (see Chapter 4), it seems that this trade development was not due to Italy’s own strength, 
but rather due to the financial leeway it owed to the massive extension of commercial 
relations with Germany. The very generous facilitation of Italian goods, which to a large 
extent fulfilled no essential need in Germany, but were rather prioritised to ensnare a potential 
political ally, provided Italy with the revenues needed to support its preferential bloc with 
Austria and Hungary. Without the indirect financing of Germany, it would have been very 
difficult to sustain the preferences of the Rome protocols. Already in 1936, the German 
newspaper Rhein NSZ Front pointed out in looking at the Rome protocols that, “if Germany 
retreats because its rightful place was threatened, it would be the sudden and sweeping 
bankruptcy of this […] little natural friendship”.1175 The Hungarian Minister of Trade Etienne 
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De Winchkler, too, deemed the Austrian and Italian market too small to consume the 
Hungarian surplus.1176 Therefore, the Hungarian government would not consider a common 
market that excluded Germany.1177 
 To the evidence for Italian subordination can be added the case of Bulgaria, which 
illustrates how Germany took over Italy’s commercial positions. A triangular deal between the 
Reichsbank, the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) and the Banca Commerciale Italiana (BCI) 
provides an instructive example not only of the takeover of commercial positions, but also of 
the interaction of the bilateral dimension with the Southeastern European dimension of the 
German-Italian economic relationship. The latter institute was throughout the 1920s one of 
the main actors and financiers of Italy’s commercial expansion into Southeastern Europe and 
Bulgaria.1178 While initially the BNB was a reliable debtor, it increasingly missed its payment 
agreements in the years before the onset of the world economic crisis. The thereby- 
accumulated debt was then frozen after Bulgaria imposed foreign exchange controls as a 
means to protect its economy. At the same time, Germany’s commercial campaign after 
1933/34 stimulated imports from Bulgaria, 1179  which consequently led to an increasing 
Bulgarian current account surplus.1180 
 In this triangular composition of debt – with the BCI as a creditor to the BNB, and the 
latter in turn as a creditor to the Reichsbank – Rome pushed in February 1936 for a deal to use 
BCI’s balance in Bulgaria to purchase urgently needed German coal. Italy’s energy shortage 
became particularly dramatic when Mussolini declared his war campaign in Ethiopia in 1935, 
which not only created higher demand, but also provoked sanctions by League of Nations 
members.1181 Britain cut its coal exports to Italy, which made way for an even higher share of 
Germany’s coal exports. The plan for the deal was that BCI’s balance at the BNB would be 
compensated for by BNB’s Reichsmark surplus. This operation enabled the BCI to grant 2 
million RM to the Italian state monopoly for coal, located within the state railway, which 
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could then be used to buy coal in Germany.1182 In return, the Italian state compensated the 
BCI in Lire.1183 It seems that this triangular deal set a promising precedent in the region 
because a similar arrangement with the national bank of Albania was suggested already before 
the negotiations over Bulgaria were concluded.1184 
 What at first glance looked like a win-win situation for every participant is on closer 
inspection not so. Apparently, Bulgaria benefited the most, as it was not only able to boost its 
exports with German demand, but also got rid of its debt to the Italian BCI. Germany, then, 
was able to retroactively finance its imports. However, the deal included rising exports of coal 
to Italy, and for this commodity an already strong demand existed from the German industry 
running at full capacity to satisfy the rearmament plans of the Nazi Government. For Italy, 
finally, the deal was considerably more than a creative way to finance its coal imports. 
Additional financial resources were badly needed to guarantee its energy supply. Without 
energy supply, Rome’s proclaimed destiny as a major European power was under threat. To 
some extent, it can be argued that Italy had to sell its assets in Bulgaria as a result of its 
growing dependence on Germany. 
 Italy’s share in Bulgaria’s trade was marginalised until 1936. In 1929, Italy was with 
10.7 per cent market share still the second-largest supplier of Bulgaria, right after Germany 
with 22 per cent. In 1935, its share was reduced to 3.1 per cent while Germany provided 53.5 
per cent of Bulgaria’s imports (see Table 11). The MAE noticed that, “like in all other 
countries of Southeastern Europe”, in Bulgaria “German steamships, optimally equipped [...] 
landed weekly in Burgas and Varna to unload remarkable amounts of goods”.1185 The director 
of the Bulgarian branch of the Banca Commerciale Italiana, Cesare Merzagora, concluded 
that Germany undoubtedly had gained its leadership position in the markets of Southeastern 
Europe thanks to two institutional features of its foreign trade: a cost-cutting infrastructural 
connection with the region, and the wide-ranging facilitations to pay for goods profiting from 
clearings, blocked funds and preferences.1186 As this chapter has shown, in the construction of 
both features the Italian example was an important source of inspiration. 
 
                                                 
1182 Deutsche Verrechnungskasse to AA, 5 Mar 1936, PA-AA, R117.334. 
1183 BCI to MCom, 18 Feb 1936, Archivio Storico Banca d’Italia, Rapporti con l’Estero n. 107, fasc. 3. 
1184 ʻPagamento dei crediti vantati dal Gruppo Comit verso la Banca Nazionale Bulgara’, 21 Feb 1936, Archivio 
Storico Banca d’Italia, Rapporti con l’Estero n. 107, fasc. 3; Banca d’Italia to BCI, 21 Feb 1936, ibid. 
1185 MAE, 18 Oct 1936, ASMAE, AC, Italia, 1936, pos. 7-9. 
1186 Iaselli, L’espansione economico-finanziaria, p. 222. 
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Table 11: Development of Germany’s and Italy’s trade with Southeastern Europe 1929-1936 
(in percentage quotas of total imports and exports) 
 
Yugoslavia
(1) Exports 1929 Exports 1935 Imports 1929 Imports 1935 
Germany 8.5 18.7 15.6 16.2 
Italy 24.9 16.7 10.8 10.0 
 
Bulgaria
(1) Exports 1929 Exports 1935 Imports 1929 Imports 1935 
Germany 29.9 48.0 22.2 53.5 









Imports avg. 1925-30 
 
Imports 1936 
Germany 11.6 26.5 18.3 24.4 
Italy 6.2 14.1 4.8 8.0 
 
Austria
(1) Exports 1929 Exports 1935 Imports 1929 Imports 1935 
Germany 15.7 15.6 20.8 16.6 
Italy 9.0 14.3 3.7 4.7 
 
Albania Exports 1930 Exports 1936 Imports 1929(3) 
Imports 
1936(3) 
Germany *(5) *(5) 4.9 6.1 
Italy 59.8(4) 66.6(4) 46.2 24.9 
 
Romania
(1) Exports 1929 Exports 1935 Imports 1929 Imports 1935 
Germany 27.6 16.5 24.1 24.4 




(1) ʻDie Wirtschaftsverflechtung Mittel- und Südosteuropas’, Eildienst 6, 123 (29 May 1936), PA-AA, R105.360. 
(2) LoN, ʻFinancial Position of Hungary in the Third Quarter of 1936’, 20 Oct 1936, ASMAE, Società delle 
Nazioni, busta 79. 
(3) Monroe, The Mediterranean, p. 253 
(4) A. Roselli, Italy and Albania: financial relations in the fascist period (London, 2006), p. 58. 










Chapter 9: Beyond Europe – Co-operation and Rivalries in the 
Mare Nostrum 
 
Introduction: Separated Spaces?  
 
The analysis of German-Italian economic rivalries and collaboration in Southeastern Europe 
has with the cases of Yugoslavia and Albania provided evidence that even Fascist Italy’s more 
exclusive sphere of economic interest was potentially under threat by Nazi Germany’s 
commercial expansion. To further investigate this conflict, one spatial concept seems to offer 
particularly relevant findings because of its crucial importance for Fascist Italy’s desire to 
become a major power: the Mare Nostrum.1187 With this notion, Fascists evoked their alleged 
strong bond with the Roman Empire, where the term had been used to describe the 
Mediterranean Sea.1188 In the 1930s and 1940s, the exact boundaries of Mare Nostrum were 
quite blurry and comprised territories in Africa and the Middle East, which did not necessarily 
have a Mediterranean coastline. A central target of Fascist Italy’s expansionist efforts, the 
Eastern Mediterranean is thus especially suitable to contrast the described development in the 
bilateral German-Italian economic relationship and in Southeastern Europe. The 1932 voyage 
of the Italian Orientalist Santi Nava in search of economic opportunities, which led him to 
Turkey, Egypt, Palestine and Iraq, coincides with the country sample of this chapter.1189 
 The Eastern Mediterranean had much in common with Southeastern Europe.1190 Both 
regions belonged to an empire until the end of World War I (Austria-Hungary, Ottoman 
Empire) and turned into a political battlefield where the remaining powers competed for 
influence.1191 They experienced a restructuring of their markets when the post-war order drew 
new borders. As in Southeastern Europe, strong German business and commercial interest 
ceased with the Great War,1192 thus creating new economic opportunities. This added to the 
                                                 
1187 Part II, Chapter 6 has shown that in the German-Italian co-ordination of preferential treatments, German 
representatives acknowledged the Eastern Mediterranean as Italy’s given sphere of influence. 
1188 Cf. J. Arthurs, Excavating modernity: The Roman past in fascist Italy (Ithaca, 2012). 
1189 MAE to MCom, 15 Apr 1932, ASMAE, AC, Italia, 1932. Although Iraq has no Mediterranean coastline, is 
has been included in the analysis. The reason is that not only foreign economic policy makers in Germany and 
Italy saw it as part of the economic area at the Levant because of its former belonging to the Ottoman Empire 
and many infrastructural connections with the states bordering the Mediterranean. 
1190 Cf. K. Kaser, ʻDer Balkan und der Nahe Osten. eine gemeinsame Geschichteʼ, Südost-Forschungen, 69/70 
(2010/2011), pp. 397-430. 
1191 Cf. S. Nava, Processo evolutivo delle relazioni fra gli Stati Balcanici e medio-orientali (Firenze, 1940). 
1192 Already during World War I, Hugo Stinnes, who was to become one of the most powerful and wealthy 
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image as “transitional” markets, where more mature western economies could hope to benefit 
from development efforts in infrastructure and nascent industries and to increase their raw 
material imports.1193 
 
Table 12: Germany’s and Italy’s trade with the Eastern Mediterranean 1929-1937 (in 
percentage quotas of total imports and exports) 
Egypt Exports 1929(1) Exports 1937(2) Imports 1929(3) Imports 1936(3) 
Germany 5.9 8.6 7.3 11.1 
Italy 6.9 6.2 9.8 3.5 
Turkey Exports first half 1929
(4) Exports 1936(5) Imports 1929(3) Imports 1936(3) 
Germany 13.1 51 15.3 45.1 
Italy 19.0 3.7 12.5 2.2 
Palestine
(6) Exports 1930 Exports 1934 Imports 1930 Imports 1936 
Germany 10.7 18.7 10.9 14.6 
Italy 0.9 0.6 3.6 0.6 
Iraq
(7) Exports 1932 Exports 1936 Imports 1932 Imports 1936 
Germany 1.5 2.8 3.8 6.5 




(1) Statistisches Reichsamt, ed., Statistisches Handbuch der Weltwirtschaft (Berlin, 1936), p. 316. 
(2) Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel, ed., Statistische Materialien über den Außenhandel 
Ägyptens (Kiel, 1941), p. 1a. 
(3) Monroe, The Mediterranean, p. 253 
(4) ʻL’Italia al primo posto nei commerci con la Turchia’, Tribuna, 1 Jan 1930 (referring to Turkish statistics). 
(5) Turkish Statistical Institute, ed., Statistical Indicators 1923-2012 (Ankara, 2013). 
(6) Office of Statistics Jerusalem, ed., Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1937-38 (Jerusalem, 1938), p. 79. 
(7) J. Sassoon, Economic policy in Iraq, 1932-1950 (London, England, Totowa, N.J, 1987), pp. 193-194. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
businessmen of the Weimar Republic, suggested to the German government that it should strive for a customs 
union with Austria, the Balkans, Turkey and Arabia. See Stinnes to Geheimrat Clemen (Rheinprovinz), 19 April 
1915, Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik, I-220-038/3. 
1193 Cf. Di Quirico, Building on borrowed bricks, p. 62; Mussolini was convinced that all countries in the Eastern 
Mediterranean were going through a phase of development transition. See Arielli, Fascist Italy, p. 17. 
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While in Southeastern Europe the former territories of an empire became independent states, 
in the Eastern Mediterranean several countries were given as mandates under the supervision 
of the League of Nations to western colonial powers.1194 Nevertheless, in spite of differences 
regarding political status, in both regions the League also played an important role as 
facilitator of economic activities. German and Italian representatives at the League not only 
discussed commercial preferences for the Southeastern European states in crisis, they also 
pursued their shared goal to secure in Geneva an “open door” to the markets of the Levant. At 
a time when international awareness about the impact of oil on economic, military and 
political power grew rapidly, and pipelines connected the Middle East with the Mediterranean 
shores,1195 representatives from resource scarce Germany and Italy fought for strict equal 
treatment on the markets and a time limit for mandatory rule.1196 Needless to say, tensions 
thereby increased, especially between Italy on the one hand and Britain and France on the 
other.1197 
 Where the economic area of Southeastern Europe (or its variations like Mitteleuropa 
or Europa Danubiana) ended, and where the Eastern Mediterranean began, was not clearly 
defined, and accordingly many of the institutions shaping foreign economic policies 
transcended the border. In Germany, the MWT, Germany’s major association promoting the 
idea of an integrated economic area between Germany and Southeastern Europe, had a 
common office in Berlin with the Orient-Verein, an association which extended the aims of 
the MWT into the Middle East.1198 Moreover, on one of his last business trips as president of 
the Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht travelled in 1936 to Vienna, Belgrade, Sofia and Budapest, 
but also to Ankara and Baghdad. With the trip, labelled by the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung 
an “economic crusade”,1199 Schacht intended to adjust the imbalances which had occurred in 
the clearings Nazi Germany had established as part of the “new plan”, and where apparently 
similar problems had occurred in both regions. In the US, where the strongest opponents to 
the “new plan” fought against the international acceptance of Nazi Germany’s trade 
bilateralism, the Council of Foreign Relations detected the same trade pattern “in the Danube 
                                                 
1194 Cf. Osterhammel and Petersson, Geschichte der Globalisierung, p. 77. 
1195 See T. Mitchell, Carbon democracy: Political power in the age of oil (London, New York, 2011), p. 10. 
1196 DB Rom to AA, 4 Feb 1931, PA-AA, Rom-Quirinal 802A. Cf. Pedersen, ʻThe Meaning of the Mandate 
System’, pp. 560-582. 
1197 See Knox, Hitler’s Italian allies, p. 9. Cf. C. Dipper, ʻMare nostro und British Interest. Das Mittelmeer in der 
Zwischenkriegszeitʼ, Trierer Beiträge, 13 (1983), pp. 44-53. 
1198 See Thörner, Der ganze Südosten, p. 394. 
1199 ʻDr. Schachts Südostreise’, Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 Jul 1936. 
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basin and the Near East”.1200 Furthermore, the Technische Union, a private sales organisation 
of the German metallurgical industry, traded machines in exchange for raw materials and 
opened according to a suspicious judgement of the Fascist Italy’s polizia politica branches in 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, but also in Turkey and Persia. “Thereby, it realises step by step the 
famous plan Hitler-Göring-Schacht”.1201 
 In Italy, too, institutions governing foreign trade blurred the border between Europe 
and Asia. The office of Italy’s export institute INE that dealt with the Danube countries, was 
also responsible for the Middle East.1202 One of the most prominent institutions of Italy’s 
commercial connection with the Eastern Mediterranean was the Fiera di Levante (Levant Fair, 
FDL), which planned to transform the Southern Italian city of Bari into a “bridgehead to the 
orient”.1203 To some extent, Bari was supposed to facilitate as a commercial and cultural hub 
Italy’s expansion into the Eastern Mediterranean like Trieste took on this role for Southeastern 
Europe.1204 However, when the FDL first opened its doors in September 1930, the German 
consulate in Naples recognised that mostly representatives from Albania, Bulgaria and 
Hungary presented their countries’ products, while “no oriental merchant was seen”.1205 The 
FDL, which was in the eyes of German authorities at least as much a political manifestation 
praising Fascist Italy’s international importance as it was a trade fair, attracted more exhibitors 
from the Eastern Mediterranean in the following years, but it likewise kept on courting for 
visitors from Romania, Hungary and Austria. There, the president of the FDL planned to open 
propaganda offices to react to dwindling enthusiasm for yet another trade fair at times of 
economic depression.1206 That the already-addressed Imprese Italiane All’Estero, a consortium 
of major Italian manufacturers for foreign investments, was in addition to Southeastern 
Europe active in Egypt and Turkey, with the latter being temporarily its most promising 
                                                 
1200 Hamilton Fish Armstrong, ʻDanubia: Relief or Ruin’, Council on Foreign Relations, Princeton University, 
Box 668. 
1201 Polizia Politica Roma, 8 Feb 1937, ACS, Ministero dell’Interno – Divisione Polizia Politica, busta 44. The 
German Government dissolved the Technische Union quite soon after in came into existence. Apparently, its 
private version of bartering agreements was not in compliance with the official rules governing foreign trade and 
payments, and which where rigorously controlled by government authorities. See Kube, Pour le mérite, pp. 181-
182. 
1202 INE, ʻCommercio Estero’, April 1932, Archivio Storico Banca d’Italia, Carte Beneduce, cart. 283. 
1203 Presidenza Fiera del Levante to DB Rom, 14 Nov 1929, PA-AA, R241.476. Another propaganda institution 
based in Bari, the broadcaster Radio Bari, transmitted its programme in Arabic and three Eastern European 
languages. Cf. Monroe, The Mediterranean, pp. 198-199; J. Herf, Nazi propaganda for the Arab world (New 
Haven [Conn.], 2009), p. 6. 
1204 Ministero dell’Educazione Nazionale, 17 Sep 1931, ASMAE, AC, Italia, 1930-31. 
1205 GK Neapel to AA, 16 Oct 1930, PA-AA, R241.476. 
1206 MAE to MCorp, 26 May 1931, ASMAE, AC, Italia, 1930-31; MAE to MCorp, 28 May 1931, ASMAE, AC, 
Italia, 1930-31. 
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market, shows that also among private business representatives the two regions were grouped 
into one cluster.1207 
 Not only were the borders between the two economic areas unclear, but Italian foreign 
trade experts also developed trade policies that aimed at integrating Southeastern Europe and 
the Eastern Mediterranean. It has been outlined already that Italy made significant commercial 
concessions to its partners of the Rome protocols in order to support a pro-fascist stance. Yet, 
in order to actually make use of the large amount of Austrian timber it had committed to 
purchase in the protocols, an Italian organisation was founded that marketed Austrian wood in 
Palestine, Persia, Egypt and the Arab peninsula. As a pleasant side effect, this distribution 
chain brought more demand to the shipping business of Trieste.1208 In addition to Austrian 
timber reaching the Eastern Mediterranean via Italy, Italian trade experts used the mechanism 
of the Rome protocols to export Italian goods destined for the Turkish market via Austria, thus 
creating greater export opportunities within the framework of Turkish compensation 
agreements (further addressed below).1209 
 Given this spatial overlap, it is quite surprising that the historiography of the “brutal 
friendship” between Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy has paid considerably less attention to 
the rivalries occurring in the Eastern Mediterranean than it did to the conflicts in Southeastern 
Europe. One reason for this bias seems to be that prior studies usually approached the 
conflicts from a more “classical”, diplomatic history point of view. While these studies 
touched on economic aspects only en passant, they rightly deemed the development in 
Southeastern Europe as more relevant.1210 From this perspective, Fascist Italy’s aspirations for 
a Mediterranean empire rather stood in conflict with the two major remaining colonial powers: 
Britain and France. Hitler and the strategists of the NSDAP explicitly stated that the 
Mediterranean was the “natural area” of Italian expansion.1211 When tensions between Nazi 
Germany and Fascist Italy over independent Austria ran high, Ambassador von Hassell 
suggested that, “it would be psychologically appropriate to acknowledge Italy’s natural right, 
and to express practical sympathy for the development of Italy in the Mediterranean”.1212 
Hassell’s suggestion, which basically assigned to Germany the role of a passive supporter of 
                                                 
1207 Banco di Roma to MAE, 21 Feb 1931, ASMAE, AC, Italia, 1930-31. 
1208 AA to DB Rom, 29 Dec 1933, PA-AA, R240.889/1; DG Wien to AA, 6 Nov 1933, PA-AA, R240.889/1. 
1209 Comitato di Coordinamento per gli Affari Economici, 9 Mar 1936, ASMAE, AC, Italia, 1936, pos. 29-54. 
1210 Typical for many other studies that followed this perspective is Petersen, Hitler-Mussolini. 
1211 G.L. Weinberg, Hitlers zweites Buch. Ein Dokument aus dem Jahr 1928 (Stuttgart, 1961), p. 177; cf. Kube, 
Pour le mérite, p. 78. 
1212 DB Rom to AA, 12 Jun 1934, PA-AA, R30.251. 
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the Italian expansion without declaring any German interest, coincided according to the 
Anglophone historiography with the role Mussolini attached to his potential ally in the 
north.1213 
Contrary to diplomatic historiography, studies focusing on the economic side of 
expansionist aspirations detected less harmony between German and Italian representatives on 
the markets of the Eastern Mediterranean. Canali1214 with an Italian, and Kockel1215 with a 
German perspective, have focused on oil policies in the Middle East. Both provide hints that 
co-operation between German and Italian stakeholders in the consortium to exploit Iraq’s oil 
was fraught with difficulties, without further investigating the roots of the conflict. 
 There was much at stake for Italy’s commercial interest, despite the fact that the 
turnover of commerce with the Eastern Mediterranean always remained below the levels 
reached with major European or American trade partners. Yet, with most countries of the 
region, Italy had at least an even balance of trade if not a surplus, an achievement as necessary 
for a country with dire foreign exchange reserves as it was a satisfaction for a regime that 
almost obsessively fought against deficits in trade.1216 In addition to trade on favourable terms, 
several Italian banks, shipping and insurance companies had identified the Eastern 
Mediterranean as a favourite destiny for foreign investment.1217 In the finance industry, the 
seizure of German foreign property in the aftermath of World War I had created opportunities 
for competitors of the once strongly involved German banks like Deutsche Bank or Deutsche 
Orientbank. The latter, before the war one of the largest banks of the Ottoman Empire, was 
only re-established in 1924, but eventually was taken over by the Dresdner Bank when the 
shock-waves of the German and Central European banking crisis of 1931 reached Turkey.1218 
The Italian banks, which helped to stabilise the failing German institution, 1219  were 
                                                 
1213 With this argument Anglophone historiography, and especially MacGregor Knox, stands to some extent in 
contrast with Italian historiography. See M. Knox, Mussolini unleashed, 1939-1941: Politics and strategy in 
fascist Italy’s last war (Cambridge, New York, 1982), p. 286. Italian historiography denies any further intentions 
of Mussolini’s foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean beyond opportunistic manoeuvres in search of 
concessions from its naval rivals France and Britain. Cf. Arielli, Fascist Italy, pp. 1-4. Also Krüger, when he 
observed the Italian Großwirtschaftsraum (greater economic area) in 1932, saw a deadlock of Italian colonial 
aspirations as major reason for an expansion into the Middle East. See Krüger, Deutsche Großraumwirtschaft, p. 
61. 
1214 Canali, Mussolini e il petrolio iracheno. 
1215 Kockel, Deutsche Ölpolitik; Mejcher, Die Politik und das Öl. 
1216 See, for instance, the constant attacks against the deficit in trade with Germany as described in part I. 
1217 Arielli, Fascist Italy, p. 84. 
1218 BdI Berlino, ʻLa Deutsche Orientbank’, 5 Sep 1931, Archivio Storico Banca d’Italia, Segretatia Particolare, 
cart. 225. Cf. W.G. Schwanitz, Gold, Bankiers und Diplomaten: Zur Geschichte der Deutschen Orientbank 1906-
1946 (Berlin, 2002). 
1219 BdI, ʻOrientbank’, 18 Sep 1931, Archivio Storico Banca d’Italia, Fondo Studi, cart. 153, fasc. 1. 
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performing relatively well at the beginning of the 1930s. In 1931, the Banco di Roma 
presented to the Italian ministry of finance a plan to bring via its branch network the gold lira 
to the markets of Syria, Turkey, Egypt and Palestine. Scheduled for 1932, the introduction of 
the new currency would coincide with the tenth anniversary of Mussolini’s march on Rome 
and equip Italy with a “formidable and sustainable means of propaganda”. 1220 
Beyond the co-operation of banks, the German newspaper Der Tag expressed early in 
1932 hopes that the newly found mixed commission of German-Italian producers (see 
Chapter 2) could help to “develop new markets, eliminate aimless rivalries and support 
extraordinarily the mutual economy”. Especially interesting would be the regions with a 
“natural predominance” of the North Italian industry: Turkey, Egypt, Arabia. 1221  Almost 
simultaneously, Mussolini wrote in a commentary for the Berliner Börsen-Courir on 
international economic support for Austria that the small neighbour would be only of very 
limited economic importance for Germany. “Instead, its big markets extend along the Danube 
till the Black Sea and the shores of the Mediterranean”, and therefore it would be important to 
jointly facilitate “the flourishing of those countries, which would create advantages for 
all”. 1222  In Turkey, initiatives for co-operation, as Der Tag expected from the mixed 
commission, seemed possible. However, Mussolini’s prediction was soon challenged by Nazi 
Germany’s commercial expansion in Turkey. 
 
1. Joint Manoeuvres in Turkey 
 
In stark contrast to the Ottoman period, the Turkish republic had the reputation of juvenile 
verve and will for change. Alfred Sohn-Rethel, economist at the lobby organisation MWT, 
and after World War II a major theorist of the relationships between German big business and 
National Socialism, wrote in 1934 that the “system of political rule in Turkey is to a large 
extent similar to the fascist systems in Italy or Germany”. However, as an important 
difference, “fascism in Turkey takes place at a time the society enters the same historical era, 
which fascism in the two other countries brings to an end”.1223 That its economy had a bright 
                                                 
1220 Banco di Roma to MFin, 31 Oct 1931, ASMAE, AC, Italia, 1932. 
1221 ʻWirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen Deutschland und Italien’, Der Tag, 29 Mar 1932. 
1222 B. Mussolini, ʻRettet Donau-Europa!’, Berliner Börsen-Courir, 17 Apr 1932. 
1223A. Sohn-Rethel, ʻDie neue Türkei’, Das neue Reich und das Ausland, 1 (1934), pp. 11-13, 12. For an 
analytical assessment of Turkish corporatism see N. Onder, ʻTurkey’s experience with corporatismʼ (MA thesis 
Wilfrid Laurier University, 1990); W.M. Hale, The political and economic development of modern Turkey 
(London, 1981). For the impression Atatürk left on Hitler, cf. S. Ihrig, Atatürk in the Nazi imagination 
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future was a widespread notion in both Germany and Italy. The young republic, which had 
asserted its independence against colonial aspirations on behalf of the victorious powers of 
World War I, and fought in Geneva with Italian and German support for a full acceptance to 
the Commission of Enquiry for European Union,1224 provided an open market and a crucial 
gateway to the East. It captured especially the imagination of those economic and political 
elites who sought new commercial opportunities to find a way out of the economic crisis. 
Rich in various minerals, Turkey have the potential to become an important supplier of the 
German industry. Vice versa, the rapidly developing country offered large opportunities for 
investments in its expanding transportation network (ports and railways). As reported by 
Sohn-Rethel, Germany’s biggest advantage was that, “it is the only industrial nation, which is 
close to the Near East, and at the same time not suspected of imperialist endeavours”.1225 
 The aspect of colonial legacy was less advantageous for Fascist Italy. It had invaded 
the Dodecanese islands right in front of Turkey’s west coast in the Italian-Turkish war (1911-
1912) and ever since had to cope with Turkish suspicions accusing Rome of pursuing 
territorial claims on Anatolia. In 1924, Mussolini declared that, “Italy cannot but go to the 
Orient, in the West there are defined national structures”.1226 Yet, political tensions decreased 
during Dino Grandi’s term as Italian foreign minister (1925-32) who, as reported by the 
Deutsche Tageszeitung, promoted Turkey’s role in the Eastern Mediterranean by making it a 
facilitator for Italy’s relations with the “Mohammedan states of Asia and Africa”.1227 Certainly, 
an improvement of political relations was supported by the diverse and extensive commercial 
relationship, which, according to Grandi, would demonstrate the “Italian-Turkish friendship 
and joint action”.1228 Till 1926, Italy was Turkey’s number one trading partner. Germany was 
increasingly catching up (especially in Turkish imports) while Britain and France occupied 
further ranks. In shipping, Italian vessels dominated the market and in 1928 even transported 
with 215,000 tons significantly more than the Turkish commercial fleet, with 135,000 tons.1229 
 This domination was challenged when around the onset of the world economic crisis 
Turkish attempts at protectionism met with renewed vigour. The German embassy called 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Cambridge, Mass., 2014). 
1224 Meeting Grandi-Suad Bey, 15 Apr 1931, ASMAE, Archivio Grandi, busta 22, fasc. 90, sottofasc. 33. Cf. 
Barlas and Güvenç, ʻTurkey and the Idea of a European Unionʼ, pp. 425-446. See for German-Italian co-
operation at the Commission of Enquiry for European Union, also Part II, Chapter 6. 
1225 A. Sohn-Rethel, ʻDie neue Türkei’, Das neue Reich und das Ausland, 1 (1934), pp. 11-13, 12. 
1226 Consiglio Provinciale dell’Economia Corporativa di Venezia, 3 Dec 1932, ASMAE, AC, Italia, 1933. 
1227 ʻDer Besuch Grandis in Angora’, Deutsche Tageszeitung, 14 Dec 1928. Cf. Arielli, Fascist Italy, p. 19-32. 
1228 Grandi, 13 Jan 1931, ASMAE, Archivio Dino Grandi, busta 27, fasc. 91. 
1229 ʻL’Italia al primo posto nei commerci con la Turchia’, Tribuna, 1 Jan 1930. 
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Turkey the country of “administrative protectionism” par excellence. 1230  Stakeholders in 
Turkey’s import business had to tackle obstacles such as unpublished customs regulations, 
which most countries raised to protect domestic industries, but which appeared to be 
particularly widespread in Turkey. As in so many other cases the trade balance became a 
matter of dispute. Italian and Turkish authorities quoted their respective statistics, which 
presented a contradictory picture of deficit and surplus, to legitimise action against the present 
state of the commercial relationship.1231 The Banca Commerciale Italiana (BCI), one of the 
leading institutions of Italy’s international commercial expansion, called on the Italian 
government to keep the door open to one of Italy’s most vital markets.1232 Also Turkey had a 
genuine interest in improved trade relations because the downfall of commodity prices in the 
run-up to the world economic crisis had dramatically reduced its export revenues. 1233 
Therefore, to solve the conflict a new institutional basis of commerce had to be found. 
 In August 1929, Turkey and Italy agreed on a modus vivendi to reciprocally guarantee 
most-favoured-nation status in trade and shipping. However, the ultimate goal, a full-fledged 
commercial contract, was not achieved and made subject to further negotiations. While the 
modus vivendi was a dubious success for Rome, the AA identified it as a potential model for 
its own upcoming commercial negotiations with the Turkish government. In particular, the 
German embassy hoped that the regulations that facilitated commercial shipping under the 
Italian flag could be as well incorporated into a German-Turkish commercial contract. “A 
close collaboration with the Italians, which does not need to become visible to the Turks, is 
recommended”.1234 
 According to Il Giornale d’Italia, Italian companies could learn from German 
practices, too. The recent success, which had made Germany the chief supplier of the Turkish 
economy, was based on a “potent industrial organisation, which enables them to produce at 
lower cost than the competitors”. What was more, the German companies active in Turkey 
employed specialists who were trained in the “psychology of Turkish finance and economics” 
and who were sent from Germany to conduct business negotiations on the ground. However, 
while both German and Italian representatives showed interest in learning about each other’s 
commercial measures, Il Giornale d’Italia revealed that this interest was not suitable to 
                                                 
1230 DB Istanbul to AA, 27 Feb 1929, PA-AA, R118.455. 
1231 DB Rom to AA, 23 Jan 1930, PA-AA, R240.906. 
1232 Smend (AA) to Richthofen (AA), 17 Jan 1929, PA-AA, Rom-Quirinal 926b. 
1233 See D. Barlas, ʻGerman Economic Domination in the Balkans in the 1930sʼ, Turkish Review of Balkan 
Studies, 2 (1994/95), pp. 135-145, 6. 
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enhance co-operation. On the contrary, the article demanded that Italian “exporters should 
make every effort to regain the primacy Germany has taken from us”.1235 
 To put this demand into practice, the BCI undertook a large-scale financial effort. 
After it had already exerted pressure to come to terms with a new Italian-Turkish commercial 
contract, in February 1930 it negotiated directly with the Turkish government over a loan of 
one million pound sterling. That the loan was denominated in sterling highlighted, according 
to Tribuna, its purpose as a means to protect the value of the Turkish currency without any 
further reservations. “Turkey is free to dispose of the sum as it deems best”, reassured the 
newspaper temporarily owned by the BCI.1236 However, as revealed by the polizia politica, 
the supportive measure was of a twofold nature. Beyond the Turkish currency, it aimed at 
supporting “the business of supply and exchange”, and many Italian industrialists had already 
contacted the BCI hoping that their products could find greater acceptance on the Turkish 
market.1237 
 The following laborious negotiations regarding the loan, which strung out for years, 
show that the report of the polizia politica was accurate in its description of the real intentions. 
Apparently, the Italian finance ministry took the view that no foreign loan should be granted if 
it was not to be used entirely for acquisitions in Italy. The finance ministry considered it 
particularly necessary that the Turkish government lower its protectionist hurdles by 
extending import quotas for Italian textiles and creating greater opportunities for Italian 
citizens to settle in Turkey.1238  Eventually, the planned loan was changed to 300 million 
Italian Lire, from which one-third had to be used for acquisitions in Italy. Thereby, it was 
officially acknowledged that the loan in the first place served the interest of the Italian 
economy. 
 The details of the Italian loan alarmed Berlin.1239 The reason for German concern was 
that trade with Turkey had just taken a comparatively favourable development against the 
background of the economic crisis, and the Italian loan was considered capable of destroying 
the recent success. In 1931, Germany logged for the first time a surplus; thus, for the German 
embassy in Ankara, there was “no ground to be dissatisfied with the commercial relations 
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with Turkey”.1240 In the new Turkish capital, however, this development met with criticism. 
As in the above-addressed conflict between Turkey and Italy, both governments publicly 
accused each other of painting a false picture of the balance of trade. While the AA asserted 
that Germany only ran a very small surplus, the Turkish newspaper Milliyet carped that 
Germany would import only half of what it exported to Turkey. Against this estimation, the 
AA filed a complaint with the Turkish ministry of economics making use of Italian statistics 
to show with a cross comparison that the German statistics were more adequate.1241 In this 
tense situation, it was feared that the Italian loan offered to Turkey could be used to shift 
significant orders of machinery from Germany to Italy. Therefore, the German embassy 
submitted to Berlin the question whether Germany, too, had to stimulate exports with further 
loans.1242 
 Major German businesses supported the idea. In June 1932, Otto Wolff, a Cologne-
based steel-maker active in several markets of the Near East, informed the German 
government about the foundation of the Vereinigung zur Förderung des deutsch-türkischen 
Wirtschaftsverkehrs GmbH (association for the promotion of German-Turkish commerce, 
VFDTW). Among other major steal-makers such as Krupp and Vereinigte Stahlwerke, the 
VFDTW represented the electrical engineering companies Siemens and AEG, the construction 
giant Hochtief and several trading companies. The companies reacted to a decision of the 
Turkish government that, in the future, Turkish imports should be financed with Turkish 
exports. The VFDTW explained to the AA that it was already regularly communicating with 
relevant Turkish authorities, but reassured them that it would pursue its goals in close liaison 
with the German government. 1243  However, the VFDTW still lobbied against too-strong 
government involvement in the commercial relationship. Instead of an official clearing 
agreement between government bodies, it supported compensation agreements between firms 
or business associations from both countries, which would exchange goods on commercial 
principles without transferring scarce foreign exchange. Yet, the VFDTW still needed 
assistance from the Reichsbank, which was asked to jump-start the system with a generous 
loan. The VFDTW was certain that the Turkish government would award substantial orders to 
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Germany as soon as the above-mentioned opportunity existed to ensure payments with the 
export of goods.1244 
 At first, it seemed that Italian authorities, still holding out the prospect of the 300 
million Lire loan, reacted quicker to the new commercial opportunity offered with the 
instrument of compensations. When in July 1932 Atif Bey, the Turkish commissioner 
responsible for compensations, toured European capitals, he concluded a compensation deal 
in Rome, whereas he only held discussions in Berlin. The German embassy in Istanbul 
warned Berlin that it could not stand idly by and watch as other countries made progress with 
compensations and loans that harmed Germany. Nevertheless, the embassy also mentioned 
that Germany could take on the competition because of its advantages. First and foremost, 
Germany was Turkey’s primary customer, and in the rationale of bilateral trade this was an 
advantage almost impossible to compensate for.1245 Moreover, the aftermath of Atif Bey’s 
voyage to Europe shows that the Turkish government was divided over the question of which 
trading partner should be privileged. Especially the conclusion of the large-scale 
compensation agreement in Rome was disapproved and rejected by the ministry of economics, 
because the delegation had only been empowered to investigate potential opportunities, not to 
actually conclude legally binding agreements.1246  Finally, the German economy benefited 
from its export structure. Turkey’s protectionist framework subjected in particular goods to 
quotation, which could be produced as well by domestic industries. Quotas regulated, for 
instance, the segment of cotton products, to which 30 per cent of Italian exports belonged. In 
contrast, imports of machinery necessary to build up domestic productions, were left 
relatively unrestricted. For the Agenzia di Roma, Germany’s commercial success was due to 
its specialisation in exactly such production.1247 
 The system of harsh quotas and private compensations soon faced limits, which gave 
occasion to greater government impact on the economic relationships. In addition to surging 
prices, Turkish merchants complained that for larger projects the rigid import quotas could 
abruptly cut off supply, thus putting industrial development at risk. After a change of office at 
the Turkish ministry of economics had brought with Mahmud Djelal Bey, “a man of practical 
experience,” into power, the Turkish government indicated that it would gradually open up the 
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economy.1248 In March 1933, the new Nazi government offered Turkey a foreign exchange 
agreement like the ones it had concluded with the Netherlands and Italy.1249 Not later than 
August 1933, government negotiations were concluded in Berlin and created new and 
substantial incentives for German-Turkish commerce. While the German government 
selectively eased the rigid foreign exchange controls to guarantee payments for agricultural 
imports from Turkey, the Turkish government removed many of the quotas still holding back 
German vehicles, chemicals, steel- and ironware. In addition, both governments declared their 
commitment to the “principle of reciprocity”; that is, they would strive to develop their trade 
towards an even balance.1250 
 Shortly thereafter, the Turkish government demanded similar treatment from Italy, but 
faced resistance. To emphasise its demand, Ankara cancelled the modus vivendi it had 
concluded with Rome in 1929, and which it accused of facilitating the recent Italian surplus in 
trade. Mahmud Djelal Bey wrote in La Turquie that, “the Italians do not want to stoop to a 
conclusion of an agreement, which regulates the conditions of exchange on a fair and 
profitable basis”.1251 Of course, an unregulated situation was not in Italy’s interest, and hence, 
some kind of concession had to be found. Given the similar economic structure, characterised 
by exports of Mediterranean agricultural goods to the north and a protectionist development 
of domestic industries (with Italy having a certain edge), there was not much to offer. 
However, there was one demand in Italy so huge that even the most optimistic supporters of 
autarchy could hardly deny it, and that was its shortage of energy. Therefore, the Italian 
government held out the prospect of coal orders in the amount of 100,000 tons for 1934 (in 
1930 Italy had only imported 1,000 tons).1252 
 On this basis, Fascist Italy and Turkey signed a new commercial contract on 4 March 
1934.1253 Whereas earlier Italian-Turkish initiatives such as the modus vivendi of 1929 or the 
300 million Lire loan had provoked a range of reactions in Berlin from recognition to 
concerns about falling behind, this time, no great success was expected. The German embassy 
in Rome considered it still comparatively threatening that Italy had committed to shift its coal 
orders to Turkey, thus potentially harming Germany’s major export good to Italy. Nonetheless, 
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it assumed that the poor quality and the difficult conveyance would still have an impact on the 
actual orders.1254 In fact, a later report confirmed that the amount of coal deliveries had been 
significantly reduced (instead of the projected 100,000 tons to only 30,000 tons).1255 The coal 
orders also represented a compromise solution necessary to keep the compensation scheme 
running after the 300 million Lire loan finally had failed. In both countries enthusiasm for the 
long-term project had dwindled, and eventually the Turkish government declined the offer 
publicly. That the loan ended this way was according to the German embassy in Ankara “quite 
embarrassing”, and concluded an “unworthy chapter in the history of Italian financial and 
economic policy”.1256 
 After all, the Italian coal orders also aimed at supporting the Italian concessions in 
Turkey, which faced a hard time. The coal mine in Zonguldag on Turkey’s Black Sea coast, 
for instance, was in Italian hands. Most of the Italian direct investments in Turkey were 
carried out by the Imprese Italiane all’Estero (IIE). In 1935, the consortium of major Italian 
companies reported growing indications that Turkish authorities wished the concessions to be 
handed over to Turkish owners.1257 Early signs of discrimination grew within one year into “a 
broad xenophobic movement”, according to the IIE. Especially the IIE electricity producers in 
Sirket and Bursa faced in 1936 a situation that jeopardised their existence. By accusing the 
IIE of price usury, local authorities legitimised unilateral price cuts, which were according to 
the IIE not legally justifiable and put the businesses under risk.1258 
 Nationalist Turkish fervour was also directed against the large and still-growing trade 
with Germany, but it appears more as a superficial line of reasoning to obtain even larger 
concessions in the next round of negotiations leading to closer economic integration. When in 
April 1936 the Turkish government negotiated new tariff rates to protect infant industries, it 
nonetheless extended quotas for exports from Germany. The German embassy in Ankara, in 
spite of its earlier concerns with the Turkish nationalistic rhetoric, considered the new 
regulation a significant improvement.1259 During the negotiations, Numan Menemencioğlu, 
secretary-general at the Turkish foreign ministry, declared that Germany, “as a result of its 
Balkan-policy had become too strong in Turkey”. He saw his country at the crossroad where it 
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had to choose between restricting trade with Germany and finally concluding a “union 
[Anschluss] with the German economy”. Menemencioğlu advocated the latter path, and 
offered proposals as to how closer integration could be carried out. For instance, the Turkish 
government could transfer the quotas it granted to imports from the US to imports from 
Germany, or re-export German goods to countries where Germany had to meet liabilities (e.g. 
France). Even though the proposals appeared to the AA as rather exaggerated and technically 
very difficult to realise, they still demonstrate how far Germany’s commercial expansion had 
gone in 1936 and the degree to which it was welcomed in Turkey.1260 Fascist Italy, which in 
the 1920s had been Turkey’s main trade partner, was left behind. 
 
2. Egypt – Commercial Expansion on Ideological Tailwind? 
  
The market environment in Interwar-Egypt was very different from the Turkish setting. 
Whereas the young Turkish republic became an independent actor on the international stage 
with a protectionist approach to rapid domestic development, Egypt, formally independent 
from the British Empire since 1922, still nurtured close ties with the UK. The latter was by far 
Egypt’s biggest trading partner, and together with substantial capital flows and linked 
exchange rate policies its appeared in 1931 to contemporary analysts that although, “Egypt is 
not part of the British Empire [...], its monetary problems are similar to those of the 
Dominions”.1261 According to German trade statistics, in 1931, Britain (without dominions) 
dominated among Egypt’s suppliers with exports worth EGP 7,135,000. While France (EGP 
3,098,000) was in distant second place, Italy followed closely behind (EGP 2,890,000) and 
Germany ranked fourth (EGP 2,537,000).1262 
 Both Germany and Italy had to fight against institutional obstacles if they wanted to 
benefit from a market development, which even in the period between 1929 and 1937 
witnessed slowed-down but nonetheless still-existing real GDP per capita growth,1263 and 
which provided the European countries with a profitable trade surplus. At the onset of the 
world economic crisis, as the Egyptian government was unable to generate sufficient revenues 
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with tax hikes, it developed its customs policy as a fiscal means. Countries without an official 
commercial contract with Egypt were obliged to pay a global 100 per cent customs surcharge. 
Accordingly, Germany and Italy hurried in 1930 to establish institutional frameworks for their 
economic relationships previously unregulated. On 25 March 1930, the German and the 
Egyptian government signed a provisional agreement in which both parties granted each other 
most-favoured-nation status, by which, “for the time the interest of Germany’s commerce is 
protected”.1264 Italian authorities monitored this institutional development,1265 and signed a 
similar treaty in the summer of 1930. According to the German embassy in Rome, Italy did 
not hesitate to accommodate Egypt’s commercial interest to the maximum extent possible as it 
put special emphasis on the extension of economic relations with Egypt.1266 
 Egypt offered not only one of the few relatively open markets with growth prospects, 
it also produced with cotton a commodity that still enjoyed high demand in Germany and 
especially in Italy.1267 In addition, in both countries the established supply chain, with the US 
being the major raw material supplier, was called into question when the Atlantic gap widened 
over disputes deriving from customs protections and currency devaluations.1268 The Fiera Di 
Levante, Italy’s propagandistic outpost to promote commercial relations with the Near East, 
was instructed to market Egyptian cotton in Italy, if necessary even with additional loans.1269 
Yet, the Italian advances could not prevent that with a joint initiative of German big business 
in the cotton trade, over the course of 1932, Germany overtook Italy among Egypt’s best 
clients.1270 In the same year Egypt’s terms of trade improved, thanks to the price of its cotton 
(see Table 13). 
 
Table 13: Egypt’s terms of trade 1931-1936 (1934 = 100) 
 
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 
Index of average export 
price of cotton 
92 92 94 100 107 111 
 
Source: C. Issawi, Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis (London, 1947). 
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The consortium established a plan to barter Egyptian cotton with German artificial fertilisers 
with a compensation agreement. Representatives of German banks, the Stickstoff-Syndikat 
(nitrogen-syndicate),1271 and cotton trading houses based in Germany and Alexandria joined 
the consortium. It negotiated directly with the Egyptian government over a transaction worth 
RM 9-10 million.1272 However, although the exchange seemed like a win-win-situation in 
view of both countries’ specialisations – with the German chemical industry exporting a major 
primary product for Egypt’s most profitable export good – the global environment of this 
barter agreement posed threats. The Anglo-South American Bank, a British and Argentinean 
bank, traded in Egypt with Chilean saltpetre, a natural fertiliser and cash cow till the invention 
of artificial fertilisers. At the time, it experienced financial distress and had to be supported by 
the Bank of England. Subsequently, the German consortium recognised that their attempt to 
increase the amount of fertilisers traded for cotton was halted by the Egyptian government, 
apparently in consideration of British commercial interest.1273 Nevertheless, compared with 
the UK competitors, the AA only felt discriminated against when bidding for large-scale 
government contracts.1274 Apart from that, the commercial agreement of 1930 still allowed for 
a relatively open access to the market. 
 Another marketing difficulty, the information asymmetry between company 
headquarters in Europe and the Egyptian market, continued to fuel discussions. The central 
German lobby organisation of foreign commerce, the Reichsverband des deutschen Gross- 
und Ueberseehandels, complained that German authorities would systematically favour 
German corporations building up their own representations in Egypt. Thereby, they would 
prevent specialised trading organisations in Germany from buying goods in Germany and 
market them together with Egyptian importers.1275 The tone of the complaint already caused 
dissension with the AA, which felt compelled to remind the Reichsverband, that “our 
diplomatic representations have to protect the overall interest of Germany, that is, the best 
possible sales of our goods and not restrict themselves to represent a specific group”.1276 
Moreover, the German chamber of commerce for Egypt rejected the content of the complaint 
as well. Whereas it principally acknowledged the idea to interpose trading organisations, in 
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the case of Egypt “this seems hardly possible because most transactions (thanks to the fierce 
competition from all countries) come about through responding to special requests, and those 
are more easily and faster collected with direct relations”.1277 
 The market environment and the collaboration with local representatives changed 
dramatically when, after the Nazi seizure of power, the boycott movement against German 
goods reached Egypt. Traditionally, many German firms had engaged members of the local 
Jewish minority. According to the AA, “Egyptian” representatives were regarded as less 
capable in terms of foreign languages and commercial skills. In contrast, Egyptian authorities 
accused the German personnel policy of wage-dumping.1278 The echoes of the boycott calls 
were clearly audible in Egypt, yet orders from Germany still increased over the first half of 
1933. The AA noticed “that there can be no talk of a united front of Jewish import 
representatives”,1279 and collaboration should continue as long as a representative did not 
agitate against Germany’s commercial interest. It was Egypt’s commercial attaché in Berlin, 
Salem Bey, who demanded that Germany should take the opportunity to replace all “Jewish 
businessmen” with “Egyptians”. He added that this might increase the German bidders’ 
chance when competing for government contracts.1280 
 The official Italian representation in Egypt took a middle stance. Much of the English- 
and French-speaking press clearly supported the calls for boycott. According to the Italian 
embassy, this paved the ground for goods that had previously faced stiff competition from 
German products. Yet, even in spite of a political environment offering untapped commercial 
opportunities to Italy, and a large section of Italian citizens in Egypt belonging to the Jewish 
faith, the Italian Giornale d’Oriente, for instance, did not argue for taking advantage of the 
boycott. While it shared concerns of the Jewish community, at the same time, it dissociated 
itself from the anti-German press.1281 
 It appears from this example that rivalries between Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy 
were less severe in Egypt than in other markets. This assessment is backed by evidence from 
the rivalries between the German and Italian ports. Even though the ports of the North Sea 
and the Adriatic competed for the same transactions (see Chapter 8), this long-lasting battle 
did not prohibit German authorities from allowing the import of Egyptian agricultural 
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products via Trieste, and even agreed to use the German-Italian clearing mechanism to pay for 
the goods Italian merchants bought in Egypt.1282 However, these kinds of concessions reached 
their limits when markets of higher German-Italian competition – like Southeastern Europe – 
were included. The already-examined commercial contract between Germany and Hungary, 
by which Nazi Germany harvested what Fascist Italy had previously sown, subsidised 
Hungarian cotton imports from Egypt via Bremen to an amount that undercut the rates via 
Trieste.1283 
In 1934, after the boycott movement ebbed, German-Egyptian commercial relations 
gained in importance. An almost-undampened German commercial expansion led to a second 
place among the countries importing from Egypt. Moreover, throughout the world economic 
crisis, Egypt’s relevance for Germany’s overall import increased. The Egyptian chamber of 
commerce in Germany draw attention to trade statistics showing that while Germany’s overall 
import declined between 1929 and 1934 from 100 index points to 33.1, imports from Egypt 
only went down to 55.7.1284 This development was felt overseas. Herbert Feis, economic 
advisor for international affairs to the US Department of State, informed the US agricultural 
administration about the harm done to US cotton exports. Usually, Italy and Germany had 
taken significant amounts of the annual production, with the latter alone buying almost 10 per 
cent. However, while in the first three months of 1933 Germany had purchased 71.7 per cent 
of its cotton in the US, in the first three months of 1934, the amount was reduced to 53 per 
cent.1285 
 The demand for cotton in Germany was not all that brought it closer to Egypt. The 
Egyptian chamber of commerce in Germany conveyed the great admiration among “the 
Egyptian youth” for Germany. “With its technique and its science, with its art and its literature, 
it provides a role model, and if Egypt seeks alignment with a fully developed industrial 
country, it seeks this alignment most preferably with Germany”. Furthermore, to the chamber 
the strong population growth in Egypt resembled the German situation in the mid-nineteenth 
century, when domestic industrial expansion spurred economic growth, and Egypt aspired to 
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enjoy this demographic dividend, too.1286 Fascist Italy was keen on playing a similar inspiring 
role for the countries in the Near East. Although Mussolini’s foreign policy attempted to avoid 
direct association with the nationalistic, revolutionary movements in Egypt,1287 it was clear at 
least to German observers “that Rome, […] where orientalism has been particularly cultivated 
[...] looks out for any constellation” aimed at replacing – also commercially – the dominant 
influence of Britain.1288 
 The decision to wage war on Ethiopia, however, undermined this strategy of “soft” 
expansion.1289 The Italian delegation in Cairo noted that in spite of the “ancient and traditional 
friendship towards Italy [...] Egypt cannot stay outside of the organism of the British Empire”. 
In fact, Egypt was the only non-member of the League of Nations that took part in the 
sanctions imposed on the Italian aggressor by the international organisation. In particular, the 
Coptic population of Upper Egypt, with strong cultural ties with the Ethiopian Orthodox 
Church, opted to keep the established close relationship with the United Kingdom.1290 The 
German embassy in Cairo recognised that Italy was falling behind commercially during the 
sanctions, partially because authorities denied payments for cotton already delivered before 
the implementation of the sanctions. At the same time, the ever-more practised compensations 
between German exporting companies, German banks as intermediaries and the Egyptian 
government as the official vendor of cotton, proved to be quite successful.1291 This was not 
the case in Italy where the Comitato di Coordinamento per gli Affari Economici (co-
ordination committee of economic affairs), a major steering body of foreign commerce, 
criticised the Italian compensation scheme and reprimanded Italian cotton importers. 
Allegedly, they had circumvented Italian trading houses because of their uncompetitive 
pricing.1292 
 In conclusion, Italy’s “soft” approach to make Egypt part of the Mare Nostrum reached 
its limits because of institutional weaknesses in the commercial relationship, and because its 
“hard” military expansion in Ethiopia discredited Fascist Italy in the eyes of many members 
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of the nationalistic Arabic movement. Unfortunately, Fascist Italy had hoped to find in this 
movement allies to sap the hegemonic position of the British Empire not only in Egypt but 
also in Palestine. 
 
3. Italy’s Multiple Replacement through Nazi Germany’s Trade with Palestine 
 
Unlike independent Egypt, Palestine was mandated to Britain, which held a firm grip on the 
remarkably developing economy. The UK played the dominant role in Palestine’s banking and 
trade. With Barclays and the Anglo-Palestine Bank, a branch of the Jewish Colonial Trust, two 
out of the five larger banks active in Palestine belonged to the British finance industry. The 
latter was broadly involved in the construction boom that followed the Jewish immigration 
into Palestine, and which made the growing Palestine economy a rare exception in the global 
economic downturn of the 1930s.1293 Large-scale projects such as the extension of the deep 
sea port of Haifa and the pipeline that connected Haifa with the oil reserves of Iraq (see below) 
created huge import requirements.1294 According to Italian statistics, imports shot up from Lp 
(Palestine Pound) 7,166,593 in 1929 to Lp 15,200,000 in 1934.1295 On the export side, the 
Jaffa orange, due to its skin particularly suitable for transportation and very appealing to the 
taste of Northern Europe, became an export hit.1296 Only between 1931 and 1932, orange 
production grew from 3 to 5 million boxes.1297 Altogether, during the period from 1929 to 
1934 the volume of total exports increased from Lp 1,554,262 to Lp 3,250,000.1298 Given the 
exceptional development during the world economic crisis, with even the global scourge of 
mass unemployment nearly unknown, it is not surprising that Germany and Italy sought to 
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bypass the bulwark erected with the mandate-status by Britain to benefit from enticing 
commercial opportunities. 
The preferred method to breach the mandate was to build up direct relationships with 
those political groups who opposed foreign rule. Fascist Italy supported at the same time the 
Arabic nationalist movement in Palestine as well as the Zionists, for instance, with a Jewish 
naval school in Civitavecchia.1299 Moreover, a scholarship programme provided graduates of 
the Istituto Superiore di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali in Bari with the opportunity to 
get hands-on experience on the Levant. The Italian consulate in Jerusalem supported the 
programme because Palestine, “given its geographical proximity and its optimal maritime 
connection […] should be almost exclusively tied to the commerce of our country”. Such 
domination was still wishful thinking, and therefore the scholarship holders were placed in 
two sectors where Italian businesses had already gained a foothold: banking and shipping. 
The Banco di Roma operated branch offices in Palestine, but was limited in scope due to the 
prevalent influence of British banks. 1300  In the sector of shipping, however, the Italian 
mercantile marine ruled the market. It was exactly in this sector that Fascist Italy was able to 
economically benefit from the migratory flows towards Palestine. 
 The Jewish emigration from Europe, and after 1933 in particular from the Third Reich, 
was to a large extent carried out via the port of Trieste, which faced the economic crisis and 
heavy competition from the German ports of the North Sea (see Chapter 8). Therefore, it had 
to seek alternatives to ensure economic survival. From the early 1920s, the Comitato Italiano 
di Assistenza agli Emigranti Ebrei (Italian Committee for Assistance to Jewish Emigrants) 
negotiated between potential emigrants, port authorities in Trieste and Italian shipping 
companies. “Given the importance of the Jewish migratory movement, which is probably the 
most remarkable in the context of global emigration […] the interest that Italy has, and must 
have, is evident due to political, economic and cultural reasons”, the committee wrote to 
Mussolini. According to its statistics, 4,028 people emigrated to Palestine via Trieste in 1931, 
8,264 in 1932 and 21,183 in 1933. Whereas emigrants to the Americas left Europe 
preponderantly from other Italian ports, all emigrants leaving for Palestine from Italy passed 
through Trieste. One of the principal reasons for this bias was the established network of 
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commercial shipping between Trieste-based shipping companies and Palestine. In 1933, for 
instance, the Italian merchant marine transported 962,019 tons of Palestine’s total import of 
3,223,959 tons, significantly more than the second-placed British merchant marine (646,608 
tons).1301  In addition, Trieste became a major European hub for the distribution of Jaffa 
oranges.1302 
 Over the thriving transit of persons and (non-Italian) goods, Italian industrialists 
nurtured hopes that ultimately their products would also find greater acceptance in Palestine. 
At first, the hopes were rather disappointing, particularly in comparison with German 
products (see Table 12). The Italian consulate in Jerusalem reported that the general strengths 
of the German industry – “commercial methods, organisation of credit, propaganda” – also 
played a role for successful positioning on the Palestine market. What was more in the 
specific Palestine context, many emigrants from Germany would bring with them a clear 
preference for German products and act as commercial multipliers.1303 
A window of opportunity then opened for Italian industrialists when in reaction to 
Hitler’s rise to power the boycott-movement against German products picked up pace. For 
instance, the Ostthüringsche Metallwarenfabrik, a metalworking company, gave a daunting 
account of its sales situation in Palestine. “What is lost here to German commerce and 
industry is outrageous” complained the completely ousted company. Contracts were awarded 
to competitors even if their prices were above the German bid, and in addition to British and 
French companies, Italian firms had seized the moment.1304 The Italian economy not only 
benefited from less competition. Gestapo (Nazi Germany’s secret police) documentation 
attests that a German company, the metal processing Robert Tümmler, relocated to Italy to 
circumvent the boycotts, thus strengthening Italian-Palestine commercial relations.1305 
 However, with a new commercial means to ward off the boycott, the Nazi government 
changed the game. Foreign exchange authorities under Nazi control had denied Jewish 
emigrants forced out of Germany by the brutal anti-Semitic attacks the chance to transfer fully 
their assets to Palestine. In this constellation, with German export goods held back because of 
the boycott in Palestine, and assets of Jewish emigrants held back by the Nazi government, 
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German government institutions (AA, RWM, Reichsbank) negotiated in May 1933 an 
agreement with the Hanotea Ltd., a private citrus planting company run by Sam Cohen. The 
agreement provided for two bank accounts at the Reichsbank: one for the Anglo-Palestine 
Bank and one for the Tempel Bank. The latter was a small financial institution founded by the 
Tempelgesellschaft, a German Protestant sect based in Palestine.1306 For a cynical fee, the 
Nazi government allowed Jewish emigrants to apply at German foreign exchange authorities 
for permission to transfer their assets to these accounts.1307 Vice versa, the Hanotea used the 
thereby collected money to purchase German pipes, pumps, construction material and 
fertilisers – all the goods necessary to expand the booming citrus business in Palestine. The 
Hanotea agreement soon developed into the similar Haavara agreement, by which a 
representative body of the Zionist movement (Haavara) replaced the private company.1308 The 
AA admitted that the deal was no means to facilitate the dreadful fate of the Jewish emigrants, 
but solely an attempt to break the boycott.1309 
 Although this arrangement was well known in Palestine, and open quarrels broke out 
between different factions within the Zionist movement whether the Haavara-agreement was 
a legitimate tool,1310 it was implemented and indeed fostered German exports. The Deutsche 
Levante-Linie, a shipping company specialised in trade with Palestine, reported that whereas 
in the first half of 1933 it had unloaded 14,146 tons of goods in the port of Jaffa, over the 
same period of 1934 the amount rose to 23,207 tons. For the port of Haifa the development 
was “even more favourable”. Furthermore, representatives of the Levante-Linie urged the 
Nazi government to generously provide foreign exchange for the import of citrus fruits from 
Palestine. “Palestine’s citrus industry is of such outstanding importance for the economic life 
of Palestine, that the stakeholders of the citrus industry can be regarded as crucial”, argued a 
representative based in Jaffa.1311 A generous access for the Jaffa orange to the German market, 
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therefore, was considered appropriate to ease the boycott tendencies and the opposition 
against the Haavara-agreement. 
This combined effort to fight back the boycott of German products showed remarkable 
results. Between 1933 and 1934 Germany increased its share in Palestine’s orange sales from 
17.6 per cent to 23 per cent, while Britain’s share decreased from 72.3 per cent to 64.2 per 
cent. At the same time Germany’s exports soared from Lp 775,100 in 1932 to Lp 1,659,000 in 
1934. Especially the lucrative sector of finished goods profited. In March, when new 
equipment for the upcoming planting season was purchased, German exports of finished 
products regularly topped even British exports. In March 1933, Germany’s exports goods 
worth Lp 98.400 were only slightly ahead pf Britain’s exports worth Lp 93,400. In March 
1935, however, Germany’s exports had more than doubled in size to Lp 257,600, while 
British exports only increased to Lp 165,500.1312 
 For Fascist Italy’s commercial interest in Palestine, Germany’s export campaign had a 
devastating impact in several respects. It has been already shown that since the Haavara-
agreement was set in motion, the German merchant marine was able to increase its Palestine 
business. Given the dominant position of Italian lines, it is not surprising that this 
development was sceptically observed by the Italian shipping company Lloyed Triestino.1313 
 Yet, in shipping the negative impact was still relatively mild. More threatening was the 
impact on Italian exports. The Haavara-agreement made an extension of commercial relations 
with the Jewish community hardly possible. Moreover, the agreement also triggered attempts 
by Arab orange planters to receive a similarly beneficial access to the German market by 
promising to shift their orders of finished goods, which previously had gone to other countries, 
to Germany.1314 As a result, Italy’s export to Palestine, which had always generated a badly 
needed surplus for Italy, went into decline. While in 1932, Italy still occupied the eighth place 
among Palestine’s suppliers, it only reached tenth place in 1933 and dropped out of the top-
ten in 1934.1315   
 Lastly, the German export campaign in Palestine also burdened Italy’s strategically 
important relationship with the German market (see Part I). Especially the export of southern 
fruits to the market north of the Alps had created essential export revenues. However, by 1935, 
the Jaffa orange had replaced Italian oranges on the German market, much to the regret of 
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Italian authorities.1316 Therefore, the case of Palestine adds more weight to the argument that 
Nazi Germany’s commercial expansion and the repercussions with Italy’s commercial 
positions in third-party markets counteracted the market benefits Nazi Germany offered to the 
Italian economy in their bilateral economic relationship. 
 
4. Iraq’s oil 
 
Iraq, although not directly bordering the Mediterranean, was connected in the 1930s with the 
countries of the Eastern Mediterranean by technical means that changed significantly the 
world of the twentieth century. Pipelines and railways carried crude oil from the recently 
developed, waste oil reservoirs of Iraq to port towns such as Haifa or Tripoli. From there the 
oil was made available in particular to the nearby European markets. The route of 
transportation was an expression of the political landscape in the Eastern Mediterranean, 
which was to a large extant structured by the League of Nations’ mandate system. The closest 
Mediterranean port towns for Iraq either belonged to the British mandate for Palestine or the 
French mandate for Syria and the Lebanon. The state of Iraq, in contrast, after it had been 
mandated to Britain in 1920, gained formal independence as of 1932. Nonetheless, many 
contracts still guaranteed a certain competitive edge for British commercial interest on the 
Iraqi market and yet, from time to time rising aversion of Iraq’s elite vis-à-vis its former 
ruling power proved to be a window of opportunity for the business community of countries 
unburdened by a colonial past. 
 In Germany and Italy, this political constellation nurtured hopes to profit from large-
scale public works, which had been discussed at the League of Nations and which after 1931 
in defiance of the world economic crisis revived the oil-rich country.1317 As early as 1930, 
Germany’s ambassador in Rome, Carl von Schubert, discussed with Italian Foreign Minister 
Dino Grandi that, if forces were joined, a bid for tender would seem more likely to have 
success. While Iraq’s formal independence was still under way, von Schubert reckoned that 
London would only grant formal independence to Iraq because it actually facilitated the 
realisation of its commercial objectives.1318 Another argument for closer co-operation was 
presented by the German representation in Iraq. It argued that negotiating with Baghdad for 
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government contracts always carried the risk that the bidding companies were played out 
against one other by the Iraqi government.1319   
 One of the most promising projects was the irrigation plan for the Euphrates. The 
project foresaw a system of channels regulating the flow of the river Euphrates into the lake 
Habbaniyah in order to reduce damage by river floods. The estimated realisation costs of the 
whole project were about one million pounds sterling, and the Iraqi government intended to 
award the realisation to one hand only.1320 Accordingly, in order to prevail against the many 
competitors, consortia had to be found. The companies Allgemeine Baugesellschaft Lenz & 
Co from Germany as well as Domenico Vitali & Co and Pietro Cidonio from Italy reached out 
for each other. The negotiators, the Italian general Armando Mola with sound experience in 
Iraq, and the German engineer Walter Ulrich, found and registered in Iraq the company Iraq 
Contracting Company Ltd.1321 Other German construction companies, namely Julius Berger 
Tiefbau AG and Phillipp Holzmann AG, joined another international consortium to bid for the 
Habbaniyah project.1322 Nevertheless, the German consulate in Baghdad dubiously reckoned 
that, “without the conjunction of the German construction company […] with a powerful 
English group not much can be achieved here”.1323  That this estimation was accurate is 
demonstrated by the bid of a consortium consisting of Italian firms only. Dominated by the 
Banco di Roma, which guaranteed every necessary loan, the consortium still did not manage 
to make it onto the short list, and complained about discrimination in the tendering 
procedure. 1324  After all, the tendering turned out to be a competition of British 
corporations.1325 
 Different was the situation of the British Oil Development Company (BOD), a 
consortium constituted mainly by British, but also Italian and German shareholders.1326 In 
1932, the Iraqi government granted the exploitation of the oil reservoirs west of the river 
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Tigris and north of the thirty-third degree latitude to the consortium. It was the second big oil 
consortium operating in Iraq next to the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), a group which 
included the four major oil companies Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Shell Group, Compagnie 
française des pétroles and the Near East Development Corporation (Standard Oil). Whereas 
IPC’s shares were distributed equally among its members, the BOD was founded initially as a 
British company, that is, with legal requirements to be registered and headquartered in the UK 
as well as to have a British chairman. Sure enough, for British stakeholders in the oil business 
the BOD was an opportunity to benefit from the legacy of British mandatory rule. What was 
more, it was also a means to counteract the rising influence of US companies in Iraq’s oil 
business. A wide-spread opinion in London held that in the construction of the IPC, a US- 
backed initiative for an “open-door policy” in Iraq had ensured the above-described equal 
distribution of the IPC’s shares at the expense of Britain’s oil interest. Conversely, the Iraqi 
government took note of the BOD with satisfaction, because with an additional competitor on 
the ground it hoped for better bargaining results compared with a situation where it was only 
able to negotiate with the IPC.1327 
 In spite of its legally underpinned British character, the BOD tried to appear as an 
international consortium by selling minority shares. The biggest chunk of roughly 40 per cent 
was acquired by AGIP, an Italian oil company with close ties to the fascist regime.1328 In Italy, 
which was heavily dependent on imports of petroleum products from the USA and the Soviet 
Union, the BOD appeared as a unique opportunity to increase energy independence.1329 The 
dependence on oil imports was of particular quality because in contrast with other countries 
without domestic oil resources, such as Germany, alternative methods of production provided 
no relief. For instance, the extraction of Italian shale oil was not profitable, and the production 
of synthetic oil from coal or similar products not possible because of a domestic lack of 
required resources.1330 
 With the Italian AGIP on board, the BOD looked for further partners in order to 
convince the Iraqi government that the “open door principle” was to be respected. As in the 
case of the Habbaniya project, the Italian General Mola appeared on the scene and reached 
out toward German circles. German initiatives for greater economic co-operation with the 
independent state of Iraq had been closely observed in Italy. For instance, the MAE informed 
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its various embassies in the Middle East about the establishment of a German Aviation 
Company, which intended to connect Berlin, Baghdad and Tehran by plane.1331  Of even 
greater interest was the plan for a new German-Iraqi commercial contract based on the MFN 
principle. German authorities had compared Iraq’s situation under mandatory rule with 
Germany’s situation prior to 1925, when obligations deriving from the Treaty of Versailles 
prevented it from enjoying MFN rights. 1332  Only the news of a potential German-Iraqi 
commercial contract sparked an immediate discussion on whether Italy too should sign a 
similar contract.1333 
 German government authorities took interest in the offers to join the BOD. The 
German consulate in Baghdad supported a minority shareholding in spite of potential political 
frictions of a German initiative in a region, which had prior to World War I seen massive 
tensions between Germany and other European powers over the construction of the 
Bagdadbahn (Baghdad Railway). However, to get a hold of the Mosul crude was too large an 
opportunity to be neglected. The oil was had the potential to change the European market 
because it was expected to be of better quality than any other Middle Eastern oil, cheaper 
because of lower freight costs and fees and easier to extract.1334 In addition, the prospect of 
participating in a major infrastructural project at times of global economic depression and 
weak demand for German products was deemed sufficient to take the political risk. The AA 
estimated that the scope of the project was at least RM 50 million.1335 
 To parallel the commercial interests of Germany and Italy, a plan was established that 
foresaw that Italy would provide the labour for the construction of drilling platforms, 
pipelines and railways, and German companies deliver machines and construction 
material.1336 Accordingly, led by the independent investor Thomas Brown, a consortium of 
German construction and mechanical engineering companies (including Fried. Krupp AG, 
Otto Wolff and Ferrostahl) acquired a minority stake of roughly 12 per cent in the BOD.1337 
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The German government backed the private initiative with a deficiency agreement 
(Ausfallbürgschaft) covering half of the possible losses of the consortium.1338 
In Italy, the successful tender for the concession nurtured aspirations for an even larger 
involvement in the BOD. Alessandro Martelli, fascist politician and president of AGIP, gained 
the impression from a voyage to Iraq that the Iraqi king and court would prefer an Italian 
domination of the BOD. Italian companies were perceived as being sincerely interested in 
developing and exploiting the oil fields, whereas British shareholders were suspected of mere 
speculative motives, which could even mean that the development would be delayed in order 
to stabilise prices. Moreover, Martelli was confident that the sympathies he detected for 
Italian fascism among Iraqi government circles could be of help for further commercial 
initiatives.1339 
 However, an episode from the construction of pipelines shows how quickly Italian 
stakeholders in the BOD could reach the limits of a legal framework, which was still 
influenced by the mandatory powers of the Middle East. If a town was passed by a pipeline on 
its way to the Mediterranean, the construction works could boost development. The Italian 
consulate in Tripoli, one of the final destinations of the pipelines coming from Iraq, reported 
that the Syrian town of Homs was economically thriving because of the massive demand for 
labour on the construction sites of the pipeline.1340 In the British mandate for Palestine, too, 
the construction of pipelines created huge labour demand, which not least was caused by the 
legal prerequisite that only “local labour”, that is, Palestinian workers, were to be employed 
on the sites. This was of course unacceptable to the Italians, who had secured in the 
distribution of tasks between BOD members the supply of workers and technicians. 
Eventually, the Italian claims were supported by German authorities, which were anyway 
more interested in the supply of machinery. 1341  Together they could overcome British 
resistance and trigger an amendment that allowed foreign citizens to work on the pipeline in 
the mandated territories.1342 
 German-Italian co-operation within the BOD soon thereafter had to deal with quite an 
existential problem: the financing of the company. Ahead of buoyant revenues, there was a 
long road of costly explorations and developments. Moreover, the Iraqi government collected 
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from the beginning on fees (e.g. a “dead rent”) for granting the concession. Although the 
original plan was to collect funds on the London financial markets to deal with the lean period, 
this option eventually became unrealistic. The German embassy suspected the British 
shareholders of deliberately delaying a timely payment of the fees in order to provoke the 
withdrawal of the concession, followed by a renewed bit for tender by the British group 
disposed of its other European partners. 1343  In this situation, Brown argued to take the 
initiative by paying the fees and acquiring the majority in the BOD. He tried to convince the 
AA that there, “won’t be another opportunity to secure at such favourable terms and with 
relatively minor expenses an investment in perhaps the most important international 
business”. 1344  In general, the AA shared Brown’s thoughts about the very lucrative 
possibilities of the deal. Yet, it had difficulties with the feasibility of the project given the 
legal character of the BOD as a British company.1345  While the German authorities still 
hesitated, the Italian group, which was always informed about every step of the German group 
by Thomas Brown, covered the “dead rent” due in April 1934.1346 
 Furthermore, Brown still envisaged a greater involvement of the German group, 
thereby claiming that the German-Italian tandem should dominate the BOD. Given the 
impossibility of collecting money on the London capital market, it was planned that the 
German companies would deliver a large chunk of the technical equipment necessary to 
develop the oilfields on credit, and receive oil in return, once it flowed to the 
Mediterranean.1347 Their willingness to reinforce efforts, and the lack of alternatives, gave the 
Italian and German group the competitive edge to increase their share in the BOD with the 
next capital increase. As of April 1934, AGIP held 47 per cent, the German group 11 per cent 
and the British group only 42 per cent of BOD shares.1348 The Italian-German liaison was 
sealed with the intention to acquire at least 76 per cent of the shares,1349 and received the 
blessing of Mussolini.1350 Also in Germany, the AA, the RWM, and namely Hjalmar Schacht, 
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Archivio Storico Banca d’Italia, Fondo Studi, cart. 157, fasc. 1. The distribution of shares changed frequently 
and the public had difficulties to follow track. See J. Kastenholz, ʻKrieg und Oel’, Berliner Tageblatt, 20 Sep 
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1349 Thomas Brown to AGIP, 5 Apr 1935, PA-AA, R92.246. 
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attached great importance to the deal because the “supply with oil is one of the most difficult 
and important questions of our economic policy”.1351 While at the beginning of the BOD 
project, only sales opportunities for the German industry suggested an involvement, by 
1934/35, strategic implications for Germany’s economic and defence policy asked for a 
greater stake. Only the finance ministry still found fault with the project, as it so far had only 
caused rising financial risks for the German government because of the deficiency agreements 
and provided no return on the investments.1352 
 Over the course of 1935, when the Italian group finally acquired 53 per cent, and all 
British members of the board withdrew,1353 the feasibility of the project changed dramatically. 
Against previous expectations, the geologists indicated that the reservoirs were mainly of 
heavy oil with a huge amount of asphalt.1354 This changed the entire project, as the oil could 
not be transported without refinement via pipelines to the Mediterranean. However, to build 
refineries would be first very expensive, and second take more time, which was unsustainable 
because of the concession fees due in the meantime. Therefore, Brown developed the plan to 
revive an old project of Imperial Germany: the Baghdad Railway. By finishing the railway 
connection with Mosul, the oil could be carried in wagons to the Mediterranean. This plan, 
however, faced much more international opposition than the connection with pipelines. First, 
the British railway project Baghdad-Haifa was potentially threatened by an Iraqi rival. Then, 
also in Turkey the German plan contradicted hopes for a Turkish railway project, which would 
connect Mosul with Anatolia. Finally, even the Iraqi government was not satisfied with the 
envisaged track as it would connect the region of Mosul, ethnically of different composition 
than Baghdad and closer with Syria, thereby increasing the risk of separation. 1355 
 Ultimately, the project also alienated the Italian partners. Via the French ambassador in 
Iraq, the AA obtained information that Italian stakeholders perceived the plan as the re-
activation of an imperial strategy, which was associated with a perceived German domination 
of the Italian industry in the late nineteenth century, and which seemed not to be a template 
for co-ordinated action with Italy.1356 The German group went on to implement the railway-
plan, but Italian stakeholders according to Thomas Brown “tried by all available means to 
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1353 ʻRom erringt die Kontrolle der Mossul-Oelfelder’, Berliner Tageblatt, 17 Sep 1935. 
1354 RWM, 26 Jun 1935, PA-AA, R92.246. 
1355 DG Bagdad an AA, 23 May 1935, PA-AA, R92.250. 
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make the matter impossible”.1357 AGIP representatives even prevented the re-election of a 
German board member, whereupon it was left to the lawyers to communicate between the 
groups.1358 In this situation, it was quite easy for British stakeholders to stir up Italian-German 
tensions. Despite its own railway project in Iraq, the British government pretended to have 
changed its mind, and would now support the German cause in order to enhance co-operation 
in the BOD and eventually increase the British-German majority.1359 
 In the end, German-Italian collaboration in Iraq failed due to deep-rooted Italian 
mistrust, based on the experience gained from Germany’s industrial expansion in the long 
nineteenth century, and Germany’s inability to address these patterns properly. Tragically, it 
failed at a moment when both governments recognised the strategic importance of oil. By 
early 1936, Italian shareholders in the BOD elaborated to pull out for the benefit of the US 
(that is in particular Standard Oil) or the British oil industry, which was still supplying Fascist 
Italy in spite of the League of Nations sanctions imposed after the attacks on Ethiopia.1360 
Eventually, the Italian group sold to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which made the BOD a 
British affair and uninteresting for the German group.1361 
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1360 DG Bagdad to AA, 14 Mar 1936, PA-AA, R92.247. Cf. G.C. Gigli, ʻLa Partecipazione Dell’Italia Allo 
Sviluppo Dei Petroli Dell’Iraqʼ, La Rivista Italiana del Petrolio, 19 (1941). 
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Conclusion and Outlook 
 
In February 1936, Italy’s de facto Foreign Minister Fulvio Suvich warned the Duce of the 
dangers to his projected path of Italian expansion. With regard to the independence of Austria, 
he reckoned that Germany will try “everything it can in order to surmount the 100 kilometres 
that still separate it from the Adriatic”. Furthermore, with the Anschluss of Austria, Germany 
would acquire all necessary means to pursue again its “traditional expansion along the routes 
to the South and the Orient”. To protect Italy’s vital interests, he urged Mussolini to stop 
Germany with a “vigilant and permanent defence”.1362 Suvich was born in Austrian Trieste 
and for great parts of his professional life was concerned with Italy’s eastern borderlands 
along the Adriatic.1363 He had a major impact on Italy’s policy towards Southeastern Europe 
and the Eastern Mediterranean since moving from the League of Nations headquarters in 
Geneva into office at the MAE in late 1932.1364 However, at the time of writing in 1936 he 
was already close to losing his influence on the Duce and Italy’s foreign policy. 
 In this year, Fascist Italy not only ended its economically demanding war campaign in 
Ethiopia, which had discredited its reputation among western democracies as well as countries 
in the Eastern Mediterranean, it also opted for the “Rome-Berlin Axis”, thus closely linking 
its destiny to Nazi Germany with which it had increasingly become economically 
interdependent.1365 In the 1936 reshuffle of Italy’s foreign ministry, Galeazzo Ciano removed 
Suvich from his position in order to facilitate the German-Italian rapprochement. But a pattern 
was established in which rivalries in the shared periphery of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy – 
Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean – accompanied and even contrasted the 
intensifying political and economic collaboration between Germany and Italy on the bilateral 
level. 
 The rivalries derived from a shared attempt to construct exclusive economic areas with 
a foreign economic policy devoted to economic nationalism and bilateralism. As has been 
shown in Part II, both countries had fought at the forefront of regionalism already since the 
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outbreak of the world economic crisis. In Geneva, political considerations on behalf of Berlin 
and Rome met with the economic interest of Southeastern European states in economic and 
financial turmoil. The primary producer’s demand to boost their exports with a preferential 
treatment provided the governments of Germany and Italy, by far the biggest markets for 
grain from Southeastern Europe, with a powerful means for political leverage. The only 
problem of such a strategy was the basic principle of international free trade: the most-
favoured-nation clause. Germany and the Southeastern European states placed the issue on the 
agenda of the League in order to circumvent international opposition by the guardians of a 
liberal order of trade and the supporters of the postwar political order of Europe. 
 In general, the League adhered to the liberal conception of free trade in its search for 
economic relief. However, the economic situation in Southeastern Europe was grim to the 
extent that it rendered the established commercial policies pointless. The option of 
preferences seemed to offer the only feasible attempt to stimulate exports and ultimately 
economic growth. Moreover, a system of preferences principally could benefit as well the 
major European powers in the League: Britain and France. Both had granted substantial loans 
to the region and faced the prospect of defaults if the Southeastern European states did not 
raise revenues. Eventually, the League altered its standpoint and allowed preferences when 
some prerequisites were fulfilled. Thereby, an opportunity arose, which Berlin successfully 
used for its preferential treaties with Hungary and Romania. The contracts complied with the 
League’s requirements, and consequently found acceptance by the international organisation 
in spite of politically rooted and sharp opposition from countries in Southeastern Europe like 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, as well as from the edge of Europe, where Russia and Turkey 
complained of commercial-interest violations. Berlin also tried to win Rome’s support for the 
contracts, after German-Italian co-operation at the League over issues such as reparations and 
rearmament had worked fairly well.1366 
 The German strategy in this regard resembled the relationship between the League’s 
mandate system and the mandatory powers, which according to Susan Pederson is rather 
understood as, “a mechanism for generating publicity and norms than as a system of 
governance: League oversight proliferated information and publicity about the mandates and 
                                                 
1366 In fact, the preparations for the German-Italian bilateral meetings as presented in Part I have shown that the 
topics discussed at the League and the international stage also served to evoke an actually disputed common 
stance and to cover up the conflicts in the bilateral commercial relationship (see Part I, Chapter 2). 
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offered legitimacy to those powers that complied with the system’s formal requirements“.1367 
The League’s rules for exceptions from the MFN clause provided the opportunity to generate 
international legitimacy to the German preferential contracts. In as much as the mandate 
powers used Geneva to talk about governing territories differently, while in fact empirical 
evidence reveals no difference in former colonial governance, the thesis shows that 
Germany’s and Italy’s talk at the League about “economic relief” actions only hid an 
nationalistic agenda of political revisionism via economic concessions. 
 However, despite this first success, Argentina and especially the US, which was not an 
official member, but as the economic and financial superpower nevertheless quite involved in 
the League’s economic and financial work, opposed the German preferences. The American 
countries, which had been both up to 1929 major trading partners of Germany and Italy, 
worried that the preferential system Germany had implemented in its commercial contracts 
with Hungary and Romania would create an “economic bloc” of a few European countries, 
which could close off to competition from overseas and stir up tensions on the recently 
pacified continent. The US and Argentinean opposition stopped the initiative at the League, 
but it also triggered Fascist Italy to create a hidden preferential system with Austria and 
Hungary, which officially complied with the requirements of the MFN clause, and which 
therefore were meant to prevent international retaliation.   
 Berlin and Rome were well informed about the needs of the countries in crisis because 
they participated or, as in the case of the financial committee’s president, Fulvio Suvich, even 
led the League’s financial oversight of national budgets, which reached unprecedented levels 
in the early 1930s. What was more, the governments of Nazi Germany (and to a lesser extent 
Fascist Italy) still used the League for their countries reputation in Southeastern Europe when 
tensions arose in the crisis countries over accusations that the League interfered with domestic 
affairs. After German officials had participated in financial oversight and the implementation 
of reform programs, they did not miss the opportunity to act as spokespersons for national 
sovereignty in Southeastern Europe once Nazi Germany retreated from the League. 
 In 1933/34, at a time when the AA stated that, “Germany and Italy are on every market 
of the Southeast fierce rivals”,1368 Italy strengthened its relations with Hungary as well Austria, 
and Germany approached Hungary as well as Yugoslavia. Both attempted a similar policy that 
was informed by the discussions at the League of Nations on commercial preferences for the 
                                                 
1367 Pedersen, ‘The Meaning of the Mandates System’, p. 560. 
1368 AA, 23 Jan 1933, PA-AA, R30.297. 
298 
countries in economic crisis and that tried to circumvent the restrictions determined by the 
MFN clause. As this thesis showed in Part III, the similarity derived from transfers of 
commercial policies. Fascist Italy’s Brocchi contracts served as a template for the commercial 
contract Nazi Germany signed with Hungary. The mastermind behind the transfer, the foreign 
trade expert Karl Schnurre, did not simply copy the Italian policy. He adapted it to Germany’s 
commercial capacities and improved its efficiency. Schnurre’s concept used the blocked 
German funds abroad to finance the preferences granted to trade partners. With its innovative 
character, the German-Hungarian commercial contract marked, according to more recent 
research, the launch of Nazi Germany’s commercial expansion into Southeastern Europe.1369 
The older literature had already identified the interrelational impact of the German-Hungarian 
contract and the Italian tripartite agreements with Austria and Hungary.1370 However, it is only 
by the methodological approach of this thesis, combining an institutional analysis with the 
study of transfers, that historiography reaches an understanding of the transnational 
construction of the instruments and their close connection to the League of Nations 
discussions on economic rescue. 
 The commercial instruments modelled on the Italian template became an important 
part of Germany’s commercial contract with Hungary. Moreover, they were also immediately 
thereafter applied in the new commercial contract Nazi Germany signed with Yugoslavia, 
which not only had been one of Italy’s most important markets, but also the central target of 
fascist revisionist policies, which intended to use economic concessions for political leverage. 
While the financing method designed by Schnurre became common practice in Nazi 
Germany’s clearing agreements, by which Germany constructed its greater economic area 
(Großwirtschaftsraum), the Italian government was not able to adapt the method for Italy’s 
commercial framework. 
 Furthermore, the Italian example provided not only a template for the formulation of 
commercial contracts, it also inspired policies governing the infrastructural connection of the 
Southeastern European markets with Germany and the world. The competition between the 
German ports of Hamburg and Bremen and the Italian ports of Trieste and Fiume to become 
the exclusive hub of Southeastern Europe triggered the German adaptation of an Italian 
transportation subsidy scheme. Together with geographical advantages, such as the inland 
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1370 Kaiser, Economic diplomacy, p. 74. 
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waters joining the Danube (the “artery of the continent” according to Péter Esterházy) with 
the North Sea, Southeastern Europe’s trade flowed increasingly via Germany. 
 With its wider spatial focus, the thesis was able to show that the situation in 
Southeastern Europe was intertwined with the Eastern Mediterranean, which has been 
neglected by research with an often all-too-narrow concept of Europe. The competition 
between the German and Italian ports reached a level where Hamburg and Bremen tried to 
lure away from Trieste the beneficial maritime traffic between Southeastern Europe and the 
Eastern Mediterranean, despite the fact that the latter was much better located, and 
traditionally the hub of choice for products from the region. The case of Turkey provided 
another example of the inspiring nature of Fascist Italy’s foreign economic policy. In 1929 
Italy still had a very prominent position among Turkey’s trade partners, importing more than 
Germany and exporting only slightly less (see Table 12). Yet, the Italian-Turkish modus 
vivendi on trade and shipping was deemed a model for Germany and stands at the beginning 
of a development resulting in marginalisation. Taking together the various examples from 
Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, the thesis argues that Nazi Germany 
after 1933/34 was economically harvesting what Fascist Italy had previously sown. 
 In dealing with the variations of German-Italian rivalries in different country contexts, 
the thesis could demonstrate how the countries in the “periphery” were able to benefit from 
their position as wooed complementary economies. In particular, the case of Hungary has 
shown that Budapest was not only an autonomous actor promoting the conclusion of the 
Brocchi contracts, and the preferential contract with Germany, thus continuing an agenda 
which previously had made it a firm supporter of preferences at the League of Nations. 
Budapest also still showed satisfaction with the economic performance of the preferential 
systems, when precisely this was negated on behalf of Italy’s very own foreign trade experts. 
The thesis thus provides support for the argument that Fascist Italy’s and Nazi Germany’s 
economic expansion were in the 1930s not unilaterally exploiting.1371 The stance that Nazi 
Germany transformed all the countries of Southeastern Europe into „informal 
colonies“ without any influence on trading conditions, formulated mostly in the older 
                                                 
1371 Cf. for the case of Nazi Germany, A.S. Milward, ʻThe Reichsmark Bloc and the International Economyʼ, in G. 
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300 
literature, but still present in recent works, must therefore be called into question for the 
period under investigation.1372 
 Attempts to tackle the German-Italian commercial conflicts in third-party markets 
existed, but they were bound to fail because, firstly, there was no consensus on which kind of 
co-ordination was favoured, and secondly, official calls for co-ordination served often to win 
time in order to secretly create a better negotiating position. Regarding the type of co-
ordination, Mussolini’s suggestion to distribute the markets of Southeastern Europe according 
to industries and each country’s economic specialisation were not convincing in Berlin. The 
AA feared that a voluntary retreat, for instance, for the benefit of the Italian textile industry, 
would in the end only expose crucial markets to political opponents (either France or one of 
its allies of the Little Entente). This example highlights how little consideration Nazi 
Germany’s foreign trade experts gave to Italy’s commercial capabilities and interests. 
 Such an ignorant attitude was even more apparent in the geographical distribution of 
markets. Contrary to all the ringing declarations that Albania in Southeastern Europe, and the 
Eastern Mediterranean as a whole, would be part of Italy’s spazio vitale, Germany’s massive 
commercial expansion after 1933 showed a lack of concern for its future political ally. 
Arguments in favour of institutionalised economic co-ordination, for instance, in the form of a 
customs union, which would provide for greater bargaining power in dealing with other 
economic powers, came to the negotiation table. The tendency, however, to use these 
arguments to veil policies concerned with national economic interest only, undermined 
confidence in these instruments and provides a cautionary example for present-day economic 
co-ordination in Europe. 
 The discussed case of the oil consortium BOD in Iraq has revealed that a lack of trust 
also hampered private business initiatives. The Italian fears of a reinvigorated project of 
imperial Germany, the Bagdad-Bahn, built on deep-rooted mistrust dating back to the times of 
German industrial domination in the late nineteenth century. German diplomatic and 
economic elites failed to address the lack of trust, thereby evading their share of responsibility 
for failed attempts at economic co-operation.1373 Attempts in other business sectors such as 
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artificial fibres, chemicals or cars failed because in the climate of economic nationalism, 
companies, which were potentially of strategic importance for their national regimes 
demanding armament and export revenues for import of raw materials, did not show interest 
in cross-border co-ordination.1374 At times, this could even mean the curtailing of established 
transnational production networks, to the detriment of both parties.1375 
 The supplanting of Italy’s commercial status in the “shared periphery” also helps to 
put into perspective the development of the German-Italian bilateral commercial relationship 
as described in Part I. After World War I had toppled the leading position of the German 
market for Italy’s foreign trade, the period between 1929 and 1936 marked a time of 
restoration of this rank. The widespread fascination of political and economic elites for 
Fascist Italy’s corporatist reforms – not only in Nazi Germany, but already in the late Weimar 
Republic – certainly promoted an intensification of economic relations. In spite of the Great 
Depression, Germany’s and Italy’s relative importance as trading partners increased 
significantly, largely through Italian coal orders in Germany and German imports of Italian 
agricultural products. Moreover the fascist regime’s autarkic measures to foster Italian 
industrial development in sectors identified as “strategic” reached new levels in the 
protectionist climate after the world economic crisis, and reduced Germany’s once very 
lucrative exports of manufactured goods. The changing composition of German exports, with 
constantly falling shares of finished goods and rising coal deliveries (which eventually 
became a supply bottleneck of the “Axis” at war),1376 calls into question the appraisal found in 
the older, more cursory literature of the commercial relationship as “very complementary”.1377 
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With a careful reconstruction of the institutional milestones leading to the commercial 
“Rome-Berlin Axis”, the thesis was able to show how the Italian negotiators fought for their 
domestic industries, and in particular for better facilitation of Mediterranean agricultural 
products that fulfilled no existential need in Germany. That the German authorities, in spite of 
the dire foreign exchange situation and the radical autarkic efforts, granted such beneficial 
access to these Italian goods illustrates that it was not primarily economic considerations that 
caused the extension of bilateral commerce. It was rather a politically motivated attempt to 
placate a crucial revisionist ally. Therefore, it would not be accurate to describe Germany’s 
rapidly growing importance in trade as an act of “conquering”.1378 Thus, the thesis argues that 
Berlin did not intend to make Italy economically dependent on Germany; rather, it was the 
fascist government that put Italy in this position.1379  
 The evidence provided in Part III suggests that in the markets of Southeastern Europe 
and the Eastern Mediterranean, Nazi Germany was not nearly as accommodating as in the 
bilateral commercial relationship. Quite the opposite. Part I already indicated that initially 
Hjalmar Schacht’s “new plan” showed less consideration for Italy’s commercial interest 
compared to Southern Europe’s, and that only Italy’s vigorous defence in the commercial 
negotiations leading to the 1934 clearing agreement, which at times even threatened the 
political rapprochement, secured the beneficial access to the German market. The German 
initiatives at the League of Nations as covered in Part II support the argument that Fascist 
Italy was merely a suitable ally for the ultimate goal, that is, greater political influence on the 
countries in Southeastern Europe, while no heed was paid to Italy’s commercial interest in the 
region. The actual development of Nazi Germany’s commercial expansion, then, not only 
burdened Italian commercial positions on every market; it also, as in the case of Palestine, 
which was one of the few remaining markets with high economic growth and rising import 
requirements for finished products during the early 1930s, caused a replacement of Italian 
goods on the German market. 
 Taking together the findings of Parts I and III, the thesis shows that the growing and 
self-inflicted dependency on Germany as a sales market for Italian agricultural products 
deprived resource-poor Fascist Italy of its leeway in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern 
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Mediterranean. For instance, in order to guarantee agricultural exports, Rome shifted more 
and more of its coal orders to Germany. Thereby, it forfeited the possibility of ordering 
Turkish coal – as had been initially planned – to stimulate demand for Italian direct 
investments in Turkish mines. Even worse, in accordance with the bilateral logic of trade, 
reduced Italian orders from Turkey also meant fewer Turkish orders from Italy. In this way, a 
major sales market for Italian industrial output gave way to a flood of German products. The 
case of Bulgaria provides more evidence for the selling out of Italian commercial positions. 
Italy used the triangular composition of debt to pay for its coal orders in Germany while 
trading in its financial assets in Bulgaria. Overall, it can be argued that to some extent Italy 
had to sell its assets in Southeastern Europe to Germany in order to pay for its self-inflicted, 
growing reliance on the German economy. 
 In light of the thesis’ twofold perspective, interrelating the international dimension of 
the German-Italian economic relationship with the bilateral dimension, it seems difficult to 
entirely follow Tatarra’s argument addressed in the preliminary conclusion to Part I.1380 He 
has argued, with a focus on the bilateral dimension, that the clearing agreement of 1934 was a 
“success story” and that the Italian plans for autarchy prevailed over the German ones. In fact, 
considering the intentions carved out by analysing the institutional negotiations, from the 
German perspective the clearing was not an economic success, but a necessary compromise 
with an aggressively demanding, yet crucial ally. Instead, economic considerations as laid 
bare in the “new plan” actually favoured the resource-richer countries in Southeastern Europe. 
In addition, what might have been gained for Italian autarchy in the bilateral relationship was 
lost in the shared periphery. 
 At the same time, it became apparent how this development prevented Fascist Italy 
from formulating a coherent foreign economic policy vis-à-vis the German market. 
Agricultural interest was of course largely in favour of closer alignment, which offered a 
much higher demand for Mediterranean products than any other potential trade partner. Italian 
industrial interest, in contrast, felt threatened by the German industry on those markets that 
had become a favoured destiny of Italy’s commercial expansion since the 1920s. Yet, energy 
for industrial production in Italy was in short supply, and therefore industrial interest was in a 
weak bargaining position when attacking the German-Italian alignment built on trading coal 
for agricultural products. In confronting the bilateral economic relationship with the 
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international dimension, the thesis was also able to show the incoherent Italian attitude 
towards economic manifestations of German anti-Semitism. Sometimes, and particularly in 
the bilateral relationship, Fascist Italy did not attempt to take advantage of the boycott 
movement against German products, as indeed happened in Southeastern Europe.1381 
 Nazi Germany, in this regard, was more successful in utilising its corporatist 
institutions to develop a coherent foreign economic policy. This assessment was even shared 
by Italian authorities.1382 The Nazis repudiated agricultural interest groups, which, after the 
onset of the crisis and before 1933, had strongly opposed opening up the German market to 
states with agricultural surplus production such as Italy. Thus, the regime sharpened one of 
Germany’s most important commercial weapons in the quest for foreign markets and political 
leverage. 
 What is more, Italy also faced problems in formulating a coherent foreign economic 
policy that integrated its various initiatives. In Part II the thesis showed that although 
Mussolini urged his diplomatic elite to embrace the work of the League of Nations in the 
name of national interest, he was not able to control a top League official such as Stoppani, 
who worked at times against the Italian initiatives.1383 The preferences granted by the Rome 
protocols to Austria and Hungary reduced the financial leeway to offer similar preferences to 
Yugoslavia. Thus, Germany was able to take the dominant position on the Yugoslavian market 
that Italy had once enjoyed. Moreover, the attempt to refinance and balance the concessions 
granted with the Rome protocols by trading with the Eastern Mediterranean was placed at risk 
by Nazi Germany’s growing share, especially in the Turkish market. Finally, the Italian 
invasion of Ethiopia undermined Italy’s reputation in the Arab world and the attempt to 
leverage anti-colonial resentments, thus leaving this ideological trump card for foreign 
economic propaganda to Nazi Germany. 
 The difficulties in formulating a coherent foreign economic policy in general, and 
particularly vis-à-vis Germany, also adds weight to the thesis’ argument that when the “Axis” 
was declared in 1936, it was not the result of collaboration among equals, but rather 
subordination, with Italy taking a minor role. Witnessing the loss of Italy’s export markets, the 
                                                 
1381 Therefore, the thesis contributes to the debate regarding the degree to which the fascist regime was anti-
Semitic, and what goals it pursued with anti-Semitic reform especially with regard to Nazi Germany. Cf. T. 
Schlemmer and H. Woller, ‘Der italienische Faschismus und die Juden’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 53, 
2 (2005), pp. 165-201. 
1382 IB Berlino to Sottosegretario di Stato per gli Scambi e le Valute, 18 Mar 1936, ASMAE, AC, Germania, 
1936, pos. 1-6. 
1383 Yet, this thesis provides evidence that he was not always an internationalist and liberal counterpart to the 
Duce. For this position see Clavin and Wessels, ʻTransnationalism and the Leagueʼ, p. 482. 
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polizia politica in Rome deplored that “the economic power of a nation, its wealth, depends 
essentially on the development of its foreign trade, and our policy, instead that it encourages 
and increases, is directed at eliminating”. 1384  The Milan branch of the polizia politica 
reckoned later that, “our economic and financial situation is not exactly brilliant, and we 
inevitably need to approach Germany”. 1385  That from a German perspective as well the 
relationship turned into subordination is backed by Ulrich von Hassell’s assessment of 
attitudes among German business circles where arrogance and disregard for the Italian partner 
prevailed. 1386  What is more, the analysis of the Fiera di Bari, Fascist Italy’s major 
propagandistic effort to become a Mediterranean “core”, indicates that also in German 
government circles Fascist Italy’s self-imposed position was not respected. For the AA, the 
Fiera di Bari was not an attempt to strengthen commercial ties between an industrialised Italy 
and the Middle East, but nothing more than a marketplace to link the agricultural Apulian 
hinterland with the German market.1387 
 When the “Rome-Berlin Axis” was proclaimed in the summer 1936, it was clear that 
Italy had lost the quest for the markets of Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Germany was able to offer these countries its bigger domestic markets, displayed the ability to 
implement ideas developed in Italy more efficiently than the creators and benefited from the 
repercussions in the bilateral economic relationship, which saw a rising Italian dependency 
with the German economy. Suvich’s demand for a vigilant and permanent defence of Italian 
interests in Southeastern Europe in February 1936 – as mentioned at the beginning of this 
conclusion – had to surrender in the very same year to economic reality. 
 The analysed development between 1929 and 1936 helps us to understand the 
imbalances of the “Rome-Berlin Axis” at war; for instance, the tide of Italian workers that 
moved to Germany from 1938.1388 Ultimately, there was not much more the Italian economy 
could offer to the then-unequal partner than its labour. In accordance with the politics of 
economic nationalism, and the greater economic area that the Nazis constructed in Central 
Europe during World War II, there was only room for one industrialised core, thus reducing 
Italy to a subsidiary economy in the southern periphery. Needless to say, this was not 
                                                 
1384 Polizia politica Roma, Roma, 27 Feb 1935, ACS, Ministero dell’Interno – Divisione Polizia Politica, busta 
177. 
1385 Polizia Politica Milano, 2 Dec 1938, ACS, Ministero dell’Interno – Divisione Polizia Politica, busta 44. 
1386 Von Hassell, Südosteuropa, p. 33. 
1387 GK Neapel to AA, 9 Oct 1933, PA-AA, R241.476; RWM to AA, 23 Aug 1934, PA-AA, R241.476. 
1388 Cf. B. Mantelli, ʻItalians in Germany, 1938-45: an Aspect of the Rome-Berlin Axisʼ, in R.J.B. Bosworth and 
P. Dogliani, eds., Italian fascism: History, memory, and representation (New York, 1999), pp. 45-63; Rieder, 
Deutsch-italienische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, pp. 194-212. 
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appreciated by Italian industrialists, a notion that is substantiated by numerous examples of 
Italian entrepreneurs working against the official political ally intending to extend its war 
production into Italian facilities.1389 What was more, even a top official of Fascist Italy’s 
economic administration such as the “foreign exchange dictator” Guarneri discarded 
emphatically the idea presented by Economics Minister Walther Funk to create a common 
“Reichsmark-area” together with Southeastern European states and to “enhance Italy’s 
agricultural production” while encouraging Germany’s industrial production.1390 Therefore, 
the development between 1929 and 1936, when the economic foundations of the “brutal 
friendship” were laid out, provides for a structural explanation of the inherent inconsistencies 





                                                 
1389 Cf. L. Klinkhammer, Zwischen Bündnis und Besatzung. Das nationalsozialistische Deutschland und die 
Republik von Salò 1943-1945 (Tübingen, 1993); M. Doria, Ansaldo: L’impresa e lo stato (Milano, 1989), pp. 
229-238. 
1390 Guarneri, Battaglie economiche, p. 859. 
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1935  Board member of the International Chamber of Commerce 
Giuseppe Volpi 
1925-1928 Italy’s finance minister 






List of Abbreviations 
 
AA   Auswärtiges Amt 
AC   Affari Commerciali 
ACS   Archivio Centrale dello Stato 
ADAP   Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 
AI   Ambasciata d’Italia 
ANFDAI   Associazione Nazionale Fascista dei Dirigenti di Aziende Industriali 
AP   Affari Politici 
ASBI   Archivio Storico della Banca d’Italia 
ASMAE  Archivio Storico Diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri 
BArch   Bundesarchiv 
BCI   Banca Commerciale Italiana 
BNB   Bulgarian National Bank 
CCC   Civilian Conservation Corps 
CEEU   Commission of Enquiry for European Union 
CI    Consolato Italiano 
CoGeFaG   Commissario Generale per le Fabbricazioni di Guerra 
DB   Deutsche Botschaft 
DDI   Documenti Diplomatici Italiani 
DK    Deutsches Konsulat 
DOS   Department of State 
DOSAG  Donau-Save-Adria-Eisenbahn Gesellschaft 
DVK   Deutsche Verrechnungskasse 
EC   Economic Committee of the League of Nations 
FC   Financial Committee of the League of Nations 
fasc.   fascicolo 
FRUS   Foreign Relations of the United States 
GK   Deutsches Generalkonsulat 
HAV   Hanseatischer Abwehrverband 
IIA   International Institute of Agriculture 
IMI   Istituto Mobiliare Italiano 
343 
INE    Istituto nazionale per le esportazioni 
Istcambi  Istituto nazionale per i cambi con l’estero 
LI   Legazione Italiana 
LON   League of Nations 
MAE    Ministero degli Affari Esteri 
MAF   Ministero dell’Agricoltura e delle Foreste (denomination differed) 
MCom   Ministero delle Comunicazioni   
MCorp  Ministero delle Corporazioni 
MFN   Most-favoured-nation 
MWT   Mitteleuropäischer Wirtschaftstag 
PNF   Partito Nazionale Fascista 
RAD   Reichsarbeitsdienst 
RDGEA  Reichsverband des Deutschen Groß-, Ein- und Ausfuhrhandels 
RDI    Reichsverband der deutschen Industrie 
RfD   Reichsstelle für Devisenbewirtschaftung 
RFM   Reichsfinanzministerium 
RLM   Reichsministerium für Landwirtschaft 
RWM   Reichswirtschaftsministerium 
SIA    Società Italiana Alluminia 
SIDA   Società dell’Aluminio 
VDEStI  Verein Deutscher Eisen- und Stahl-Industrieller 
 
 
 
 
